Regulation of Urban Water Supply: The Case of Small-Scale and Independent Providers in Ethiopia and Kenya. by Ayalew, Mulugeta Mengist.
Regulation of Urban Water Supply: 
The Case of Small-scale and 
Independent Providers in Ethiopia
and Kenya
Mulugeta Mengist Ayalew
PhD
University of Surrey 
April 2011
ProQuest Number: 27557555
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uest
ProQuest 27557555
Published by ProQuest LLO (2019). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346
Abstract
Water and its related problems constitute the core of poverty. At the United Nations 
summit in 2000, world leaders agreed to halve the percentage of population without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water. As much as 50 percent of residents in urban 
centres across the developing world rely on what are referred to in this research as small- 
scale and independent providers (SIPs). However, these providers are not accorded the 
protection and support which is given to official providers. They charge higher prices and 
the quality of water is very poor. No legal framework exists for regulating competition, 
price and quality of water provided by SIPs. This research investigates how legal 
frameworks for the regulation of SIPs can be established in the context of two case 
studies; Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Kisumu (Kenya). First, it examines whether there is 
a need to regulate the price and safety of water provided by SIPs. It analyses this question 
within the normative framework of the public interest theory of regulation. It argues that 
there is a need for regulating the safety of water and for adopting regulatory and non- 
regulatory instruments to increase affordability of SIPs. This need is transformed into an 
obligation to regulate because of the right to water. The research also addresses the issue 
of how to effectively and appropriately regulate the safety of water provided by SIPs. 
SIPs are the micro enterprises of the water sector. Therefore, the propriety of regulating 
them might be questioned considering that regulation generally imposes heavier burden 
on small enterprises. However, instead of exempting SIPs from water safety regulations, 
the research argues for a ‘differentiated regulation’. In addition, the sheer number of SIPs 
and their largely informal nature implies that a different model of regulation is needed, 
one that relies largely on collaboration and voluntary compliance.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1. Background
In studying water and related problems, two facts can be produced as motivations/ First 
is the intrinsic value of water; that, according to a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, 
Thales, everything is w ater/ The second is utilitarian-oriented; that lack of access to 
adequate and safe drinking water and sanitation services has widespread repercussions/ 
Water and its related problems constitute the core of poverty as can be seen from the 
pervasive effects of deprivation in water and sanitation:
Some 1.8 million child deaths each year as a result of diarrhoea.. .Together, unclean 
water and poor sanitation are the world’s second biggest killer of children. Deaths 
from diarrhoea in 2004 were some six times greater than the average annual deaths 
in armed conflict for the 1990s. The loss of 443 million school days each year from 
water-related illnesses...Close to half of all people in developing countries 
suffering at any given time from a health problem caused by water and sanitation 
deficits... Millions of women spending several hours a day collecting water... 
Lifecycles of disadvantage affecting millions of people, with illness and lost 
educational opportunities in childhood leading to poverty in adulthood...
The above quote reflects the human cost of lack of access. Attempts are also made to 
measure the economic costs, though doing so is ‘inherently difficult’. It is estimated, for 
instance, that Sub-Saharan Africa loses about 5% of Gross Domestic Product, an amount 
that exceeds total aid and debt relief in 2003.^ This implies “success in addressing that 
challenge [overcoming the crisis in water and sanitation] through a concerted national 
and international response would act as a catalyst for progress in public health, education 
and poverty reduction and as a source of economic dynamism”.^
' PB Anand, Scarcity, Entitlements and the Economics o f  Water in Developing Countries (2007) 1 
^Ibid 
 ^ Ibid
 ^UNDP, Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis 
(2006) 6. See also WHO/UNICEF, Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (2000) 2- 
3
 ^Ibid 6 
 ^Ibid I
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A person is said to have adequate/reasonable access to improved water sources when at 
least 20 litres of water per day are available to him/her within one kilometre of his 
dwelling/ Improved water sources include: household connection, public standpipe, 
borehole, protected dug well, protected spring and rainwater collection/ On the other 
hand, vendor-provided water, tanker truck provision of water, unprotected well, 
unprotected spring and bottled water are not regarded as improved sources/ Because of 
the difficulty of measuring access to safe water directly and perhaps also because of the 
disagreement that may ensue in defining safety, many organisations use an indirect way 
of measuring safety through access to improved sources. This is based on the 
presumption that improved sources are safe. However, like any other presumption, this is 
not conclusive, for piped water may at times be unsafe for drinking. It should also be 
noted that the definition of access to improved water sources does not measure the 
reliability of supply. At the beginning of 2000 it was estimated that 18 percent of the 
world’s population (1.1 billion) was without reasonable access to improved drinking 
water supplies.^ ^  Likewise, 40 percent of the world’s population (2.4 billion) was without 
adequate access to improved sanitation services. Theses global figures are fraught with 
a few limitations suggesting that the real problem might be worse than what the figures 
convey. First, the figures underestimate the extent of the problem as they do not measure 
the reliability and quality of piped services.Second, the real service coverage figures 
are worse in some countries and for some groups of people such as low-income people in 
urban areas.*"* Third, the estimates cover only 90 percent of the global population.*^
’ WHO/UNICEF (n 4) 4
*Ibid
U bid
A Baietti and P Raymond, ‘Financing Water Supply and Sanitation Investments: Utilizing Risk 
Mitigation Instruments to Bridge the Financing Gap’ (2005) 4 World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation 
Seetor Board Discussion Paper Series, 1
" WHO/UNICEF (n 4) 7
Ibid
Baietti and Raymond (n 10) 1
J Budds and G MeGranahan, ‘Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the Point? Experiences 
from Afriea, Asia and Latin America’ (2003) 15 Environment and Urbanization 87, 88; and RC Carter and 
K Danert, ‘The Private Seetor and Water and Sanitation Serviees: Policy and Poverty Issues’ (2003) 15
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Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present the percentage of population with access to safe drinking water 
and sanitation services for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2008. The majority of the 
people without access to safe drinking water and sanitation are Sub-Saharan Africans and 
Asians. Rural services are far behind urban services.*^ Access is not defined in terms of 
having affordable and safe running water 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. Taken that 
way, the number of people without access to safe and adequate water would definitely be 
much higher. For example, in 2000, 47 percent of the world’s population is estimated not 
to have access through household connections.*^
Table 1.1: Percentage of population with access to improved water sources
Category 1990 1995 2000 2008
Global 75.7 79.3 82.4 86.2
East Asia & Pacific 68.3 74.6 80.2 87.4
Europe and Central Asia 90.3 91.8 93.4 95.0
Latin America & Caribbean 83.9 86.7 89.2 91.4
Middle East & North Africa 88.8 88.9 89.0 87.7
South Asia 73.1 77.1 81.2 86.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 48.5 51.0 54.7 58.4
(Source: Figures taken from World Bank Millennium Development Goals Data:
www.data.worldbank.orgl
Journal o f  International Development 1067, 1068. For a detailed discussion o f  the diversity o f  access 
figures for different countries and urban centres, see UN-Habitat, Water and Sanitation in the W orld’s 
Cities (2003) 1-56.
T Lee and V Floris, ‘Universal Access to Water and Sanitation: Why the Private Sector Must Participate’
(2003) 27 Natural Resources Forum 279, 279-280
WHO/UNICEF (n 4) 10
Ibid 12
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Table 1.2: Percentage of population with access to improved sanitation facilities
Category 1990 1995 2000 2008
Global 51.2 53.9 57.1 60.0
East Asia & Pacific 48.1 53.0 59.6 65.6
Europe and Central Asia 88.3 88.4 88.5 88.7
Latin America& Caribbean 67.9 71.8 74.9 78.3
Middle East & North Africa 66.7 70.6 73.5 74.5
South Asia 17.9 22.2 27.3 32.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 25.6 26.7 28.6 30.8
(Source: Figures taken from World Bank Millennium Development Goals Data:
www.data.worldbank.orgl
At the United Nations summit in 2000, world leaders agreed on a set of goals to be 
achieved by the year 2015. These goals (known as the Millennium Development Goals, 
MDGs) are sets of eight goals consisting of 32 target indicators. MDGs represent 
“progress on a range of economic and social indicators” and “have since occupied a great 
deal of attention of the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and bilateral aid 
agencies in their dealing with low-income countries”.*^  MDGs serve two purposes. First, 
they motivate and mobilise development efforts.*^ Second, they are a means of measuring 
the performance of countries With respect to drinking water, the relevant target is 
defined in terms of ‘halving the percentage of population without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water’. However, the data for measuring the baseline and the progress of 
countries in that regard come in terms o f ‘access to improved water sources’.^ *
W Easterly, ‘How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa’ (2009) 37 World 
Development 26 ,26
Ibid (stating that, in this regard, they have resulted in high publicity and aid increases and as such can be 
said to have achieved their goal considerably)
Ibid (Easterly argues that “the MDGs are poorly and arbitrarily designed to measure progress against 
poverty and deprivation, and that their design makes Africa look worse than it really is. This paper does not 
argue that Africa’s performance is good in all areas, only that its relative performance looks worse because 
o f  the particular way in which the MDG targets are set. As a result, some African successes are portrayed 
as failures.”)
Ibid 35
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The target of halving the number of people who do not have access to safe drinking water 
was agreed at the time when 18 percent and 40 percent of the global population lacked 
access to adequate water supply and sanitation services respectively. This involves 
reducing the global figure for lack of access to about 9 and 21 percent or providing water 
supply services to 280 000 people and sanitation facilities to 384 000 people every day 
for the period of fifteen years.^^ The required task is more formidable for some regions 
and countries. For example, Sub-Saharan African countries need to reduce by half the 
number of people without access from 45 percent for water and 71 percent for sanitation. 
This is a huge undertaking necessitating massive mobilization and coordination of 
resources and providers. This would require doubling the annual investment in water 
supply and sanitation from the historical level of US$ 15 to US$30 billion.^^ The 
enormity of the task required in low-income countries becomes clearer when constraining 
factors, such as urbanisation and general population growth, are taken into account.^"*
Several case studies carried out in developing countries report that many of the residents 
in urban centres rely not on official utilities, public or private, but on what are referred to 
hereinafter as small-scale and independent providers (SIPs).^^ However, it has been 
reported that these providers are not accorded the recognition and support which is given 
to official providers. It has also been reported that they charge higher prices and the 
quality of water is very poor. No legal framework exists for regulating competition, price 
and quality of water provided by SIPs. This research has been carried out as part of a 
larger project funded by Leverhulme Trust. The objective of the project was to examine
WHO/UNICEF (n 4) 1
Baietti and Raymond (n 10) 5; and M Mehta, T Fugelsnes and K Virjee, ‘Financing the Millennium 
Development Goals for Water and Sanitation: What Will it Take?’ (2005) 21 Water Resources 
Development 239, 240 (arguing that “these figures might underestimate the total requirements as they do 
not take into account wider sector management costs as well as operations and maintenance costs o f  
existing capital stocks”).
Carter and Danert (n 14) 1068
See, for example, G MeGranahan and others. How Small Water Enterprises Can Contribute to the 
Millennium Goals: Evidence from  D ar es Salaam. Nairobi, Khartoum and Accra  (2006); S Snell, ‘Water 
and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor: Small-Scale Providers Typology and Profiles’ (1998) WSP 
(World Bank) Working Paper; TM Solo, ‘Small-scale Entrepreneurs in the Urban Water and Sanitation 
Market (1999) 11 Environment and Urbanization 117; WSP, ‘The Experience o f  Small-Scale Water 
Providers in Serving the Poor in Metro Manila’ (2004) WSP (World Bank) Field Note; and A Allen, JD 
Davina and P Hofmann, ‘The Peri-Urban Water Poor: Citizens or Consumers?’ (2006) 18 Environment and 
Urbanization 333
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how guidelines for technical, policy and legal frameworks could be created that would 
integrate SIPs, in developing countries, into the formal system as a means of increasing 
access to safe and affordable drinking water. This research examined in particular how 
legal frameworks for the regulation of SIPs could be established.
The research aimed to identify the legal status of SIPs in two case study areas: Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia) and Kisumu (Kenya). By mapping out the legal frameworks for 
regulation of water providers in Ethiopia and Kenya, the research determined the extent 
to which their activity is regulated. The research also aimed to find out if there is any case 
for regulation of competition among SIPs and the price and quality of water they are 
providing. Finally, one of the objectives was to make a critical analysis of the way they 
are currently regulated (to the extent they are and should be) and to explore alternative 
regulatory instruments most suited to the specific problem at hand. By doing this, the 
research has contributed to the current knowledge on the subject. The literature consists 
mainly of case studies. The two case studies in this research will further enrich the 
existing knowledge. In addition, it will fill gaps identified in this literature: whether and 
how to regulate SIPs.
1.2. Research Questions
The research addressed the general question: whether and what regulatory tools might be 
developed to ensure that water is safe and affordable? This general question was broken 
down into a number of specific questions. The research addressed the following questions 
relating to SIPs in general (Chapter Two):
• What are SIPs?
• How are they different from other providers?
• What are the different types of SIPs?
• What kind of consumers do they serve?
• What are their strengths?
• What regulatory and legal issues do they raise?
• What gaps exist in the current knowledge regarding SIPs?
One of the aims of the research was to map Ethiopian and Kenyan legal frameworks for 
regulation of water providers in general and SIPs in particular. Therefore, it was found 
important to answer some general questions relating to the concept of regulation
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(Chapter Three). The answer to these questions constitutes the normative framework of 
this research.
• What is regulation?
• What are the different forms of regulation?
• Why is regulation necessary?
• What are the qualities of a good regulatory system?
The research also addressed a number of questions in relation to Ethiopia and Kenya 
(Chapters Four and Five):
• Who provides water in Addis Ababa and Kisumu?
• What types of SIPs operate in Addis Ababa and Kisumu?
• How is abstraction of water regulated in Ethiopia and Kenya? How does this 
affect the various forms of SIPs operating in Addis Ababa and Kisumu?
• Are SIPs allowed to operate by law?
• How is quality of water regulated in Ethiopia and Kenya? How does this affect 
the various forms of SIPs operating in Addis Ababa and Kisumu?
• How is price of water regulated in Ethiopia and Kenya? How does this affect the 
various forms of SIPs operating in Addis Ababa and Kisumu?
Once the above questions were addressed, the research examined if there is a need to 
regulate competition among, and price and quality of water provided by SIPs (Chapter 
Six):
• Is there a need to regulate the price of water provided by SIPs?
• Is there a need to regulate the quality of water provided by SIPs?
• What are the regulatory implications of the right to water?
To the extent there is a normative case for regulation of SIPs, the research addressed a 
few questions on choice of instruments and institutions for regulation of SIPs in Ethiopia 
and Kenya (Chapter Seven).
• What regulatory instruments are cost-effective and appropriate to regulate SIPs?
• Who should be mandated to regulate SIPs?
• What other regulatory and non-regulatory instruments may be used to ensure that 
water is safe and affordable?
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1.3. Research Methods and Perspective
1.3.1. Doctrinal Research Complemented by Economics of Regulation
Conventional legal research has two elements: interpretive and evaluative. Its interpretive 
aspect is captured by the attempt to identify what the law is with respect to a particular 
issue. And its evaluative aspect is reflected by the attempt to evaluate the law with 
respect to a given issue. Evaluative legal research measures its effectiveness or measures 
the law and its application against certain attributes, which Fuller articulated as the 
‘internal morality of law’.^  ^ These attributes include consistency, specificity, clarity, 
predictability, fairness and possibility. Whether one characterises these values like Fuller 
as essential qualities of law or like Hart as ‘principles of good legal craftsmanship’, they 
serve as evaluative criteria in legal scholarship. This research incorporates the above two 
elements. First, it identifies the legal frameworks for the regulation of water providers in 
Ethiopia and Kenya and the status of SIPs within this framework. Second, it critically 
analyses such legal frameworks with the view to identifying aspects that could be 
improved. To achieve its evaluative task, the research goes beyond Fuller’s principles. In 
particular, it draws insights from a related field of inquiry, economics of regulation.
Economics adds value to legal research by supplying the notion of efficiency as a 
benchmark to understand the effects of, and evaluate, legal rules.Econom ics, therefore, 
supplies ‘ought to because of efficiency’ answers to normative legal questions. Such 
answers are directly applicable when the underlying purpose of the law is efficient 
allocation and utilisation of resources. In addition to efficiency, however, legal rules are 
and should also be concerned with achieving equitable outcomes like affordability of 
water services. Economists would say that redistribution is best done by the tax and 
welfare apparatuses of government than by legal rules.^^ In this regard, Mattei writes:
LL Fuller, The M orality o f  Law  (1964)
U Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (1997) 7 (stating that the concept o f  efficiency “lies in the 
world o f  the is and in the world o f  the ought at the same time”)
See, for example, L Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role o f  
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributive Income’ (2009) 29 Journal o f Legal Studies 821; L 
Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income’ (1994) 13 Journal o f  Legal Studies 667; and DA Weisabach, ‘Should Legal Rules Be Used to 
Redistribute Income?’ (2003) 70 University o f  Chicago Law Review 439
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Legal interpretation should not be guided by justice. It should be guided by 
efficiency. Consequently, lawyers—as opposed to legislators-politicians—should 
not be concerned with dividing the pie as much as with making it bigger. Their role 
is not that of helping to cut the slices in a more just way. Issues of distribution 
should stay outside of the scholarly analysis of lawyers. They are the domain of 
politics. If lawyers get involved in issues of distribution and introduce them in the 
course of interpretation (where they have the last word), they substitute their own 
value judgements for those introduced by the legitimate political process of 
democracy. In other words, a lawyer concerned with justice (and therefore with 
distribution) loses objectivity and neutrality (the only source of his 
legitimization).^^
The above prescription regarding the proper province of legal analysis might be 
acceptable in places where the tax and welfare systems are well entrenched and 
functioning. But how about those places, many low income countries, where these 
systems do not either exist or adequately function? In such cases, it is very important that 
efficiency be complemented by redistributive goals. It is also the case that there are times 
where requirements of efficiency and equity coincide. For example, affordability of water 
services is related to public health owing to the external effects of water-borne diseases. 
Therefore, both efficiency and equity considerations require that laws should aim to 
achieve affordable water services. One area where there is divergence of equity and 
efficiency is on the issue of cross-subsidies, which are not favourably seen by 
economists. An attempt is made to moderate the economic analysis by incorporating 
considerations of the requirements of the right to water. There is also a comparative 
element to this research as it involves analysing and comparing the legal frameworks in 
Ethiopia and Kenya. This comparative analysis does not, however, proffer a theory to 
comprehensively explain any of the identified differences and similarities in the legal 
fi-ameworks of Ethiopia and Kenya.^°
Mattel (n 27) 3-4
See, for example, AI Ogus, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A  Contribution o f  Economic 
Analysis to Comparative Law (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 405 (stating that 
comparative law is entrusted with three tasks: investigation o f  the differences among legal systems, 
explanation o f  divergence or convergence among legal systems and evaluation o f  observed convergence or 
divergence); and WJ Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 485, 511-512 (“There are, thus, three main operations or stages involved in 
comparative law. The first may take the form o f  a description o f the norms, concepts and institutions o f  the 
systems concerned or it may consist in the examination o f  the socio-economic problems and the legal 
solutions provided by the systems in question. The second stage may, for convenience, be described as the 
identification phase and is concerned with the identification or discernment o f  differences and similarities 
between the systems under comparative consideration. The third stage is the explanatory phase under whieh 
the divergence and resemblances are accounted for”).
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1.3.2. Fieldwork: Collecting Documents and Conducting Interview
This research was carried out as part of a larger multi-disciplinary research project 
funded by Leverhulme Trust. This project had engaged two PhD researchers, Mr 
Mulugeta M Ayalew and Mrs Loma Okotto. Mrs Okotto carried out a water quality and 
pricing studies in the case study areas. This researcher on the other hand carried out a 
legal analysis of the regulatory frameworks that exist in Ethiopia and Kenya. In addition, 
drawing on the key water quality and pricing studies, this analysis covered the adequacy 
of the existing regulatory frameworks to address the water quality and safety issues 
identified.
Many of the research questions in this thesis involve identifying and analysing legal 
frameworks for regulation of water providers. For example, how is the quality of drinking 
water, price and quality of service regulated in Kenya and Ethiopia? To answer this and 
related questions, legislation relevant to the matter had to be identified and analysed.
Two visits in 2007 and 2008 were made to Kisumu and Addis Ababa during which 
documentary sources such as laws, regulations and background papers were collected. 
Local libraries and documentation centres of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations were used. In addition, unstructured interviews were held with a few people 
working in the area. The purposes of these interviews were to locate relevant legislation, 
local research papers and to determine the level of enforcement of the law for the 
regulation of water providers. Preliminary findings of the research from the two case 
studies were presented in stakeholders workshops in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia (see the 
Appendix).
1.3.3. Workshop of Stakeholders
After the two field visits, workshops of stakeholders were held in Addis Ababa (22 May 
2009) and Kisumu (27 May 2009). Preliminary results of the research project were 
presented and feedback was solicited and incorporated in the research.^* The report 
presented in the workshops is attached as an appendix to this thesis. By doing that the 
content and outcome of the research has been improved and refined. An effort was made
L Okotto and others, The Establishment o f  Legal Frameworks fo r  Independent and Small-scale Water 
Providers (2009) (See the Appendix for the relevant sections o f  the preliminary report presented to the 
stakeholders workshops in Addis Ababa and Kisumu)
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to make participants of this workshop broadly representative of the various individuals 
and organisations having a stake in the matter. Such individuals and organisations include 
SIPs, consumers, conventional water utilities, regulatory agencies, nongovernmental and 
community organisations.
1.3.4. Water Quality and Pricing Surveys
As part of the bigger project of which this research is a component, water quality analysis 
and pricing surveys were carried out in Kisumu and Kenya. The details of these surveys 
are provided in the appendix to this thesis. In addition, the report in the appendix 
provides fiirther details of the project as a whole. The purposes were to find out the price 
of water by SIPs and to determine the quality of water as it passes from one point to 
another along the supply chain. Results of the pricing survey and the water quality 
analysis were used to determine the extent to which they support the conclusions of the 
economic theory of regulation. In addition the key findings are used here to identify 
priority areas and effectively target regulatory instruments.
1.4. Introduction to the Case Study Areas
Meaningful practical legal discussion could be made only when legal questions are 
framed and addressed in a particular context. Likewise, the meaning of discussions 
regarding SIPs will be enhanced when made in the context of a particular time and place. 
The use of case studies supplies this important context. Hence, many of the research 
questions are made in the context of Ethiopia and Kenya. Two cities are in particular 
used: Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Kisumu (Kenya).
Ethiopia and Kenya are selected for two principal reasons. First, the two countries are 
different in their legal and political systems. Ethiopia is a country which has a legal 
system largely influenced by the continental legal tradition and Kenya’s legal system is, 
on the other hand, influenced by the common law tradition. Ethiopia’s constitution 
envisages a federal ethnic based parliamentary system; whereas Kenya’s constitution (at 
the beginning of the research) envisages a unitary presidential political system. There is 
no national regime for regulation of water providers in Ethiopia and regulatory decisions 
are made at regional or local level. On the contrary, there is a national regulatory regime 
in Kenya and variations are observed from place to place only in the role and significance 
of SIPs.
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Second, if we take the two cities selected, they are markedly different in the structure of 
the water sector and the role and nature of SIPs. In Addis Ababa, the official water 
provider, Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA), is a department of the 
city government. 98 percent of the water in the city can be traced back to AAWSA. This 
does not, however, mean that 98 percent of households in the city have direct and reliable 
connection to the AAWSA’s network. Significant numbers of households rely on SIPs 
who are connected to the network. Recently, because of the rapid change in the city 
(mainly because of urban migration and expansion of the city), the capacity of the official 
provider is being pushed to the limits as it can be deduced from frequent rationing of 
water. With the current trend, one may expect the significance and role of SIPs to 
increase in the city. In the town of Kisumu, the official water provider, Kisumu Water 
and Sewerage Company (KIWASCO), is a share company wholly owned by the town 
council. About sixty percent of the water in the town can be traced back to the water and 
sewerage company. However, it is only forty percent of households in the town that have 
direct connection to the company’s network. About forty percent of the water comes from 
SIPs and about sixty percent of households in the town rely on one or another form of 
small-scale providers.
1.5. Structure of the Thesis
Apart from this introductory chapter, the thesis has seven chapters. Chapter two reviews 
the existing literature regarding SIPs. By doing so, it identifies gaps in the literature. 
There are various forms of water providers across the developing world: public, private, 
nongovernmental, community-based and small-scale and independent providers. SIPs 
serve as much as fifty percent of the people in many urban centres in the developing 
world. They serve informal settlements and low-income neighbourhoods which are left, 
for different reasons, un-served and under-served by official providers. In some cases, 
they also operate in well-to-do areas when services by official utilities are not reliable. 
SIPs, though widely regarded as provisional solutions, are not likely to disappear in the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important to determine to what extent law, in particular 
regulatory law, may be used to make water by SIPs safe and affordable. In many cases, 
SIPs operate in direct or indirect contravention of laws. Their activities are virtually 
unregulated. Some have called for their regulation. A few of them went further and 
examined how to regulate them. Chapter two examines this literature and identifies two 
issues for further research: should SIPs be regulated? How should they be regulated?
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Chapter three constructs the normative framework within which the above questions are 
to be examined. After reviewing a few of the definitions, it formulates a working 
definition of regulation. Regulation is therefore defined as rules-based governmental 
system, which puts limitations on individual freedom with a view to achieving public 
policy objectives. This definition is broad enough to encompass parts of private law 
having regulatory purposes/effects. Chapter three also presents the major forms of public 
regulation: prohibition, entry regulation, regulation of conduct and information 
regulation. Having done that, it presents the normative theory of regulation: regulation 
should aim to correct market failures and other undesirable outcomes o f a market system, 
which can not be effectively addressed by private law. This is a prima facie case of public 
regulation. It will be conclusive when appropriate regulatory instruments are available to 
effectively solve the problem. When two or more equally effective instruments are 
available, a choice has to be made on the bases of associated costs, degree of 
intrusiveness, legitimacy, vulnerability to regulatory capture and other criteria. A good 
regulatory system also consists of procedures and values that enhance its effectiveness, 
legitimacy and accountability. It is within this normative framework that the major 
research questions are addressed: to what extent SIPs are currently regulated? To what 
extent SIPs should be regulated? How should SIPs be regulated?
Chapter four presents Ethiopia’s legal framework for regulation of water providers. 
Ethiopia is a federal state. Water resources including water are publicly owned. The 
federal government has the power to enact a framework law according to which regional 
states manage water resources. It has the power to administer international water 
resources and water bodies connecting or crossing two or more member states of the 
federation. The law enacted by the federal government introduces a licensing system for 
abstraction and supply of water. However, this law does not provide any national 
framework with respect to supply of water services: who has the power to enact drinking 
water quality standards? Who regulates the price of water? What are the conditions for 
getting a permit to supply water services? Under what conditions may a private water 
company acquire a right of way over publicly or privately held land? A department of the 
federal government generally charged with development of national standards has already 
developed drinking water quality standards. Nevertheless, this set of standards remains 
unenforced for lack of any formal procedure for monitoring and enforcement. The 
official supplier of water services in the city of Addis Ababa is a department of the city 
government. The tariff structure is determined by the executive branch of the city
24
government. Though, it is reported that 98 percent of the water in the city can be traced 
back to the official provider, significant proportions of the city’s residents do not have 
private household connections. They rely on different forms of SIPs: public fountains, 
water kiosks, neighbour sellers and to a limited extent on mobile vendors. Only public 
fountains and communal taps are officially recognised and benefit from a flat rate. Others 
are subject to a progressive tariff structure. Although the national legal framework 
permits supply of water subject to licences, it is not clear if a private provider will be 
allowed to abstract and supply water in the city as the law which has established the 
official utility gives a monopolistic privilege to the provider. Chapter four concludes by 
identifying the legal status of SIPs in the city of Addis Ababa.
Chapter five presents Kenya’s legal framework for regulation of water providers. In 
contrast to Ethiopia, Kenya has a comprehensive national framework dealing generally 
with management of water resources and particularly with supply of water services. Like 
in Ethiopia, water is publicly owned and abstraction of water is subject to a licensing 
system the general outline of which is laid down in the primary statute and the details are 
determined through secondary legislation. In addition to the permit to abstract water, one 
has to also have a licence to supply water services. The licensing body, objectives and 
requirements for abstraction are different from that of supply of water services. Kenyan 
law envisages establishment several regional organs, known as Water Services Boards 
(WSBs), which are charged with developing and owning water supply systems. The law 
requires that only WSBs may be granted a license to supply water services. The law also 
stipulates that except with the approval of the national regulator under exceptional 
circumstances, WSBs are not allowed to operate the water supply infrastructure which 
they have developed and owned or otherwise acquired. They are supposed to appoint one 
or several companies, known as Water Services Providers (WSPs). Anyone which 
supplies more than 20 households a day ought to have the authorisation, of the relevant 
WSP, in the form of a service provision agreement. In Kisumu, the WSB is known as the 
Lake Victoria South Water Services Board (LVSWSB). About 60 percent of the residents 
rely on various forms of SIPs: well operators, handcart operators, tanker-trucks, and 
standpipes. Only standpipes are currently permitted to operate. The rest exceed the 
threshold in the national law triggering in motion the requirement that they should have 
operated on the basis of a service provision agreement with LVSWSB. The national 
drinking water quality standards are developed by the department of government charged 
with certification and development of standards. The quality of water by SIPs is currently 
unregulated. The price of water is determined by the national regulator. The fact that
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there is no direct relationship between the national regulator and SIPs means that the 
price of water by SIPs is not controlled by the national regulator. However, the tariff 
guidelines developed by the regulator require WSPs to control the price charged by water 
kiosks. Likewise, a draft model water services regulation provides for a requirement on 
independent providers to be registered and licensed by the relevant WSB. In addition, it 
requires that all independent sources of water should meet the quality standards set by the 
Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) and should not contain any 
constituent in quantities that may be injuries to health.
The legal status of SIPs having been identified in the preceding two chapters, chapter six 
provides a critical analysis of the extent to which they should be regulated. This 
discussion is made within the normative framework outlined in chapter three. It first 
considers the public interest arguments for regulation of conventional water utilities. 
Conventional water utilities are subject to economic, social and environmental standards. 
The emphasis in this chapter is, however, on regulation of price and quality of drinking 
water. It identifies the problem of natural monopolies as the principal reason for 
regulating the price of water by conventional utilities. In addition, there is the problem of 
affordability which largely determines the approach that should be taken towards price 
regulation. It is argued in this chapter that the small-scale market does not exhibit 
attributes of natural monopolies. Their business model, different from conventional water 
utilities, does not involve ‘significant’ sunk cost and no other natural barriers exist. Key 
findings of the survey on the price of water in Kisumu and Addis Ababa are also 
presented. Such findings highlight the problem of affordability where poor households 
spend two or three times the affordability threshold accepted by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). It is argued nonetheless that owing to the different structure of the 
small-scale water market, the problem of affordability cannot be solved by regulating 
SIPs. Regulations targeted at official utilities and other non-regulatory instruments should 
instead be considered. Arguments for regulation of the quality of drinking water by 
conventional utilities include problems of natural monopoly, information asymmetry, 
externality and concerns of equity. All of the arguments but one is applicable to SIPs and 
hence it is argued that there is a prima facie case for regulation. Chapter six also 
discusses the normative foundation and content of the right to water under international 
human rights law and in the legal systems of Ethiopia and Kenya. It is argued that 
individuals in Ethiopia and Kenya have the right to water which might be based on 
international human rights law and national constitutions. One of the state obligations 
emanating from this right is the duty to protect. Relying on General Comment 15 (on the
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right to water), it is argued that the duty to protect involves the duty to formulate legal 
frameworks to make drinking water safe and affordable; any regulatory requirements 
should not, however, amount to ‘arbitrary interference’ with existing water supplies. The 
chapter concludes by arguing that the need for regulation as established based on the 
public interest theory is transformed into a state obligation owing to the right to water.
The extent to which SIPs should be regulated having been established, chapter seven 
considers issues of choice and design of regulatory instruments and institutions. Though 
the focus is primarily on regulation of quality (for which the prima facie case has been 
made out), the chapter also examines challenges of regulating the price of water by SIPs. 
SIPs are the micro-enterprises of the water sector. They are many in number and informal 
in nature. Chapter seven relies on these attributes of SIPs to conclude that a light-handed 
form of regulation should be adopted. It argues against exempting some of them because 
it would introduce problem of information which would segregate the market and 
exacerbate the problem. Light-handed regulation, as argued in this chapter, requires 
consolidating and simplifying the existing licensing system of water abstraction and 
supply for those independent providers having their own source of water, wells and 
boreholes. For dependent providers such as standpipes and handcart operators, it is 
argued that, there is no need for entry regulation. In addition, the chapter argues for 
differentiated water quality regulation. This involves not only having different and less 
stringent water quality standards but also having to rely more on technology-based than 
performance-based standards. The chapter also considers the option of self-regulation and 
recommends a forum of cooperation, consultation and control instead of conventional 
self-regulation. Chapter seven concludes by outlining sets of administrative and legal 
reform measures that may be introduced in Ethiopia and Kenya.
Chapter eight is the last chapter. The chapter presents the key findings of the research and 
puts it in the context of the existing literature on small-scale providers. It discusses the 
implications of this research for legal and regulatory reform. Last, it outlines issues for 
future research on regulation of water providers and generally on economic and social 
regulation in developing countries.
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Chapter Two: Small-scale and Independent Water Providers 
(SIPs): Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
Domestic water needs of significant proportions of the population in many developing 
countries are not met by official utilities, public or private, but by small-scale, 
independent, informal and private providers. Yet, these forms of providers are not given 
the protection, recognition and support that are routinely extended to the official 
providers. They operate mostly either in direct or indirect contravention of laws. In most 
cases, they are unregulated. Stated in general terms, the objective of the research is to 
examine whether and how law could help in making water supplied by SIPs safe and 
affordable. This chapter reviews the current literature relating to SIPs. By doing so, it 
identifies the legal issues that arise in relation to them. The subsequent chapters address 
the legal issues which are identified and contextualised in the following sections.
Section two discusses the various types of water providers: public, private, 
nongovernmental and community-based providers. Subjects of this research as they are, 
section three further discusses SIPs. It discusses the common features and the various 
business models of SIPs. Section four discusses the roles that SIPs are currently playing 
in urban areas of developing countries. Section five explores the factors which constrain 
their role and growth. In addition, it discusses regulatory problems attributed to these 
providers. Section six takes up the issue of regulating SIPs and examines the relevant 
literature. Section seven concludes.
2.2. Classification of Water Providers
2.2.1. Public Providers
Water is said to be provided by a public provider when the water system is owned and 
operated by the state. There are generally two forms of public water providers. The first, 
‘old and venerable’, form is where a department of local, regional or national government 
owns and operates water supply systems.^ Such providers are financed by tax-based
* M Palaniappan and others, ‘Water Infrastructure and Water-related Services: Trends and Challenges 
Affecting Future Development’ in Infrastructure to 2030 (Volume 2): Mapping Policy fo r  Electricity, 
Water and Transport (2007) 279
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and/or fee-for-service revenue.^ The second form is that which is called corporatised 
public utility. It is run like any other company; the difference being it is owned by city, 
national or regional governments.^
2.2.2. Private Providers
The participation of the private sector takes various forms; it does not necessarily involve 
complete substitution of public providersSuch  forms include but are not limited to: 
service contract, management contract, lease, concession, Build-Own-Transfer (BOT)- 
type and divestiture. Distinctions are made among these depending on answers to 
questions such as: who owns the assets for the abstraction, treatment and distribution of 
water supplies? Who is required to undertake capital investments? Who bears the 
commercial risk? Table 2.1 summarises the key differences among the various forms of 
private sector participation. They are only described in general terms and in each country 
the details might be different. For example, in the Netherlands, water utilities are jointly 
owned by the government and private individuals but are operated by a public entity.^
Despite being promoted by multilateral financial institutions and bilateral aid agencies, 
the participation of the private sector has been limited. It is only in very few countries 
that the private sector serves about half of the population (United Kingdom-90%, France- 
76%, Czech Republic-68%, Spain-45%, Greece-44%, Italy-41%, Netherlands 0%, 
Canada 4%, Germany-17%, and Belgium 3%).^ The private sector is estimated to be 
serving only five percent of the world’s population.^ Its role is also limited in the
 ^Ibid.
 ^Ibid.
See, for example, J Budds and G McGranahan, ‘Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the 
Point? Experienees from Africa, Asia and Latin America' (2003) 15 Environment and Urbanization 87; J 
Baumert and L Bloodgood, 'Private Sector Participation in the Water and Wastewater Services Industry'
(2004) Office o f  Industries Working Paper (US International Trade Commission); and World Bank, 
Approaches to Private Participation in Water Services: A Toolkit (2006)
 ^Palaniappan (n I) 280
® Ibid 283
’’ Budds and McGranahan (n 4) 88; and UN-Habitat, Water and Sanitation in the W orld’s Cities (2003) 
177-178
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developing world, accounting for only about 5-6% of the urban water consumption and 
this is unlikely to exceed 15% by 2020.*
Table 2.1: Forms of private sector participation
Service
contract
Management
contract
Lease Concession BOT-
type
Divestiture
Asset ownership Public Public Public Public Private/
public
Private
Capital investment Public Public Public Private Private Private
Commercial risk Public Public Shared Private Private Private
Operations/maintenance Private/
public
Private Private Private Private Private
Contract duration 1-2
years
3-5 years 8-15
years
25-30
years
20-30
years
Indefinite
Source: Budds and McGranahan (n 4)
2.2.3. Private or Public?
Private enterprises were involved in the supply of water services long before 
governments assumed this function, in the latter part of the 19^  ^ century, to “ensure 
service coverage for all segments of society, reduce the incidence of waterborne diseases, 
including cholera, and provide water for fire fighting”.^  In the 1990s the trend shifted 
towards the private sector. In summary, privatisation is advocated because it is argued 
that private providers would solve many of the problems attributed to public providers by 
tapping private capital, enhancing operational efficiencies of utilities, improving the
 ^ AK Biswas, ‘An Assessment o f  Future Global Water Issues’ (2005) 21 International Journal o f  Water 
Resources Development 229,235
 ^ Palaniappan and others (n I) 282-283; Budds and McGranahan (n 4) 90-91; and LE Garcia, ‘Water 
Pricing: An Outsider’s Perspective’ (2005) 21 Water Resources Development 9, 9-10
Budds and McGranahan (n 4) 91-92 and TM Solo, Independent Water Entrepreneurs in Latin America: 
The Other Private Sector in Water Services (2003) 8
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quality of service and drinking water and lowering price. The empirical literature on the 
relative desirability of privatisation is not, however, conclusive.
Capital: If the search for private capital is the underlying objective of privatisation, it 
will take the form of divestiture or long term concessions. In this regard, the experience 
of England and Wales can be mentioned where regional water utilities were transferred to 
private ownership. Since then it has been reported that several billion pounds of private 
capital have been introduced into these utilities.Generally, however, the performance of 
privatisation, in this regard, has been disappointing.^^ It has been reported, for example, 
that between 1991 and 2001, only 5 percent of the investment in developing-country 
infrastructure projects with private participation went to the water sector, compared with 
44 percent for telecoms and 28 percent for electricity. Castro, after making comparative 
case studies, concludes: “Not only was there no substantial contribution of private capital 
to [less developed countries] accompanying the expansion of [privatisation] but in fact 
the overall trend had been that the main funding sources on which [privatisation] has 
relied have been the collection of service fees, direct state subsidies to the private 
companies, and borrowing”.*^  Multinational companies which were expected to be the 
source of capital in many of the developing countries, despite the original interest, have 
also exhibited reluctance, for “they not only did not make the profits they anticipated, but 
also actually made very significant losses due to currency devaluations (as in Buenos 
Aires and Jakarta) and to political and social considerations. Many urban centres of the
See, for example, IN Kessides, ‘Infrastructure, Privatization and Regulation: Promises and Perils’ (2005) 
20 World Bank Research Observer 81, 82 (stating that public providers “suffered from low productivity, 
deteriorating fixed facilities and equipment, poor service quality, chronic revenue shortages and inadequate 
investment, and serious problems o f  theft and non-payment”) and Budds and McGranaham (n 4) 95-98
See, for example, S Cowan, ‘Privatization and Regulation o f  the Water Industry in England and W ales’, 
in M Bishop, JA Kay and CP Mayer, Privatization and Economic Performance (1994)
Palaniappan and others (n 1) 275; and Budds and McGranahan (n 4) 99-101
A Baietti and R Raymond, ‘Financing Water Supply and Sanitation Investments: Utilizing Risk 
Mitigation Instruments to Bridge the Financing Gap’ (2005) 4 World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation 
Sector Board Discussion Paper Series, 5
JE Castro, ‘Neoliberal Water and Sanitation Policies as a Failed Development Strategy: Lessons from 
Developing Countries’ (2008) 8 Progress in Development Studies 63, 67. For a similar point see, AJ Loftus 
and DA McDonald, ‘O f Liquid Dreams: A Political Ecology o f  Water Privatization in Buenos Aires’
(2001) 13 Environment and Urbanization 179,198
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developing world, such as Kathmandu, have found out that not even a single 
multinational company is willing to bid for the concession to run their water systems”.
Operational efficiency: Public utilities are blamed for large proportion of water loss, 
over-employment, and low-level of billing. Privatisation is advocated as a solution to 
these problems. There is no recognisable consensus as to whether the actual performance 
of the private sector has been satisfactory. On the one hand, it is argued that whether 
assets are privately or publicly owned does not have significant impact on efficiency: 
“Reviews of the performance of water supply utilities in Asia, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Europe indicate that ownership (public or private) does not predict 
the efficiency of water service providers”. Saal and Parker reported little improvement 
in productivity following the 1989 UK privatisation.^* Studies on the relative efficiency 
of public and private utilities in the US based on small samples also reported no 
significant differences.^^ A study carried out in Asia concluded that there are not 
significant differences in efficiency levels achieved by public and private providers.^^ 
Bhattacharyya and others, after having analysed a sample of 190 public and 31 private 
water systems, concluded that when water systems are small, private operators tend to be
MHI Dore, J Kushner and K Zumer, ‘Privatization o f  Water in the UK and France: What Can We 
Learn?’ (2004) 12 Utilities Policy 41, 43; ‘Priceless: A  Survey o f  Water’ The Economist (19 July 2003) 19 
(“The companies have learnt that the risks o f  setting up in a developing country are greater than they 
thought"); and PT Robbins, ‘Transnational Corporations and the Discourse o f  Water Privatization’ (2003) 
15 Journal o f  International Development 1073,1078-1081 (discussing cases o f  Buenos Aires and Jakarta)
Bakker and others, ‘Governance Failure: Rethinking the Institutional Dimensions o f  Urban Water Supply 
to Poor Households’ (2008) 36 World Development 1891,1893
DS Saal and D Parker, ‘Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage 
Companies o f  England and W ales’ (2001) 20 Journal o f  Regulatory Economics 61. For an argument that 
separation o f  environmental management from supply o f  water services as a result o f  privatisation in 
England and Wales, results in efficiency loss from co-production, see EL Lynk, ‘Privatisation, Joint 
Production and the Comparative Efficiencies o f  Private and Public Ownership: The UK Water Industry 
Case’ (1993) 14 Fiscal Studies 98
P Byrnes, S Grosskopf and K Hayes, ‘Efficiency and Ownership: Further Evidence’ (1986) 68 Review o f  
Economics and Statistics 337; S Feigenbaum and R Teeples, ‘Public versus Private Water Delivery: A  
Hedonic Cost Approach’ (1983) 65 Review o f  Economics and Statistics 672; and R Teeples and D Glyer, 
‘Cost o f  Water Delivery Systems: Specification and Owner Effects’ (1987) 69 Review o f  Economics and 
Statistics 399
A Estache and MA Rossi, ‘How Different is the Efficiency o f  Public and Private Water Companies in 
Asia’ (2002) 16 World Bank Economic Review 139
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more efficient/^ To support the argument that formal-legal status does not affect the 
efficiency and quality of services, Biswas raises the two most efficient water utilities in 
the world, the publicly owned utilities of Singapore and T o k y o O n  the other hand, 
lesser forms of privatisation, like contracting out in West Africa, are found to have 
improved the quality water supply services?^ It is also suggested that the threat of 
privatisation has improved the performance of public companies: “the competitive 
pressure has forced the public sector companies to improve their performance in the 
developing and developed world, including the United States”?'^  A study carried out in 
Africa on the relative operational efficiencies of private and public operators concluded 
in favour of the former.^^
Quality of service: Clark, Kosec and Wallsten found in a household-level study in 
developing countries that connection rates to piped water increased following 
privatisation, even among the poor, but connection rates also increased in areas that did 
not privatise?^ Low-income urban and peri-urban areas are particularly found to have 
been ignored by formal private suppliers as they are considered less profitable suggesting 
the limitation of privatisation to provide equitable coverage?^ On the grounds that there
A Bhattacharyya and others, ‘Specification and Estimation o f  the Effect o f  Ownership on the Economic 
Efficiency o f  the Water Utilities’ (1995) 25 Regional Science and Urban Economics 759
“  Biswas (n 8) 236
S Jaglin, ‘The Right to Water versus Cost Recovery: Participation, Urban Water Supply and the Poor in 
Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2002) 14 Environment and Urbanization 231,233
Biswas (n 8) 236
A Estache and E Kouassi, ‘Sector Organization, Governance and the Inefficiency o f  African Water 
Utilities’ (2002) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No, 2890
GRG Clarke, K Kosec and S Wallsten, ‘Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved 
Coverage?’ (2004) AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper
Budds and McGranahan (n 4) 109-111; Jaglin (n 23) 233-234; Castro (n 15) 70-71 (“The poor cannot 
afford to make standard use o f  WSS services (by standard use I mean consuming the per capita volumes o f  
water expected from networked users, namely around 100 litres per capita per day) i f  they have to pay for 
them at the rates needed to make the system profitable for multinational private corporations, which 
understandably are also very reluctant to invest in the expansion and maintenance o f  WSS in poor areas 
owing to the high financial risk involved”); Robbins (n 16), 1078; and K Bakker, ‘The Ambiguity o f  
Commons: Debating Alternatives to Private-Sector Provision o f  Urban Water Supply’ (2008) 1 Water 
Alternatives 236, 236-237 (“...by the mid 2000s, it had become evident that the majority o f urban PSP 
contracts signed in the 1990s had largely failed to extend water supply to poor households”)
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is little or no foreign direct investment in regions where they are most needed like Sub- 
Saharan Africa and South Asia, Castro argues that private sector participation must not be 
expected to improve the poor’s access to water services.^*
Quality and price of drinking water: Saal and Parker reported higher prices following 
the 1989 UK privatisation?^ Cowan, Clarke and Zuluaga estimate that privatisation in the 
UK led to a net loss in total welfare, with consumers and the government being net losers 
and the firm and its employees net gainers?^ Another study on the price of water in Spain 
reported that, after factors which influence price (such as location, population density and 
income) are accounted for, private firms set on average higher prices than public ones?*
Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsku explore the effect of water privatisation on child 
mortality using data from Argentina in the 1990s and reported that child mortality fell 8 
percent in regions that privatised their water systems and that the effects were more 
pronounced in the poorest areas?^ Wallsten and Kosec, after analysing data concerning 
all privately and publicly owned community water systems in the United States for a 
period of 1997-2003, summarised their findings as follows;
The results provide no evidence supporting critics of private ownership, but also do 
not suggest that private ownership is inherently superior. Privately-owned systems, 
on average, comply with drinking water regulations just as well as—and in some 
cases better than—publicly-owned systems. Consumers do not appear to pay more 
for water, on average, when served by private systems and may pay a bit 
less....Overall, our results are consistent witii the hypothesis that public or private
Castro (n 15) 67. For the relationship between privatisation o f  utilities in general and poverty, see K 
Bayliss, ‘Privatization and Poverty: The Distributional Impact o f Utility Privatization’ (2002) 73 Annals o f  
Public and Cooperative Economics 603; and Budds and McGranahan (n 4) 105-107
Saal and Parker (n 18)
S Cowan, GRG Clarke and AM Zuluaga, Competition and Regulation in Urban Water Supply: The 
Privatisation o f  Thames Water (2000)
R Martinez-Espineira, MA Garcia-Valinas and F Gonzâlez-Gômez, ‘Does Private Management o f  Water 
Supply Services Really Increase Prices? An Empirical Analysis in Spain’ (2009) 46 Urban Studies 923
S Galiani, PJ Gertler and E Schargrodsky, ‘Water for Life: The Impact o f  Privatisation o f  Water Services 
on Child Mortality’ (2003) 113 Journal o f  Political Economy 83-120
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ownership may not make much of a difference when the operator is largely 
monopolistic..?^
The above conclusion is also reached in a separate study that has examined the 
performance of water utilities in England and France:
In both cases, water quality improved, but at a higher cost in terms of prices and 
higher returns on private capital. Indeed the improvement in water quality could be 
the result of better regulatory regimes spurred on by the required standards set by 
the European Union. Thus we conclude that the evidence from these two countries 
does not support the case that the private sector had absolute efficiency advantage 
in drinking water production.^'*
Overall, it can be stated that the empirical case for the desirability of privatisation is not 
conclusive. Performance with respect to a given variable, price for example, may be 
affected by factors other than the ownership structure of utilities and hence it is difficult 
to attribute the outcome to one factor alone. It is, however, clear that full-scale 
privatisation and long-term concessions, despite their ambiguous effects with respect to 
price, operational efficiency, quality of service and quality of drinking water, have not 
been practical in low-income countries owing to the nature of the water supply industry 
and economic and political instability. In low-income countries, therefore, lesser forms of 
privatisation may be pursued. At any rate, if pursued in any form, privatisation must be 
accompanied by appropriate legal and policy frameworks.^^
S Wallsten and K Kosec, ‘The Effects o f  Ownership and Benchmark Competition; An Empirical 
Analysis o f  U.S. Water Systems’ (2005) AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working 
Paper 05-05
Dore, Kushner and Zumer (n 16) 50
See for example Robbins (n 16) 1081; A Estache, A Gomez-Lobo and D Leipziger, ‘Utilities 
Privatization and the Poor: Lessons and Evidence from Latin America’ (2001) 29 World Development 
1179 (arguing that with the appropriate legal and policy frameworks, privatisation may work for the poor); 
CA Arnold, ‘Privatization o f  Public Water Services: The States’ Role in Ensuring Public Accountability’ 
(2005) 32 Pepperdine Law Review 561 (arguing that the desirability o f  privatisation depends on the 
context, the need, the nature o f  the arrangement, and legal controls imposed to ensure accountability to the 
public); Bakker (n 27) 245 (stating that “ownership (i.e. public versus private) is less important than 
institutions (rules, norms, and laws) and governance (decision-making processes)”); A Nickson and C 
Vargas, ‘The Limitations o f  Water Regulation: The Failure o f  the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia’
(2002) 21 Bulletin o f  Latin American Research 99; T Lee and V Floris, ‘Universal Access to Water and 
Sanitation: Why the Private Sector Must Participate’ (2003) 27 Natural Resources Forum 279; and K 
Komives, ‘Designing Pro-poor Water and Sewer Concessions; Early Lessons from Bolivia’ (2001) 3 Water 
Policy 61
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2.2.4. Nongovernmental Organisations
‘Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)’ is an ambiguous term that literally could 
include for-profit private organisations?^ However, it is generally understood to refer to 
entities that are entirely or largely independent of government and have humanitarian or 
cooperative rather than commercial objectives?^ The World Bank defines them as private 
organisations “that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, 
protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development”?* They could be national or international. They are often distinguished 
from community-based organisations (CBOs) which exist to serve their members.^^ In 
many developing countries, NGOs play an important role in the supply of water services. 
In addition to being involved directly in construction of small-scale water systems, they 
also play supporting, financing, advocating and organising roles. Strengths attributed to 
NGOs include ability to reach poor communities and remote areas; promote local 
participation; operate at low cost; identify local needs; build on local resources; and 
introduce new technologies.'*** On the other hand, they are said to suffer from limited 
replicability, self-sustainability, managerial and technical capacity; narrow context for 
programming and politicisation.'**
2.2.5. Community-based Organisations
Community-based organisations (CBOs) are associations of individuals who contribute 
resources towards securing water services for their members.'*^ They could develop
P Streeten, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and Development’ (1997) 554 Annals o f  the American 
Academy o f  Political and Social Science 193,194
World Bank, Operational Directive 14.70: Involving Nongovernmental Organizations in World Bank- 
Supported Activities (28 August 1989) [1]
Ibid [2]
W Werker and FZ Ahmed, ‘What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?’ (2008) 22 Journal o f  
Economics Perspectives 73 ,74
World Bank (n 37) [6] and Streeten (n 36) (for a critical discussion o f  this attribution)
World Bank (n 37) [7]
Some private water companies in England have attempted to restructure into community-based 
organisations. For an account o f  this development, see KJ Bakker, ‘From Public to Private to...Mutual? 
Restructuring Water Supply Governance in England and Wales’ (2003) 34 Geoforum 359
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spontaneously or be formed by outside governmental and non-governmental 
organisations?^ Apart from sustaining the system, they do not operate on a commercial 
basis. CBOs are most common in rural areas where NGOs or governmental organisations 
set up water supply facilities and transfer its ownership and maintenance to the former. In 
recent years, governments have started to use such organisations in urban areas as well.'*'* 
For example, several countries in West Africa have introduced changes to their laws with 
a view to establishing such organisations and entrust them with the responsibility to own 
and operate water supply facilities.'*^ In Argentina water systems with pipe networks 
owned by service cooperatives serve a quarter of the urban population.'*^ Another 
example of a cooperative, in fact the largest one in the world serving about 750,000 
people, is found in Santa Cruz (Bolivia); a related organisation and ownership structure is 
followed by the Welsh Water, a non-profit company owned by members and limited by 
guarantee, supplying about 3 million customers.'*^ Though CBOs are conventionally 
assumed to work effectively “at a very small scale, in areas where the state is unable, and 
private sector uninterested, in service provision”, Bakker argues that, “under the right 
conditions large-scale cooperatives function effectively”.'**
G Watson and others, ‘Water and Sanitation Associations: Review and Best Practices’ in R Meinzen- 
Dick, N V  Jagannathan and A Subramanian (eds). User Organizations fo r  Sustainable Water Services 
(1997) 102 (discussing o f  the various factors which affect the success o f  community-based organizations). 
For similar discussion with respect to community-based water systems established by outside governmental 
and non-governmental organizations, see RC Carter, SF Tyrrel and P Hows am., ‘The Impact and 
Sustainability o f  Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes in Developing Countries’ (1999) 
13 Journal o f  the Chartered Institution o f  Water and Environmental Management 292
K Sansom, ‘Government Engagement with Non-state Providers o f  Water and Sanitation Services’ (2006) 
26 Public Administration and Development 207, 212 (“many governments have declared policies which 
place a heavy reliance on community-based organisations, particularly for operation and management o f  
water and sanitation facilities in rural areas and low-income urban settlements”)
Jaglin (n 23) 239-240
TM Solo, ‘Small-scale Entrepreneurs in the Urban Water and Sanitation Market’ (1999) 11 Environment 
and Urbanization 117,121
47 Bakker (n 27) 242
Ibid 242-243 (discussing also the limitations o f  cooperatives and the reasons why the Scottish 
government and later the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) decided against mutualisation o f  
suppliers); and J Birchall, ‘Mutual, Non-profit or Public Interest Company? An Evaluation o f  Options for 
the Ownership and Control o f  Water Utilities’ (2002) 73 Annals o f  Public and Cooperative Economics 181 
(discussing conditions where large-scale CBOs may effectively own and manage water supply systems)
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The usual form is that residents served by the system would form a committee to exercise 
overall control and supervision. The day-to-day operation of the system is delegated to a 
paid individual.'*^ Community management ensures sustainability of water systems by 
creating a sense of ownership, empowerment and representation. This requires explicitly 
setting out operation, maintenance and financial arrangements. In many cases, however, 
such systems are fraught with several problems: “the very common practice of 
management responsibility within committees being confiscated by the elders; the 
spacing out or elimination of meetings; the absence of account books; and varying 
degrees of indifference on the part of users’’.^ ** In urban areas, CBOs pool resources of 
individual members and manage to get community connection to the official water 
provider. Such arrangements also run to problems because of misappropriation of money 
collected from the sale of water.^*
CBOs have also emerged as local regulatory bodies representing users. This is 
particularly the case in densely populated urban areas where licensing a private individual 
to operate a water system is preferred making, therefore, CBOs regulators as opposed to 
owners and operators. In this form and role, they serve as intermediary between 
consumers and water providers. By doing so, the costs of regulation are shifted to 
members of the community.^^
Jaglin (n 23) 238; and WSP, ‘The Experience o f  Small-Scale Water Providers in Serving the Poor in 
Metro Manila’ (2004) WSP Field Note, 4 (discussing one example o f  community-based organisation in 
northern Metro Mania)
Jaglin (n 23) 239. For an argument that community management is not by itself sufficient to ensure 
sustainability, see Carter, Tyrrel and Howsam (n 43) (The authors argue that community participation, 
though an essential foundation stone o f  water and sanitation projects in developing countries is not 
automatic guarantee o f  success. They also discuss the reasons (attitudinal, institutional and economic 
factors) for the break-down or non-sustainability o f  community-managed systems.) and DA Rondinelli, 
‘Decentralizing Water Supply Services in Developing Countries; Factors Affecting the Success o f  
Community Management’ (1991) 11 Public Administration and Development 415
S Snell, ‘Water and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor Small-Scale Providers: Typology and 
Profiles’ (1998) WSP Working Paper, 9. For a general critique o f  the movement towards CBOs even in 
large urban areas by discussing the limitations o f  this alternative, see Bakker (n 27)
Jaglin (n 23) 240 
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2.2.6. Small-scale and Independent Providers
In many countries, whether the private sector should be allowed to participate in the 
provision of water services is a moot issue. This is because in these places “the only 
effective provision of water comes from private water sellers”.^  ^ This is characterised as 
‘privatisation by default’.^ '* Since SIPs are the focus of this research, they are discussed in 
detail in the following sections.
2.3. Small-scale and Independent Water Providers: Nature and Types
2.3.1. General Features
In the water supply literature of developing countries, a distinction is often drawn 
between formal and informal providers.^^ Though informal providers, referred to here as 
SIPs, are as old as (and in some cases older than) the formal water providers^^, it is only 
recently that resources and efforts have been directed towards understanding SIPs. 
International organisations such as the World Bank have been advocating privatisation 
with a view to enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of formal utilities. With the 
observation that the expected benefits are not trickling down to the urban poor, attention 
has been directed, if not shifted, towards reaching the poor through SIPs. A preface to a 
research report by UNDP-World Bank reads:
Lee and Floris (n 35) 280
Ibid 282; and A Gilbert, ‘Water for All: How to Combine Public Management with Commercial Practice 
for the Benefit o f  the Poor’ (2007) 44 Urban Studies 1559, 1561 (“Privatised tankers and informal 
companies sold water to the poor.. .In the cities o f  the South, therefore, water became a commodity long 
ago and, consequently, the conversion o f  water from a public good into a marketable commodity is 
anything but new”)
L Moretto, ‘Urban Governance and Multilateral Aid Organizations: The Case o f  Informal Water Supply 
Systems’ (2007) 2 Review o f  International Organizations 345, 350 (“The world ‘informal’, in fact, is 
widely used in the literature but there is not a clear consensus as to what it really means. On the one hand, 
the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ is difficult to be outlined because, in practice, ‘there is an 
extensive range from the fully formal to the totally informal’. On the other hand, in terms o f  urban water 
supplies, ‘informal’ is related to both the technical systems o f  provision and the resulting relationships and 
processes between the actors involved, even if  the boundaries between these two sides o f  urban water 
services are difficult to outline”)
Solo identifies the operation o f  informal water providers in colonial times in Latin America. See Solo (n 
10) 8 and MU Klein, ‘Economic Regulation o f  Water Companies’ (1996) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 1649 (“Water vendors were indispensable in every town in the world in the 18* century 
and continue to be so in many cities o f  the developing world’)
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For several years, the World Bank has been promoting the participation of the 
private sector in the water and sanitation sector at the formal level focusing on 
utilities’ performance and regulatory reforms. Recent evidence suggests, however, 
that the poor urban populations are still without access to the water and sanitation 
services, despite sector modernization. This has raised interest in the small-scale 
and informal private sector. These small providers have the potential to deliver 
improved services to low-income areas at comparatively low investment costs
The formal providers are officially recognised; their operation is considered desirable and 
hence legal. They are often given, by contract or legislation, monopoly rights within a 
certain defined area either indefinitely or for a certain period of time. On the other hand, 
SIPs often are not officially recognised; their activities are considered undesirable and 
hence illegal. Even if they are not illegal, they might be regarded as undesirable by 
government officials. In such cases, not the law but its enforcement has prohibitive effect. 
It could also be the case that though the operation of SIPs is a clear contravention of the 
law, they are yet tolerated as can be seen by their presence. SIPs are virtually 
unregulated.
The distinction of markets (and hence the actors therein) into formal and informal is not 
unique to the water sector; it 
McGranahan and others write:
is generally the characteristic of developing economies.^*
In low-income towns and cities, a large share of small enterprises and residences 
are informal; they are unrecognized, unregistered or do not conform to the formal 
planning regulations... Informality has been and will continue to be widespread, 
not only in Africa but in many parts of the world. In 1991, a study of nine Asian 
countries concluded that between 40 and 95 percent of all households had no 
possibility of living in a dwelling produced by the formal sector.^^
”  Snell (n 51) 4
B Collignon and M Vezina, Independent Water and Sanitation Providers in African Cities: Full Report 
o f  a Ten-Country Stucfy (2000) 7; and D Mitlin, Competition, Regulation and the Urban Poor: A Case 
Study o f  Water (2002)
G McGranahan and others, How Small Water Enterprises Can Contribute to the Millennium Goals: 
Evidence from  Dor es Salaam. Nairobi, Khartoum and Accra (2006) 10. For an analysis o f  the informal 
housing sector in developing countries as dead capital that can be reincarnated and put to productive use, 
see H De Soto, The Mystery o f  Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(2000)
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There are informal actors in, for example, transportation, health, and food. In the water 
supply literature, SIPs are known by different names such as alternative providers^**, 
independent water providers^*, informal providers,^^ water vendors^^, mini-utilities, non­
state water providers^'*, and ‘the other private sector’ Despite the variable 
nomenclature. Solo asserts that they “share some impressive characteristics in terms of 
operational efficiencies”: they recover their costs fully and are financially sustainable; 
they have virtually no unaccounted-for water; and they require no public subsidy, 
borrowing or debt.^^ Variously named as they are, SIPs also have different operational 
and organisational f o rm s .T h i s  aspect is regarded as their strength: “the virtue of the 
‘other’ private sector lies in its ability to produce appropriate models to fill every 
circumstance and need”,*^* The following sections provide an outline of the main forms.
2.3.2. Private versus Non-private Small Providers
Kariuki and Schwartz draw a distinction between private and non-private small 
providers While they all may be regarded as micro and small enterprises, private 
providers are different from non-private providers in that they are established with the
E Gerlach, ‘Regulating Alternative Providers for the Poor’ in R Franceys and E Gerlach (eds), 
Regulating Water and Sanitation fo r  the Poor: Economic Regulation fo r  Public and Private Partnerships 
(2008)
Collignon and Vezina (n 58); and B Collignon, ‘The Potential and the Limits o f  Private Providers: 
Independent Sellers in Francophone Africa’ (1999) UNDP-World Bank Working Paper
“  Moretto (n 55); A Allen, JD Davina and P Hofmann, ‘The Peri-Urban Water Poor: Citizens or 
Consumers?’ (2006) 18 Environment and Urbanization 333; and M Llorente and MH Zerah, ‘The Urban 
Water Sector: Formal versus Informal Suppliers in India’ (2003) 22 Urban India 14
M Kjellen and G McGranahan, Informal Water Vendors and the Urban Poor (2006)
^  Sansom (n 44)
Solo (n 10)
Solo (n 46) 122
World Bank, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work fo r  Poor People (2003) 171 
Solo (n 46) 121
M Kariuki and J Schwartz, ‘Small-Scale Private Service Providers o f  Water Supply and Electricity: A 
Review o f  Incidence, Structure, Pricing and Operating Characteristics’ (2005) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3727
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initiative of a private individual either for profit or non-profit purposes, with a larger 
portion (25 percent or more) of the capital secured on commercial basis?** It should be 
noted in this connection that the focus of this research is on private providers.
2.3.3. Dependent versus Independent
A further distinction is between dependent and independent providers.^* Dependent 
providers are those who purchase water in bulk from the official utility or other providers 
and retail it to consumers. By contrast, independent providers have their own source of 
water. This classification is important for the implication it has on the details of any 
regulatory framework applicable to them. For independent providers, regulatory issues 
may relate to abstraction of water, distribution, and quality and public health standards; 
whereas for dependent providers, relevant are tariff and connection charges, fee 
structures and licensing procedures.^^ For the purposes of this research the term 
independent in SIPs does not have the same meaning as that attributed by Kariuki and 
Schwartz. As they have also indicated, the term is used in the literature to mean several 
things. It could refer to their organisational or financial independence from the formal 
utility.^^ For this research the qualifier ‘independent’ means both depending on the 
context it is used.
2.3.4. Dependent versus Independent Piped Suppliers
Dependent piped suppliers purchase water from the official provider and distribute it 
through sub-networks connected to households and kiosks. This model is often referred 
to as delegated-management.^'* On the contrary, independent piped suppliers rely on their 
own water sources, such as wells or boreholes from which water is distributed through a 
network of pipes. Independent piped suppliers are sometimes called mini-utilities because 
of their similarity to conventional formal utilities. Independent piped suppliers are
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reported to exist in Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire), Asuncion (Paraguay) (serving more than 30 
percent of the city) and Malang (Indonesia)?^ Other examples include in Guatemala City 
(Guatemala), Cuzco (Peru) and Manila (Philippines)?^ It should be noted that 
independent piped suppliers are not common, perhaps because of the high level of capital 
required and hence the unwillingness and/or inability of individuals to invest without 
property and investment security?^
2.3.5. Dependent versus Independent Point Sources
Dependent point sources are connected to the official network and sell the water they 
have bought or acquired otherwise in kiosks or stand posts. By contrast, independent 
point sources own their own water sources such as well or borehole. Kiosks or stand 
posts are estimated to serve 30 percent of the households in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia).^* 
They also serve significant number of people in Nairobi (Kenya). Neighbour sellers fall 
under this category and they play a significant role in serving unconnected people; in 
Bamako (Mali), for example, they are responsible for 25 percent of the water supply.^^ 
Dependent point sources usually have contractual relationship with the official provider 
and hence benefit from a special tariff.*** The contract often sets out the respective 
obligations of the parties; however, it is observed that such contract is meant to safeguard 
the interest of the official provider; it is not meant to ensure the quality of service 
provided to the end users.** In addition, in some cases, a dependent point supplier 
appoints a turncock who is not part of the primary contractual arrangement.*^ The use of
Solo (n 46) 119-121. For the study o f  independent providers in Paraguay, see PW Loach, S Melgarejo 
and M Lombardo, ‘The Small-scale Water Providers in Paraguay: Bringing Private Sector Efficiency to 
Water Resource Use and the Provision o f  Drinking Water to the Poor’ (2000) 24 Natural Resources Forum 
263
Snell (n 51) 4
Kariuki and Schwartz (n 69) 17
78 Solo (n 46) 121 
Ibid
Solo (10 )4
Jaglin (n 23) 239
Ibid
43
dependent point sources is said to have two main advantages: improving local services by 
placing them on commercial basis and reducing costs of management on the part of the 
official provider. However, case-studies on actual operation of such arrangements suggest 
that the above two advantages are not easily achievable.*^
2.3.6. Dependent versus Independent Mobile Distributors
Dependent mobile distributors purchase water in bulk from the official provider and 
deliver it directly to customers. They include tanker-truckers, carters and water carriers. 
They provide water when and where services by the official provider are not reliable. 
They operate in many cities including Dakar (Senegal), Port-au-Prince (Haiti), Lima 
(Peru), Tegucigalpa (Honduras) (serving more that 30 percent of the water demand), 
Guatemala City (Guatemala), Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.*'* On the other hand, 
independent mobile distributors supply water from independent sources. Though they are 
not common, in some cities like Accra (Ghana) there are small-scale enterprises involved 
in the selling of bottled or packed water.*^
2.4. Role of Small-scale and Independent Providers
2.4.1. To Whom, Where and How Do SIPs Supply?
SIPs play three important roles in the supply of water services.*^ First to be mentioned is 
their gap-filling role. In some cities across the developing world, official providers have 
high coverage in terms of network size and number of household connections. However, 
they have a poor performance record as measured by the number of hours or days the 
service is actually provided to customers. In such places, significant amount of demand is 
left unfulfilled. Consequently, SIPs emerge to satisfy such damend. For example, in 
Manila, a metropolis of 11 million people, the two private operators of the public water 
supply system have high service coverage: 85 and 93 percent.*^ However, households
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still rely on SIPs in cases when the two official providers are not able to supply sufficient 
and reliable service.** It might also be the case that large numbers of low income 
households are not connected for a number of reasons. One such obstacle is the 
connection fee (which includes standing charges and deposit to cover risk of non­
payment) to be paid upfront.*^ A study that compared the amount of the connection fee 
for some sub-Saharan countries in relation to GDP per capita found out that the cost of 
connection amounts to, for example five and four months GDP in Benin and Kenya, a 
large sum considering the fact that poor households earn significantly lower than the 
national average.^** The fact that most formal utilities do not provide flexible payment 
arrangements exacerbates the problem.^* Although some households manage to get 
connected, they are more likely to default on their periodic payment for the water 
consumed and hence risk disconnection.^^ Second, SIPs are sometimes pioneers in the 
development and operation of systems in places to which the official provider is not able 
or willing to serve and in those places where there is no official provider in the first 
place.^^ Such places are peri-ruban, rural and remote regions. '^* Because no official 
provider exists or operates in these places, SIPs are said to be the only “viable operators 
for the foreseeable future”.^  ^Residents in these areas “are often the most costly clients to 
serve for large investors, the last to receive connections and the targets of controversial 
universal service obligations imposed upon private investors and concessionaires”.^  ^ In
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playing the above two roles, SIPs often operate informally. Third is their sub- 
concessionaire role where they would purchase water from the official provider and resell 
it to other people.^^ SIPs playing this role might have a formal contractual relationship 
with the official provider.
SIPs serve as much as half of the population particularly in post-conflict and weak or 
failed states.^* One-fourth of the urban population in Latin America and half of that in 
Africa are believed to rely on services provided by SIPs.^^ SIPs are reported to be 
actively present in at least 22 countries in Africa: “the share of the population or 
households served by such providers in important urban centers ranges widely, from 21 
percent in Dakar to 30 percent in Kampala, 35 percent in Abidjan, 26 percent in Dar es 
Salaam, 60 percent in Nairobi, 66 percent in Conakry and 80 percent in Khartoum”.***** 
The number of people they serve is even greater in secondary towns and in any case, the 
number of people being served is increasing.**** In several case studies, it is found that 
SIPs are growing faster than the official supplier.***^
The presence of SIPs is strongly felt in informal settlements. Informal settlements, also 
called slums, low-income areas and squatter settlements, are estimated to be homes for 
between 40% and 70% of the population in urban Africa.***^  Informality in housing 
facilities is a feature of not only African urban areas but also many other cities across the 
world.***'* The informal settlements are characterised by a lack of proper and legally 
recognised tenure and public services, such as electricity and water, provided by the
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official utilities.***  ^A study of the cities of Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Khartoum and Accra 
has concluded that large numbers of residents in informal settlements are not connected 
to the official water network.***  ^ The same study enumerates several financial, 
institutional and technical obstacles to the extension of official networks to informal 
settlements. The large size of capital that needs to be invested in these areas (owing to 
unplanned developments and distance), risks of demolition and giving legitimacy to 
informal settlements explain why these areas are largely unserved by official utilities.***^  
In Buenos Aires (Argentina), for example, the potentially high cost of extending services, 
attributed mainly to the fact that many of the informal settlements are very far from the 
existing network and have irregular layout of houses, outweighs the revenue that could be 
collected.**** But most importantly, administrative preconditions, such as a requirement 
that the user must have a recognised rights on the land operate to deny services to 
residents of informal settlements. McIntosh mentions two factors in order to explain why 
informal settlements and slum areas are often left out. First, “total available water is not 
always sufficient to cover whole populations, and vulnerable groups are the first to be left 
out”.***^ Second, “even when water supplies are sufficient, tariffs and low volumes of 
water consumption may not make it attractive for utilities to deliver services in low- 
income areas, where the minimum cost of extending services is relatively high”.**** In 
some cases, for example Kingston (Jamaica), the level of violence is mentioned as a 
reason why official utilities do not operate in informal settlements and slum areas.*** For 
residents of informal settlements who are predominantly poor, the connection fee is also 
prohibitive.**^ The fact that they do not have formal property rights means that they are 
not also willing to make investment in connection and able to borrow money from micro-
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finance agencies that are reluctant to part with their money without a security of formal
tion
left to use other sources of water including SIPs.**'*
title or employment.**^ Without official connec , residents in informal settlements are
SIPs are not limited to particular income groups and parts of a city; they serve middle, 
lower and upper income households.**^ In terms of geography they could operate in the 
heart of the city as the experience of Lima (Peru) shows; “during six months of the year, 
[SIPs] deliver water in trucks to Lima’s most well to do neighbourhoods when rationing 
hits even the heart of town”.**^  Therefore, when the water provided by the formal utility 
is not satisfactory, even well-to-do residents in formal neighbourhoods resort to SIPs.**  ^
So in these areas, SIPs operate in competition with the formal utilities.*** This seems to 
justify Solo’s statement that SIPs “appear income and class-blind when it comes to 
seeking out customers”.**^
2.4.2. Evaluating SIPs’ Role and Prospect
SIPs are not only playing a significant role at the moment but are also said to have huge 
potential in serving areas and groups of people underserved and un-served by official 
providers. Their potential is linked with certain features of their business model and 
operation. In addition, any improvement, if any, by formal utilities is not expected to 
match the pace of urbanisation and as a result SIPs are “likely to remain as one of the few 
realistic options for water delivery in some parts of towns and eities for the foreseeable 
future”.*^**
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First, they are said to provide good customer services in the form of flexible payment 
arrangements, free public services and quick solutions to technical problems?^* The SIPs 
in Asuncion (Paraguay) supply water free to schools, health centres and churches and 
those in Paraguay and Argentina offer same day solutions to technical problems and offer 
flexible payment arrangements.*^^ In Paraguay, SIPs provide house connections on the 
basis of loans to be paid in instalments.*^^ This is an attractive arrangement, for the 
connection fee is identified as one of the barriers preventing the poor getting house 
connection to the official network.* '^* In some cases, they are also reported to deliver 
water on short-term credit.*^^ Second, they are capable of discovering new products and 
services as they, by their nature, are driven by consumer demand.*^^ Studies of SIPs in 
different cities indicated that they have started the production and sale of ice, soda and 
flavoured waters. *^  ^They have relied on their market knowledge and efficient production 
system in order to discover and develop new products such as packed or bottled water. *^ * 
Third, they provide their services at lower rates which make them feasible sources for the 
poor.*^  ^There is no consensus in the literature as to this point and the price they charge is 
found at any rate to vary depending on several factors such as the specific form of the 
provider, the season and the availability of water sources.*^ ** McIntosh argues in this 
connection that “even if the cost of water from [SIPs] is higher than the nominal tariff 
charged by utilities, poor consumers may prefer the former because the supply is reliable 
and flexible (particularly in terms of quantity and hours of supply) and there is
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excessively high connection fee”.*^  ^ Fourth, as opposed to official providers, SIPs have 
the capacity to grow with d e m a n d . O n  the other hand, large providers grow not in 
response to demand but in response to an injection of capital from outside donors and 
lending agencies; SIPs detect new demand (particularly new informal settlements) before 
they are detected by the local planning officials and those which rely on pipe networks 
even set up delivery systems in advance of population growth.
Fifth, they play a special role in introducing innovative technologies, market approaches 
and administrative sys tem s .S ix th ,  they operate in competition with one a n o t h e r O n  
the subject of operating in competition with one another, Snell writes the following:
In the Kibera settlement of Nairobi, Kenya, it would appear that the water kiosk 
business is so lucrative that kiosks get into rough competition with one another... 
In Paraguay, the areas covered by various [SIPs] often overlap, leading to direct 
competition for customers, which often culminates in price wars among themselves 
and even with the subsidized public agency. One example of rough competition 
comes from Peru, where a lone provider...suffered damage to his vehicle because 
he was undercutting prices by his competitors. This trucker is the exception to the 
rule that the Latin American artesian well providers avoid competing with each 
other by staking out defined geographical areas where they install their piping to 
customers’ homes. Such competition that does exist is usually found only in the 
boundary areas where the different [providers’] territories meet.
Competition is particularly strong among water carriers which are involved in an activity 
which does not have significant entry barriers: "If entry is easy, however, the market is 
usually competitive and [they] have no guaranteed customers. They therefore need to 
attract and retain enough loyal customers to remain in business”. S e v e n t h ,  the 
important role of SIPs is particularly pronounced in areas where water sources are not
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easily found. There are examples of providers operating in situations where groundwater 
is not easily accessible: “almost all of the urban populations of Sana’a, Yemen and about 
a quarter of Lima’s depend on small-scale private companies for their water supply 
despite difficulties in finding water sources”.
Snell enumerates factors which are said to be indispensable for the success of SIPs. These 
include: an entrepreneurial or commercial approach to competition, and innovation to 
develop effective service or specialised customer relations; the ease of independent water 
production resulting from drilling of wells or purification of natural sources; and the 
ability to offer instalment plans for connection fees.^^^
As it is mentioned in the previous section, SIPs are not limited to particular areas and 
groups of people. However, they predominantly serve the poor urban residents whether it 
is in informal settlements, inner city or peri-urban areas. The positive features mentioned 
above also make them particularly suitable to the poor urban population. In particular, the 
flexible payment arrangement for consumed water and connection fees by independent 
piped water providers makes them attractive to low-income households. As regards other 
forms of SIPs, their payment arrangement is also suitable to the needs and requirements 
of the urban poor.
2.5. Small-scale and Independent Providers; Discussion of Problems
2.5.1. Illegality
It is stated in many studies that one of the problems faced by SIPs is the lack of a 
regulatory framework. Collignon and Vezina state in this relation that “the main 
constraints...are not the availability of equipment or material, lack of appropriate 
technology, or lack of human resources. The main constraints are institutional and legal 
and stem from the lack of appropriate public policy framework”. In some countries, for
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example in Ghana, the law prohibits the resale of w a te r /A no the r  report provides that in 
Ghana tanker truckers are registered and authorised to provide water/"*^ However, such 
laws are not often enforced, perhaps because it is recognised that it is the failure of the 
official provider that created an opportunity for their emergence/"*^ In other countries, for 
example Tanzania, their operation is conditional upon getting a business licence, though 
this is not also strictly enforced/'*'^ In Karachi (Pakistan), tankers are registered and 
allowed to supply water which they get from the official utility or boreholes; however the 
boreholes are operating i l l e g a l l y W h i l e  reporting case studies from Pakistan, South 
Africa, Malawi, Nigeria, Bangladesh and India, Sansom writes that many independent 
providers are unauthorised/"*^ In Amman (Jordan), there are wells which are licensed to 
sell water for drinking purposes; tanker truckers which are also registered providers buy 
from them to distribute/"*^ There are licensing regimes in Zambia for water resellers, in 
Enungu and Lagos (Nigeria) for tankers, and in Jakarta (Indonesia) and Jordan for 
groundwater users but generally limited or no enforcement/"*^
Although in some cases the operation of SIPs is not clearly prohibited, the official 
provider is given the exclusive right to supply water within a certain defined geographic 
area. As a result, operation of SIPs in such areas is considered to go against the interest of 
the official provider, if not the public interest. The supply of water and sanitation services
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is considered to be a natural monopoly and hence competition in this industry is 
conventionally assumed to be an undesirable or unnecessary waste of resources. It is on 
the basis of this rationale that official providers are given a monopolistic position. 
However, an attempt to enforce this privilege against SIPs without managing to extend 
the formal service to all residents within that area is considered by many to be 
unacceptable.*"*^
The fact that resale of water is prohibited or licence is required, although not actively 
enforced, creates opportunity for officials to harass these providers.*^** In Khartoum, for 
instance, local officials are reported to regularly harass providers using donkey carts with 
the view to extracting m oney .H ow ever ,  independent piped water providers are more 
likely to have some form of legal status because otherwise they would not have invested 
in the system. Sometimes point sources might hold licences for abstracting water or for 
reselling the water they have purchased .This  is variable by country. When they remain 
informal, Kariuki and Schwartz argue, it is because of legal and administrative 
problems.*^"*
Owing to their legal status, SIPs secure finances from the informal market on 
unfavourable and suboptimal t e r m s . T h i s  could also render some of their transactions 
not legally enforceable and hence force them to rely on transactions which involve only 
simultaneous performance.*^^ This affects in particular the interests of the urban poor
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who, beyond any ground of consumers, need a credit arrangement to have access to 
water. Non-enforceability of transactions could also force them to resort to violent self- 
help remedies, as reported by Collignon in Port-au-Prince (Haiti).
Considering the current role being played by SIPs in many countries and their potential to 
grow and expand, one wonders why they have been neglected or not been encouraged by 
governments. Four reasons are identif ied.First,  SIPs have been regarded as temporary 
or ‘stopgap’ solut ions.Second,  not only the market for the supply of water services is 
considered a natural monopoly, but it is also believed that controlling a small number of 
large enterprises is easier than a large number of SIPs.*^° The third reason has to do with 
the conception that water is a public good and consequently it is not appropriate for 
private enterprises including SIPs to be involved.*^* Finally, the fact that SIPs are not 
regarded as safe (improved) sources of water has contributed to their marginalisation in 
national policies.
2.5.2. Property and Investment Security
SIPs lack property and investment s e c u r i t y .A n y  water supply facility developed and 
possessed by an informal provider is in turn informal and hence cannot be used as 
collateral to raise investment capital. This is what De Sotto calls dead capital: “Because 
the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily 
be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside narrow circles where people know and 
trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan and cannot be used as a share
defense. The independent providers thus find themselves under pressure to do favors for the local police in 
return for undefined protection”)
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against investment.”*^"* The lack of sufficient property security has repercussions in not 
only the ability of providers to raise money for the development and expansion of the 
system but also willingness to invest in the first place. In this connection, Collignon 
writes:
One of the most important factors driving private operators to stay in the informal 
sector and putting a brake on their investments is the lack of legal security, and the 
absence of a state of law. How can operators invest when they can be expelled, 
nationalized on the spot, at the snap of a finger? The government must guarantee 
that laws are respected and particularly leasing or concession contracts and the 
property rights of private investors. For their part, informal sector operators will 
move into the formal sector and will then constitute a source of extra tax and social 
revenue. *^ ^
The lack of property security seems to explain the relatively small number of independent 
piped water providers which are also called mini-utilities.*^^ Risk of expropriation is not 
only a possibility but a reality. For instance, it is reported that the government in 
Paraguay was considering a law which would expropriate all the investment made by 
independent piped water providers over a period of 15 years.*^^ In Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, the official utility took over a networked water system developed by 
community-based organisations.*^^
Owing to their legal status, SIPs secure finances from the informal market on 
unfavourable and suboptimal terms.*^^ Risks of expropriation and suboptimal financing 
would cause independent piped suppliers to transfer the risk and the added cost to 
consumers through high prices.*^ **
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2.5.3. Access to Water and Water Rights
The operation of SIPs is conditional on the availability of good quality water sources. For 
example, the development of small-scale private providers in Paraguay is partly attributed 
to the presence of good quality groundwater.*^* This is a natural factor. Sometimes as in 
the case of Colombia where there is good quality surface and ground water, lack of 
technologies for extraction and treatment could pose barriers to the operations of SIPs.*^  ^
The problem is, however, when regulatory or legal measures prevent the use of water 
resources even when they are available. For example, it is reported that there are more 
than 60 wells on the outskirts of Lima but not one inside the city because of legal 
restrictions.*^^ Likewise, Collignon and Vezina put the situation in Africa as follows: 
“Under law in most African countries, ownership of water resources is vested in the 
state...Some concessionaires, such as those in Dakar and Nouakchott, have attempted to 
use this legal situation to eliminate potential competitors, by demanding that government 
ban independent operators from drilling for water”.*^"*
2.5.4. Unregulated Price
SIPs are reported generally to charge high prices per unit compared to what households 
connected to official utilities pay.*^  ^ But there are exceptions. Solo found that their 
“charges range from one-tenth those of the public providers (private water systems in 
Cordoba, Argentina) to eight times those of the public providers (water truckers in Lima, 
Peru)”.*^  ^Solo further writes:
The private water systems...sell water at lower prices than the public providers 
(most of which subsidize water prices for low-income sectors). Prices can be lower 
still when the private providers are actively competing for markets. In Cordoba,
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See, for example, D Whittington, DT Lauria and X  Mu, ‘A Study o f  Water Vending and Willigness to 
Pay for Water in Onitsha, Nigeria’ (1991) 19 World Development 179. For a comparison o f  per unit price 
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56
Argentina, the independent companies sell water for as little as one-third the price 
of...the official company; in Paraguay, the [small-scale providers] compete very 
favourably despite the subsidies offered by [the official utility] and in Barranquilla, 
Colombia, several full service companies emerged but only one, it must be 
admitted, selling below the Triple A’s rates. Also, even though they charge lower 
rates, the independent providers enjoy a higher income-to-expense ratio than the 
monopoly companies (a public utility in the case of Asuncion and privately owned 
concessions in Baranquilla and Cordoba). This suggests that the independent 
providers’ operations are more efficient and more cost-effective than the large-scale 
official companies.
Cases have been reported where charges range to over 60 times more than that of the 
official utility.*^* This must, however, be seen in light of the fact that the official 
providers in most cases benefit from subsidies, economy of scale and relatively better 
access to water sources. Few general observations can be made regarding price. Water 
truckers, cart operators and carriers charge the highest prices but they also provide a 
service suitable to the needs of particular consumers. Next to them, standpipes and 
kiosks are expensive.*^* With respect to price, independent network suppliers, where they 
exist, are said to compete with the official providers.
In many cases, the price of water supplied by SIPs is not regulated. There are exceptions 
though. In Karachi (Pakistan) there are officially prescribed rates for the estimated five 
thousand tanker-truckers operating in the city; however this rate is not enforced. Yet,
Solo (n 46) 125. See also Loach, Melgarejo and Lombardo (n 75) (arguing that independent providers in 
Paraguay operate efficiently in terms o f  finance, water utilisation and economic efficiency)
Solo (n 46) 119
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as the hest or only alternative to the way many public systems are operated”); and Njiru and Albu (n 151) 
(stating that even if  households pay high percentage o f  their income, the price charged by SIPs is 
reasonable considering the costs involved)
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the report is that their price is cheaper than water which is similarly transported but 
bought in bulk from the official utility. In Amman, there is price regulation for tankers 
which tends to be ignored during periods of shortage.* "^* Despite the prescribed maximum 
price, there are no specified procedures of monitoring and consequential penalties. In 
Zambia, the price of utility-dependent point sources is r e g u la t e d . I n  Bolivia, Colombia 
and Argentina, the prices of independent providers are regula ted.Whereas  many who 
call for price regulation would welcome these exceptional cases. Solo looks at it from a 
different perspective:
Such tariff restrictions, which are meant to protect consumers, also appear to limit 
new entries and/or investment in new services. The fact that bottled water prices are 
not restricted, probably because bottled water is felt to be a luxury good, may also 
explain why over 140 producers crowd the bottled water industry in Barranquila 
while only a handful of private networks are operating. To raise capital to replace 
or build new equipment, independent operators must find new customers to pay 
connection fees up front. They cannot raise funds to pay off debt through tariffs, 
making it virtually impossible for the operator to invest in ways to improve service. 
At the same time, the tariff regimes actually discourage the provider from reducing 
costs, since lower costs will lead to lower profits.
From the current literature, it can be concluded that with the exception of independent 
providers in some urban areas, SIPs generally charge more per unit of water than official 
providers. In addition, their price is not subject to regulatory limits. In those exceptional 
areas where there is a prescribed official price limit, there is, however, limited or no 
enforcement.
2.5.5. Quality of Water Unregulated
The other problem posed by SIPs is the fact that the quality of water provided is not 
regulated. For instance, Ahmed and Sohail write in relation to SIPs in Karachi 
(Pakistan):
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A borehole generates water of inferior quality, usually unfit for drinking. However, 
since there is no monitoring of water quality and the operation of these hydrants 
takes place in connivance with the concerned government officials, the practice 
continues unabated....people are forced to use it because they have no
alternatives.*^**
In relation to tankers operating in Delhi (India), Llorente and Zerah report that “the water 
sold is often unfit for human consumption. This market is also characterized by...lack of 
regulation and control”.*^ * In some cases, it is reported that SIPs are preferred for the 
high quality of water they provide in situations where the water from the official provider 
is of doubtful quality as in the case of Dhaka, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. *^  ^ Even if generally the quality of water is not regulated, there are some 
exceptional cases. In Amman (Jordan), for example, “environmental health aspects are 
well regulated and enforced...Trucks must be registered and require a license to operate, 
and water quality certificates are issued at refill stations. Failure to comply with water 
quality standards, which are subject to routine monitoring...carried heavy fines”.*^  ^ In 
Colombia, there are standards that are supposed to improve or maintain the quality of 
drinking water provided by independent providers. An example is a requirement that 
pipes must be made of durable material, cement or PVC; because of this and other 
information obligations. Solo argues, some of the providers “have not been able to 
survive costs imposed by regulations, and in some cases they simply went 
underground”.*^"*
2.5.6. Unregulated Competition
Another point, mentioned in connection with the allegedly high price which SIPs charge, 
relates to the possibility of cartels being established among them.*^^ It is also suggested
Ahmed and Sohail (n 145) 36
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that regulations must be in place to make sure that small-scale providers are not 
concertedly fixing p r i c e s . A  related problem which is identified by Solo in the study of 
independent providers in Latin America is the tendency of official utilities to engage in 
predatory pricing: “They have no grounds to complain of unfair competition when a 
municipal utility offers water at no charge or gives financial assistance to 
consumers....[the utility in Guatemala City] provided water free to families who agreed 
to block independent providers’ attempts to run pipes down their streets”.
2.6. Regulation of Small-scale and Independent Providers
In the literature on SIPs, there appears to be a general agreement that they, or some form 
of them, are not legally recognised. In some cases, their core activity is unequivocally 
prohibited by law. In other cases, the right to supply water is given exclusively to the 
official utility and hence SIPs do not have the right to operate in areas which fall under 
the former’s exclusive service area whether or not such areas are being effectively served. 
As a result of these positions taken by the law in many countries, so it appears, the 
activities of SIPs are not regulated. The price they charge is generally uncontrolled by 
any public agency. There are generally no standards of quality imposed and enforced 
upon SIPs. Based on these observations and the significant role SIPs are playing in 
serving the urban poor, many have urged for their recognition, regulation and support.
Collignon and Vezina (n 58); and Solo (n 10) 20
Solo (nlO ) 22
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However, the literature is short on materials setting out the case for regulating price and 
quality of water. They are not regulated, but should they be? The consensus that SIPs 
should somehow be regulated appears to be unquestioned and not properly examined. 
Some researchers have considered the issue of how to effectively regulate SIPs but not in 
a comprehensive manner.
McGranahan and others argue that “the indirect costs of regulation (e.g. reduced water 
supplies) must be set against the gains (e.g. a low risk of water contamination)”.^**** By 
this, they seem to refer to the notion of subjecting particular regulatory standards and 
methods to cost-benefit analysis. Regulation should, among other things, result in 
benefits which are greater than costs. In the case at hand, the benefits are the health 
benefits resulting from improved water quality and lesser costs consequential upon 
regulated price. The costs include administrative and compliance costs. By referring to 
indirect costs, the authors seem to refer to compliance costs. Because of requirements to 
comply with regulatory standards, SIPs will incur costs of buying equipments and 
technologies. Such costs might force some of them out of the business: “one of the most 
common afflictions of...regulation is that standards are set so high that [SIPs] cannot 
comply without drastically reducing water provision”.^ *** McGranahan and others put 
emphasis on the need to consider the costs of particular regulation and urge for 
incremental standards: “under most circumstances, effective regulation is regulation that 
supports incremental improvement...and does not impose a burden on...[SIPs] that are 
providing vital services”.^ **^ One of the challenges of regulating SIPs is that which is
providers); and N  Tynan, ‘Role and Design o f  Free Entry Policies: Expanding Service Options for Low- 
income Households’ (2002) Background paper presented for a conference on Infrastructure Development—  
Private Solutions for the Poor: The Asian Perspective, 12 March, Manila (arguing against exclusivity 
privilege accorded to official providers)
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posed by their number, variety and informality/**^ This, in the opinion of McGranahan 
and others, seems to explain why attempts to regulate them were not effective, for 
example in Tanzania and Sudan/**"* The imperative to take costs into account is also 
voiced by Tremolet and Halpem who contended that costs, of not only compliance but 
also monitoring and enforcement, should be considered for each form of provider/**^ In 
any attempt to regulate SIPs, McGranahan and others argue that the possibility of 
voluntary (self) regulation should be considered; this is, however, without losing sight of 
the possibility that voluntary regulation might be used to stifle competition and hence 
charge extra-competitive prices for water of poor quality/**^
SIPs “arguably serve the largest portion of Maputo’s urban poor”/**^  However, like in 
many other countries, they are not regulated in Maputo. Recognising this, the regulator 
commissioned a research in order to formulate a strategy for extending its regulatory 
power to small-scale water providers.^*** Matsinhe and others stated that lack of clear 
regulatory frameworks endangers their sustainability.^**  ^ The regulatory framework they 
have suggested has two elements. First they proposed a comprehensive licensing regime
Kariuki and Schwartz (n 69) 8 (stating that it is “easier to deal with small number o f  large enterprises 
than to regulate a maiket o f  small-scale providers”); and Sansom (n 44) 215 (“The regulation o f  
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that applies equally to all forms of SIPs/*** By making the licensing regime applicable to 
all, the authors have ignored their diversity. In granting or denying licences the regulatory 
authority should, Matsinhe and others argue, “follow a real demand as expressed by 
consumers” and “follow proved managerial capacity of potential candidates”/** In this 
connection, Matsinhe and others also argued for reconsidering the tariff structure of the 
formal utility as far as those SIPs buying their water in bulk from the utility are 
concerned. One of the factors that constrain the operation of SIPs relates to tariff. The 
tariff structure used by utilities in many developing countries is such that people who 
share taps or people who resell water are discouraged.^*^ As a solution, they 
recommended a single price tariff structure.^*^ The second element of the regulatory 
framework relates to allocation of regulatory powers among various institutions. They 
called for decentralisation of the power to regulate SIPs. This is in order to take 
advantage of an already existing local institution by the name Water Committee. Water 
committees are established to exercise supervisory functions over standpipe attendants.^*"* 
They also have a role in the selection of attendants and in the management of finances/*^ 
Taking advantage of these community-based organisations, Matsinhe and others 
recommended that they be given some regulatory functions in the form of arbitration of 
disputes between residents and licensed SIPs.^*  ^ According to their model, the main 
regulatory agency is expected to “define operational and performance norms while the 
Municipality will assume the responsibility for issuing licenses and implementing the 
regulatory functions”.^ *^  In outlining the strategy for integrating SIPs into the formal
Ibid 847 
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framework, Matsinhe and others have relied on a clause in the contract between the 
regulator and the private concessionaire (in Maputo) which entitles the former to appoint 
a third party to areas where the latter is not able to serve/**
There are also some other authors who commented, in passing, on certain aspects of 
regulating SIPs. In its Field Note on Manila, the Water and Sanitation Program of the 
World Bank states that SIPs operate in competition with one another and hence there is 
no need, at least not a pressing one, for regulating price:
Whether the tariffs charged by small-scale water providers should be regulated 
depends mainly on whether they are excessive. A review of the average price per 
cubic meter of water charged by small-scale water providers provides little 
evidence that [they] charge excessive prices. Consequently, the need for their 
economic regulation may not be as pressing as often thought. In fact, from the 
current pricing policies of the small-scale providers investigated in the study, it is 
not obvious whether the cost of regulation would exceed its benefits. It seems the 
threat of competition, either from the concessionaires or from other small-scale 
providers in the market, is a good substitute for economic regulation, as it keeps the 
price of water competitive, albeit not necessarily low.^*^
In addition to throwing doubt on the propriety of regulating prices charged by the SIPs, 
on the ground that competition among them would curb any excesses, the above Field 
Note has also remarked on the need to consider the costs of regulation; the idea being 
even if there were good enough grounds for controlling the price charged by SIPs, the 
costs of doing so might weigh heavily against the benefits.
Discussing if there is any case for regulating the quality of water, the same study took 
account of the issue of whether consumers have found it safe to drink or not:
Another rationale for regulating [SIPs], however, is rooted in public health 
concerns over the quality of water they provide...the Sanitation Code of the 
Philippines requires all municipalities to have a local drinking water quality 
monitoring committee, and other legislations provide for routine water safety 
testing. In general, however, the enforcement of regulatory provisions requires
A similar ground is used by a WSP study o f  the water seetor in Manila to urge for the reeognition and 
integration o f  small-scale providers. There are two private operators o f  the public water supply system. In 
both cases, the concession contracts allow service delivery by third parties as a means to expand coverage. 
On that basis, it is remarked that the private operators could collaborate with small-scale water providers 
which are operating in Manila, albeit in an informal manner. Any such collaboration has to be approved by 
the regulator, however. See WSP (n 49) 7
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improvement. Nonetheless, it is interesting that the maioritv of small-scale water 
providers’ consumers tend to rate the quality of the water high, with about 80 
percent customers characterizing the water supplied to them as drinkable (emphasis 
added).^""
It must be remarked at this point that the fact that the majority of the customers have 
found the water drinkable is not an adequate ground to rule out the possibility of 
regulating the safety of water. Often it is the case that safety and public perception of 
safety do not coincide.^^* McIntosh also asks the same question (is there any need to 
regulate SIPs) and answers it in the negative:
Evidence suggests that there is not. That would probably drive many of them out of 
business. To a large extent, the market promotes regulation through customer 
choice concerning price and quality of water. Competition is strong. There is, 
however, a need to recognize SIPs officially
Likewise, Collignon and Vezina argue that competition among SIPs would keep price 
under control and hence no need for public authorities to regulate SIPs.^^  ^ In relation to 
this point, Sansom remarks that “it would be impractical for a regulator to take into 
account the varying costs of a wide range of [SIPs] in a city and then regulate those 
[SIPs] on a fair basis. Economic regulation of smaller informal [SIPs] is unlikely to be an 
efficient use of resources”.^ "^* Gerlach remarks that the absence of economic regulation of 
SIPs “would of course be expected for a (largely) competitive market, where the main 
justification for regulatory intervention is absent”.^ ^^
It is stated previously that in some countries resale of water is prohibited by law, though 
the public authorities seem reluctant to enforce the prohibition. One initial response, it is 
argued, is to get rid of this legal prohibition and allow the operation of SIPs who are 
involved in the resale of water. In Jakarta, where household resale of water was illegal.
Ibid
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the government took a measure of legalising it in 1990 and the result, according to Crane, 
has been a net benefit to consumers in the form of reduced price and increased 
consumption of water/^^ For Jaglin, however, mere legalisation of SIPs is not sufficient; 
in addition, they should be subject to price and quality controls:
Legalization of local water markets and recognition of private operators are not, 
however, sufficient measures...In the absence of adequate regulation, this informal 
economy is often accompanied by substantial health risks, seasonal inflationary 
spirals and speculative mechanisms which penalize particularly the most vulnerable 
households. It is common for consumers in the resale circuit to pav much more for 
a cubic metre of water than those who pay for the public service... ^
Karikuki and Acolor describe the framework established by the public utility in Accra, 
Ghana, to regularise and control the activities of the water tankers in the city.^^* The 
utility has encouraged the establishment of three associations of tankers. Any person 
intending to operate water tankers has to first secure a licence to that effect and become a 
member of one of the associations. The public utility has made a contract with each 
association. The contract provides that certain measures relating to quality and pricing 
has to be complied with: “for example, water tankers may no longer be used for fuel 
delivery and members’ tankers are to be regularly inspected for cleanliness by their 
association”.^ ^^  A failure to comply with such measures by one of the members results in 
the whole association being banned from the business; this is an introduction of joint and 
several liability in the regulatory arena. In return for the continued compliance by 
members of the association with such measures, the utility provides metered service 
points. In addition, the utility recommends certain tariff rates to be used by tankers. 
However, Kariuki and Acolor acknowledge that controlling the price the final consumer 
pays has been difficult.
See R Crane, ‘Water Markets, Market Reform and the Urban Poor; Results from Jakarta, Indonesia’ 
(1994) 22 World Development 71. This legalisation is recently reported to have been suspended to prevent 
standpipe operator’s perceived profit losses, see Gerlach and Franceys (n 142) 1234
Jaglin (n 23) 243
Kariuki and Acolor (n 206)
Ibid
66
2.7. Conclusion
It follows from the discussions in the previous sections that SIPs play an important role in 
serving a large proportion of the urban poor in developing countries. And for the 
foreseeable future, these providers seem to be the only source of water for these groups of 
customers. The failure of formal utilities to expand and improve their services and the 
various features of SIPs that make them rather attractive to the urban poor support this. It 
is also clear that, except for some of them, SIPs are not recognised, supported and 
regulated. These constrain their ability suggesting that, with proper legal and regulatory 
framework, SIPs could make further contribution in the supply of services, as essential as 
water, to the urban population. The literature is full of case studies describing their role in 
different urban areas of the developing world and concurring, among other things, on the 
fact that these providers are not regulated and hence should be regulated. With the 
exception of those discussed in the previous section, however, there appears to be a 
dearth of works that examine to what extent regulation is necessary and, to the extent that 
it is necessary, how effective regulation could be organised. The two general questions 
that are given inadequate examination so far and that are examined in this work are: to 
what extent is there a need for regulation of SIPs? How could SIPs be best regulated? In 
the following chapters, these and other related questions are examined in detail. As part 
of the effort to examine these questions, the next chapter outlines the normative 
framework that is used to address the above questions.
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Chapter Three: Regulation of Water Providers: The Normative 
Framework
3.1. Introduction
In the water supply literature concerning small-scale and independent providers (SIPs), 
presented in chapter two, there appears a consensus that they are not but should have 
been regulated. Some went a step further and considered, if not adequately and 
comprehensively, how best to regulate and integrate them into formal regulatory 
frameworks. The general objective of this research is to examine whether and how law 
might be used to achieve safe and affordable water by SIPs. Specifically, the regulatory 
role of law with respect to SIPs is explored and analysed. At the outset of projects such as 
this, it is essential to have a normative framework within which existing regulatory 
frameworks are evaluated and recommendations made. The objective of this chapter is to 
outline this normative framework.
Section two provides, after reviewing some of the meanings given to the term, a working 
definition of regulation. It characterises regulation as a system of rules and as a tool of 
government. By characterising regulation as a system of rules, the section sets it apart 
from taxes and subsidies which might be used for the same purpose. And by 
characterising it as a tool of government, it draws a distinction between formal and 
informal regulatory rules. In addition, section two discusses the distinctions between 
private and public regulation. Private regulation is that part of private law which has 
regulatory purposes, changing and restricting individual behaviour and freedom. Section 
three discusses the various forms of public regulation. Section four presents the 
normative theory of regulation. This normative theory is known as the public interest 
theory: regulation should primarily be concerned with correction of market failures. 
According to this theory, market failures which cannot be corrected by private regulation 
constitute a prima facie case of regulation. This prima facie case will be transformed into 
unassailable case when there is a cost-effective regulatory instrument. A good regulation, 
therefore, has four elements. First, it is aimed at correction of market failures. Second, the 
market failures identified cannot be corrected by private regulation. Third, cost-effective 
instruments can be found to transform the regulatory objectives. In addition, there are a 
number of process values which regulation needs to possess to be considered ‘good’ or 
‘smart’. These are outlined in section four. Section five concludes.
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3.2. Regulation Defined
3.2.1. An Overview of Definitions
The task of “defining regulation is by no means a simple matter”* and yet the literature is 
filled with several definitions on which there is no recognisable agreement. For example, 
the term ‘regulation’ could be used to refer to the form of a rule: secondary legislation 
promulgated by lawmaking organs, other than the legislature, based on delegated power.^ 
Suffice it to say that the term is not used in this sense. Prosser observes that there are 
differences between Europe and the United States in the usage of the term.^ Black writes: 
“regulation is not a concept that travels well...different socio-linguistic communities 
have different terms, with different connotations and meaning”."* A number of disciplines 
have contributed to the growing literature on the subject of regulation: law, economics, 
political science, sociology, history, psychology, geography, management and social 
administration.^ The study and design of regulation requires the input of different 
disciplines.^ The input of different disciplines, considered by Baldwin and Cave, and 
Ogus as desirable and necessary, contributed. Black opines, to the lack of consensus on a 
single definition.^ The resulting ‘conceptual confusion’ ought to be clarified, for “any 
debate about whether there is regulation, whether there should be, and the forms that it 
could take will be confused and stultified”.* Taking this advice, a working definition is 
formulated. In addition, the place of regulation will be located within the larger system of 
social control and public policy tools (instruments).
Prosser writes that there are two extreme definitions of regulation and, from the two, 
extracts, what he calls, the ‘core conception’ of regulation: “interventions which affect
' T Prosser, Law and the Regulators (1997) 4 
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the operation of markets through command and control”/  It is not immediately clear as to 
whether all kinds of interventions which affect the operation of markets are considered 
regulation. For example, taxes, apart from generating revenue for the state, are used in 
order to manipulate the operation of markets.*** Baldwin and Cave identify three different 
senses in which the term is used:
J s  a specific set o f commands—where regulation involves the promulgation of a 
binding set of rules to be applied by a body devoted to this purpose...
As deliberate state influence—where regulation has a more broad sense and covers 
all state actions designed to influence industrial or social behaviour. Thus, 
command-based regimes would come within this usage but so also would a range 
of other modes of influence—for instance those based on the use of economic 
incentives (e.g. taxes or subsidies); contractual powers; deployment of resources; 
franchises; the supply of information or other techniques.
As all forms o f social control or influence—where all mechanism affecting 
behaviour—whether these be state-derived or from other sources (e.g. markets)— 
are deemed regulatory. Within this usage of the term ‘regulation’ there is no 
requirement that the regulatory effects of a mechanism are deliberate or designed 
rather than merely incidental to other objectives.**
Based on the above senses in which the term is used. Black formulates three definitions:
In the first, regulation is the promulgation of rules by government accompanied by 
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, usually assumed to be performed 
through a specialist public agency. In the second, it is any form of direct state 
intervention in the economy, whatever form that intervention might take. In the 
third, regulation is all mechanisms of social control or influence affecting all 
aspects of behaviour from whatever source, whether they are intentional or not. ^
The first definition provides regulation as an activity that involves formulation and 
application of rules by government. This is general, for it does not specify the purpose 
and type of the rules. There are different kinds of rules with different purposes.*^ It does
® Prosser (n 1)4-5
See, for example, AI Ogus, ‘Corrective Taxes and Financial Impositions as Regulatory Instruments’ 
(1998) 61 Modern Law Review 767; and AI Ogus, ‘Nudging and Rectifying : The U se o f  Fiscal 
Instruments for Regulatory Purposes’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies 245
Baldwin and Cave (n 5) 2
Black (n 4)11
RC Elliekson, Order without Law  (1991) 132-136; Baldwin (n 2) 7-15; and W Twining and D Miers, 
How to Do Things with Rules: A Primer o f  Interpretation (1999) 123-156
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not, for example, tell us whether or not a government enacting law of contracts is 
involved in the act of regulating. Regulation is a distinguishing feature of certain rules 
only. Consequently, this definition is deficient, for it does not distinguish rulemaking and 
application having regulatory purposes from those which have other purposes such as 
enabling or facilitating transactions.
The second definition is even broader. It defines regulation as governmental intervention 
in the market. However, it does not distinguish between the different ways governments 
intervene in the market. Nor does it indicate the purposes of the intervention. It is similar 
to the first in that it associates regulatory activity with the state (government). The two 
definitions are also similar in their generality regarding the purpose and the form of the 
activity; rulemaking and enforcement in the first and market intervention in the second 
definition. Yet the second definition differs from the first in that it does not stipulate rules 
as defining features of the activity of regulation. This is important because government 
intervention might at times not primarily involve formulation and enforcement of rules.
Black draws a distinction between state-centred and decentred concepts of regulation.*"* 
The first definition above is what Black characterises as state-centred; the identity of 
regulation is defined in terms of the state. Anything which is not done by the state does 
not qualify as regulation. According to the state centred conception, the term regulation 
refers to governmental activities of controlling, guiding, directing or influencing the 
behaviour of individuals. On the other hand, a decentred concept of regulation takes the 
objective of the activity instead of the source as a defining feature of regulation. Hence, 
any system or activity is deemed regulatory in so far as it is designed to influence or has 
the effect of influencing individual behaviour. From the above three definitions, the first 
two are state centred; the last is decentred definition.
3.2.2. Regulation as a System of Rules
In this research, two characteristics are taken to define regulation. First, regulation refers 
to a system of rules. As such regulation involves formulation and enforcement of rules. 
Regulation as a system of rules is not necessarily associated with government and hence 
there are nongovernmental systems consisting and involving formulation and 
enforcement of rules. However, this research is not concerned with all systems of rules. It
'"B lack(n4)
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is concerned with governmental rules and systems. Hence the second defining feature of 
regulation as conceived and used here is its association with government. In this sense, 
the research is based on a centred conception of regulation.*^ This is not, however, 
sufficient; what distinguishes regulation from other governmental activities should also 
be discussed. The distinguishing feature is its purpose or effect: influencing or directing 
the behaviour of individuals. Influencing or directing the behaviour of individuals is not 
by itself an end; the ends are the essential purposes of collective action, government. 
Regulation is nothing but one tool of government. In order to have a clear understanding 
of the concept of regulation, it is important to consider regulation in comparison with 
other tools of government. In this section, the characteristics of regulation as a system of 
rules are discussed further and in the subsequent section, the characteristics of regulation 
as one tool of government is discussed.
In Order without Law, Elliekson sought to establish that at times people solve their 
disputes without reference to formal rules. *^  To this effect, he develops a classification of 
all systems through which individuals control themselves and one another.*^ This 
research is not concerned with informal rules; yet it is important to set out the place of 
regulation within this larger framework. The larger framework consists of five systems. 
The common denominator is the fact that they all consist of rules. Twining and Miers 
define rules as “general norms mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation”.** Rules are normative (prescriptive) statements which set out permissible or 
prohibitive or mandatory courses of actions in situations generally defined.
Twining and Miers noted four aspects of rules:
(a) A rule is normative or prescriptive, that is to say it is concerned with ought 
(not), may (not) or can (not), in relation to behaviour, rather than with factual 
description of behaviour.
(b) A rule is general in that it is concerned with types of behaviour in types of 
situation or circumstances; a prescription governing a unique event is not a rule.
(c) Rules both guide and serve as standards for behaviour, that is to say activities, 
acts or omissions...
Ibid
Elliekson (n 13) 
Ibid 123-136
18 Twining and Miers (n 13) 123
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(d) Rules provide one kind of justifying reason for decision or action. When asked, 
‘Why did you do this?’ the actor may justify the action by reference to a rule, 
for example, ‘Because I was required/permitted/empowered to do so under 
Regulation...’*^
Table 3.1: Rule-based social control systems
CONTROLLER RULES SANCTION COMBINED
SYSTEM
First-Party Control 
(Actor)
Personal
ethics
Self-sanction Self-control
Second-Party Control 
(Person Acted Upon)
Contracts Personal self- 
help
Promisee-enforced
contracts
Social Forces (Third 
Party Control)
Norms Vicarious self- 
help
Informal control
Organisation (Third 
Party Control)
Organisation
rules
Organisation
enforcement
Organisation
control
Government (Third 
Party Control)
Law State
enforcement
Legal system
Source: Elliekson (n 13) 131
It is possible that water providers are constrained by their own ethical rules or rules of an 
association to which they belong.^** It is also possible that they are controlled by informal 
norms. However, this research examines the system of rules set by the state to control 
water providers. The recommendations, however, may involve complementing these 
governmental rules with, for example, organisational rules in the form of self-regulatory 
agencies. The system of rules to be explored must be distinguished from commendatory 
or enabling rules. It is useful in this regard to consider a distinction drawn by Baldwin:
Rules based on the prescriptive model involve instruction plus some kind of 
sanction. This may be direct, as with criminal imprisonment and fines, or it may be 
indirect where, for example, an enforcement official is given discretion to apply an 
administrative sanctions or order, failure to comply with which may involve an 
offence. In contrast commendatory or enabling rules are used so as to organize, 
enable, or recommend a course of action. Failure to follow such advice will not 
necessarilv involve direct or indirect legal liabilitv (emphasis added).
Ibid 123-124
J Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59 Modem Law Review 24,26-27
Baldwin (n 2) 10; and B Morgan and K Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and 
Materials (2007)
73
Although rules of law of contracts or company law may have impacts on activities of 
SIPs, the research is concerned with regulatory rules, those designed primarily to 
constrain their operation. Law of contracts, restricted to its traditional role of enabling or 
facilitating transactions, is not regulatory. There are at least two qualifications to this 
assertion. First, modem day law of contracts, apart from merely enforcing private 
agreements, is also concerned with protecting consumers and other contractual parties 
supposed to have a weaker bargaining position.^^ This role of law of contracts is clearly 
regulatory. Second, in some continental systems where the distinction between private 
and public laws has practical legal consequences because of different legal doctrines and 
court systems, a separate branch of law and courts govern contracts called administrative 
contracts. This branch of law has regulatory elements and in fact contracts are the 
primary regulatory instmments of water providers in France.^^ It may also be noted here 
that tort law is considered regulatory to the extent that it constrains individual freedom.
Regulation for the purpose of this research can, therefore, be defined as a system of 
formulation and enforcement of rules to control, constrain and guide human behaviour. 
As such it involves restricting freedom.^"* The state can achieve the same purpose, 
however, with a number of other tools such as financial incentives and persuasion. The 
use of these tools is not considered regulatory for this purpose. But the discussion in the 
last two chapters may suggest the use of these non-regulatory tools to achieve certain 
public interest objectives. The following section locates the place of mles in state’s tool 
shed.
P Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory, and Policy in the UK  (2001) 8- 
15. For a discussion o f  law o f  contracts as regulatory law, see H Collins, Regulating Contracts (2003)
See, for example, A  Eberhard, ‘Infrastructure Regulation in Developing Countries: An Exploration of 
Hybrid and Transitional M odels’ (2007) PPIAF (World Bank) Working Paper No. 4
E Groom, J Halpem and E Ehrhardt, ‘Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation o f  Water and 
Sanitation Services’ (2006) 6 Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board discussion Paper Series 8 (stating 
“regulation means restrictions on the normal freedom o f  operation o f  people and enterprises”)
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3.2.3. Regulation as a Tool of Government
Government tools, also known as policy instruments, are “tools or instruments through 
which governments seek to influence citizen behaviour and achieve policy purposes”?^ 
Howlett defines policy instrument as a “generic term provided to encompass the myriad 
techniques at the disposal of governments to implement their public policy objectives” 
and these techniques are different from one another in their complexity and age.^^ It 
should be noted that not all sorts of government tools attempt to achieve policy purposes 
by influencing the behaviour of individuals. In this respect, therefore, Howlett’s assertion 
is general enough to encompass all kinds of government tools. Salamon’s definition of 
tools or instruments is more general than the above two in that he disassociates tools from 
governments: “identifiable method through which collective action is structured to 
address a public problem” Governments assume sets of functions variable across time 
and space; as its functions change so do the tools or instruments.^* There are different 
ways of classifying government tools.^^ McDonnell and Elmore classify government 
tools into four: mandates, inducements, capacity-building and system changing.*® 
Mandates involve formulation and enforcement of rules coercing or affecting 
performance.*^ Inducements involve transfer of money in exchange for goods or 
services.*^ It may be noted that inducements are often accompanied by rules but these 
rules, instead of mandating individual action, are often meant to enable and facilitate the
A Schneider and H Ingram, ‘Behavioral Assumptions o f  Policy Tools’ (1990) 52 Journal o f  Politics 510, 
511
M Howlett, ‘Policy Instruments, Policy Styles, and Policy Implementation: National Approaches to 
Theories o f  Instrument Choice’ (1991) 19 Policy Studies Journal 1 ,2
LM Salamon, ‘The New Governance and the Tools o f  Public Action: An Introduction’ (2001) 28 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 1611,1641-1642
P Lascournes and PL Gales, ‘An Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments—  
From the Nature o f  Instruments to the Sociology o f  Public Policy Instruments’ (2007) 20 Governance: An 
International Journal o f  Policy, Administration, and Institutions 1, 2; and Salamon (n 27) 1612
Howlett (n 26) 2
LM McDonnell and RF Elmore, ‘Getting the Job Done: Alternative Policy Instruments’ (1987) 9 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 133,134
Ibid 138
Ibid 138-139
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administration of inducements.** Capacity building, like inducement, involves transfer of 
money but as an investment for future benefits.*"* Inducements and mandates are said to 
have proximate and tangible effects; capacity-building has distant, uncertain and 
ambiguous effects.** All these four categories of instruments may be used to address the 
same goal; in some cases only one or a combination of them is used.** Schneider and 
Ingram used the behavioural assumption of tools to classify them into five categories: 
authority; incentive; capacity; symbolic and hortatory; and learning tools.*^ Authority 
tools are “statements backed by the legitimate authority of government that grant 
permission, prohibit, or require action under designated circumstances”.** Incentive tools 
on the other hand use rewards or punishments to induce compliance.*® Capacity tools, 
according to Schneider and Ingram, “provide information, training, education, and 
resources to enable individuals, groups, or agencies to make decisions or carry out 
activities”."*® A classification that sheds light on the distinction between regulation and 
other tools of government is that provided by Salamon."** He writes that the multi­
dimensionality of tools and the fact that tools have both defining and design features 
complicates the task of classification."** What is not included in Table 3.2 is the use of 
information and persuasion to influence the behaviour of individuals. Salamon presents 
prohibition as a product of social regulation and fair prices as that of economic 
regulation. This characterisation is misleading for four reasons.
Ibid 138 
Ibid 139 
Ibid 139 
Ibid 144
Schneider and Ingram (n 25) 514 
Ibid
Ibid 515 
Ibid 517 
Salamon (n 27)
Ibid 1644
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Table 3.2: Types of policy instruments
Tool Product/Activity Vehicle Delivery System
Direct
government
Good or service Direct provision Public agency
Social
regulation
Prohibition Rule Public agency/regulatee
Economic
regulation
Fair prices Entry and rate 
controls
Regulatory commission
Contracting Good or service Contract and cash 
payment
Business, non-profit 
organization
Grant Good or service Grant award/cash 
payment
Lower level of 
government, non-profit
Direct loan Cash Loan Public agency
Loan guarantee Cash Loan Commercial bank
Insurance Protection Insurance policy Public agency
Tax
expenditure
Cash, incentives Tax Tax system
Fees, charges Financial penalty Tax Tax system
Liability law Social
protections
Tort law Court system
Government
corporations
Good or service Direct provision/loan Quasi-public agency
Vouchers Good or serviee Consumer subsidy Public agency/consumer
Source: Salamon (n 27)
First, prohibition is not an end on its own. The end products of social regulation include a 
clean environment and healthy public. Social regulation uses prohibition to achieve these 
ends. Second, taken as a means, prohibition is just one of many. Social regulation 
generally uses rule-based mechanisms including prohibition, entry control and other rules 
which prescribe courses of action on the regulated. In this regard, therefore, there is not 
much difference between social and economic regulation. Third, Salamon presents public 
agencies as delivery systems of economic and social regulation and courts as that of 
liability law. This is misleading, for courts are also involved in economic and social 
regulation either as primary forum for dispute resolution or as forum for review. Fourth, 
Salamon presents liability law as something distinct from economic and social regulation. 
As it will be discussed in subsequent sections, liability law can be taken as one form of 
regulation.
The utility of the above table is, however, in its ability to draw a contrast between 
regulation which is a rule-based tool on the one hand and other tools which rely on
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expenditure and financial incentives. When setting about to solve a specific problem, 
government has generally two options: to get the job done using the human and financial 
resources it commands or to make people do the job. Assume that there is a serious 
shortage of street lights restricting the movement of people during the night and attracting 
criminals. The state may use any one or two of the tools in the above table. It could 
choose direct government where one department will be responsible for installing and 
maintaining street lights. Or it could use contracting where a private company will be 
paid to install and maintain street lights. Or it could use social regulation where a rule 
will be passed which requires every household to light that part of the public way it 
borders. Or the government could subsidise households which decide to light part of a 
public way which they border. Though, in some circumstances, a particular tool may be 
the most suitable, in most cases tools are considered to be substitutable and hence the task 
is to choose the best one. The literature on the subject identifies about five criteria to be 
used in tools choice: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability and political 
legitimacy."** Regulation, broadly speaking, refers to the option of making people, instead 
of government, solve a certain problem. The government can use what are generally 
called fiscal instruments to influence the behaviour of individuals or it can use rules and 
associated sanctions. For the purpose of this paper, however, the term regulation is used 
in a sense that it refers to the use by the government of rules and associated sanctions to 
effect changes in the behaviour of individuals in order to achieve certain public purposes. 
The use of fiscal instruments and persuasion (education) are discussed, in this research, 
only incidentally.
3.2.4. Working Definition
For the purpose of this research regulation is defined as a rule-based governmental 
system, which puts limitations on individual freedom with the view to achieving public 
policy objectives. Three attributes of this definition determine the scope of the research. 
Regulation primarily involves formulation and implementation of rules. Rules are 
normative statements of acceptable courses of action backed by sanctions. Hence, it does 
not cover the use of financial incentives, education or persuasion. Second, it is a 
governmental system. Therefore, it excludes rule-based systems in which government 
does not play leading roles such as rules of private associations. Third, this rule-based 
governmental system is distinct from other rule-based systems which have enabling
Ibid 1647
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purposes like traditional rules of law of contracts in that it operates by limiting or 
restricting individual freedom/"*
Some present ‘regulation’ in such a way that criminal law is excluded from the domain."** 
However, a close scrutiny of criminal law suggests that it is in fact regulatory law. It is to 
be admitted that the role of government is limited to providing an effective enforcement 
system and investigating and prosecuting violations of criminal law. Administrative 
agencies are not often involved in formulating rules of criminal law which are formulated 
by the primary lawmaking organ. Criminal law is in fact the earliest form of regulatory 
law."** Matters which are now considered within the province of criminal law were once a 
matter of private matter; there was no organised government machinery for investigation 
and prosecution; private individual aggrieved by the violation would bring court actions 
and the proceeds would go to the victims."** Criminal law in its formative period was, 
therefore, like the modem day tort law. That has now changed; although one can observe 
remnants of this history in modem day criminal law where under certain conditions 
private prosecution is allowed."** The following section presents how tort law as 
regulatory instmment operates in a manner different from public regulation.
3.2.5. Private versus Public Regulation
Regulation, as defined in the previous section, is broad enough to include two general 
categories; private and public. The distinction between private and public regulation
Stone defines regulation as “a state imposed limitation on the discretion that may be exercised by 
individuals or organizations, which is supported by the threat o f  sanction”. WK Viscusi, JE Harrington, Jr. 
and JW Vernon, Economics o f  Regulation and Antitrust (2005) 357 citing A Stone, Regulation and Its 
Alternatives (1982) 3
See, for example, N  Frank, From Criminal Law to Regulation: A Historical Analysis o f  Health and 
Safety Law (1986)
For discussion o f  criminal law as an enforcement o f  regulatory standards, see AI Ogus, ‘Enforcing 
Regulation; Do We Need the Criminal law?’ in H Sjogren and G Skogh, New Perspectives on Economic 
Crime (2004)
D Friedman, ‘Private Creation and Enforcement o f  Law: A Historical Case’ (1979) 8 Journal o f  Legal 
Studies 399,401
See, for example, A  Sidman, “The Outmoded Concept o f  Private Prosecutions” (1976) 25 American 
University Law Review 754 (arguing that private prosecution “is outdated, unnecessary, unethical, and 
perhaps unconstitutional”)
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corresponds to the distinction between private and public laws. In the common law 
tradition, private regulation refers to the common law, particularly tort, and is usually 
contrasted with regulation implying that regulation refers to public regulation. Tort law is 
depicted here as private regulation. Some legal scholars argue that the main purpose of 
tort law is not regulation; it is rather concerned with corrective justice, loss spreading, 
distributive justice, or/and compensation."*® On the other hand, others contend that it is 
primarily concerned with influencing the behaviour of individuals; the compensation is 
awarded to provide incentive for victims to bring tortfeasors to courts.*® The research 
subscribes to the moderate view that tort law has regulatory effect in that it deters 
individuals from acts considered torts and at the same time it has the purpose of 
compensating victims.**
Degree of state’s involvement; The difference between private and public regulation 
mainly lies in the extent to which the state participates in the development and 
enforcement of the rules. In private regulation, the primary lawmaking body sets specific 
rules of behaviour; their application and interpretation is left to private litigation. In 
common law systems, much of what constitutes tort law is developed by the courts. Apart 
from formulating the rules of behaviour, the state also provides the court system for 
resolving disputes.** On the other hand, though public regulation could take various 
forms, its core characteristic is that it involves a more active role of state. It is a 
trademark of public regulation that one or several government agencies are involved in its 
formulation, interpretation and enforcement. The procedures in public are also different
See, for example, EJ Weinrib, The Idea o f  Private Law  (1995) (arguing that tort law is exclusively 
concerned with corrective justice). For an argument that tort law is concerned with corrective and 
distributive justice, see JL Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992); J Coleman, The Practice o f  Principle: In 
Defense o f  a Pragmatist Approach to Tort Law Theory (2001); and J Coleman and A Ripstein, “Mischief 
and Misfortune” (1995) 41 McGill Law Review 91. For an argument that tort law is concerned with a 
number o f  other aims including justice, compensation and deterrence, see G Williams, “The Aims o f  the 
Law o f  Tort” (1951) 4 Current Legal Problems 137.
P Cane, ‘Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations’ (2001) 41 Washburn Law Journal 427, 
434
See, for similar position. Ibid 428 (stating that “the most common view is that tort law operates both as a 
compensation mechanism and as a risk-control (deterrence) mechanism”)
JRS Prichard and MJ Trebilcock, ‘Class Actions and Private Law Enforcement’ (1978) 27 University o f  
New Brunswick Law Journal 5, 5; and WM Landes and RA Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement o f Law’ 
(1975) 4 Journal o f  Legal Studies 1 , 1
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from private regulation.** Whether a given rule is privately or publicly enforced does not 
always determine if it is private or public regulation, for public regulation could also be 
enforced by private parties.*"* Criminal law sometimes allows private prosecution. 
Another example is the treble-damage rule which allows individuals to claim more than 
compensatory damage for anti-competitive practices. Private enforcement of public laws 
may be explicitly permitted by the legislature or implied into the statute by the courts.** 
However, there is no general agreement as to the desirability of private enforcement of 
public laws.**
Ex post versus ex ante control: Private regulation is an ex post regulation in the sense 
that the issue of liability comes into picture when harm is caused by a conduct deviating 
from a socially desirable course. In the absence of harm or injury, issues of private 
regulation do not arise despite a deviant behaviour. This is without losing sight of the use 
of preventive remedy, injunction, in tort law. By contrast, in public regulation, issues of 
enforcement and sanction arise when there is violation of the rules of conduct whether or 
not such violations have resulted in harm. In that sense, therefore, public regulation 
provides an ex ante control system.** Wittman puts the same distinction in another way: 
“a legal system may monitor and punish speeding (an input into the production of 
accidents) and/or monitor and punish for the accident (the output)”.** Private regulation 
can be considered as laws monitoring and punishing accidents (outputs) and public
S Rose-Ackerman, ‘Regulation and the Law o f  Torts’ (1991) 81 American Economic Review 54, 54
Prichard and Trebilcock (n 52) 5-6
MC Stephenson, ‘Public Regulation o f  Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role o f  
Administrative Agencies’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 93 (arguing that the public regulatory agency, as 
opposed to the courts and the legislature, is better placed to permit private actions to enforce public laws)
JR Hay and A Shleifer, ‘Private Enforcement o f  Public Laws: A Theory o f  Legal Reform’ (1998) 88 
American Economic Review 398 (arguing for the use o f  private actions to enforce public regulations in 
Russia to overcome limited public resources and corruption by public enforcers); WM Landes and RA 
Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement o f  Law’ (1975) 4 Journal o f  Legal Studies 1 (arguing private enforcement 
results in over-enforcement); and AM Polinsky, ‘Private versus Public Enforcement o f  Fines’ (1980) 9 
Journal o f  Legal Studies 105 (concluding that private enforcement will generally result in under­
enforcement)
S Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation o f  Safety’ (1984) 13 Journal o f  Legal Studies 357, 357; 
and S Rose-Ackerman, ‘Regulation and the Law o f  Torts’ (1991) 81 American Economic Review 54, 54
D Wittman, ‘Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring’ 
(1977) 6 Journal o f  Legal Studies 193,193
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regulation monitoring and punishing inputs to accidents. It should, however, be noted that 
criminal law, a kind of public regulation, comes into operation in most cases when a 
behaviour has resulted in a harm; in fact most crimes are defined in terms of not specified 
behaviour but harmful results. There are also instances where acts are criminalised on the
ground they are inputs to undesirable result.*® Table 3.3 summarises the distinction 
between private and public regulation.
Table 3.3: Comparison between private and public regulation
CHARACTERISTICS LIABILITY SYSTEM REGULATORY SYSTEM
Actors Private parties (not always) Public authorities
Actions Suits Fixing standards and controls
Effects Indirect way to modify 
behaviours by deterrent 
effects
Direct way to modify 
behaviours by requirements
Structure Decentralised Centralised
Focus Parties in the suits Whole population
Decision makers Judges Specialists
Influence Independent Political pressure
Source: Boyer and Porrini (n 116)
There is no water-tight compartment between private and public regulation. There is now 
a tendency to ‘privatise’ public regulation. Privatisation of public regulation is manifested 
through a number of institutional arrangements. The idea of self-regulation is an obvious 
example. In addition, allowing the involvement of private individuals in proactive 
enforcement of publicly formulated standards is another example. In developed legal 
systems, private citizens are also involved in the formulation of regulatory standards 
whether as a matter of right or discretion of the regulator. In addition, there are various 
ways in which private regulation may interact with public regulation.*® First, in some
® The law o f  criminal attempts, conspiracy and endangerment offences are examples.
KS Abraham, ‘The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An Analytical 
Overview’ (2002) 21 Washburn Law Journal 379, 391-295; and P Cane, ‘Tort Law as Regulation’ (2002) 
31 Common Law World Review 305, 319-328 (discussing the interaction between tort and public 
regulation in England and Australia)
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cases, public regulation could pre-empt any existing causes of action in private law.** 
Second, compliance with standards of public regulation might be recognised as an 
affirmative defence in private litigation.** Third, non-compliance with public standards 
could be recognised as prima facie negligence or negligence per se.**
3.3. Forms of Public Regulation
3.3.1. Economic and Social Regulation
The first distinction that can be drawn is between economic and social regulation. The 
exact dividing line between economic and social regulation remains unclear.*"* 
Nevertheless, it can generally be said that economic regulation refers to restrictions on 
decisions of firms and individuals over such economic variables as price, quantity, entry 
and exit, advertising, quality of services and investment.** By contrast, what are often 
grouped into social regulation are a range of restrictions having the objective of 
improving public health and environmental quality. Another distinction is that economic 
regulation is often restricted to specified activities and hence it is activity (sector)- 
specific; by contrast social regulation is generally applicable to a range of activities.** 
This is not, however, absolute as rules of economic regulation, like minimum wage and 
antitrust policy, are also generally applicable.
Water providers are often subject to economic, environmental and social regulations. The 
exact institutional framework is different across countries. For example, in England and 
Wales, the economic regulator of water utilities is different from the environmental 
regulator. The environmental regulator is also different from the public health regulator. 
In United States, drinking water quality standards are formulated by the Environmental
Abraham (n 60) 391-392 
“  Ibid 393-394
Ibid 394-395; and Cane (n 60) 321 (stating that non-compliance does not amount to a breach o f  duty o f  
care in English and Australian law as opposed to some states in the United States)
^  Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (n 44) 8
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RW Hahn, ‘Regulation: Past, Present, and Future’ (1990) 13 Harvard Journal o f  Law and Public Policy 
167,172-174
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Protection Agency, a branch of the federal government. However, monitoring and 
enforcement of such standards is done by state organs. Economic regulators are instituted 
at state and local levels. The following sections discuss the common forms of public 
regulation, including economic and social regulation.
3.3.2. Prohibition
Prohibition of a specified activity is one instrument of public regulation. It may be noted 
in this connection that prohibition is at times presented as an alternative to regulation 
instead of a type of regulation.** The prohibition may be either built into the statute 
enacted by the principal legislature or developed by the regulatory agency. In its extreme 
form, it involves a complete ban of a particular activity. Examples include bans on 
advertising of certain products and services (cigarettes, alcohol, prescription drugs, 
eyeglasses, optometry services and legal services); prohibition of cartel; and prohibition 
of insider trading. In its more diluted, modem and more practical form, what is prohibited 
is bringing about of a certain result. Many of the mles of criminal law are proscriptions 
targeted at not activities but harmful results. This is without losing sight of rules relating 
to criminal conspiracy, attempt, incitement, and drink-driving, possession of offensive 
weapons and similar other offences.
In regulation of water providers, prohibition is sometimes used. Water utilities in England 
are banned from using pre-payment devices.** In addition, they are prohibited from 
disconnecting particular groups for non-payment of charges or using limiting devices 
such as trickle valves.*® These are examples of prohibitions targeted at specified activity. 
In addition, water utilities may be prohibited from bringing about a certain harmful result.
See, for example, TE Loscalzo and SJ Shapiro, ‘Internet Gambling Policy: Prohibition versus Regulation 
(2000) 7 Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal II; and R Marks, ‘Prohibition or Regulation: An 
Economist’s View o f  Australian Heroin Policy’ (1990) 23 Australia and New Zealand Journal o f  
Criminology 65
See, for example, M Drakeford, ‘Water Regulation and Pre-Payment o f  Meters’ (1998) 25 Journal o f  
Law and Society 588
JW Sawkins and VA Dickie, Affordability o f  Water and Sewerage Services in Great Britain (2002) 10 
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3.3.3. Regulation of Entry
Another regulatory instrument is entry regulation. Entry regulation involves prohibition 
of a specified activity unless the actor has a licence that can be acquired only after 
fulfilling certain technical, educational and capital requirements. This is also known as 
screening regulation.*® It is different from prohibition in that it is not an absolute ban; it 
requires only prior approval.** The details of entry regulation might be different from one 
area to another. In some cases, what is regulated is an activity, for instance supply of 
legal services. And whether an applicant is granted approval depends on satisfaction of 
educational and training requirements. In others, the regulation may be in the form of an 
entry exam. Sometimes, the organisational structure of the applicant (partnership or 
limited liability) might also determine entry. In other cases, what is regulated is not the 
activity but a product; an example is a legal requirement that a new drug must be 
approved before its introduction into a market.
Water providers are also subject to entry regulation. For example, in England, water 
providers are subject to at least three distinct licensing regimes with economic and 
environmental objectives. A provider must be either appointed as a water and/or 
sewerage undertaker or secure a water supply licence. The appointment as a water 
undertaker or water supply licensee is made or granted only when certain entry 
requirements are fulfilled. Among others, to be appointed as an undertaker, the company 
must either be a limited company or a statutory water company; only limited companies 
may be appointed as sewerage undertakers.** In addition, water providers ought to get 
licence for abstraction of water and waste discharge consents.**
Screening regulation is defined as “a process o f  regulating the risk by advance scrutiny and approval or 
rejection” P Hubler, ‘The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 1025, 
1030
Cartwright (n 22) 41 
Water Industry Act 1991 s 5
Water Resources Act 1991 s 24 (amended by the Environment Act 1995)
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3.3.4. Regulation of Conduct
Regulation of conduct involves setting of standards that must be observed by people 
engaged in a specified activity. It is also known as standard-setting regulation.*"* Conduct 
regulation could involve regulation of price and quality of a product or service. In 
regulation of price, there are generally two options: price-cap regulation and rate-of- 
retum regulation.** In price-cap, the regulator allows firms to increase price of goods by 
the inflation rate discounted by a number which is calculated to induce firms to make cost 
savings. In rate-of-retum regulation, the regulator determines the costs of products and 
services and a rate of return which it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
In regulation of conduct, the regulator formulates standards and requires firms and 
individuals to comply with these standards. Generally there are two kinds of standards: 
product/output/performance-based and process/technology-based standards. In 
performance-based, the regulator identifies a certain goal that individuals should achieve 
and the choice of means is left to the regulated.** In technology-based standards, the 
regulator prescribes a technology/process that should be followed by individuals engaged 
in the relevant activity.** A given regulatory objective may be achieved by the use of 
either performance or process-based standards; or some combination of the two. 
Economists generally prefer performance-based standards on the ground that it would 
enable each firm to achieve the goal by the use of cost-effective means; it leads to 
technological innovation; and it enables easy adaptation to technological changes.** On 
the other hand, process-based standards are said to be inflexible; costly for some firms;
Standard-setting regulation can be defined as a process that “seeks to encourage risk-reducing 
transformations through mandatory, or occasionally, suggested guidelines directed at specific activities or 
products” Hubler (n 70) 1030
For a comparative discussion o f  the two forms o f price control, see, for example, ME Beesley and SC 
Littlechild, ‘The Regulation o f  Privatised Monopolies in the United Kingdom’ (1989) 20 Rand Journal o f  
Economics 454
WK Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace (1983) 128-129; SG 
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982) 105; and Cartwright (n 22) 44
Cartwright (n 22) 44
JM Antle, ‘Efficient Food Safety Regulation in the Food Manufacturing Sector’ (1996) 78 American 
Journal o f  Agricultural Economics 1242, 1246; Cartwright (n 22) 46-47; and AI Ogus, ‘Regulatory 
Institutions and Structures’ (2002) 73 Annals o f  Public and Cooperative Economics 627, 632-633
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and lead to technological stagnation.*® Whether to adopt process or performance-based 
standards depends on the relative advantages of each in a particular context.*® Ogus 
discusses a third kind of standard, target standard which does not prescribe any process 
and output but imposes liability when a product or activity causes a particular 
consequence.** He gives an example of a legal requirement that toys must be designed in 
a way that do not present health hazards or risks of physical injury by ingestion, 
inhalation or contact with the skin.** This kind of standard is presented earlier as a 
prohibition formulated in terms of harmful consequences rather than specified conduct.
Regulation of water providers involves in many cases regulation of price. Some 
regulators like the Water Services Regulation Authority for England and Wales use price- 
cap regulation and many economic regulators in United States use rate-of-retum 
regulation. Likewise, water utilities in England and Wales are required to meet a number 
of standards relating to quality of service and quality of drinking water.
3.3.5. Information Regulation
Information as a government tool can be contrasted with regulation. In this sense, 
government provides the information with a view to persuading individuals to follow or 
avoid certain courses of actions. In another sense, information can be regarded as a form 
of regulation. In this sense, it is not the government that provides the information; 
specified individuals will be required by law to provide information of a specified nature 
to the government or third parties; this is a duty to produce and disclose information. 
Britain’s Better Regulation Task Force identified three ways this instmment could be 
applied. ** First, the government could require provision of certain information; for 
example, food producers have to provide information about the ingredients within the
Antle (n78), 1246; and Cartwright (n 22) 46-47
See, for example, C Coglianese, J Nash and T Olmstead, ‘Performance-based Regulation: Prospects and 
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection’ (2003) 55 Administrative Law Review 705 
(discussing conditions under which performance-based standards may be superior) and SA Shapiro and TO 
McGarity, ‘Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation’ (1991) Duke Law 
Journal 729
AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994) 151 
Ibid
BRTF, Imaginative Thinking fo r  Better Regulation (2003) 34-41
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product. Second, government could leave the decision to the producers but if they choose 
to do so, the disclosure should follow prescribed formats; for example, food producers do 
not have the obligation to disclose nutritional content unless they make nutritional claims 
in which case the disclosure should follow prescribed formats. Third, government could 
choose to advise an industry to provide information. In all of the above senses, the 
purpose seems to supply consumers with information so that they make informed choice. 
Regulations could also impose reporting obligations on the regulated. The purpose is 
different from the above three forms; it is rather to monitor if individuals are complying 
with set standards of conduct. In this way, therefore, information regulation is being used 
to complement other forms of regulation.*"* Another format is an obligation to produce 
and disseminate information deemed to be public good: an obligation on broadcasters to 
devote certain number of hours on educational programs is a good example.
In the regulation of water providers, information regulation is also common. In the 
United States, water providers are required to carry out water quality tests in a prescribed 
manner and report to the relevant state organs and ERA on a prescribed format. In 
addition, they are required to provide their customers with annual performance reports 
detailing the level and nature of non-compliance with water quality standards. In cases of 
emergency, they are required to inform the public the risks involved and advise on 
alternative courses of actions. In England and Wales, water utilities have obligations to 
compile and submit annually, to the economic regulator, two types of information sets. 
The first set is what is known as the June Return which is required to contain information 
on several matters: levels of service on key indicators (restrictions on water use, low 
pressure etc) and financial information (costs, asset base, revenue, profit, loss etc). The 
purposes are to monitor if utilities are complying with prescribed standards of service and 
to collect information for further development of economic regulation. The second set is 
known as Principal Statement where utilities state their intention and rationale regarding 
proposed changes in tariff. The purpose here is mainly monitoring compliance.
PR Kleindorfer and EW Orts, ‘Information Regulation o f  Environmental Risks’ (1998) 18 Risk Analysis 
155,156-157
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3.4. Public Interest Theory of Regulation
3.4.1. Overview of Positive Theories of Regulation
Theories of regulation may generally be grouped into two: positive and normative. 
Positive theories attempt to identify reasons behind existing regulatory regimes; the 
reasons do not necessarily have any moral force. These are attempts to explain the effects 
of various regulatory systems. By contrast, normative theories identify conditions 
wherein governments should intervene in the market through regulation.** Before 
discussing the normative theory of regulation, which is the principal aim here, it is useful 
to outline the major positive theories of regulation. The first, known as public interest 
theory, provides that regulation aims to correct market failures. It is positive in the sense 
that it does not state that regulation should aim at correcting market failure. As a positive 
response, it may be subject to empirical tests. Reported results of such tests are not all 
supportive. Stigler and Friedland, for example, studied the performance of electric 
utilities and found out that price regulation has not really resulted in outcomes consistent 
with the public interest theory.** The results of this and similar other empirical studies 
contributed to the emergence of another theory, ‘capture theory’, of regulation, according 
to which even if regulation might originally be intended to correct market failures, the 
regulated would eventually capture the regulator to serve their interest.** The capture 
theory is now more refined and is known generally as the private interest/economic 
theory of regulation.**
Private interest analysis starts from the premise that regulation has benefits and costs. In 
most cases, the benefits of regulation accrue to the public in general and as a result the 
benefit per capita is small/marginal. On the other hand, the costs of regulation are home
Viscusi, Harrington and Yem en (n 44) 376
GJ Stigler and C Friedland, ‘What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case o f  Electricity’ (1962) 5 Journal o f  
Law and Economics 1
WA Jordan, ‘Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects o f  Government Regulation’ 
(1972) 15 Journal o f  Law and Economics 151
** GJ Stigler, ‘The Theory o f  Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal o f  Economics and Management 
Science 3; RA Posner, ‘Taxation by Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal o f  Economics and Management 
Science 22; RA Posner, ‘Theories o f  Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell Journal o f  Economics and 
Management Science 335; S Peltzman, ‘Towards a More General Theory o f  Regulation’ 91976) 19 Journal 
o f Law and Economics 211; and G Becker, ‘A Theory o f  Competition among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence’ (1983) 98 Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 371
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by a small number of firms and the benefit per firm is significant. This will give the 
regulated firms an incentive to organise and lobby for a favourable regulation. 
Organisation for the purpose of getting favourable legislation is desirable under normal 
circumstances. In fact it is a necessary condition for realising the benefits of democracy. 
However, the interests of a large section of the population will not be adequately 
represented in the process. When the per capita benefit of regulation is small, individuals 
have minimal incentive to organise for the purpose of maintaining or realising favourable 
regulatory terms. In such cases, politicians and regulators are supposed to represent the 
public. However, politicians and regulators who are interested in re-election and other 
forms of benefits would strike deals with organised private interests to introduce a 
regulatory system favourable to the latter.
The application of private interest analysis is limited in at least two principal aspects. 
First, it could only be true in those political systems which are vulnerable to private 
interest lobbying. Second, it can not be used as a general theory of regulation. Baldwin 
and Cave draw a distinction between technical justification (public interest theory) and 
motives (private interest theory) of regulation.*® The point of making this distinction is 
not clear. Private interest analysis can be invoked to explain regulation in those 
circumstances where its assumptions and premises are true and no other explanation 
exists. Nevertheless, it could not be cited as a normative theory of regulation. Setting 
aside the distinction between general and specific theory or motives and technical 
justifications, private interest analysis has important implication in designing a good 
regulatory regime. That is, it can be used to formulate procedural safeguards against 
regulatory capture.®® In addition, regulatory instruments which are less vulnerable to 
capture might be chosen. The following section outlines the main elements of the 
normative version of the public interest theory: the state should advance the public 
interest by regulating to remedy market failures or/and to bring about socially desirable 
outcomes.
Baldwin and Cave (n 5) 9 (“Governments may regulate for a number o f  motives— for example they may 
be influenced by the economically powerful and may act in the interests o f  the regulated industry or they 
may see a particular regulatory stance as a means o f  re-election. Different commentators may analyze such 
motives in different ways”)
Ogus (n 78) 628
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3.4.2. Elements of the Normative Public Interest Theory
It is important to note that there could be discrepancy between theory and practice. Ogus 
says “historically, governments have perhaps been too ready to embark on regulation 
without first ascertaining whether the intervention is really necessary. In consequence, it 
is often difficult to identify the exact reasoning which motivated the intervention”.®* That 
implies that there could be encountered situations where governments failed to intervene 
while there is sufficient reason and/or where governments regulate while there are neither 
economic nor non-economic reasons. In this regard, it may be noted that one of the 
qualities of a good regulatory regime is that it contains safeguards to make sure that the 
process and outcome do not depart from the intended original public interest objectives.
The normative version of public interest theory is deceptively simple: the state should 
regulate to advance the public inter est. How is the public interest advanced? The theory 
posits that generally the public interest is advanced by leaving the market alone and the 
state should regulate the market only when there is identifiable market failure. The 
typical argument runs as follows: markets result in allocation of resources to the most 
productive use and user. The market relies on price to achieve efficient allocation of 
resources. In addition, competition in the market results in productive and technological 
efficiencies. The premise is that the market would advance the public interest in that it 
allocates limited resources to its most productive use and user; and it results in increased 
productivity through technological innovation. There are two distinct problems associated 
with the notion of market serving the public interest. First, the conditions essential for the 
proper working of the market may not always exist. The reality of markets of different 
good and services and in different places is not exactly the same as the ideal market. One 
or more of the preconditions are found lacking in many markets producing what are 
called market failures. Second, markets might result in overall increase of wealth but this 
does not mean that the wealth is equitably distributed. Third, the standard argument for 
market assumes that individuals are capable of making decisions by themselves. But 
there are cases where individuals may need someone to protect them from their own 
decisions. The idea according to this normative theory is that government should regulate 
to correct market failures and bring about fair distribution of wealth. In some cases, it
Ibid 629
92 For a full account o f  the public interest theory, see for instance AE Kahn, The Economics o f  Regulation: 
Principles and Institutions (1988); CR Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory 
State (1990); Ogus (81); and Breyer (76)
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might intervene to control individuals from harming themselves. The following 
paragraphs discuss the most common instance of market failures.
The first limitation of ‘free’ market is its failure to adequately supply what are known as 
public goods. Public goods are those having two characteristics: non-rivalry and non­
excludability. Parker puts this as follows:
These are goods and services where non-payers cannot be excluded from the 
benefits of the provision of a good or service; at the same time supplying one 
person with the good or service does not prevent supply to someone else...In other 
words, public goods are associated with the two conditions of non-excludability 
and non-rivalry. Where a good or service is non-excludable, there will be a 
tendency for consumers to ‘free ride’, refusing to pay for its provision but 
nonetheless benefiting from its consumption.®*
The characteristic of non-excludability does not necessarily refer to the physical 
impossibility of excluding non-payers from consuming such goods. In most cases, the 
impossibility is economic in a sense that even if it is physically possible to carry out 
exclusion, doing so is not economically feasible.®"* Examples of public goods include 
security and defence services.®*
The second limitation of the institution of market is manifested in the form of natural 
monopolies. The efficiency of market as an institution for the allocation of resources 
depends, among other things, on the presence of so many economic actors that are, taken 
individually, not significant enough to have influence on output and price. In such cases, 
market and competition result in allocative and productive efficiency. However, in 
certain markets, having more than one economic actor might result in productive 
inefficiencies. Such markets are said to suffer fi"om the problem of natural monopoly. In 
this connection, Parker writes:
Natural monopolies exist where there are sufficient economies of scale or scope in 
production so that competition raises supply costs. This is most likely where there 
are important sunk costs in the form of networks, pipelines and similar high fixed- 
cost infrastructure. Examples of industries with important network effects, and
D Parker, ‘Economic Regulation: A Review o f  Issues’ (2002) 73 Annals o f Public and Cooperative 
Economics 493,495
Badlwin and Cave (n 5) 13-14
Ibid
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therefore where competition is restricted by the technology and economics of the 
industry, include electricity and gas transmission and distribution, rail 
infrastructure, fixed line telecommunications (though less so today because new 
technology is reducing network costs) and water and sewerage services.®*
In markets characterised by natural monopolies, it may not be desirable, from allocation 
of resources perspective, to introduce competition. At the same time, however, natural 
monopolies will not have an adequate incentive for productive efficiency resulting in 
restricted output and higher prices.®* Therefore, where there is a problem of natural 
monopoly, the purpose of governmental intervention is not to enhance competition but to 
alleviate the problems of natural monopoly. In situations where the presence of monopoly 
is not desirable from efficiency perspective, the role of governmental intervention is to 
enhance competition.
Externalities are the third form of market failures. Externalities exist when one’s actions 
impose uncompensated costs or unpaid benefits on others. The problem with benefit 
externalities is that it does not provide the actor with sufficient incentive to engage in the 
activity since the private benefits might not be sufficient to justify the private cost.®* 
Hence, it is argued that governments should intervene to remedy this incentive problem. 
Cost externalities pose a problem which is a mirror image of benefit externalities; the 
actor does not have the incentive to take the socially optimal level of the activity since the 
benefits are fully internalised but not the costs. Efficient market assumes that its tool, 
price, reflects the full costs of production. Costs of production (often called the social 
cost) include private costs and external costs. In the case of cost externalities, however, 
the price of the product reflects only the private cost and hence the product is cheaper 
than what would have been in a properly working market. As a result of this, much of 
that good is demanded with the corresponding increase in the level of external costs 
imposed on others.®®
Fourth, markets result in efficient outcomes when, among other things, the participating 
economic actors have sufficient information required for making informed decisions.
Parker (n 93) 496 
Baldwin and Cave (n 5) 9-10 
Parker (n 93) 495 
^  Baldwin and Cave (n 5) 11-12
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Markets leave the power of decision making to individual economic actors on the 
assumption that they will make decisions best for themselves and optimal for the society. 
Making such decision requires sufficient information. The problem with certain markets 
is that the required information is not available or is difficult to discover or comprehend. 
Even if there is a possibility for a separate market that supplies required information to 
emerge, such market by itself is pervaded with problems of incentives. Baldwin and Cave 
write:
The market may, however, fail to produce adequate information and may fail for a 
number of reasons: information may cost money to produce (e.g. because 
researching the effects of a product, such as a drug, may prove expensive). The 
producer of information, however, may not be compensated by others who use that 
information (e.g. other manufacturers of the drug). The incentive to produce 
information may accordingly be low. There may also be incentives to falsify 
information—where, for example, consumers of the product are ill-positioned to 
challenge the falsification and seek remedies for damages suffered or where they 
face high costs in doing so. Areas in which consumers purchase a type of product 
very infrequently may give rise to this problem. The information produced may, in 
addition, not be of sufficient assistance to the consumer—for instance because the 
consumer lacks the expertise required to render technical data usefiil. Finally, 
collusion in the market place, or insufficient competition, may reduce the flow of 
information below the levels consumers might want. Producers, as a group, may 
thus fail to warn consumers about the general hazards or deficiencies associated 
with a product.*®®
The above four types of market failures are the most common. In such cases, the concern 
is the market outcomes may depart from the socially desirable one and hence, according 
to the public interest theory, government should intervene in the market.
In addition, there are also non-economic normative grounds for the intervention of the 
state. First, the outcome of a market, even when none of the above market failures exist, 
might at times be inequitable. Therefore, the argument goes, the state should also regulate 
the market to ensure fair redistribution of wealth.*®* It should be noted that this argument 
is not shared by all proponents of the public interest theory.*®* However, leading
Ibid 12
Parker (n 93) 496; and D Helm, ‘Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden’ (2006) 22 
Oxford Review o f  Economie Policy 169, 171 (discussing vertical equity (concern for future generation) and 
horizontal equity (to justify for example rules against discrimination on the basis o f  gender and race))
See, for example, L Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role o f  
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributive Income’ (2000) 29 Journal o f  Legal Studies 821; L 
Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
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proponents argue that it is legitimate for the state to regulate to achieve this social 
objective.
The second non-economic ground can be characterised as a principle of paternalism 
according to which the state intervenes to prevent individuals from, not imposing costs on 
others (like in the case of externalities) but, harming his/herself.*®* It is a complete 
antithesis to the premise of public interest theory; freedom of choice furthers the public 
interest.*®"* Diluted versions of paternalism can, however, be reconciled with the principle 
of freedom of choice.*®* The idea is individuals do predictably suffer from problems of 
bounded rationality, bounded self-interest and bounded willpower. They make decisions 
based on rules of thumb which do not necessarily result in socially desirable outcomes.*®* 
They are ill equipped to assess levels of risks, particularly when the risks are very 
small.*®* In such cases, the idea is the state has the responsibility to intervene to regulate 
self-harming behaviours. Another non-economic reason for regulation of individual 
behaviour is what can be termed as legal moralism: that regulation is necessary to prevent 
immoral behaviour. Again this ground is one that has been a bone of contention among
Income’ (1994) 13 Journal o f  Legal Studies 667; and DA Weisabach, ‘Should Legal Rules Be Used to 
Redistribute Income’ (2003) 70 University o f  Chicago Law Review 439
G Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ in Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (2010) (defining paternalism as “the 
interference o f  a state or an individual with another person, against their w ill, and defended or motivated by 
a claim that the person interfered with will be better o ff or protected from harm”)
See, for example, JS Mill, On Liberty (stating “His own good either physical or moral is not a sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it w ill be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because in the opinions o f  others, to do so would be wise or even right”)
See, for example, RH Thaler and CR Sunstein, ‘Libertarian Paternalism’ (2003) 93 American Economic 
Review 175; and CR Sunstein and RH Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 
University o f  Chicago Law Review 1159
Thaler and Sunstein (n 105) 176 (“People do not exhibit rational expectations, fail to make forecasts that 
are consistent with Baye’s rule, use heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit 
preference reversals (that is, they prefer A to B and B to A) and make different choices depending on the 
wording o f  the problem...Furthermore, in the context o f  intertemporal choice, people exhibit dynamic 
inconsistency, valuing present consumption much more than future consumption. In other words, people 
have self-control problems”). See, for a general discussion o f  the limitations o f  human rationality, CR 
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legal philosophers and practitioners; the debate is usually framed in the context of 
criminal law and its proper province.*®*
In summary, it can be stated that, according to the normative version of public interest 
theory, there is a legitimate ground for state intervention when a given market suffers 
from any of the market failures outlined above; and/or when a given market results in 
inequitable outcomes; and/or when individuals predictably do not make welfare- 
enhancing decisions.
The public interest theory of regulation has been subject to several criticisms.*®® Many of 
the criticisms do not, however, challenge the propriety of the above goals; instead they 
cast doubt on whether regulation in practice serves these purposes. Private interest 
theories suggest that regulation in practice is not designed to serve the public but private 
interests. This is not a fatal blow to the public interest theory as normative statements 
cannot be refuted by empirical ones.**® At best, as stated earlier, it can be used to only 
suggest safeguards to make sure that regulation works, at least most of the times, in 
accordance with the public interest. The other criticism is its failure to fully account 
regulation. As discussed earlier, public regulation is nothing but one of the tools of 
government. Other tools include private law (law of contracts and tort), taxes, subsidies, 
education, public ownership (direct provision of goods and services by the government), 
and public expenditure. A full normative theory of regulation should identify not only 
reasons for intervention but also reasons why public regulation should be used as 
opposed to other instruments. The following section outlines conditions where public 
regulation should be used on top or/and instead of private regulation to complete the 
normative framework.
See, for example, JS Mill, On Liberty (stating “the only purpose for whieh power ean rightfully be 
exercised over any member o f  a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others” 
(emphasis added)); HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) (arguing against legal moralism); P 
Devlin, The Enforcement o f  Morals (1970) (defending legal moralism) ; and J Feinberg, Harmless 
Wrongdoing: The Moral Limits o f  the Criminal Law (1990)
See, for example, PH Aranson, ‘Theories o f  Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion’ (1990) 6 
Journal o f  Law and Politics 247; and MD Adler. ‘Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory o f  
Regulation’ (2001) 28 Florida State University Law Review 241
Hart (n 108) 2 (stating that a positive answer to a positive question (has the development o f  law been 
influenced by morals?) does not mean that an affirmative answer is to be given to a normative question 
(should law incorporate moral standards?)
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3.4.3. Failure of Private Regulation/Law
Traditional public interest theory does not sufficiently justify regulation. At best it can 
only justify the intervention of government in the market. Governmental intervention 
could take so many forms including private regulation. However, the traditional version 
public interest theory does not deal with the choice between private and public 
regulation.*** Modem versions of this theory now state that market failure should be 
accompanied by private failure to establish a prima facie case for public regulation.*** If 
a given market failure can effectively be addressed by private regulation and law, the 
argument is that there is no normative basis for public regulation. It should be noted that 
the demonstration of the limitations of private regulation does not necessarily result in 
complete substitution of private with public regulation; the two can work together. The 
purpose of this section is to present general conditions where private regulation might fail 
to correct market failures.
In discussing the failures of private law, the distinction between doctrinal and stmctural 
failures should be noted. Doctrinal failures are rules of private law which limit its use to 
remedy market failures discussed earlier. For example, when water provided by a 
municipally owned utility has caused injury to a person, the use of tort law to recover 
damages and hence deter similar incidents in the future might be limited by a doctrine 
which exonerates the utility from liability.*** The use of tort law on products liability 
might also be limited by the characterisation of what is provided by the utility as a service 
instead of a product.**"* The use of contract law on the ground of warranty may also be 
limited by the absence of such warranty in the contract between the utility and the 
victim.*** These and similar other limitations are doctrinal and therefore do not justify the 
use of public regulation. At best they justify a reform of tort law. On the other hand, there
EL Glaeser and A Shleifer, ‘The Rise o f  the Regulatory State’ (2003) 41 Journal o f  Economic Literature 
401,401
Ogus (n 78) 629-630
See, for example, JG Derouin and DR Nelson, ‘Developments in Toxic Tort Liability for the Quality o f  
Groundwater Served’ (2007) 49 Arizona Law Review 469,475-477
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Ibid 473-475
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are limitations of private law which make it unsuitable for solving a given market failure, 
no matter how it is reformed. Such failures are the concern here and they can be 
characterised as structural failures.
According to Shavell four factors determine the choice between private regulation and 
public regulation: knowledge of costs and benefits; capacity to pay in full; probability to 
pay in full; and administrative costs.*** In relation to the first factor, for example, the 
question that ought to be raised is: who has (private parties or regulatory agencies) 
superior knowledge about the concerned activity? The knowledge relates to the benefits 
of the relevant activity, costs of risk reduction measures and the probability or severity of 
the consequences of the relevant risk.*** In a situation where private parties have such 
informational advantage, the balance tilts toward private regulation. In such cases, to 
invest regulatory power to a public agency would result in too stringent or too lenient 
standards.*** In most circumstances, private parties are expected to possess superior 
knowledge than regulatory agencies. This is because of the fact that the required 
knowledge is usually a by-product of the concerned activities and hence the parties 
directly involved in the activities are expected to have superior knowledge.**® This is, 
however, without losing sight of circumstances where regulatory agencies could have 
superior knowledge than private parties and hence the balance of the scale could tip in 
favour of public regulation. Such circumstances can generally be characterised as those 
where risks are not obvious to those involved and require special expertise to obtain and 
comprehend it.**® Drawing on the discussion of the choice between private and public 
regulation by Shavell, private regulation, in particular tort, is expected to fail in four 
circumstances. First, tort law will fail if knowledge of costs and benefits is not a by­
product of the activity but requires specialised expertise. Second, tort law will fail if the
Shavell (n 57); S Shavell, ‘The Optimal Structure o f  La^v Enforcement' (1993) 36 Journal o f  Law and 
Economies 255; and S Shavell, 'A Model o f  the Optimal Use o f  Liability and Safety Regulation' (1984) 15 
RAND Journal o f  Economies 271. For the application o f  these four determinants in the context o f 
environmental policy, see M Boyer and D Porrini, ‘The Choice o f  Instruments for Environmental Policy: 
Liability or Regulation?’ in T Swanson (ed). An Introduction to the Law and Economics o f  Environmental 
Policy: Issues in Institutional Design (2002)
Shavell (n 57) 359
"*Ibid
Ibid 360
Ibid
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expected harm is larger than assets of individuals involved in the activity as they will not 
have the capacity to pay and hence will not be deterred by liability. In relation to this 
point, Viscusi writes: “for instance, the estimated value of valid claims against the 
asbestos industry exceeds the combined financial resources of all asbestos producers and 
their insurers. The bankruptcies resulting from liability for asbestos-related disease, 
moreover, could preclude subsequent suits by workers who latter discover that their 
illnesses are asbestos-related”.*** Third, tort law will fail if the probability to pay in full is 
low. Such is the case when: harms are widely dispersed; there is long time between the 
activity and the occurrence or manifestation of the resulting harms***; there is a problem 
of identifying the particular person responsible for the harm***; and causation is difficult 
to prove. Fourth, tort law will fail to solve market failures when the administrative cost 
involved is high.
Table 3.4: Choice between private and public regulation
Factors Forms of Regulation
Private Regulation Public Regulation
Knowledge of costs 
and benefits
A by-product of the activity Requires specialised expertise
Capacity to pay in 
full
Expected harm is lower than assets of 
individuals
Expected harm larger than assets of 
individuals
Probability to pay in 
full
Concentrated harms;
Short time between activity and 
occurrence of harm;
Determinate defendants;
Causation provable ; and 
Negligence provable ;
Harms widely dispersed;
Long time between activity and 
manifestation of harm;
Indeterminate defendant ;
Difficult to prove causation ; and 
Difficult to prove negligence ;
Administrative costs Low High
Transaction costs Low High
WK Viscusi, ‘Structuring Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and Risk 
Regulation’ (1985) 2 Yale Journal on Regulation 53, 54-55
In such cases, by the time the harm is discovered, important evidences have already been lost or their 
credibility has been highly reduced. See also Abraham (n 60) 380-381 (characterising environmental harms 
as having long-latency period and discussing the legal implication in terms o f  difficulties o f  proof)
Ibid 381. Viscusi discusses a related problem o f identifying plaintiffs in occupational illnesses, see WK 
Viscusi (n 107) 691. See also Abraham (n 60) 382 (discussing the problem o f  plaintiff indeterminacy in 
environmental torts)
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In addition to private regulation/tort liability, contracts could also solve some of the 
problems under certain conditions. In his seminal article, Ronald Coase argued that the 
problem of externalities does not necessarily necessitate governmental intervention in the 
form of regulation or private liab ility .W hatever the initial assignment of rights and 
liabilities, negotiation between the parties involved would result in the socially desirable 
outcome in a state of zero transaction costs. The limitation of contracts as a solution to 
market failures is the problem of transaction costs particularly when there are numerous 
parties involved.
3.4.4. Forms of Regulation
Demonstration of market failure and/or the need to achieve non-economic goals and 
failure of private regulation provide a case for public regulation. This case is, however, 
tentative. According to Ogus, a good regulatory regime has two qualities: appropriate 
justification and instruments and p ro cesse s .T h e re  is appropriate justification when 
there is a market failure which cannot be addressed with private regulation. There is 
appropriate instrument if  the use of the instrument does not result in more costs than 
benefits. Therefore, the prima facie case for public regulation would be conclusive only 
when there is cost-effective instrument to be used. If there is no cost-effective instrument, 
the argument is, it is better not to regulate at all and consider other tools such as 
education, financial incentives or direct government. The option of non-intervention is
now increasingly advocated by governments as an alternative to regulation. 127
RH Coase, ‘The Problem o f  Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal o f  Law and Economics 1
Ogus (n 78) 628
See, for example, R Schmalensee, The Control o f Natural Monopolies (1979) 6 (“Since these sectors are 
generally viewed as natural monopolies, there is at least a prima facie ease for special controls...But 
arguments o f  this sort cannot be dispositive; the operational properties o f  alternative feasible control 
strategies must be considered because no such strategy is perfect or costless. Even though there are 
potential benefits from detailed control in some particular ease, the cost o f  feasible control may outweigh 
the realizable benefits. To my knowledge, nobody seriously proposes detailed regulation o f  local grocery 
monopolies in small towns, for instance, though perfect and costless regulation would yield net benefits”). 
Resources and technological limitations mean that it might be desirable to shelve problems even if  they 
might appear to be significant: see WK Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities fo r  
Risk (1995) 5 (“The greater threat from an asteroid’s impact than the average job risk does not imply that 
we should ignore risks on the job as being too trivial to merit our attention. The real issue is whether steps 
can be taken to reduce these risks. If so, will these measures produce sufficient risk benefits to justify 
taking such actions...The fundamental issue is not the level o f  the risk but whether we can decrease the 
risks and whether the cost o f  these efforts is waiTanted by the risk reduction”)
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Various instruments of public regulation are outlined earlier. Once the prima facie case 
for regulation has been identified, the next task is to choose the most appropriate 
instrument/s. The choice of instruments is driven by a number of factors. First, the very 
reason for intervention might determine to some extent the appropriate instrument to be 
used.'^^ For instance, if the identified problem is asymmetry of information and if 
individuals are expected to make rational choice once they are equipped with the required 
information, the most effective tool is information obligation. On the other hand, if the 
problem is information asymmetry and bounded rationality, information regulation would 
not be effective; in such cases, other forms such as regulation of entry and conduct need 
to be explored.^^^ Likewise, the problem of public good as a market failure is not always 
addressed by the use of regulatory tools. Defence is a good example of public good. 
Unregulated markets do not supply sufficient level of defence services. In such cases, the 
government should intervene by directly supplying the service. Nevertheless this does not 
mean that regulation is always inappropriate. Information on how to prevent a specific 
epidemic is a public good and hence will not be adequately supplied in unregulated 
market. As opposed to defence, however, this public good can be supplied by the use of 
regulatory requirements. Requirements on broadcasters to devote some time on 
educational programmes and news are good examples.
The second consideration in the choice of regulatory forms is the relative cost of 
alternative instruments. Costs include administrative and compliance costs. If the concern 
is on administrative costs alone, for example, one may opt for entry regulation as opposed 
to regulation of conduct. The same consideration might entail preference of 
technology-based standards to performance-based standards. Technology-based standards
Glaeser and Shleifer (n 111) 422 (“ ...doing nothing is the most efficient response to market failure”); 
and BRTF (n 83) 19-24
Ogus (n 78) 629 (“The choice o f  an appropriate regulatory instrument must, in the first instance, depend 
on the justification for intervention”.)
Ibid (n 78) 633-634
For a different argument see Cartwright (n 22) 42-43 (stating that entry regulation is expensive to 
conduct and to comply with); and Ogus (n 78) 631 (“The administrative costs o f  scrutinizing all 
applications is very high and to these must be added the opportunity costs arising from any delay before the 
license is granted. Moreover, significant welfare losses arise i f  the system is used for the anti-eompetitive 
purpose o f  creating barriers to entry. The benefit from prior scrutiny must therefore be very large to justify, 
on public interest grounds, these substantial costs”)
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are less costly for two reasons. First, it is argued that they are less costly to promulgate 
compared to the costs of developing performance-based standards.S econd , it is less 
costly to monitor compliance with technology-based standards than performance-based 
s t a n d a rd s . I t  may be noted that in some cases, technology-based standards are also less 
costly to comply with.*^^ Concerns with administrative costs could determine the use of 
information regulation by which the costs of monitoring are shifted to the regulated. If, 
on the other hand, the focus is on minimising compliance costs, the choice of instruments 
could be different. Instead of requiring regulated individuals and firms to self-monitor 
and report, it might be preferable for the regulator to do the monitoring.
The third consideration is the need to minimise risks of regulatory capture. One of the 
inputs of private interest theory of regulation is that it has brought to light the real risk of 
regulators being captured by organised private interests. This risk can be minimised by 
the choice of regulatory forms. Regulators forms are differently susceptible to capture by 
private in t e r e s t s .F o r  example, entry regulation is more susceptible to capture than 
conduct regulation. Design-based standards are more vulnerable to organised interests 
than performance-based standards. Related to this, it is argued that technology-based 
standards and entry regulation may be used for anti-competitive purposes.
The fourth consideration is political legitimacy; regulation basically involves limitation 
of freedom and hence, to the extent it is necessary, the instrument selected must be the 
least intrusive but equally effective. Information regulation is the least intrusive and 
prohibition is the most intrusive. The same consideration might affect the decision to go 
away from the use of self-monitoring obligation when the results of monitoring might be
WE Wagner, ‘The Triumph o f  Technology-Based Standards’ (2000) University o f  Illinois Law Review  
83,93-100
Ibid 104; and Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (n 44) 37 
Wagner (n 131) 101 
‘^^Helm(n 101) 170 
Cartwright (n 22) 46-47
J Ayling and P Grabosky, ‘Policing by Command: Enhancing Law Enforcement Capacity through 
Coercion’ (2006) 28 Law and Policy 420, 434 (discussing mandatory reporting and actions by individuals 
to help public enforcement); and Ogus (n 78) 632 (“there is a presumption in favour o f  less interventionist 
measures”)
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used in criminal proceedings against the regulated as this might violate the privilege 
against self-incrimination.^^^
Fifth, other policy objectives such as the need to encourage technological innovation may 
also be relevant. In this connection, it may be noted that design-based standards are often 
presented as a choice that discourages innova t ion .A f te r  considering the various 
instruments, if none is found which is effective or even if some are effective but at 
significantly higher costs than benefits, this leads to the conclusion that regulation is not 
an appropriate solution. Solution should be sought somewhere else.
3.4.5. Process of Regulation
Once the most appropriate instrument is selected among alternatives, the next task is to 
examine what process values should a good regulatory system incorporate. As stated 
earlier, regulation is good not only when it has underlying public interest objectives and 
is implemented through appropriate instrument but also when the process contains 
safeguards to minimise costs, and risks of regulatory capture and non-compliance. A 
number of governmental and nongovernmental organisations have identified these 
principles as principles of ‘good’, ‘smart’ or ‘better’ regulation. The following 
paragraphs summarise some of these process values.
Britain’s Better Regulation Task Force has, for example, identified five principles of 
better regulation: proportionality, transparency, consistency, targeting and
accountability.'^^ The principle of proportionality requires that regulation must be 
proportional to the risk or problem to be addressed. This principle has been discussed in 
relation to choice of regulatory instruments. If a given problem can be effectively 
addressed either by information regulation or regulation of conduct, the principle of
W Howarth, ‘Self-Monitoring, Self-Policing, Self-Incrimination and Pollution Law’ (1997) 60 Modem 
Law Review 200 (after discussing the potential incompatibility between the use o f  self-monitoring 
obligations to minimise enforcement costs and the privilege against self-incrimination particularly when 
failure to report or detection o f  non-compliance is used in criminal proceedings, the author recommends the 
use o f  either remote monitoring where the equipment is owned and maintained by the regulator or self­
monitoring only for other purposes such as participatory objectives and collection o f  information to 
develop a knowledge base for further development o f regulatory standards)
Cartwright (n 22) 46-47; and Antle (n 78) 1245
BRTF (n 83)
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proportionality requires that the least intrusive and less costly of the two must be used. 
The principle of transparency is a requirement that regulatory standards and process must 
be open, simple and user friendly. The principle of consistency is a principle of certainty 
and predictability of regulatoiy outcomes. Regulatory interventions must also be targeted 
in the sense that they must be focused on the problem with minimal side effects. And 
finally, regulators must be accountable, directly or indirectly, to the public. There are a 
number of instruments that can be used to reflect the above principles and achieve the 
underlying objectives. The use of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is a good 
example; this is an instrument which ensures that the costs and benefits of regulations are 
comprehensively considered. RIA ensures that regulatory interventions are proportional, 
targeted and transparent and that regulators are accountable.Another tool is the use of 
participatory procedures. Participation in regulatory decision making can be considered 
both an end and a means. It is an end in the sense that the idea of democratic government 
requires that people should participate in decisions affecting them. It is a means because 
it can be used to enhance the quality of regulatory interventions and to control 
regulators.''"
3.5. Conclusion: Elements of Good Regulatory Regime
The following diagram presents the elements of the normative framework as discussed in 
this chapter. From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that a good regulatory 
regime has the following elements. First, it is a response to clearly identified public 
interest objectives expressed in terms of correcting market failures and ameliorating 
undesirable market outcomes. Second, such identified objectives cannot be achieved by 
private law remedies including tort and law of contracts. Third, it uses the most 
appropriate least-intrusive cost-effective regulatory instrument. Fourth, it is also designed 
to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of regulation through transparent, 
participatory and accountable regulatory process. These elements of a good regulatory 
regime are used to evaluate the existing legal frameworks for regulation of water 
providers in general and small-scale water providers in Ethiopia and Kenya. Using the
NAO, Better Regulation: Making G ood Use o f  Regulatory Impact Assessments (2001)
J Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 597, 599 (“If 
we operate on the assumption that society is plural, differentiated, that there is no monopoly o f  knowledge, 
or even no single vantage point from which the whole can be observed then there is no ‘one’ who can 
decide; decisions may therefore have to be made by some combination o f  ‘others’, however those are 
identified and defined”)
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working definition presented in this chapter, the remaining chapters explore the extent to 
which small-scale providers are and should be regulated. To the extent that there is prima 
facie case for regulation, the research explores the most appropriate least-intrusive cost- 
effective instruments of public regulation and makes recommendations for legal and 
administrative reform. Figure 4.1 depicts the steps and questions that must be asked in 
evaluating and designing a good regulatory regime.
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Is there a public interest case for public regulation?
No
Can these problems 
be solved by 
.  private 
law/regulation?
Yes
Cost-effective
Legitimate
Less-
vulnerable...
Choice of regulatory 
instruments, processes 
and organs
NO REGULATION
Yes
NO REGULATION
Is there appropriate 
instrument^
No
r
NO REGULATION
Figure 4.1: The Normative Framework
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Chapter Four: Legal Framework for Regulation of Water 
Providers in Ethiopia
4.1. Introduction
The preceding chapter has presented the normative framework of the thesis: the meaning 
of regulation is discussed; the various issues involving regulation of water providers are 
presented; and the benchmarks of ‘good’ regulatory regime are outlined. In this chapter, 
the legal framework for regulation of water providers in Ethiopia is examined. Ethiopia is 
a federal state. Governmental powers and functions in general and management of water 
resources in particular are divided between the federal government on one hand and 
constituent units of the federation on the other. The federal government has the power to 
set a framework law according to which regional governments manage water resources 
found exclusively in their territory. Administration of water bodies which connect or 
cross two or more regional states is, however, the responsibility of the federal 
government. Since many of the rivers are of such a nature, this implies a very limited role 
of regional governments.
Water is publicly owned and hence individuals generally acquire rights to abstract and 
use water through a permit system. The function of supplying water services is that of 
regional and local governments. There is no framework law which provides if, and under 
what conditions, the private sector may be involved in the supply of water and sanitation 
services. The federal government sets drinking water quality standards but currently there 
is no effective enforcement mechanism. Quality standards are uniform and do not reflect 
local variations. In Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority 
(AAWSA), a department of the city government has a monopoly in supplying water 
services. However, direct connection to AAWSA’s network is very low. Significant 
numbers of households access their water from authorised standpipes and unauthorised 
neighbour sellers and water kiosks. The city government determines the price of water. 
Apart from authorised standpipes, the other forms of SIPs operate in contravention of the 
monopoly right of AAWSA. These providers do not have their own source of water; they 
acquire the water they are selling from the official provider. And they are unfavourably 
treated in the tariff structure. In addition, these providers are virtually unregulated so far 
as price and safety of drinking water is concerned. This chapter also provides an 
evaluation of the legal framework for the management of water resources in general and
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regulation of water providers in particular. Allocation of powers with respect to water in 
a federal state is assessed from efficiency and effectiveness perspectives. In addition, 
issues of justice such as judicial review and public consultation and participation are 
examined.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two presents key water facts to provide a 
context for the subsequent discussion. Section three discusses the relevant laws and 
policies relating to management of water resources and regulation of water providers. 
Section four takes the case of Addis Ababa and examines the legal framework of water 
supply. It assesses the legal status and performance of AAWSA. It also identifies the 
legal status of SIPs. Section five evaluates the allocation of responsibilities between 
federal and regional governments with respect to management of water resources and 
regulation of water providers. Section six examines two issues of justice, public 
participation and judicial review, in the administration of water and regulation of water 
providers. Section seven concludes.
4.2. A Few Water Facts
Ethiopia is endowed with one of the largest surface freshwater resources in sub-Saharan 
Africa, with per-capita freshwater resources estimated at 1,924 cubic meters.' It has huge 
potential for hydro-power generation (second in Africa) and irrigation.^ However, only 2 
percent of the potential is currently being exploited, 86 percent of that being in the form 
of irrigation.^ The country is divided into twelve river basins with aggregate annual
' MWR-FDRE, Ethiopian Water Resources Management Policy  (2001). The World Bank estimate for 
2008 is 1,511.5 cubic meters per capita for Ethiopia and 6,442.0 cubic meters for the world 
('wmv.worldbank.ora last visited 05 September 2010). The decrease can be explained by increased 
population between 2001 and 2008 and perhaps climate change.
 ^ The gross hydropower generation potential o f  the country is estimated to be 650 TWh per year o f  which 
25 percent can be exploited for power. That is about 100 times the existing installed capacity. Ethiopia 
could potentially develop irrigation o f  over 3.73 million ha o f  farmlands. Nevertheless, the total area to date 
under irrigation is estimated to be about 160,000 ha, including the area under traditional irrigation. Irrigated 
agriculture has realised only 4.3 percent o f  its estimated potential. In terms o f  output, irrigated agriculture 
accounts for approximately 3 percent o f  total food crop production. See MWR-FDRE (n 1); D Rahmato, 
Water Resource Development in Ethiopia: Issues o f  Sustainability and Participation (1999); and S Moges 
and others, ‘The Water Resources o f  Ethiopia and Large-Scale Hydropower and Irrigation Development’ in 
H Kloss and W Legesse (eds). Water Resources Management in Ethiopia: Implications fo r  the Nile Basin 
(Cambria Press, 2010) 69-101
 ^MWR-FDRE (n 1)
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runoff from the 9 river basins being 122 billion cubic meters/ The three largest basins 
(Abbay (Blue Nile), Baro-Akobo, and Omo-Gibe) contribute 76 percent of the total 
runoff from a catchment area comprising only 32 percent of the total area of the country/ 
Their large runoff stems from the fact that the river basins occupy the western and south­
western parts of the country, where the highest concentration of rainfall occurs/ The true 
scale of the country’s groundwater resources is not known/ However, it is believed the 
country possesses a groundwater potential of approximately 2.6 billion cubic meters.^
Both urban and rural water and sanitation coverage in Ethiopia are the lowest in Africa.^ 
The urban coverage for water supply excluding Addis Ababa is 65.3 percent and that of 
rural areas is 15 percent.'*' Sewerage coverage is in a worse condition in that even large 
cities lack proper services." There are no piped sewerage systems in any town except for 
a small and very limited system in Addis A b a b a . I t  should be noted that even when 
there is coverage of water and sanitation services, the quality of services provided is very 
unsatisfactory.'^ Table 4.2 provides national figures for access to improved water sources 
and sanitation facilities.
Hbid  
^Ibid 
® Ibid 
Hbid  
Mbid
 ^ A Atkins, C Martinsen and C van der Voorden (eds). Making Every Drop Count: Financing Water, 
Sanitation and Hygiene in Ethiopia (2005) 7 (“In 2000, the World Health Organization rated Ethiopia as 
having the lowest level o f  water and supply coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 24 percent, and the second 
lowest sanitation coverage, at 15 percent. Equally concerning is the extremely small increase reported in 
coverage over the decade 1990-2000: just 2 percent in both water and sanitation. In 2004, the Government 
o f Ethiopia reviewed the Water Matrix from the Sustainable Poverty Reduction plan and registered an 
increase in access to potable water to 38.1 percent for 2003/2004. It is exciting to note that there may well 
have been a significant increase in coverage since 2000, although a number o f  implementers on the ground 
queried the rate o f  increase shown by these figures”.)
MWR-FDRE, Water Sector Development Program  (2002)
Ibid
Ibid
Atkins, Martinsen and van der Voorden (n 9) 7 (“Where there is coverage, the level o f  service is poor. 
On average, it is far less than the 20 litres recommended by the WHO as a minimum standard per capita per
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Table 4.1; M ajor river basins in Ethiopia
No. River basin Catchment area 
(km^)
Annual runoff 
(BM")
Specific discharge 
(1/s/km^)
1 Abbay (Blue Nile) 199 812 52.6 7.8
2 Awash 112 700 4.6 1.4
3 Baro-Akobo 74 100 23.6 9.7
4 Genale -D aw a 171 050 5.80 1.2
5 Mereb 5 700 0.26 3.2
6 Omo-Gibe 78 200 17.90 6.7
7 Rift Valley 52 740 5.60 3.4
8 Tekeze 89 000 7.63 3.2
9 Wabe Shebele 200 214 3.15 0.5
10 Afar-Danakil 74 000 0.86 -
11 Ogaden 77 100 0 -
12 Aysha 2 200 0 -
Total 1136816 122.00
Source: M W R-FDRE (n 1)
Rahmato attributes the low water and sanitation coverage to a number of factors 
including: the lack of comprehensive water legislation, inadequate investment resources, 
absence of community participation and management, and a lack of a national water tariff 
policy/'' In order to meet the target in the MDGs, access to safe water needs to reach 
64% and access to sanitation 57%: this amounts to about 44 million new people getting 
access and maintaining existing coverage.'^
day (and it is important that this is addressed, as quantity o f  water is key to reducing disease). In urban 
areas, the service is intermittent. In rural areas, the Ministry o f  Water Resources figures put non­
functioning water schemes at 20 percent to 30 percent, but, anecdotally, those involved in implementation 
put the non-functioning figure at 30 to 40 percent”)
Rahmato (n 2). See also Atkins, Martinsen and van der Voorden (n 9) 5-8
Atkins, Martinsen and van der Voorden (n 9) 15
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Table 4.2: Percentage of population with access to improved water sources and 
sanitation
Category 1990 1995 2000 2006
Total water 13 20 29 42
Rural water 4 10 19 31
Urban water 74 79 87 96
Total sanitation 4 5 7 11
Rural sanitation 2 2 4 8
Urban sanitation 19.0 21.5 24.0 27.0
Source: World Bank Millennium Development Goals Data 
(www.data.worldbank.org)
4.3. Water Laws and Policies
4.3.1. Brief Remarks on Constitutional and Legal Systems of Ethiopia
The current constitution, which came into force in 1995, represents significant departure 
from the past three constitutions in many ways.'^ One such change is the introduction of a 
federal state structure.'^ It envisaged two independent layers of government: federal and 
regional.'^ There are nine regional and two city governments.'^ Government powers and 
functions are divided between regional and federal governments. Powers are delegated to 
the federal government by regional states.^" The federal government is supposed to have
Constitution o f  the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia Proclamation No 1/1995. For detailed 
discussion o f  the salient features o f  the Constitution, see F Nahum, Constitution fo r  a Nation o f  Nations: 
The Ethiopian Prospect (1997)
Article 1 o f  the Constitution reads: “This Constitution establishes a Federal and Democratic State 
Structure. Aceordingly, the Ethiopian state shall be known as The Federal Demoeratie Republic o f  
Ethiopia”.
Article 50(8) o f  the Constitution provides: “Federal and State Powers are defined by this Constitution. 
The States shall respeet the powers o f  the Federal Government. The Federal Government shall likewise 
respeet the powers o f  the States”.
Article 47(1) o f  the Constitution lists member states o f  the federation. The Constitution recognises the 
right o f  self-determinations ineluding the unconditional right to secession. As a result o f  secession, internal 
or external, the number o f  member states could either increase or decrease. The city governments are that 
o f  Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa which are accountable to the central government.
It appears from the preamble that the federal government is constituted by the member states; it is not a 
case o f  a national government devolving power to regional states.
I l l
an exhaustively enumerated set of functions and powers/' The state governments have 
residual power; anything that is not given to the federal government alone or the federal 
and regional governments concurrently is left to regional governments/^ The 1995 
constitution is unique not only because it establishes a federal state, but also because the 
constituent units of the federal states are demarcated mainly based on ethnicity; the 
constitution introduced a structure usually referred to as ‘ethnic federalism’/^
Different people characterise the legal system of Ethiopia differently. Some argue that 
Ethiopia essentially follows the Romano-Germanic legal tradition.^'' Others argue that the 
legal system of Ethiopia is mixed. Not surprisingly, no one (at least to the best the 
writer’s of knowledge) has ever written that Ethiopia follows the common law tradition. 
The writer subscribes to the view that Ethiopia’s legal system is mixed. Close 
examination of historical and material sources of major laws, and status of customary and 
religious norms support this characterisation. Both the drafter of the Civil Code, Rene 
David, and a leading commentator of Ethiopian law, George Krzeczunowicz, wrote that
These are enumerated in Article 51 o f  the Constitution. These include: establishment and implementation 
o f national standards and basic policy criteria for public health, education, science and technology as well 
as for the protection and preservation o f  cultural and historical legacies; enactment o f  laws for the 
utilisation and conservation o f  land and other natural resources, historical sites and objects; formulation and 
implementation o f  foreign policy; negotiation and ratification o f  international agreements; determination 
and administration o f  the utilisation o f  the waters or rivers and lakes linking two or more states or crossing 
the boundaries o f  national territorial jurisdiction; and regulation o f  inter-state and foreign commerce. 
Though it appears from Article 51 that the powers and functions o f  the federal government are exhaustively 
listed, there is a mechanism for the transfer o f  some powers from the states to the federal government when 
the House o f  Federation (the second chamber o f  the legislature) decides so. In addition, some powers o f  the 
federal government can be delegated to the states.
The Constitution (n 16) Art 52(1)
See M Haile, ‘The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights and 
Development’ (1997) 20 Suffolk International Law Review 1 (arguing that “the particular form o f  
federation established by the new Ethiopian Constitution not only lacks the essential attributes o f  successful 
federations, it is riddled with those undesirable features that will doom the federation as still bom and 
perhaps trigger the disintegration o f  Ethiopia into mini-tribal entities in perpetual warfare against one 
another”). For a contrary argument, see Nahum (n 16) 51 (“This rather unusual constitutional approach has 
been hailed, on the one hand, as a stroke o f  genius that will uplift Ethiopia from its age-old backwardness 
and, on the other, as the sign o f  the first cracks for disintegration. Could both be correct in that the outcome 
depends on how the instrument is employed, just as the atom, as a fantastic source o f  energy, can be used 
either to greatly benefit mankind or to send it to its doom”). See also JM Cohen, ‘Ethnic Federalism in 
Ethiopia’ (1995) 2 Northeast African Studies 172; and J Abbink, ‘Breaking and Making the State: The 
Dynamics o f  Ethnic Democracy in Ethiopia’ (1995) 13 Journal o f  Contemporary African Studies 149.
See, for example, A Jembere, An Introduction to the Legal History o f  Ethiopia (2000) 11 
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Ethiopian law incorporates elements of common law and local customary and religious 
rules; this is in addition to the lessons the drafters have taken from continental codes/^ 
Consequently, despite the use of continental style forms (codes), the content of Ethiopian 
law is a mixture of customary, continental and Anglo-American principles. The role of 
religious and customary norms has been expanded by the Constitution. Article 34(5) of 
the Constitution provides: “This Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of 
disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary 
laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute”. The legal status of precedents has 
contributed to the mischaracterisation of the legal system as civil law. For a long time, 
lower courts refused to take notice of precedents set by higher courts. In cases where 
parties argued on the basis of such precedents, courts refused to accept them on the 
grounds that either there are no statutory bases for binding precedents or Ethiopia is a 
civil law country and hence precedents are not binding.^^ In 2005 the federal legislature 
promulgated a law which makes decisions of the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court binding on all courts in the country.^^ The Cassation Division reviews 
final decisions of lower courts when there are basic errors of law; it is not an ordinary 
court of appeal. Whether lower courts will heed to this prescription remains to be seen.
R David, ‘A  Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification o f  the Civil Law in African 
Countries’ (1963) 37 Tulane Law Review 187; and G Krzeczunowicz, ‘The Ethiopian Civil Code: Its 
Usefulness, Relation to Custom and Applicability’ (1963) 7 Journal o f  African Law 172
See, for instance, G Kassa, ‘Mechanisms o f Constitutional Control: A Preliminary Observation o f  the 
Ethiopian System’ (2007) 20 Afrika Focus 75, 96-97 (writing on a related law that has made decisions o f  
the body that interprets the constitution binding in similar future cases, he remarks: “This, in a way, is a 
new development in the field as it has introduced a precedent system; a practice peculiar to the common 
law system has thus been introduced into the predominantly civilian legal tradition. As a country o f  civil 
law tradition there is no possibility for the introduction o f  judge-made laws in Ethiopia. Law making is the 
sole responsibility o f  the legislative arm o f  the state. A sudden departure is exhibited with the adoption o f  
this precedent system for the constitutional adjudication”). It should be remarked in this connection that 
even civil law countries give some kind o f legal force to judicial precedents; see, for example, V Eon and F 
Parisi, ‘Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis’ (2006) 26 International Review o f  
Law and Economics 519.
Article 10(4) o f  the Federal Courts Proclamation 25/1996 (as amended by Proclamation No 454/2005) 
reads: “Interpretation o f  a law by the Federal Supreme Court rendered by the Cassation division with not 
less than five judges shall be binding on federal as well as regional courts at all levels. The Cassation 
division may however render a different legal interpretation some other time”)
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4.3.2. The Constitution
The Constitution envisages a public ownership of land and all natural resources. Article 
40(3), in particular, reads “the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all 
natural resources, is exclusively vested in the state and in the public”. In so far as water is 
concerned, this is by no means a major departure from the past. This is because the 1960 
Civil Code has also declared water resources to be part of the public domain.^^ Public 
ownership of water resources serves as a constitutional basis for the role of government 
in regulating allocation and utilisation of water resources. Considering the fact that 
Ethiopia is a federal state, a question might be raised as to which layer of government has 
the responsibility and power to regulate the allocation and use of water. In Ethiopia, 
power is divided between the federal and regional governments in such a way that 
anything that is not given to either the federal government alone or the federal and 
regional governments concurrently is reserved to the s ta tes .A r t ic le  51(5) of the 
constitution provides that the federal government has the power to “enact laws for the 
utilization and conservation of land and other natural resources...” According to Article 
52 (2), regional governments have the power of administering land and other natural 
resources in accordance with the federal laws. The primary responsibility in the 
management of water resources rests with the federal government. The federal 
government discharges its responsibility by enacting the basic legislative framework and 
regional governments are empowered to administer water resources in their respective 
territories in accordance with federal laws.^° In addition to providing the basic legislative 
framework for the management of water resources, the federal government also has the 
power to “determine and administer the utilization of the waters or rivers and lakes 
linking two or more states or crossing the boundaries of the national territorial 
jurisdiction”. '^
The role of state governments can be said to be restricted to that of administering the 
federal laws on water resources. The power of administering federal laws might include
Article 1447(1) o f  the Civil Code provides: “waterways, lakes and underground aceumulations o f  water 
shall be deemed to form part o f  the public domain”.
Article 52(1) o f  the Constitution provides: “All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government 
alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States”.
Constitution (n 16) Art 52(2)(d)
"'Ibid Art 51(11)
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the power to enact legislation. It is very clear that regional states cannot make laws that 
contradict federal laws on water resources. It is not, however, clear under what 
circumstances states could enact laws even if such laws do not contradict federal laws. 
Should such power be delegated to them by federal law? Or can they enact any law so far 
as it does not contradict the federal law? In my opinion, express delegation by federal law 
is not a necessary requirement. This is because the power of states to administer natural 
resources according to federal law emanates from the Constitution. However, any law 
that they enact must be demonstrated to be not only consistent with federal laws but also 
necessary for the purpose of administering water resources. The role of states to 
administer water resources is, however, limited because of the clause in the Constitution 
that gives such power, with respect to water resources that link or cross two or more 
states, to the federal govemment.^^ Major water bodies of the country link or cross two or 
more states (in fact most of them are international rivers) and hence administration of 
such water bodies is the responsibility of the federal govemment.^^ Figure 4.1 presents 
major rivers and water bodies of the country. It is clear from this that no major river is 
found within the exclusive territory of one state; almost all major rivers with the 
exception of Awash are international, a fact which further augments powers of the federal 
government.
The Constitution provides a political forum, the House of Federation, for resolution of 
disputes among any two or more of the constituent units of the federation. Perhaps this 
mechanism can also be used to resolve water disputes, if any arise. One of the powers and 
functions of the House of Federation is to “find solutions to disputes or 
misunderstandings that may arise between States”.^ '' But such disputes are unlikely, for 
interstate rivers are administered by the federal government; if there is any dispute, it 
would be between the federal government on one hand and regional governments on the 
other.
Article 51(11) o f  the Constitution states that the federal government “shall determine and administer the 
utilization o f  the waters or rivers and lakes linking two or more states or crossing the boundaries o f  the 
national territorial jurisdiction”
Rahmato (n 2)
Constitution (n 16) Art 62 (6)
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Figure 4.1: Major rivers of Ethiopia
4.3.3. Water Resources Management Policy 
4.33.1. Overview
The key problem as far as the water sector in Ethiopia is concerned is the spatial and 
temporal variability of water availability:
Between 80-90 percent of Ethiopia’s water resources is found in the four river 
basins namely, Abay (Blue Nile), Tekeze, Baro Akobo, and Omo Gibe in the west 
and south-western part of Ethiopia where the population is no more than 30 to 40 
percent. On the other hand, the water... avail able in the east and central river basins 
is only 10 to 20 percent whereas the population in these basins is over 60 
percent...The temporal distribution poses no lesser trouble. Ethiopia gets plenty of 
annual rainfall on the aggregate. It falls either ahead of time or comes too late or
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even stops short in mid-season. The required amount is not available at the right
time.^^
The Water Resources Management Policy recognises that dealing with the temporal and 
spatial variability requires sustainable utilisation of water resources, setting of priorities 
and judicious management policy and associated finance.^^ The significantly low 
contribution of the water sector to the overall development of the country is attributed to 
“the absence of a well defined coherent policy and the lack of the required huge 
investment”.^  ^ Taking this fact into account, the water policy strives “to enhance and 
promote all national efforts towards the efficient, equitable and optimum utilization of the 
available water resources of Ethiopia for significant socio-economic development on 
sustainable basis”.^  ^The policy embodies some fundamental principles that should guide 
development, utilisation and protection of water resources. First it provides that water is a 
natural endowment commonly owned by all the peoples of Ethiopia. This is also a 
principle provided in the Constitution as discussed earlier. Second, it provides that, as far 
as conditions permit, every Ethiopian citizen should have access to sufficient water of 
acceptable quality to satisfy basic human needs. Third, reflecting the terms of Dublin 
Principles, the policy prescribes the recognition of water both as economic and social 
good. Consequently, it states, the allocation, development and utilisation of water 
resources should ensure social equity, economic efficiency, systems reliability and 
sustainability. In particular, it prescribes the adoption of social strategies to ensure that 
‘the underprivileged sectors of the population’ are provided with water to satisfy their 
basic needs. Fourth, it stipulates that development of water resources be undertaken 
within an integrated framework that incorporates rural-centred, decentralised 
management and participatory approaches. In particular, it calls for the participation of 
women in all aspects of water resources management. The imperative of integrated 
framework is a requirement that all aspects of water resources management (water supply 
and sanitation; irrigation, drainage and watershed management and other activities) 
should be coordinated by taking each river basin as a management unit. To deal with the 
variability problem mentioned above, the water policy indicates inter-basin transfer of
MWR-FDRE (n 1 )2
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid 5
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water as a strategy to be adopted. Considering the fact that the federal government has 
strong constitutional mandate in the management of water resources of the country, such 
transfer of water will not raise disputes that it would raise in other federal states.
4.3.3.2. Allocation of Water
In the allocation of water to various uses and users, the policy demands that the minimum 
requirement for basic human and livestock needs and environmental services (called 
reserve) be identified. The reserve should have priority in any water allocation plans and 
decisions.^^ Generally, allocation for domestic water supply and sanitation is to have 
priority over other uses and u s e r s . I n  addition, efficient uses of water resources should 
be encouraged in water allocation decisions."*  ^ Most importantly, the policy states that 
water allocation decisions are not permanent but for limited period of time and also are 
liable to revisions when there are new developments."^^
4.3.3.3. Conservation and Protection of Water
The water policy incorporates several principles for the conservation and protection of 
water resources. These include:
• Management of water resources should incorporate environmental conservation 
and protection requirements. The use of Environmental Impact Assessment and 
protection requirements should be used as part of the criteria for evaluating 
water projects;
• Adoption of watershed management practices as an integral water resources 
management;
• The creation of appropriate mechanisms for the protection of water resources 
from pollution and depletion. These include standards and classification for 
different uses of water in terms of quantity and quality; and
• Adoption of water conservation measures."*^
Ibid 9 
Ibid40
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid 9-10
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4.3.3.4. Water Pricing
Water is an economic good and hence fees must, as a principle, be paid for the services 
provided/"^ The pricing strategy should encourage conservation, protection and efficient 
utilisation of resources/^ This is not, however, without losing sight of the need to ensure 
equitable access to water. The tariff structure ought to be ‘site-specific’ considering “the 
particulars of the project, location, the users, the cost and other characteristics of the 
schemes”."*^ The government ought to cover the costs of providing a minimum amount of 
water for basic human needs for rural communities; in so far as they are able and willing, 
rural communities could be made to cover the operation and maintenance costs on their 
own."*^  However, the principle of full cost recovery should underlie the tariff structure for 
urban water supplies."*  ^ The policy also encourages the development of cross­
subsidisation strategies and promotion of credit services.
4.3.3.S. Water and Sanitation Services
The policy provides that “the overall objective of the water supply and sanitation policy 
is to enhance the well-being and productivity of the Ethiopian people through provision 
of adequate, reliable and clean water supply and sanitation services and to foster its 
tangible contribution to the economy by providing water supply services that meet the 
livestock, industry and other water users’ demands”.^ ® The specific policies include;
• Community participation in water supply development should be promoted so 
that the community owns and maintains the system;
Ibid 14 (It should be noted in this relation that consideration o f  water as an economic good is limited not 
only by the social considerations that the policy requires to be taken in its management but also by the 
constitutionally enshrined principle o f  common ownership)
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid 22
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• The development of water supply systems should be coordinated with irrigation 
and hydropower projects;
• Subsidies should be provided to communities unable to pay with the eventual 
and gradual phase out plans; and
• Tariff structures should be site-specific and based on the principle of cost 
recovery; establish progressive rates in urban water supplies; and embody flat 
rates for communal services like hand pumps and public stand posts/^
4.3.4. The Civil Code
The Civil Code provides that waterways, lakes and underground accumulations of water 
are part of the public domain/^ However, water could assume a form of private property 
when some kind of effort to appropriate is exerted: “where it is collected in a man-made 
reservoir, basin or cistern from which it does not flow naturally"/^ Here we have to make 
a difference between the source of water and the corpus of water. The source of water is a 
public domain and as such it is subject to the following conditions: it may not be 
alienated; it may not be acquired by possession in good faith or usucaption; it may be 
given to private persons in concessions without modifying the purpose of the property; 
private persons may occupy it only through authorisation; and the state regulates the use 
of the property in order to protect its continued existence.^"  ^However the corpus of water 
could be privately owned if it is appropriated, for example when it is collected in a man- 
made reservoir. However, not all persons are free to appropriate water. The Civil Code 
provides several rules regarding appropriation and use of water. The main characteristic 
of water use right (as regulated in the Civil Code) is that it is attached to land ownership 
and that disputes are primarily and exclusively resolved by the courts. It also recognises a 
hierarchy of uses and users. The local community has priority over and above all other
Ibid 23-25
Civil Code Art 1447
Ibid Art 1229
Ibid Arts 1454, 1455, 1456,1457 and 1459 
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users/^ And domestic uses are to be preferred to other uses including agricultural and 
commercial uses.^ *^
Article 1232 provides: “a landowner may use the water on, below, running through or 
bordering his land for his personal use, that of the persons living with him and for 
watering his cattle”. Once such a landholder has satisfied his domestic needs, he is 
required to supply his neighbours the amount of water which is “indispensable for their 
domestic use, where they cannot get water elsewhere except at exaggerated costs”.^  ^ In 
such circumstances, the landholder is entitled to compensation “where his rights as an 
owner are notably reduced or impaired”.^  ^And Article 1235 provides:
(1) Whosoever is entitled to use a well, spring or other water, whether running or 
still, may object to the construction of any work such as a sewer or latrine, capable 
of polluting the water used by him.
(2) He may require that any such work done in disregard of his rights be destroyed.
Article 1237 authorises an owner of a land to use any running water for irrigating his land 
without, however, affecting other people who use the same water for domestic purposes. 
In case of disputes between two landholders (downstream and upstream) who use the 
same water for irrigation, the Civil Code adopts a prior appropriation rule. Article 
1237(1) provides: “where the use of water for purposes of irrigation is or may be 
detrimental to persons downstream who use such water for purposes other than domestic, 
the said persons may, where they show the existence of vested rights to their benefit, 
object to the water being used for irrigation”. A person is said to have a vested right on 
the use of water where “apparent or notorious works or installations have been done on 
the ground with a view to using the water for such purposes”.^  ^In such cases, the person 
downstream with vested rights can request “the cessation or putting out of use of the 
works or installations done on the land upstream to the extent that they are incompatible
Ibid Art 1228(1) 
Ibid Art 1237 
Ibid Art 1233 
Ibid Art 1234 
”  Ibid. Art 1237(2)
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with such vested rights”.^ ® However, the person upstream is entitled to compensation 
where the exploitation of his land is impaired or rendered impossible by the prohibition 
from using water crossing or bordering his land.^  ^ The amount of compensation includes 
“the value of the works or installations the use of which is prohibited by the court and 
which have been done in good faith without the persons downstream objecting”.^  ^ The 
decrease in the value of the land which the prohibition from using water entails and the 
profit derived from the use of water by the persons downstream are also considered in 
assessing the amount of compensation.^^ The Civil Code also provides rules regulating 
access to the land owned by another for the purpose of building works necessary for 
taking water.
4.3.5. The Water Proclamation
The Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation 2000 (hereinafter referred to 
as the Water Proclamation) has repealed the Water Resources Utilisation Proclamation 
No.92/1994.^^ In addition, “any laws, regulations, directives, guidelines or practices 
relating to matters covered by this Proclamation” are proclaimed not to have “force or 
effect to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of this Proclamation”.*^  ^ The 
proclamation is enacted in order to “put the water resources of Ethiopia to the highest 
social and economic benefit for its people through appropriate protection and due 
management”.^  ^ This purpose is also underscored in Article 3: “The purpose of the 
Proclamation is to ensure that the water resources of the country are protected and 
utilised for the highest social and economic benefits of the people of Ethiopia, to follow 
up and supervise that they are duly conserved, ensure that harmful effects of water are
Ibid Art 1238 
Ibid Art 1239 
“  Ibid Art 1240 
Ibid Art 1240 
^UbidArts 1249-1254 
Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation No. 197/2000 Art 32(1) 
Ibid Art 32(2)
Ibid Preamble
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prevented, and that the management of water resources is carried out properly”. The 
Proclamation applies to all water resources (surface and ground) of the country with the 
exception of mineral and geothermal deposits, which are governed by Proclamation 
No.52/1993.^^
The government agency entrusted with the enforcement of the Water Proclamation is the 
Ministry of Water Resources. The Ministry is endowed with regulatory and executive 
powers and functions. These include:
• Issuing permits and certificates of professional competence;
• Determining allocation and manner of use of water resources among various 
uses and users;
• Establishing quality standards for surveys, design and specification of 
waterworks as well as standards for construction of waterworks, necessary for 
the development of water resources, and supervising compliance of water works 
with established standards;
• Preparing directives (in consultation with public bodies concerned) in order to 
ensure that water resources are not polluted and hazardous to health and 
environment; and
• Issuing directives, regarding water use restrictions in a situation of water 
shortage emergency, and supervise its implementation.^^
Water is allocated to uses and users on the basis of a permit system. Article 11 of the 
Proclamation reads:
No person shall perform the following activities without having obtained a permit 
from [the Ministry]:
(a) Construct waterworks;
(b) Supply water, whether for his own use or for others;
(c) Transfer water which he/she abstracted from a water resource or received from 
another supplier; and
(d) Release or discharge waste into water resources unless otherwise provided for 
in the regulations to be issued for the implementation of this proclamation.
It should be noted that the Proclamation exempts certain uses of water from the above 
permit requirement. Digging water wells by hand or using water from hand-dug wells;
Ibid Arts 2(6) and 4 
Ibid Art 8
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and using water for traditional irrigation, artisanal mining and for traditional animal 
rearing, as well as for water mills are exempted from the permit requirement/^ Some uses 
of water are usually exempted because, considering that they have negligible 
environmental impact, regulating them will cause significant cost on the users as well as 
the permit system/* However, there could be conditions where even such uses might 
have to be regulated/^ To this effect, the Water Proclamation empowers the Ministry to 
“issue directives to prevent inappropriate use and wastage of water regarding the uses” 
which are normally exempted from the permit requirement/^
An application for the use of water must contain the following elements: name and 
permanent address of applicant; location of water resources and intended place of use; 
intended use; volume of water required monthly and annually; intended method and 
manner of use; where appropriate, investment certificate; and feasibility studies and maps 
reasonably required by the Ministry of Water Resources/"* A permit would be issued by 
the Ministry within sixty days after receiving the application unless the proposed use: 
infringes, in any manner, any person’s legitimate interests upon the water; or entails 
pollution or harmfril effects on the water resource and the environment/^ As a general 
principle, an application to release or discharge waste into a water would not be accepted 
if that endangers human life, animals, plants or any living things; however, the permit 
might be issued provided that the applicant has undertaken to treat the waste before 
releasing/^ When an application is rejected, the Ministry is required to notify the 
applicant in writing of the rejection and the reasons/^
Ibid Art 12(1)
See, for example, lA  Fox and S Walker, ‘Abstraction and Abstraction Control in Scotland’ (2002) 294 
Science o f  the Total Environment 201, 209
Ibid 205 (stating that “there are concerns that the unregulated nature o f  other abstractions may be 
adversely affecting the environment or other abstractors. Whilst individually, small abstractions may have 
minimal impact, their cumulative effect can be significant”.)
Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 12(2)
Water Resources Management Regulations No 115/2005 (hereinafter mentioned as the Water 
Regulations) Art 3
Proclamation (n 65) Art 14(1)
Ibid Art 13(2)
Ibid Art 14(2)
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Permits are transferable, at the request of the permit holder, upon approval by the 
Ministry/^ Article 17 of the Water Proclamation states that permits could be revoked or 
suspended in whole or in part at any time under certain conditions enumerated in the 
Water Regulations. According to Article 6(2) of the Regulations: “a water use permit 
may be terminated or suspended by the Supervising Body in whole or in part” on the 
following grounds: failure to comply with the terms and conditions prescribed in the 
permit; use of water for purposes not authorised; failure to pay the required water charges 
within sixty (60) days following a written notification; finding by the supervising body 
that the water resources involved is being temporarily depleted; and failure to comply 
with water quality standards. In addition, the Ministry is authorised to terminate a permit 
for the following reasons: voluntary failure, in excess of the period fixed in the permit, to 
utilise the water represented by the permit; undertaking to transfer the permit without the 
authorisation of the supervising body; discovery by the supervising body that the permit- 
holder has obtained the permit by giving false evidence; finding that the water resources 
involved is being permanently depleted; and finding that the usage of the water resources 
causes a negative impact on the environment as per the provisions of Environmental 
Impact Assessment Proclamation No 299/2002.^^
A person who is not satisfied with the decision of the Ministry of Water can appeal to a 
court of law.^° However, it is not clear if the court can review legal as well as factual 
determinations of the Ministry. If the structure of similar fi’amework legislation is taken 
into account, it seems that courts should show some level of deference to the Ministry’s 
factual determination.^' With respect to the management of water resources, the Ministry 
is endowed with not only quasi-legislative but also quasi-judicial powers. Disputes 
between permit holders or between a permit holder and a third party concerning rights or 
obligations arising from permits are first decided by the Ministry. The procedures to be 
followed in resolving such disputes are provided in the Water Regulations:
Ibid Art 16(4)
Water Regulations (n 74) Art 6(3)
Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 18(3)
See, for example, Article 140 o f  the Labour Proclamation No.377/2003 (stating that the federal High 
Court shall review the decisions o f  the Labour Relations Board only on questions o f  law not facts)
Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 9(1)
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• The person complaining files with the Ministry a memorandum summarising 
the dispute and supporting his allegations. The memorandum ought to state the 
nature of the complaint and the relief sought;
• Upon receiving the memorandum, the Ministry gives notice to the adverse 
party, forwarding a copy of the memorandum received, and indicating to both 
parties the time and place at which a hearing is to be held;
• The person authorised to hear such disputes informs all parties of his decision 
regarding the dispute and provides each party with a copy of the record of such 
proceedings; and
Other procedural issues are governed by the Civil Procedure Code. 83
A party who is not satisfied with the decision can appeal to a court of law.*"' However, the 
Proclamation requires that disputes between the Ministry and permit holders be solved 
through negotiation.^^ Failing negotiation, the case should be solved through arbitration.^^ 
The Water Regulation provides the procedures on solving disputes through arbitration:
• Each party nominates two arbitrators and inform the other party;
• The arbitrators nominated by the parties nominate a third arbitrator as presiding 
one. In case the nominated arbitrators fail to agree regarding the third arbitrator, 
the matter would be solved based on provisions of the Civil Code; and
• The outcome of the arbitration is binding provided, however, that the person 
who does not get favourable judgement can appeal to a court of law.
4.3.6. Relationship between the Civil Code and the Water Proclamation
The relationship between rules provided in the Civil Code and those found in the Water 
Proclamation is not clear. The Civil Code rules are supposed to be implemented primarily 
and exclusively by the courts. On the other hand, the Water Proclamation provides that 
water disputes are to be resolved by the Ministry of Water Resources and if one of the
Water Regulations (n 74) Art 35 
*'* Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 9(2) 
Ibid Art 9(3)
Ibid Art 9(4)
Water Regulations (n 74) Art 36
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parties is not satisfied with the decision rendered, the court is empowered to review its 
legality. From this it appears that there is some contradiction between the rules and one 
has to give way to the other.
The problem with respect to the provisions governing water resources provided in the 
Civil Code is that they are designed on the assumption that there are private landowners 
and water is allocated on the basis of land ownership.^* Currently, however, land is not 
privately owned and hence a question might be raised as to the usefulness of these 
provisions.*^ On the other hand, there are some gaps left by the Water Proclamation. 
According to the Proclamation, not all water disputes are solved by the Ministry of Water 
Resources but disputes between permit holders and between permit holder and the 
Ministry itself. A question might properly be raised here as to who is empowered to 
resolve disputes between users who are not permit holders. This is because there are 
some kind of uses and users who are exempted from the general permit requirement. The 
question is what will happen if there is any dispute among these kinds of water users? 
The argument here is that provisions of the Civil Code are not expressly repealed by the 
Water Proclamation.^" Though express repeal is not required, it cannot be said that those 
provisions are impliedly repealed either. The provisions can still be used to govern 
disputes between individuals who are not permit holders. Second, even as between permit 
holders, both the Water Regulations and the Proclamation do not provide detailed rules 
on resolution of disputes. Therefore, guidance could be sought from the provisions of the 
Civil Code.
4.4. Supply of Water and Sanitation Services
4.4.1. Who is Responsible for Supplying Water and Sanitation Services?
Prior to the restructuring of the Ethiopian state from a unitary state to a federal one, there 
was one central government authority responsible for the supply of water and sanitation: 
the Water Supply and Sanitation Authority (WSSA).^' Established in 1981, it was a
Civil Code Arts 1228-1256 
Constitution (n 16) Art 40 
Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 32 
Rahmato (n 2)
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division within the Water Resources Commission, the predecessor to the Ministry of 
Water Resources.^^ With the restructuring of the state, the functions of the WSSA had 
been transferred to the constituent units of the federation.^^ Therefore, which organ and 
level of government is responsible for the supply of water and sanitation services depends 
on the constitutions and laws of regional states. The picture is, however, complicated 
because the federal government. Ministry of Water Resources, has also a department with 
the same set of functions: Department of Water Supply and Sanitation.^''
The Water Policy and the Water Sector Development Program underscore the need to 
engage the private sector in the management of water resources. However, there is no 
legal framework outlining whether and under what conditions the private sector may be 
involved in the supply of water and sanitation services. The Water Proclamation merely 
requires a permit for the supply of water. Such a framework could outline the specific 
preconditions required for a private company to be permitted to engage in the supply of 
water services: the form of business organisation needed, capacity and capital 
requirements. So far the participation of the private sector is limited only to providing 
consultancy and construction services.^^ There is no a single case of water supply system 
managed/operated by the private sector.^^
The other point worth remarking upon is the separation of water services from sanitation 
services into two different federal government agencies which is also reflected at the 
regional and local government level. The Ministiy of Health is responsible for sanitation
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid (stating that “the relationship between DWSS and the Regions appears rather unclear, and how the 
decentralization o f  water development will be carried out in practice needs to be spelt out in more detail.”)
Atkins, Martinsen and van der Voorden (n 9) 13
^  Ibid (“There are exceptions where the private sector has successfully been involved in management, such 
as in Mekelle, where leakage and fee collection rates improved with private sector management. Still 
currently the larger-scale private sector doesn’t see investment opportunities in the sector, due to the 
problems with cost recovery”.)
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m atte rs .T h ere  is an attempt to coordinate their activities at the national level but 
problems remain at the level of regional and local governments."*
4.4.2. Regulation of Price and Quality of Services
The Water Policy provides that water should be considered both as an economic and 
social good implying and also expressly acknowledging that the resource should be used 
not only efficiently but also equitably."" Managing resources equitably requires adoption 
of social-tariffs, cross-subsidisation strategies, and cost-recovery principle (maintenance 
costs for rural water supply and full costs for urban water supply). There is no national 
organ of government entrusted with these economic and social objectives. Again it 
appears that this depends on the constitutions and laws of regional states and the two city 
administrations.
Likewise, the federal government does not have any constitutional role in regulating the 
quality of water and sanitation services. The power appears to be that of regional states. 
Which specific organ, in regional governments, is entrusted with these functions depends 
on their constitution. As things stand now, however, there are no national standards 
governing the quality of water and sanitation services in the country.
4.4.3. Regulation of Safety of Drinking Water
4.4.3.I. Drinking Water Quality Standards
Safety of water is a public health matter. Article 51(3) of the Constitution provides that 
the federal government “shall establish and implement national standards and basic 
policy criteria for public health, education, science and technology as well as the 
protection and preservation of cultural and historical legacies”. The Quality and 
Standards Authority is entrusted with the development of such standards.'"" The 
Authority is empowered, among others, to: solely approve and declare Ethiopian
See Public Health Proclamation No.200/2000
Atkins, Martinsen and van der Voorden (n 9))
MWR-FDRE (n 1) 2
Quality and Standards Authority o f  Ethiopia Establishment Proclamation No. 102/1998
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Standards; formulate, approve, declare and issue Ethiopian standards for general or 
specific applications as may be necessary; and order, subject to prior notice, the closure 
of factories or business undertakings or the cessation of operations, or ban the movement 
of products, where the products and/or processes do not conform to the relevant 
compulsory Ethiopian Standards.'"' On the basis of this delegation, the Authority has 
developed in 2001 a body of standards applicable to public drinking water supply,'"^ 
These are uniform standards applicable throughout the country and repeal the old 
standards which were issued in 1990.'"* The new directive has introduced changes with 
respect to requirements and test methods.'"'' The Authority, in developing the standards, 
relied on WHO guidelines for drinking water quality and Kenyan and Indian drinking 
water standards.'"*
This set of standards specifies the physical, chemical and bacteriological requirements of 
water for drinking and domestic purposes. In particular, the standards set the maximum 
permissible level and the testing method to be applied for this purpose. Maximum 
permissible level is a level whose non-fulfilment would disqualify the water for drinking 
and domestic use because of its probable hazard to health.'"^ The requirements are of four 
types: 1) physical requirements; 2) chemical requirements; 3) other constituents; and 4) 
bacteriological requirements. The odour, taste, turbidity, and colour of drinking water 
must conform to certain requirements so that it can be considered safe. In relation to the 
chemical quality of water, the standards distinguish between two characteristics: 
palatability and safety. Palatable water is water which is safe to drink, pleasant to the 
taste and usable for domestic purpose. Safe water is water intended for drinking and 
domestic use whose limits for toxic substances, bacteriological and organo leptic levels 
conform to the requirements of the prescribed requirements.
Ibid Art 6
Gashaw Tesfaye, QSA (October 2008, Addis Ababa)
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
QSA-FDRE, Drinking Water Quality Standards (2001) 
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It is worth remarking that the Ethiopian standards make two important provisions with 
respect to chemical requirements. The first relates to the problem of having national 
standards when people of different demographic groups are differently vulnerable to 
certain concentration of elements. In this regard, the Ethiopian standards provides that “if 
nitrates are present in concentrations in excess of lOmg/1, the water may be unsuitable for 
use by infants under one year of age, and an alternative source of supply must be found 
for such infants use or the water should be corrected in cases of lack of other sources”. 
Though it is imperative to take into account what health impacts might certain elements 
have on people of different demographic groups, the purpose and practical legal 
implications of the above provision is not clear. What is the extent of the obligation 
imposed on the provider when nitrates are present in concentrations in excess of 10 mg/1? 
Is it required to make sure that it is not so? Is it only obliged to inform customers so that 
they may find alternative sources? The second provision relates to fluoride. One of the 
problems with having national standards as opposed to local ones is the inefficiency 
associated with them. A given maximum permissible level is said to be optimal if the cost 
of attaining that requirement is not greater than its benefits. Clearly, the cost of attaining 
a particular level of concentration is influenced by local factors; the quality of the raw 
water for example. Some providers supply water by treating highly polluted water, which 
is what is available locally, and hence they incur significant costs. On the other hand, 
some providers are fortunate enough to have access to relatively clean and safe raw 
water. Under these conditions the propriety of having national standards of safety is 
questionable. However, it is worth pointing out what is stated in the Ethiopian standards 
with respect to fluoride: “the limit value for fluoride should consider climatic conditions, 
volume of water consumed and intake from other sources provided the limit specified in 
the above table is satisfied”. The standards prescribe that the following biological 
organisms must not be detectable in drinking water: viable organisms; faecal 
Streptococci; coliform organisms; and E. coli.
4.4.3.2. Procedural Aspects of Standard Formulation and 
Enforcement
Compared to other federal administrative agencies, the Quality and Standards Authority 
employs a participatory rulemaking process.'"^ Generally, public participation in
See Section 4.7
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administrative rulemaking serves at least two purposes.'"* First, it helps the agency to 
avail itself of the information and expertise available dispersed among the public and the 
private sector.'"" Second, it helps to legitimise and ease the implementation of rules thus 
developed."" The latter, more than the former, seems to have influenced the authority to 
make standards development participatory.'"
The following principles are said to guide the activities of the Authority:
• Standardisation is an act of simplification and aims at the prevention of
unnecessary complexity (variety rationalisation);
• Establishment of standards should be based on general consensus and promoted 
by mutual cooperation of all concerned;
• Standards must be implementable and be implemented through promotional 
efforts, publicity campaigns and other public relation activities;
• The standards should be reviewed at regular intervals and revised as necessary;
• The standards must establish means for clear and non-ambiguous evaluation of 
the fixed/specific requirements; and
• The means of implementing the standards should be deliberately considered 
(legal enforcement or voluntary application may be considered depending on
the nature of the standards, and the laws and conditions prevailing in
Ethiopia)."^
There are generally two mechanisms of enforcing standards set by the Authority. The 
first is through voluntary product and management system certification. It is a voluntary 
scheme where companies and individuals interested to use the quality mark of the 
authority may apply be part of. The second mechanism involves compulsory application
Ibid
Ibid
"°Ibid
’ * ' “The active voluntary participation o f all stakeholders in the Ethiopian standards development process is 
crucial to ensure the effective implementation o f  the standards thus published. In most cases, the 
involvement in standards preparation is in two spheres/layers, namely: by participating/attending meetings 
o f technical committees, and by commenting on draft standards that are made publicly available”. See 
www.qsae.org (last visited 17/08/2009)
"2 Ibid
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of the quality standards to certain products. There are currently 104 products which are 
required to be certified for their conformity to the standards set by the Authority."*
Three aspects of the drinking water quality standards should be noted. First, the standards 
are uniform."'' Their application does not depend on the specific locality, or the specific 
nature of the regulated entity. A provider in an area where there are only few sources of 
raw water of good quality is subject to the same quality standards as another provider 
which is located in relatively endowed and pristine environment. In addition, a provider 
serving a large size of the population such as in major cities is subject to the same quality 
standards as that which serves a small town or few individuals. Second, the standards are 
what can be called product standards as opposed to process (or technology or input) 
standards. Though it is agreed that product standards afford the regulated entity much 
flexibility in the choice of means to achieve the goals set, it also fails to take into account 
the specific problem at hand and capacity of the regulated entity. In some cases, it might 
be advisable to simply provide for a treatment technology or process instead of providing 
for a maximum contaminant level for drinking water. Another point worth mentioning is 
the lack of an effective mechanism for the enforcement of drinking water standards. The 
enabling statute empowers the Authority to take remedial measures against individuals 
and companies not complying with quality standards. This is done only with respect to 
those 104 regulated products and those companies who have chosen to get their product 
or management system certified. Unfortunately, drinking water is not one of these 
products.
4.4.3.3. The Role of Tort Law
It is observed that the drinking water quality standards are not currently enforceable. To 
the extent that any supplier observes such standards it is only because it has chosen to use 
the Authority’s mark or because of political reasons. Companies involved in production 
of bottled water are often certified, for they seek to use the Authority’s quality mark. In 
this connection, one may raise a question as to what remedy individuals have when they 
consume water which is contaminated. Under Ethiopian tort law, one possible ground to
Standards Mark and Fees Council o f  Ministers Regulations No. 132/1999
In fact, the Quality and Standards Authority o f  Ethiopia states that “one o f  the key features o f  a standard 
is to help create uniformity/order in various areas o f  social and economic development”. See www.qsae.org 
(last visited 17/08/2009)
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hold a supplier of contaminated water liable is Article 2028: “Whosoever causes damage 
to another by [fault] shall make it good”. It is a liability based on the fault of the 
defendant. The fault committed could consist of intentional act or mere negligence."* To 
succeed in such an action, the victim needs to establish: 1) that he was supplied with 
water by the defendant; 2) the water was contaminated at the time of supply; 3) as a result 
of the contamination he has suffered damage; and 4) the supplier was negligent. The fact 
that the water was contaminated at the time of supply does not necessarily mean that the 
supplier is negligent. A person is said to be negligent when he fails to do what he ought 
to do. In the case of contaminated water, the supplier is negligent when he fails to do 
what he ought to do. It is not necessary that what he ought to do be provided in the law. 
In this regard, therefore, failure to comply with the quality standards set by the Quality 
and Standards Authority may be considered as prima facie negligence. At any rate, one 
should not lose sight of the difficulties of proof that one faces when attempting to recover 
damage from a supplier of contaminated water."*
Another possible ground for tortuous liability of the supplier is products liability. In this 
regard. Article 2085(1) provides that “a person who manufactures goods and sells them to 
the public for profit shall be liable for any damage to another person resulting from the 
normal use of the goods”. However, “no liability shall be incurred where the defect which 
has caused the damage could have been discovered by a customary examination of the 
goods”. I n  addition, the manufacturer is not relieved from liability even though it has 
committed no fault or it was impossible to establish the cause of the damage, or it was not 
within their power to prevent the damage or that the damage was due to the fault of a 
third party."* They can, however, be exempted to the extent that the damage is caused by 
the victim."" The advantage of products liability as a basis for holding a supplier of 
contaminated water liable is that the plaintiff is not required to establish negligence.'^"
""Civil Code Art 2029
For difficulties surrounding the use o f  tort actions for recovering damages for contaminated water, see 
JG Derovin and DR Nelson, ‘Developments in Toxic Tort Liability for the Quality o f  Groundwater Served' 
(2007) 49 Arizona Law Review 469
Civil Code Art 2085(2)
Ibid Art 2086(1)
"®Ibid Art 2086(2)
Derovin and Nelson (n 115) 482
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Despite this, there are still some doubts as to the applicability of this provision to a case 
that involves supply of contaminated drinking water. First, the above provision applies 
only when the manufacturer supplies for profit. So a department of government supplying 
drinking water may challenge the applicability of this provision on the ground that it is 
not primarily acting for profit.'^' This argument is supported by the Water Policy which 
encourages a social approach to the supply of water and sanitation services. Second, the 
provision applies to manufactured ‘goods’. And it is not entirely clear if water is 
considered as a manufactured good or a service.
4.4.4. Environmental Regulation
As it is stated in the previous chapter regulation of water providers involves not only 
economic and social issues but also environmental issues. There are two aspects to the 
issue of environmental regulation. The first is: how is water pollution in general 
controlled in the country? And the second is a question that specifically relates to the 
supply of water services: how is the environmental impact of the activities of water 
providers regulated? The principal instrument for the control of water pollution is the 
permit system that is also used for the abstraction and use of water. It aims to control 
discharge of wastes into the water resources of the country. Any person who desires to 
use water for discharging of wastes needs to get a permit from the Ministry of Water 
Resources.'^* Such permit is to be granted only when it is found that the discharge does 
not affect the environmental quality of the receiving water or only when the waste is 
treated in a manner prescribed by the law.'^'' Supply of water and sanitation services also
Ibid 484 (“The ability o f  manufacturers to absorb the cost o f  making safer products by passing the cost 
along to consumers in the price o f  the product is another traditional justification for strict product liability 
with questionable applicability to municipal water systems. For example, some commentators point out that 
such cost-spreading would be an ineffective and a dangerous precedent to apply to public utilities, which do 
not exist in a free market. These decisions theorize that the financial cost o f  applying strict liability would 
eliminate a municipality’s ability to provide water service”).
Ibid 482 (“On a basic level, characterizing drinking water as a ‘product’ seems logical, as product 
liability claims have long been a means for recovering for tainted food and beverage. Arizona’s statute on 
product liability, for example, specifically defined ‘food product’ as ‘any product that is grown, prepared, 
provided, served or sold and that is primarily intended for human consumption and nourishment’. 
Arguably, municipal drinking water falls within that definition. Courts regard bottled water as a product 
subject to a product liability claim, so why not drinking water delivered by a municipal water provider?”)
Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 1 l(I)(d)
Ibid Art 13(2)
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involves issues regarding disposal and treatment of water wastes. The Ministry of Water 
Resources is involved only when wastes are to be discharged into the water bodies of the 
country. Otherwise, the power to regulate how wastes are generally to be treated and 
disposed is that of the Environmental Protection Authority.'^*
4.5. Regulation of Water Providers: The Case of Addis Ababa
4.5.1. Introducing Addis Ababa
Addis Ababa, the seat of the federal government, was established in 1886 by Emperor 
Menelik II and has been the capital city of the country ever since. Before 1886, 
Ethiopia’s capital had constantly been shifting mainly for military reasons.'^* The 
development of the city has largely been u n p la n n e d .T h e  2007 population census puts 
the population of the city at about 2.7 million and this grows at a rate of 2.1 percent.'^* 
Table 4.3 presents sources of drinking water for residents of the city based on a survey 
made in 2004.'^"
See Environmental Organs Establishment Proclamation No. 295/2002
For brief overview o f  the historical development o f  the city, see M Ruttena and T Degefa, ‘Addis 
Ababa’ in K Shillington (ed). Encyclopaedia o f  African History (2005); UN-HABITAT, Situation Analysis 
o f  Informal Settlements in Addis Ababa  (2007) 23 (“Prior to the foundation o f  Addis Ababa by Menelik II 
in 1886 Ethiopia had a succession o f  capital cities, largely owing to dynastic changes and depletion o f  
forestry resources such as timber and firewood... More generally, it appears that as the country opened up 
to western civilization in the late 19* century, three important factors, namely the introduction o f  
eucalyptus, the 1907 proclamation legalizing private ownership o f  urban land, and completion o f  the Addis 
Ababa to Djibouti railway line in 1917, saved the capital from relocation”.)
Ruttena and Degefa (n 125) 14 (“The main advantage o f  this spontaneous growth was the absence o f  
spécifié quarters (rich versus the poor, foreigners versus Ethiopians), as often witnessed in African cities 
that developed under colonial rule”)
PCC-FDRE, Summary and Statistical Report o f  the 2007 Population and Housing Census; Population 
Size by Age and Sex (2008)
The figures are taken from CSA-FDRE, Welfare Monitoring Survey 2004: Indicators on Living 
Standards, Accessibility, Household Assets, Food Security and HIV/AIDS (2004)
136
Table 4.3: Sources of drinking water in Addis Ababa
Source Percentage
River, lake 0.18%
Unprotected well/spring 0.75%
Protected welFspring 1.30%
Public tap 58.29%
Own tap 39.37%
Not stated 0.11%
Rain water 0.53%
Source: CSA-FDRE (n 128)
4.5.2. Constitutional Status of Addis Ababa
According to the Constitution, Addis Ababa is the capital city of the federation and the 
seat of the federal government.'*" The residents are constitutionally entitled to self­
administration; however, the city administration is responsible to the federal 
government.'*' The government of the city of Addis Ababa has three layers: central city 
administration, sub-city administration and Kebele administration.'** The city is divided 
into 10 sub-cities and each sub-city is further divided into several Kebeles (lowest 
administrative units). Article 11(1) of the Addis Ababa City Government Charter 
generally provides for the powers and functions of the city government: “The City 
Government shall have the power to make laws and exercise judicial powers specifically 
conferred on it by [the] Charter as well as executive powers and functions over matters 
that have not specifically been included in the details of the powers and functions of the 
executive organs of the Federal Government”. These include but not limited to powers to: 
• Identify, determine and organise municipal services to be delivered at the city, 
sub-city and kebele level;'**
Constitution Art 19(1) 
" ‘ Ibid Arts 49(2) and (3)
Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation No.361/2003 Art 10 (hereinafter 
mentioned as the Charter)
Article 2(4) o f  the Charter defines municipal service as “water and sewerage service, road construction 
service, fire and emergency service, day to day services for residents including civil status record
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• Provide efficient, effective and equitable services through the use of a variety of 
service delivery alternatives and the participation of the people and to ensure 
that a standardised, acceptable system of service delivery is in place; and
• Administer, according to law, the land and the natural resources located within 
the bounds of the city.
The City Council is the legislative branch of the city.'*'' Members of the Council are 
elected by residents of the city for a term of five years.'** The Council meets regularly 
every two months; it could also convene for extraordinary meetings.'** The powers and 
functions of the Council include, but not limited to:
• Promulgate proclamations on matters which are within the authority of the city 
government;
• Issue regulations pursuant to powers vested in it by proclamations enacted by 
the House of Peoples’ Representatives;
• Levy taxes and duties and set service charges on revenue sources specified 
under the charter; and
• Approve the quality standards of and charges for municipal services.'**
The political party occupying the majority of seats of the Council or, where such does not 
exist, the coalition of political parties, form and give leadership to the executive organ of 
the city.'** The City Cabinet and the Mayor constitute the executive branch, the latter 
being the chief executive.'*" The same structure is followed at sub-city and kebele level, 
which have councils, chief executives and standing committees.'''" The judiciary consists 
of three layers of courts. There are social courts, first instance courts and the appellate
operations, land development and management, city sanitation and beatification and other services to be 
designated as such by the City Government”.
Addis Ababa Charter (n 131) Art 14(1)
Ibid Art 12(1)
Ibid Art 15
" ’ ibid Art 14
"* Ibid Art 13
""Ibid Art 12(1)
Ibid Arts 30-38
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court.''" Social courts are found at the level of kebeles. And there is one first instance 
court for every sub-city. These courts constitute the judicial branch of the city 
government.
4.5.3. Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA)
Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority is a department of the Addis Ababa City 
government responsible for the supply of water and sewerage services. Its structure is 
unique compared to other public utilities such as telecommunications and electricity 
which are structured as federal public enterprises and which are regulated by autonomous 
agencies. In the areas of telecommunications, for example, Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation is the national operator. It is a public enterprise 
operating on commercial basis. For all legal purposes it is considered as a company but 
owned by the state. It is regulated by another organ of government, Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Agency which is charged with regulatory functions over 
telecommunication services.'''*
Following the restructuring of the state into a federal one, AAWSA was re-established in 
1995 for the purpose of supplying safe and adequate water and providing wastewater and 
sludge disposal services to residents of the city and its environs.'''* Within its jurisdiction 
and area of service, AAWSA is given exclusive rights to install and operate a water 
supply system, wastewater/sewage disposal system and sludge treatment and disposal 
system.''''' The principal jurisdiction and areas of service encompass the city of Addis 
Ababa. However, the main water sources and treatment plants are found outside the 
boundaries of the city and within the regional state of Oromia.'''* The AAWSA 
Proclamation has, therefore, included a clause that provides the possibility of the
" ‘ Ibid Arts 39-50
Telecommunication Proclamation No 49/1996 and Public Enterprises Proclamation No 25/1992
Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority Re-Establishment Proclamation N o 10/1995 Art 5(1)
Ibid Art 5(2). In addition, Article 15(2) provides: “the authority shall have special and exclusive power 
to import water meter for use o f  the same within its jurisdiction and area o f  service. It is hereby prohibited 
to import or sell such meter or distribute in any manner or cause to use the same by any other person or 
institution”.
It may be noted that the city o f  Addis Ababa is surrounded by the regional state o f  Oromia
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jurisdiction and areas of service of the authority to be extended to neighbouring towns 
and villages.'''* Currently, there is an agreement between the city government and the 
government of the Oromia regional state to the effect that the former would provide water 
and sanitation services to the towns surrounding the city.'''* These towns have been put 
together into one administration for the purpose of facilitating the provision of social
148services.
The exact nature of AAWSA is further reduced to ambiguity because of legal rules that 
seem to grant it regulatory powers. For example. Article 8(1) provides;
Unless the Authority permits as it mav determine, no person shall develop, process 
and distribute or supply water for its own or sell water from the Authority’s water 
supply system or provide a sewerage disposal service by installing the same or by 
letting the sewer system connected for himself, to any other person for any purpose 
and upon any condition including for payment of money or otherwise, within the 
jurisdiction and areas of service of the Authority (emphasis added).
In addition, the authority is granted power to determine for what purposes treated water 
may be put to use under certain conditions. In this regard. Article 9(1) provides:
The Authority may prohibit the use of treated water for any purpose other than:
• household consumption and other domestic uses, notably the watering of 
gardens;
• industrial and commercial uses;
• the prevention and quenching of fires and other forms of combustion;
• watering public parks, filling public swimming pools and supplying public 
fountains;
• watering of domestic animal and the general use of dairies and chicken farms.
Article 6(l)(b) o f  the AAWSA Proclamation (n 143) provides “the jurisdiction o f  the Authority shall 
extend, with the prior consent o f  other concerned Regional Council(s) to all catchment areas and places o f  
water works and wastewater works/facilities and further to non-municipal villages adjacent to the city”. In 
addition. Article 6(3) provides that when requested by the regional government, the city council determines 
the localities outside the city, other than the localities along its water transmission and sewer lines, or in the 
vicinity o f  its water dams, which shall be provided with water supply and sewerage disposal services and 
the volume o f  water that shall be supplied to them. However, according to Article 6(4), no connection to 
the water or sewerage system shall be made for any locality or establishment outside the city where such 
connection would jeopardize the safety o f  water or wastewater works.
Wondimu Tekle, Technical Deputy Manager, AAWSA (June 2007)
148 Ibid
140
Some of the above uses of water may also be restricted under conditions “reasonably” 
determined by the authority.'''" The other power of the AAWSA which has regulatory 
nature relates to the issue of expropriation. In this connection, Article 10 of the AAWSA 
Proclamation provides:
The Authority is entitled to expropriate and acquire immovable properly by way of 
expropriation by paying fair compensation in respect thereof, according to the 
relevant law, where the use of such property is required for the achievement of the 
Authority’s objectives.
Water works developed by any person within the jurisdiction and areas of service 
of the Authority shall be expropriated by the same where such works are considered 
useful for the public. The owners thereof shall have the right of fair compensation 
in accordance with the civil code.
Other regulatory powers of the Authority include the power to: license and determine the 
conditions under which private plumbers may fix and repair water and wastewater works; 
establish conditions under which underground water may be extracted; and determine the 
quantity of water to be supplied and the characteristics and quantity of 
wastewater/sewage to be discharged into the sewage system (enforce quality and health 
standards criteria and conditions).'*" With respect to sewerage services, the establishing 
statute provides that the Authority “may invite, encourage, license, and supervise private 
investors who participate in the collection, transportation and discharge of sludge by 
vacuum trucks”.'*' Note the fact that this does not impose any obligation on the 
Authority to grant license to private individuals or companies intending to be involved in 
the sewerage business. However, the Authority has already licensed some private 
companies in the sewerage business.'**
The AAWSA Proclamation also deals with the manner by which AAWSA could acquire 
rights of way. AAWSA acquires right to install water or sewer lines and right of way on a 
property held by another subject to conditions which are mutually agreed and in return 
for compensation paid in advance.'** If the Authority and the landholder fail to agree, the
AAWSA Proclamation (n 143) Art 9(2) 
Ibid Art 14 
" ‘ Ibid Art 16
152 Tekle (n 147) and Nega Getahun, Head o f  Legal Department, AAW SA (May 2009) 
AAWSA Proclamation (n 143) Art 11(1)
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conditions of access to the land would be determined by the city government.'*'' 
However, the landholder could contest the adequacy of compensation awarded in a 
court.'** Rights of way acquired in this way impose certain duties upon the landholder. 
These include: the duty to inform any authorised user of his property the existence of 
such rights'**; the duty to safeguard the lines'**; and the duty not to obstruct in any way 
the installation, use, inspection, maintenance or repair of the lines.'**
For the purpose of understanding regulatory constrains under which the Authority 
operates, it is important to understand the structure of the organisation. The Authority has 
a general manager and deputy managers.'*" The activity of the Authority as managed by 
the general manager is supervised by a Board. The members of the Board are appointed 
by the executive branch of the city government.'*" It holds regular monthly meetings.'*' 
The powers and duties of the Board include:
• submission of the work programme and budget of the Authority for approval by 
the executive branch of the city government;
• decision on policy matters of the Authority other than those to be decided by 
the executive branch of the city government;
• appointment and removal of the general manager and determination of his 
salary and allowance;
• evaluation of the annual financial and work reports of the Authority and 
submission of the same to the executive branch of government; and
• establishment of capital reserves necessary for financing the depreciation of 
fixed assets, the expansion and development of the activities of the Authority
Ibid Art 11(2) 
Ibid Art 11(4) 
""Ibid Art 11(6) 
" ’ ibid Art 11(7) 
"* Ibid Art 11(8) 
"" Ibid Art 17 
Ibid Art 18 
Ibid Art 19
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The main water supply sources used by the Authority are the Gefersa, Legedadi and Dire 
dam and treatment plants. Gefersa dam is designed to produce 30,000 cubic meters per 
day.'** However, for reasons which are attributed to the age of the dam and the treatment 
plant, had been producing about 24,000 cubic meters per day.'** It has been reported 
recently that Gefersa dam has started to produce water at its full capacity owing to the 
rehabilitation work done.'*'' The largest amount of water comes from Legedadi dam and 
treatment plant. Legedadi has designed capacity to produce 150,000 cubic metres per 
day.'** It does not however operate at full capacity because accumulated silt has reduced 
the amount of water that the dam can hold and hence it produces only 125,000 cubic 
metres per day.'** In addition to these sources, the Authority relies on a number of 
springs, boreholes and wells.'**
The water services provided by the Authority are said to cover 97-98 percent of the 
city.'** This figure must be taken with caution and must be clarified. This does not mean 
that 98 percent of the households in the city have direct connection to the Authority’s 
water supply network. In fact, only 40 percent of the households have direct connection 
to the water supply network.'*" When the Authority is quoting 98 percent as a coverage 
figure, it only means that 98 percent of the water in the city can be traced back to the 
Authority. The above figure does not also mean that the Authority is satisfying 98 percent 
of the water demand in the city. Quite the contrary, only half of the current demand is 
currently being fulfilled by the Authority.'*"
Tekle (n 147) and Getahun (n 152)
Ibid
K Bekele, ‘Authority rehabilitates Gefersa dam at the cost o f  204 million birr’ (19 September 2009) The 
Reporter
Tekle (n 147)
Getahun (n 152) ( stating that sedimentation/siltation has become a serious problem for the city’s water 
supply system resulting in the seasonal shortage o f  water and increasing cost o f  supply)
Ibid and Tekle (n 147)
Tekle (n 147)
CSA-FDRE (n 128)
Tekle (n 147)
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The above coverage figure also hides the true picture as far as reliability of service 
provided by the Authority is concerned. In addition to the inability to satisfy the current 
demand for water and low level of direct connection, the reliability of service, measured 
in terms of number of hours per day for which running water is available, is 
unsatisfactory. There is repeated interruption of services. Some localities get water only 
once a week.'*' Customers are charged monthly; because of the time it takes to process 
the bills, customers are required to pay in September for the water consumed in the 
month of July.'** Compared to utilities in other African countries, the monthly bill better 
serves the interest of the poor; this does not, however, mean that there is nothing that can 
be further done to take the interest of poor households into account.'** Settlement of bills 
has recently been decentralised to the Kebelle level.'*'' Decentralisation of billing services 
to the lowest administrative level is a commendable measure and one that is recognised 
as a best practice/solution to the problem of disconnection.'**
There is a great deal of unaccounted-for water due to either leakage or illegal connection. 
Though the exact figure is not certain, estimates put the loss of water due to leakage and
This is particularly true o f  areas which are being newly settled; the area which is known as Bethel is 
particularly known for suffering from a very poor water service. It is also around here where there is a 
strong presence o f  mobile water vendors (Solomon Ketema, resident o f  Bethel, Addis Ababa (as recent as 
September 2009))
Tekle (n 147); Mengist Ketema, Manager o f  Kebele 19, Yeka-Sub City (May 2009, Addis Ababa)
WUP, Better Water and Sanitation fo r  the Urban Poor: Good Practice from  Sub-Saharan Africa (2003) 
37) (The monthly and bi-monthly or quarterly payment period may suit middle and high-income users that 
are paid on a monthly basis but this is rarely appropriate for low-income users. It places a significant strain 
on household budgeting and expenditure... Despite these difficulties, many countries and cities continue to 
implement a relatively infrequent billing regime and have not introduced any measures that would assist 
low-ineome households to make their payments. Currently, billing is carried out on a bi-monthly basis in 
Senegal, Mali, Cameroon and bills are issued on a quarterly basis in Cote d’Ivoire. In Nairobi, where 
billing is carried out on a bi-annual basis, low-income consumers note that infrequent billing is a key 
reason why they default on payments (and are subsequently disconnected)”.)
Ketema (n 172)
WUP (n 173) 38 (“Establishing local payment centers in low-income areas may also facilitate payment 
by improving proximity o f  payment sites to customers. Typically low-income households live in marginal 
areas on the periphery o f  cities and utility payment centers are located a significant distance fi-om the 
residence or place o f  work. Paying bills may mean taking time out o f  work. More careful consideration o f  
the constraints that low-income households face (especially when they are trying to make payments) is 
likely to lead to better cost recovery”.)
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illegal connection at 40 percent of the total daily production.'** Though efficient 
utilisation of water including conservation is the main strategy incorporated in the Water 
Policy, little has been done to minimise leakage. It appears that the policy at this time is 
geared towards increasing the daily production of water. It should be noted that 
minimising the amount of leakage narrows the gap between demand and supply a great 
deal. This is despite the policy statement by the Authority to be concerned with water loss 
reduction.'**
As it is stated earlier, only 40 percent of the households in the city have direct 
connections. Others access the water services provided by the authority indirectly, 
through intermediaries discussed below. But one may raise a question as to why only less 
than half of the households in the city have direct connection. The first barrier to indirect 
connection is the connection charge, deposit and other initial costs borne by a customer to 
get a connection. The connection charge is decided by the Board of AAWSA in the form 
of directives.'** The deposit to be paid depends on the size of the water meter and the 
customer will be responsible for other costs that may arise, for example costs of digging 
the ground to bury the pipes.'*" The customer is also required to buy secondary and 
tertiary pipelines and, depending on the distance to the mains, this by itself may 
constitute a huge barrier.'*" These costs have the effect of prohibiting poor households 
from getting direct connection. In addition, such costs are to be paid in advance and there 
is no flexible payment arrangement.'*' In Addis Ababa, customers are not required to pay 
in advance for the water meter installed; on the other hand, AAWSA retains ownership of
Tekle (n 147) and Getahun (n 152)
Website o f  the authority: “Water loss reduction has become high priority to AAW SA due to the fact that 
the estimated amount o f  water loss record in the water supply systems is high and it has been aggravating 
the water shortage in the city. Moreover, as the demand increases and the water supply network systems 
expand the need for modem and efficient operation and management o f  the system is becoming 
fundamental issue. Although it varies so frequently and is generalized rate, recent studies have indicated 
that the water loss rate o f  Addis Ababa water supply system has been estimated to be 37%. The rate did not 
indicate how much proportion goes to physical losses or commercial losses”.
Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage Disposal Services Regulations N o 31/2002 Art 6
Ibid Arts 9 and 10 (the amount o f  deposit ranges from Birr 120 to 1037 depending on the size o f  the 
water meter)
Ketema (n 172)
Ibid
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such meters and customers pay only rents.'** As it is observed in chapter two, in many 
developing countries, lack of tenure security stands in the way of many poor households 
in informal settlements from getting connected to the official water supply network. In 
Addis Ababa too a person is required to provide a copy of the title deed to get connection. 
This is not a requirement provided in the Proclamation that has re-established the 
Authority. Nor is it provided in the Regulations enacted by the city government. It is 
enacted by the Board of AAWSA based on the Regulations.'** In this regard, compared 
to other African cities, this may not be a huge problem as even most houses where the 
poor live are owned by the government.'*'' However, this is a problem to the peri-urban 
areas where there are some informal settlements.'** In addition, payment arrangement for 
monthly bills is not flexible. As a result, even though households get connection, they 
might end up with arrears and hence eventual disconnection.
4.5.3. Small-scale and Independent Providers
It is reported that about 98 percent of the water in the city can be traced back to AAWSA. 
This does not, however, translate into corresponding proportion of households having 
private connection. Only an estimated 40 percent of households in the city have private 
connection; the remaining households rely on different forms of SIPs.'** One form of 
small-scale and independent providers is what is called public fountains. These are 
Kebelle managed communal water collection points. They are operated by individuals 
employed by local administrators. However, a number of them are not currently in 
operation.'** Those, which do, operate only for few hours a day.'**
The rents which depend on the size o f the water meter range from Birr 1.35 to 14.02 per month.
Article 7(1) o f  the AAWSA Regulations (n 178) provides: “any person desiring to have water supply 
services shall submit an application. The type and description o f  supportive documents to be attached and 
submitted by such persons shall be decided by the Directives to be issued by the Board”.
WUP (n 173) 23 (“In countries such as Ethiopia where most households have secure tenure, the utility is 
not restricted in its provisions o f  services...It is interesting to note that many o f  the mud and wattle 
structures occupied by poor households are owned by the Ethiopian Government and as a result poor 
households are tenants o f  the government and eligible for a service.”)
UN-Habitat (n 126)
See Table 4.3
S Howard, ‘Taps for Town? Exploring Pubic Water Tap Management in Addis Ababa’ (2005) Water 
Aid (Ethiopia) Briefing Note
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Another form of SIPs is those which are owned and operated by community groups. 
These are common particularly in newly settled areas in the outskirts of the city. 
Community groups pool their resources together to get a public standpipe. They also 
negotiate with AAWSA to be categorised as public fountains for the purpose of getting 
favourable tariff rates. These are temporary solutions. They remain in operation until 
each member of the community group manages to get its own private connection. Once 
the water supply network has been extended to the locality it would be relatively easier 
for each household to get a private connection.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Also most common are what can be called neighbour sellers and water kiosks. These do 
not have any kind of special relationship with AAWSA apart from the ordinary 
contractual relationship which every ordinary customer has. As such they do not benefit 
from the flat rate which authorised standpipes benefit from. They are found across the 
city. They regularly serve poor households who can not afford private connection. In 
period of interruption in some areas, they also serve other households who are normally 
connected to the official network. Their presence is not restricted to specific sections of 
the city. What is different about the city of Addis Ababa compared to other African cities 
is that it is not developed by colonial powers and also not in a planned manner. As a 
result the poor households are found almost evenly distributed throughout the city.'*" As
Ibid and Getahun (n 152)
UN-HABITAT (n 126) 26-27 (“ ...the wealthy lived side by side with the deprived. The mixed 
residential structure...was not altered by the changes that took place in its economic base as the country
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these are households who do not have private connection, they rely on water kiosks to 
buy their daily water. Water kiosks are general grocery shops which sell water by the 
bucket.
Figure 4.3: Neighbour seller around Meri, Addis Ababa
Recently, as the city expands in size, households in newly settled areas have found 
themselves poorly served by AAWSA. Because of insufficient availability of raw water 
during particularly the dry season and a number of other factors, there are times when 
households in these areas get running water only once a week. This has created a business 
opportunity for mobile water vendors who transport water by donkey or car from areas 
where there is running water. The same people also serve the growing water demand of 
the construction sector.
In conclusion, it can be said that SIPs have a large presence in the city of Addis Ababa. 
They serve: 1) poor households that do not have private connection; 2) households in 
informal and new settlements; and 3) areas where there is interruption of water supply. It
opened up to western civilization in the early 20 century and subsequently during the short-lived Italian 
occupation. Over the past three decades, a few, predominantly high-income, residential areas have 
emerged, especially in the Bole and Old Airport areas. A new upper middle class residential area also 
seems to be in the making in the eastern peripheries o f  the city. Apart from these few changes— all o f  
which are results o f planned housing development— Addis Ababa fails to display the degree o f  separation 
between housing classes commonly featured in other major cities in the developing world. Although Addis 
Ababa has its own fair share o f  ethnic concentration areas, these cannot be defined as ghettos. All over the 
city, the poor, the middle-income earners and the rich live side by side in apparent harmony”.)
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is difficult to quantify the number of households who rely on these alternative means of 
supply as many of the so-called private connection are also shared among several 
households.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
It should also be noted in this connection SIPs in Addis Ababa, as presented earlier, are 
not independent in the sense of having a separate source of water like wells and 
boreholes. There are some people who sunk boreholes and have reportedly been 
exploiting the demand left unfulfilled by AAWSA and created by the construction 
boom.'"" But in our field visits, we did not find any individual having a separate source of 
water and selling it to other households (see the appendix). There are of course factories, 
embassies and other high-volume water users who have their own source of water but 
could not be considered SIPs as they are not using their source to provide other people 
with water.'"'
4.5.5. Regulation of Safety, Price and Quality of Service
The situation regarding regulation of the safety of drinking water in the city of Addis 
Ababa is not different from the national situation. The standards set by the QSA are also 
applicable to the water supply in Addis Ababa. The limitations of those standards are 
already discussed.'"* The AAWSA has in-built system to ensure the safety of drinking 
water; it daily take samples from different areas of the city and test the water for
Getahun (n 152)
W Zenebe, ‘AAWSA to Use Eminent Domain to Curb Water Shortage’ (29 May 2007) Addis Fortune 
See Section 4.4.3.2
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193co n tam inan ts .B u t these are not reported to any outside organ and are useful only for 
purposes internal to the authority. It should be noted in this regard that there are no 
safety standards that are applicable to the activities of SIPs in Addis Ababa.
As it is indicated earlier, there is no national regulatory framework applicable to urban 
water supply across the country. Taking the case of Addis Ababa, a question might be 
raised as to how the tariff structure employed by the utility is decided and who 
determines that. Currently the legislative branch of the city government has the power to 
determine the tariff structure. Article 7(2) of the AAWSA Proclamation provides that the 
Addis Ababa City Council may determine and amend by regulations the rates of charges 
for the services which the Authority provides. Price determination is a political issue; if 
there is any control on how price is determined it is a only political one. The current tariff 
structure is that which is set by AAWSA Regulations. The following table provides the 
tariff for the last year (from July 8,2006 to July 7, 2007) of this five-year period.
Table 4.4: AAWSA’s rate structure
Block
July 8, 2006 to July 7, 2007
Tariff/m^ (in Birr)
Water Sewerage Total
Public Fountain 1.75 - 1.75
Domestic customers (0-7 cubic meter monthly) 1.75 - 1.75
Domestic customers (7-20 cubic meter 
monthly)
2.60 0.55 3.15
Domestic customers (above 20 cubic meter 
monthly)
3.25 0.55 3.80
Non-domestic customers 3.25 0.55 3.80
Source: AAWSA Regulations (n 178)
The above tariff was supposed to expire on July 7, 2007; however, it is still in use as the 
city government has not been willing to accept its revision as requested by AAWSA.
Tekle (n 147)
Ibid
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In this connection, it should be noted that the price of water in the city of Addis Ababa is 
highly subsidised. The Water Policy requires that with respect to urban water supply the 
principle of full cost recovery be followed; at the same time it requires that special 
measures must be taken to make to ensure that certain sections of the population are not 
excluded from this vital s e rv ic e .T h e  recognition of public fountains and the adoption 
of cross-subsidies are strategies adopted for this purpose. However, such strategies are 
effective only when on the whole the revenue collected from the supply of water covers 
at least the operation costs of the water supply system. On the contrary, it is reported that 
the operation cost of the water supply in the city is Birr 14/m^; while the highest 
permissible charge is Birr 3.25/m^ (even this is for non-domestic and high-volume 
domestic custo m ers).[B irr is the unit of currency in Ethiopia] Contrary to the principle 
incorporated in the Water Policy, AAWSA is currently operating on the basis of 
subsidies. It should also be noted that the price charged by different forms of SIPs is not 
currently controlled. The above tariff binds only AAWSA. Public fountains are charged a 
flat-rate as they are expected to serve many households. This tariff structure, however, 
discourages households from sharing connections or selling to others; if they do, since 
they are likely to be considered high-volume users, they would heavily charge their 
customers.
Quality of service measured in terms of the minimum number of hours for which running 
water has to be supplied, justifiable and unjustifiable interruptions, customer treatment, 
level of unaccounted-for water, and so on are also issues involved in the regulation of 
water providers. It has been argued, in relation to the national framework, that there 
exists no regulatory regime on this matter. The same is generally true regarding the 
situation in the city of Addis Ababa. There are some provisions pertaining to pressure^
Getahun (n 152)
See Seetion 4.3.3.5 
Getahun (n 152) and Table 4.4
Artiele 15 o f  the AAW SA Regulations provides: “1. The authority shall make an effort to provide 
pressure up to one (1) bar or ten (10) meters water height. 2. Where it is impossible for the Authority to 
provide water supply service at a lower or equal water height stipulated under sub-article (1) o f  this Article 
due to location or height o f  the building or due to any reason, the customer or person requesting the 
services shall be responsible to fulfil the conditions required to get the services”.
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handling of customer complaints^^^ and cost-allocation between the customer and 
AAWSA but these do not in any way constitute a comprehensive quality of service 
standards. Therefore, in this regard, it can be observed that the only forms of control 
imposed on the official utility are political in nature. There are some internal procedural 
requirements governing, for example, how customer complaints and applications need to 
be treated but are not legally enforceable or monitored by any external organ.
4.5.6. Legal Status of Small and Independent Water Providers
The Water Proclamation requires a permit for abstraction and supply of water.^°° The law 
which established AAWSA provides that any one who intends to abstract and supply 
water or resale water acquired from AAWSA should obtain a permit from the latter:
Unless the Authority permits as it may determine, no person shall develop, process 
and distribute or supply water for its own or sell water from the Authority’s water 
supply system or provide a sewerage disposal service by installing the same or by 
letting the sewer system connected for himself, to any other person for any purpose 
and upon any condition including for payment of money or otherwise, within the 
jurisdiction and areas of service of the Authority.
As it is stated earlier, there are no private providers who supply water from an 
independent source. But AAWSA states that they would most likely grant this permit if 
an applicant comes forward.^*^  ^ However, this permit is unlikely to be granted for the 
neighbour sellers and water kiosks, for one of the requirements of this permit is a letter of 
support from Kebelle. The practice currently is to write a letter of support only to 
community-based groups. At this time water kiosks and neighbour sellers are therefore 
operating in violation of the law. This prohibition is hardly enforced; but the tariff 
structure, the progressive rate, discourages resale of water. Clearly unenforced law is not
Article 41 o f  the AAW SA Regulations provides: “1. A customer or potential customer shall have the 
right to submit complaints to the Authority against any request, order or decision o f  the Authority which 
according to his opinion affects his present or future rights or interest. 2. The Authority is duty bound to 
examine and decide any complaints submitted in accordance with sub-article (1) o f  this Article. 3. The 
Board shall specify the rules o f  procedure for such customer’s complaint Administration by Directives. 4. 
The right o f  the customer or potential customer is reserved to contest against the decision o f  the Authority 
before the court o f  law which has a jurisdiction over the matter.”
See Section 4.4.4
AAWSA Proclamation (n 143) Art 8(1)
Getahun (nl52)
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a desirable thing. However, when it comes to this particular legal prohibition, before any 
argument is made calling for the active enforcement of the requirement of the licence to 
supply or resale of water in the city, one should first evaluate the propriety of the 
prohibition. If the prohibition is found to be well justified, then the right thing to do is to 
actively enforce it. If, on the other hand, the prohibition appears to be unjustified, the 
right thing to do is to change the law. In the event of the latter, one may wonder about the 
purpose of initiating the lawmaking process to do away with a prohibition which is not 
enforced in the first place. The point of doing that lies in the fact that even if the law is 
not actively enforced, officials entrusted with the enforcement of the law might 
selectively attempt to enforce the law with the view to advance other personal interests or 
preferences. This is a valid concern substantiated with the experience of SIPs in other 
countries.^®  ^In addition, even though the prohibition is not directly and actively enforced, 
there are other legal provisions which are designed taking into account this prohibition. 
For example, the progressive tariff structure discussed in the previous section is designed 
having taken the prohibition of resale of water into account. So in the event that the 
prohibition is found to be unjustified, it is important to not only repeal the specific 
prohibition but also modify such other legal provisions as might have been influenced by 
the prohibition.
4.5.7. Ongoing Reforms
Currently, AAWSA is undergoing a restructuring process to separate its regulatory power 
from its operational functions. It was reported that the city government has already 
approved the division of AAWSA into four different a g e n c ie s .O n e  of these agencies 
would have regulatory responsibilities; whereas the other three have operational 
functions. Water Services Authority is one of the agencies which would come into 
existence. It would be primarily responsible for the supply of water. Management of the 
sewerage services would be given to a second agency called Sewerage Management 
Agency. The third agency would be concerned with the construction and maintenance 
services of the water supply and sewerage facilities of the city. The three agencies would 
be regulated by the fourth new agency. Separation of functions might at times be 
desirable when it results in specialisation. However, one should not overlook the
See the discussion in Chapter 2
H Alemu, ‘Agency Under Restructuring’ (12 July 2009) Addis Fortune 
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collective action (coordination) problem that attends over fragmentation of institutions. It 
is particularly questionable if supply of water should be separated from provision of 
sewerage services. On the other hand, separating the construction activity of AAWSA 
from its operational (operating of the facilities) function might enable to make sure that 
the utility is operating in a sustainable manner by covering at least its operating costs. 
This proposal to create four agencies out of AAWSA is, however, suspended at this 
moment.^ ®^
4.6. Water Federalism
4.6.1. Allocation of Water Rights and Prevention of Water Pollution
Federalism poses a unique problem as far as water management is concerned. Questions 
can be raised as to whether it is the federal or regional governments which should be 
charged with administering water resources. More specifically, the question is which 
level of government should be responsible for the; allocation of water rights and 
prevention of water pollution; and regulation of price, safety and quality of water 
services? The objective is to evaluate the manner in which responsibilities and powers 
over water resources are currently allocated in a federal Ethiopia. It should be clear at the 
outset that allocation of water resources is not merely a matter of defining property rights; 
it also involves issues of environmental regulation with a view to minimising risks of 
pollution and over-abstraction. For this reason, functions relating to the two issues are 
treated together in this section. The division of powers and functions with respect to 
water resources between the federal government and regional governments has been 
discussed earlier.^°^ Here what is done is to address the corresponding normative 
question.
In a federal state arrangement, there is a prima facie presumption in favour of allocating 
such powers and responsibilities to the constituents units of the federation and local 
governments as opposed to central government organs. This is what is known as the 
principle of subsidiarity, “the idea that social decision-making should take place at the
W Zenene, ‘BPR Deferred for Water Authority’ (04 October 2009) Addis Fortune 
See Sections 4.3.2 and 4.4
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least centralized level appropriate to the decision in question”.^ ®^ Decentralisation in the 
area of environmental regulation is said to yield several benefits:
In addition to allowing for a closer fit between local ecological conditions and 
environmental policies, a suitably decentralized regulatory system provides several 
other advantages. First, the ecological and economic diversity of the nation requires 
local knowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the federal level. A more 
decentralized system is better able to overcome this ‘knowledge problem’ and 
ensure that regulatory measures take account of local conditions. Second, 
decentralization, and the resulting policy experimentation and interjurisdicitonal 
competition, can encourage policy innovation as policymakers seek to meet the 
economic, environmental, and other demands of their constituents. As a result of 
such competition, states are able to learn from each other’s successes and failures. 
This competition allows states to act as environmental ‘laboratories’ developing 
new and improved ways of addressing environmental concerns
There are generally four circumstances wherein the above presumption is abandoned in 
favour of charging the federal government with the power of environmental regulation.^®^ 
The first instance wherein federal intervention is deemed appropriate is in the case of 
interstate spillovers:
...when pollution crosses state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the 
conflict on their own. Where activity in State A causes pollution in State B, there is 
an almost unimpeachable case for federal involvement, even if only to adjudicate 
the relevant dispute... In such a context. State A is unlikely to adopt sufficient 
controls because it would bear the primary costs of any such regulatory measures, 
whereas the primary beneficiaries of such controls would be in State B ?^
Interstate spillovers also take the form of a problem which is similar to what is called 
‘tragedy of the commons’; a resource commonly owned by two or more states might be 
over-utilised.^^ ^  In such cases, it is argued that some kind of federal intervention is
GA Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 331, 338-339; and RL Revesz, ‘The Race to the Bottom and 
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics’ (1997) 82 Minnesota Law Review 535, 536-538 
(discussing the reasons for the prim a facie  presumption in favour o f  decentralisation)
JH Adler, ‘Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism’ (2005) 14 New York University 
Environmental Law Journal 130, 136-137
"°Hbid
^'°Ibidl40
G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy o f  the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243 
155
required. This argument implies that federal intervention is required in managing inter­
state rivers. The argument is that absent federal intervention, states would be locked into 
‘tragedy of the commons’ resulting in over-abstraction and pollution of interstate rivers. 
In Ethiopia, therefore, the power of the federal government to administer interstate rivers 
can be justified as a means to avoid the commons problem. It is also clear that a number 
of major rivers in Ethiopia are not only interstate but also intemational.^^^ So the 
international element bolsters this larger role of the federal government. This can, 
however, be challenged in the case of rivers which are not international and which link, 
for example, only two states. Awash River is not international and it links only two 
constituent units of the Ethiopian federation: Oromia and Afar.^^^ This river is not a 
national but regional concern. With respect to interstate rivers in Ethiopia, the federal 
government plays two important roles. It not only formulates rules and standards for 
allocation of rights and prevention of pollution but also administers these resources. This 
strategy avoids any dispute between regional states regarding rivers which connect them. 
Another possibility which is followed in the case of United States and India, for example, 
is to leave management of interstate rivers to the states involved.^^"  ^That means, the states 
are supposed to negotiate and come up with rules and standards for allocation of rights 
and prevention of pollution. The negotiation could result in a regional body entrusted 
with regulatory and adjudicatory powers. In the event that states could not reach an 
agreement, they resort to the federal government. In the case of United States, the Federal 
Supreme Court is charged with this dispute resolution functions. In India, an ad hoc 
tribunal is called for to resolve such disputes.^Considering the fact that most major 
rivers are international as well, the stronger role of the Ethiopian federal government is 
understandable. However, one might question this stronger role (in favour of a lesser role 
of providing a dispute resolution forum) for rivers which are interstate but not 
international.
See Figure 4.1
213 Ibid
See, for example, ND Hall, ‘Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the 
Great Lakes Region’ (2006) 77 University o f  Colorado Law Review 405; LA Mandarano, JP Featherstone 
and K Paulsen., ‘Institutions for Interstate Water Resources Management’ (2008) 44 Journal o f  American 
Water Resources Association 136; and H Gundimeda and CW Howe, ‘Interstate River Conflicts: Lessons 
from India and the U S’ (2008) 33 Water International 395
Gundimeda and Howe (n 214) 396
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The second argument in favour of federal role in environmental regulation relates to 
national public goods. Public goods are associated with the problem of free-ridership that 
eventually results in their undersupply. The idea in this connection is provided as follows:
Insofar as certain ecological resources located in some states provide non­
excludable benefit to residents in other states, these goods are likely to be 
underprovided. Just as private firms in a competitive market may undersupply 
goods that produce benefits for which they cannot charge, individual states may 
underproduce environmental goods, such as national parks or species habitat, that 
provide substantial uncompensated benefits to residents in other states... recent 
empirical research finds some evidence that states ffee-ride and underinvest in 
conservation of species habitat where the benefits of such action would accrue, at 
least in part, to other states.^
In the case of allocation of rights and prevention of pollution, this argument justifies a 
role of national governments to protect national goods from harms. As such, it requires 
the federal government to first identify that national public good associated with a given 
water resource and justify its intervention as only necessary. It does not, however, justify 
a blanket power of federal governments to set standards for allocation of water rights and 
prevention of water pollution.
Third, federal intervention is justified where there is a benefit that comes from economies 
of scale: “it may be more efficient to perform certain functions at the federal level for the 
country as a whole rather than separately in each state”.^ *^  This justifies only the role of 
federal governments in generating scientific knowledge and developing product 
s tanda rdsL ikew ise ,  in the case of allocation of rights and prevention of water 
pollution, this justifies a specific and limited federal role in generation and transmission 
of scientific knowledge with respect to water resources.
The final major argument for federal intervention in environmental regulation is what is 
known as ‘race to the bottom’ problem. The idea is that if states are empowered to set 
environmental standards, they would try to attract capital by setting lower environmental 
standards than competing states and this would eventually result in all states adopting
Adler (n 208)140 
Ibid 145 
Ibid 145-150
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sub-optimal environmental standards.^'^ This argument, if accepted, justifies federally set 
uniform minimum environmental standards with enforcement functions left to states. The 
problems with this argument are widely discussed. They range from challenging the 
existence of a race in the first place to doubting the direction of the race, top or bottom.^^° 
The empirical evidence is not conclusive either.
In Ethiopia, the federal government has two roles in allocation of rights and prevention of 
water pollution. First it sets general rules and standards for the allocation of rights and 
prevention of pollution of water resources found all over the country. Second, the federal 
government has the power to administer interstate and international rivers and water 
bodies. The fact that many of the major rivers in the country are interstate and 
international implies a limited role for regional state governments, implementing federal 
laws with respect to rivers and water sources which are not interstate. In the section, an 
attempt is made to see if this far-reaching role of the federal government is normatively 
supported. Four general grounds are identified as justifying the role of the federal 
government in environmental regulation; the last one is very debatable and is not a settled 
one. These grounds justify the role of the federal government in the generation and 
transmission of scientific knowledge. They justify the role of the federal government with 
respect to inter-state and international water sources. They justify the role of the federal 
government to regulate the use of any water body to the extent that it can be justified as a 
means to protect a national public good from harm, for example if a certain water source 
is a habitat for a certain forms of animal and plant life which can be considered national 
public goods. But they do not justify the role of the federal government to set general 
rules and standards for the allocation of water rights and prevention of water disputes. 
This later role might, however, be justified in relation to a concern to prevent ‘race to the 
bottom’ but the very argument of race-to-the-bottom is not yet settled and the empirical 
evidence is not conclusive.
See, for example, Revesz (n 207) and R Stewart, ‘Pyramids o f  Sacrifice? Problems o f  Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation o f  National Environmental Policy’ (1977) 86 Yale Law Journal 1196
Adler (n 208) 152 and RL Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race-to-the- 
Bottom’ rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (1992) 67 New York University Law Review  
1210
158
4.6.2. Regulation of Price, Quality and Safety of Water Supply
It has been shown that regulation of safety of water is a federal matter as all public health 
matters are constitutionally given to the federal government. On the contrary, regulation 
of price and quality of service is a local matter. The question is: is it an appropriate 
allocation of governmental power? For this purpose too, the benchmarks discussed in 
relation to water rights and pollution can be used. Regulating the safety of water requires 
understanding the various contaminants and their effects on different social and 
demographic groups. Generation of such knowledge benefits from economies of scale 
and hence this justifies the role of the federal government. Water supply systems are local 
in their nature and unless it is bottled water, there are no economies of scale associated 
with the formulation of product standards. On the other hand, there are no significant 
problems of interstate spillovers or national public good. Quite the contrary, formulation 
of standards for the safety of water depends on the specific local conditions and hence are 
better left to the state governments or local authorities. Adler writes in this relation:
Federal drinking water standards cannot be justified on the grounds of interstate 
spillovers, as drinking water quality in one community seldom, if ever, has an 
effect upon drinking water in neighbouring jurisdictions, let alone states half a 
nation away. Both the costs and benefits of more protective standards fall on users 
of the drinking water system... Drinking water is a local good produced by local 
water systems, so there are no economies of scale in the setting of uniform national 
standards. If states lack the expertise to identify the proper contaminant thresholds, 
it would justify the promulgation of federal guidelines to better inform local 
decision-making. It would not, however, justify imposition of a federal rule. 
Similarly, if state and local governments lack the capacity to monitor and maintain 
drinking water quality, this could justify financial and technical support from the 
federal government, but not mandatory standards.^^^
More specifically, the problem is not exactly the federal government having the power to 
formulate the standards but having uniform standards. As a result, the objection would 
not be significant if the federal government formulates differentiated standards for 
different localities or have a uniform standard but allows deviations under certain 
conditions.
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4.7. Issues of Administrative Justice
In regulation of human activities, an administrative process might at times be preferred to 
a legal p r o c e s s . I n  the legal process, standards of behaviour are set by the legislature 
and enforced in courts through privately or publicly brought actions. Enforcement of 
contracts and properly rights is, for example, a legal p r o c e s s . O n  the other hand, typical 
administrative process involves establishment of an administrative agency with powers to 
make, execute and interpret rules of conduct applicable within specified areas of social 
life. Courts play important and necessary supervisory power over administrative 
agencies; however, this does not eliminate the basic difference between administrative 
and judicial enforcement of laws.^^^ There has been a conspicuous shift from the legal 
approach to the administrative one in the area of water resources in Ethiopia. It has been 
observed that rules regarding water use rights and allocation are provided in the civil 
code and their enforcement is left to privately-initiated judicial litigation. Things have 
changed with the enactment of the Water Proclamation. Now the Ministry of Water 
Resources is entrusted with far-reaching powers over water resources. It adjudicates 
disputes between water users; it makes rules and standards regarding water uses and 
control of water pollution; it executes these rules and adjudicatory decisions.
The move from legal to administrative process raises several issues. First, the fact that 
most administrative agencies combine rulemaking and adjudicatory powers contradicts 
the principle of separation of powers which is rooted in concerns of efficiency and 
faimess.^^^ Second, in a democracy laws are formulated by representatives of the people
Whether to opt for legal or administrative process also depends in part on those factors which are 
discussed in connection with tort versus public regulation (in chapter three)
This is without losing sight o f  exceptional circumstances where, for example, considerations o f  
consumer safety and protection have resulted in the establishment o f  administrative agencies charged with 
responsibilities o f  checking contractual terms for fairness.
EL Rubin, ‘Law and Legislation in the Administrative State’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 369, 
373-74 (“It is important to recognize that implementation is a complex task, generally involving a range o f  
mechanisms. In many cases, there is a primary mechanism, which is the one charged with basic 
implementation o f  the statute...There are relatively few statutes, however, for which the primary 
implementation mechanism is the exclusive one; at the very least, the courts tend to exercise a supervisory 
role, on either substantive or constitutional grounds. Such supervision is important, but it should not be 
confused with judicial enforcement, which occurs when the court is the primary implementation 
mechanism”)
JO Freedman, ‘Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process’ (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 
1041, 10 4 1 (“For many years, the dominant concern was the anomaly o f  the existence o f  administrative 
agencies in a government founded upon a commitment to the separation o f  powers”); and PM Garry,
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as they affect broader sections of the population and the range of interests that are 
affected must be taken account of,^^  ^ It was attempted to resolve this contradiction by 
drawing a distinction between technical and policy decisions; that democracy requires 
only that representatives of the people make policy decisions; it does not require 
technical decisions to be made by representatives of the people?^^ The problem with this 
argument is that many times technical and policy decisions are intertwined with one 
another that it is difficult to separate them and hence administrative agencies are 
inevitably involved in the making of policy choices. The problem can not be avoided 
either by referring such powers of administrative agencies as ‘quasi-legislative’. Third, it 
can also be argued that delegating judicial power to administrative agencies contradicts 
the principle of judicial independence. This is particularly true when the administrative 
agency makes a judicial ruling in a case to which it is also a party.
The above problems posed by the administrative process do not in any way justify its 
abolition altogether; the time has passed when life is so simple to be left only to the legal 
process. There are now economic and political reasons for using the administrative 
process in some a r e a s . T h e  problems can however be minimised by subjecting the 
process to certain procedural and substantive requirements. One such requirement is to 
ensure that the administrative process is participatory. Participatory decision making 
ensures that a range of interests affected by a proposed administrative decision are 
accounted for.^^  ^In addition, it eases its implementation.^^® But most importantly it helps
‘Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation 
Doctrines’ (2006) 38 Arizona State Law Journal 921, 927 (2006) (“Early judicial decisions used the 
separation o f  powers rationale to forbid any delegation o f  legislative power to the executive branch”)
Garry (n 224) 927 (“society is bound to obey the laws enacted by democratic legislatures exercising the 
power delegated to it by the people. This social contract exists because citizens have agreed to relinquish 
their governing powers only to their elected representatives”);
PH Aranson, E Gehhnorn and GO Robinson, ‘A Theory o f  Legislative Delegation’ (1983) 68 Cornell 
Law Review 1, 7
See the discussion on the choice between tort and public regulation in chapter three. In addition, for a 
good discussion o f  the managerial and political reasons for delegation o f  legislative power to administrative 
agencies, see Ibid; and MP Fiorina, ‘Legislative Choice o f  Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or 
Administrative Process’ (1982) 39 Public Choice 33,43
See, for example, E Gellhom, ‘Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings’ (1972) 81 Yale Law 
Journal 359,361
230 Ibid
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the administrative agency to benefit from knowledge and information which is available 
outside the administrative process/^^ The issue of fairness raised by the judicial powers 
of administrative agencies can also be taken care of by enabling courts to review 
administrative decisions. In this regard, it could also be argued that issues of judicial 
independence does not imply that every justiceable matter be entertained in the first and 
at the last resort by the courts. The real question is: who has the final say? By recognising 
the power of courts to have the final word on judicial matters, care should also be taken 
not to squander the advantages of the administrative process. Consequently, courts could 
be restricted to review only the legality of administrative decisions. Other measures could 
involve separating the judicial powers from the legislative and executive powers of 
administrative agencies.
One of the benchmarks which can be used to measure the quality of a legal framework 
for the management of water resources in general and regulation of water providers is the 
extent to which it enables interested individuals to participate in administrative decision­
making. It is observed that the Ministry of Water Resources is charged with the task of 
formulating of standards for allocation of water resources and control of water pollution. 
These are rules having the effect of laws; any person contravening such rules is faced 
with s a n c t i o n s I n  this regard, the problem is that the Water Proclamation does not 
provide the rules as to when and how individuals could participate in the process by 
which the Ministry comes up with standards. This is despite the commitment by the 
Water Policy to public consultation and participation.^^^ It does not also incorporate any 
clause which can be used by individuals to force the Ministry to initiate this process when 
it fails to exercise its mandate. This problem is exacerbated by the fact there is no 
administrative law (like the Administrative Procedure Act in the United States) which can 
generally be applied to administrative agencies. In relation to this point, the procedure 
followed by the Ethiopian Standards and Quantity Authority can be mentioned for its
See, for example, FA Hayek, ‘The Use o f  Knowledge in Society’ (1945) 35 American Economics 
Review 77-78 (1945) (“ ...the knowledge o f  the circumstances o f  which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits o f incomplete and frequent contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess”)
Article 29 o f  the Water Proclamation provides: “any person who violated this Proclamation or 
Regulations issued thereunder, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions o f  the Penal Code”. In 
addition, failure to comply with the rules and standards formulated by the Ministry o f  Water Resources 
results in denial or withdrawal o f  permits for the use o f  water resources.
See Section 4.4.2
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exceptionality. The authority is committed to public participation in setting of standards. 
To that effect, it posts draft standards on its website and solicits comments from 
interested parties. It should be noted that the authority does this not because it is required 
by law. It seems this is motivated by the values of public participation. However, whether 
this procedure is effective is another question. It is also open to doubt because, first off, 
the practice of soliciting public comments on draft standards is considered by the 
authority more as a mechanism of easing its eventual implementation than as a way of 
taking advantage of the relevant knowledge and information found in a fragmented 
manner outside the authority. Second, self-imposed a procedure as it is, there is no way of 
ensuring that comments collected are duly considered.
There is now a draft Administrative Procedure Proclamation which is under development 
by the Institute for Justice and Legal Research.^ '^* This draft is largely influenced by the 
Model Administrative Procedure Act of the United States. It aims to transplant into 
Ethiopia the American formal notice and comment model of public participation. The 
idea of transplanting this procedure into Ethiopia should be seriously considered. First it 
is open to question if uniform procedure of public participation is suitable for the various 
administrative agencies which are different in terms of functions and structure. Second, 
the propriety of providing a general right to participate in administrative rulemaking, like 
what is done in the draft administrative procedure proclamation, should be seriously 
considered. The fact that public participation is generally and socially beneficial does not 
necessarily mean that individuals should be given the right to participate in every 
instance of administrative rulemaking. For example, the situation in England is that 
individuals are allowed to participate in administrative rulemaking only when a particular 
statute recognises this right; there is no general right, in common law, to participate in 
administrative rulemaking.^^^ In addition, it should be recognised that public participation 
is more effective when those individuals having an interest in the outcome of an 
administrative rulemaking are organised. A good way of ensuring administrative rules 
and standards take into account the interest of consumers, in the area of regulating water 
providers, is to statutorily establish an organ that represents the interests of consumers in 
regulatory decision making. In this regard, lessons could be learned from the role of the
234 Institute o f  Justice and Legal Research, Federal Administrative Procedure Proclamation (Draft) (2009)
See, for example, PP Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States o f  
America (1990) 161
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Consumer Council for Water in England and Wales. When administrative decision­
making is open to public consultation and participation without there being an organised 
consumer group, it is likely that such opportunity would favour only those business 
groups who have a better advantage in overcoming collective action problems.
It has been asserted earlier that the principle of judicial independence does not 
necessarily require that laws be interpreted and disputes be resolved exclusively by the 
courts. What matters is for the court to have the final say on legal determinations. In this 
regard, therefore, questions of fairness and legitimacy raised by administrative agencies 
can be addressed by providing for the power of the courts to review administrative 
decisions. The judicial power of the Ministry of Water Resources is subject to 
supervision by the courts. It is provided in the Water Proclamation that any person 
dissatisfied with the judicial determination of the Ministry call appeal to a court of law.^^  ^
Even though it is not expressly stipulated in the law, if approach taken in other statutes 
establishing administrative agencies is taken as a guidance, it can be argued that the 
courts review only the legality of administrative decisions. A point worth mentioning in 
this connection is the mechanism of arbitration embodied in the Water Proclamation.^^^ 
Judicial independence will be an issue in an administrative adjudication particularly when 
one of the parties to the case is the administrative agency itself. In such cases, the 
possibility of judicial review (restricted to review of only legal determination in exclusion 
of factual determination) might not by itself ensure confidence in the impartiality of the 
system. The Water Proclamation requires that disputes between the Ministry and Permit 
holders should be submitted to arbitration.^^^ This is an aspect of the legal fi*amework that 
deserves a positive note.
4.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, the legal framework governing the activities of water providers in 
Ethiopia has been discussed. After outlining the main features of Ethiopia’s constitutional 
and legal systems, the chapter has discussed the main water laws and policies. In 
addition, the specific elements of such laws and policies as they relate to issues of supply
Water Proclamation (n 65) Art 18
Ibid Art 9
Ibid
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of water and sanitation services are discussed. Moreover, the case of Addis Ababa has 
been taken for further examination. It is found out that even if small-scale water 
providers play an important role in complementing the activities of the official water 
provider, only some of them operate legally. The law prohibits supply or resale of water 
by individuals other than those authorised by the utility. And the utility authorises only 
those which are managed by the Kebele administration or community-based 
organisations. Even if such prohibition is not actively enforced, providers operating 
illegally are categorised as high-volume water users and are made to pay high charges 
which are in turn transferred to their poor customers. In addition, this survey of 
Ethiopia’s legal framework has found out authorised-standpipes, unauthorised neighbour 
sellers and water kiosks are not subject to any system that is designed to control either the 
price they are charging or the safety of water they are providing. In the next chapter, 
Kenya’s legal framework for regulation of water providers is analysed both nationally 
and by taking the city of Kisumu for a particular focus.
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Chapter Five: Legal Framework for Regulation of Water 
Providers in Kenya
5.1. Introduction
The preceding chapter has presented and evaluated the legal framework for regulation of 
water providers in Ethiopia. This chapter will present the legal framework for regulation 
of water providers in Kenya. In addition, it will identify the differences and similarities 
between the Ethiopian and the Kenyan legal frameworks. The Kenyan water sector has 
undergone a ‘fundamental reform’ introduced through the Water Act 2002. As a result of 
this reform, several institutions have been established. Issues of water supply and 
sewerage services have been separated from the wider issues of water resource 
management. Water is publicly owned and hence individuals generally acquire the right 
to abstract and use water through the permit system the general nature of which is 
outlined in the Water Act 2002 and the details of which are provided in Water Resources 
Management Rules 2002. An autonomous administrative organ. Water Resources 
Management Authority (WRMA), is established to manage the water resources of the 
country and to supervise abstraction and other uses of water.
There is no single national agency that is charged with the responsibility of supplying 
water and sewerage services in the country. Instead, following the prescriptions of the 
Water Act, seven Water Services Boards (WSBs) were established with the responsibility 
to develop and own water supply and sewerage infrastructures within their respective 
service areas. The boundaries of the service areas of the WSBs correspond to the 
boundaries of the major river basins. They are licensed to provide water services and 
their activities are regulated by a national regulatory agency, the Water Services 
Regulatory Board (WSRB). WSBs are required to engage the services of Water Services 
Providers (WSPs) to operate the water supply system and provide water and sewerage 
services in a defined portion of their service areas.
Lake Victoria South Water Services Board (LVSWSB) was established to develop and 
own water supply infrastructure in the Lake Victoria South river basin which 
encompasses the city of Kisumu. LVSWSB entered into a service provision agreement, 
for the operation of the water supply infrastructure in the city, with a company wholly
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owned by the Municipal Council of Kisumu, Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company 
(KIWASCO). Neither the performance of this company nor the water supply 
infrastructure is, however, adequate to satisfy the current demands of the city. More than 
60 percent of the residents rely on one or other forms of small-scale and independent 
providers (SIPs).
The national legal framework allows the operation of SIPs on a limited scale defined in 
terms of the number of households and volume of water supplied. It permits self-supply. 
This is particularly important for high-volume water users. In the case of Kisumu, there 
are various forms of SIPs. Some of them work in agreement with KIWASCO as they 
purchase the water in bulk from the latter. Though this official provider prescribes the 
retail price based on tariffs guidelines developed by the national regulator, it is not widely 
observed nor enforced. Those who have their own source of water are not officially 
recognised as they are operating beyond the permissible threshold. They are also 
unregulated. In recent years, there has been an attempt to formalise the operations of SIPs 
in the city by registering and offering service provision agreements by the LVSWSB. But 
this has not been effective.
5.2. A Few Water Facts
According to the National Water Resources Management Strategy (NWRMS), Kenya is 
classified as a water-scarce country:
The natural endowment of renewable freshwater is currently about 21 BCM (billion 
cubic meters) or 650m^ per capita per annum. A country is categorized ‘water­
scarce’ if its renewable freshwater potential is less than l,000m^ per capita per 
annum. By 2025, Kenya is projected to have a renewable freshwater supply of only 
235m^ per capita per annum.*
The World Bank estimate of renewable internal freshwater resources per capita is 534 
cubic meters for 2008; the global figure being 6,442.0 cubic meters.^ Therefore, the 
country experiences water scarcity. According to the most widely used indicator of water 
scarcity, known as Falkenmark indicator or ‘water stress index’, a country experiences 
water stress if less than 1700 cubic meters of renewable water resources per capita; water
* MWI-GOK, National Water Resources Management Strategy (2007) 1 
 ^www.worldbank.org last visited 13 October 2010
167
scarcity if less than 1000 cubic meters; and absolute water scarcity if  less than 500 cubic 
meters are available/ The NWRMS a 
limited resource is not fully exploited:
lso highlights the fact that the potential from this
About 40% of the freshwater has potential for development and this represents the 
safe yield. The remaining 60% are required to sustain the flows in rivers so as to 
ensure ecological biodiversity and acting as a reserve for development beyond the 
timeframes of the strategies. Kenya’s safe yield of surface water resources is 7.4 
BCM per annum and the safe yield of groundwater is about 1.0 BCM per annum. 
The current water abstractions are only a fraction (13%-19%) of the assessed safe 
yield or potential for development, which in 1992 amounted to 1.1 BCM per annum 
and is currently 1.6 BCWannum, thus indicating an extremely low level of 
development. This extremely low level of development portrays a negative picture 
of the country’s commitment to developing water resources. Kenya, although 
water-scarce, has room for extensive development towards achieving maximum 
utilization of the renewable fraction of the freshwater resources."*
The major problems associated with the water resources of the country are the spatial and 
temporal variability of rainfall.^ This problem is exacerbated by the fact that inadequate 
efforts were made in the past to alleviate this by investing in enhancing the water storage 
capacity of the country.^ Another problem in this regard is catchment degradation:
Catchment degradation is causing increased runoff, flash flooding, reduced 
infiltration, erosion and siltation and this is undermining the limited sustainable 
water resources base in the country. The main causes of catchment degradation are 
poor farming methods, population pressure (forest excision for resettlement) and 
deforestation (for agricultural land and fuel wood). For example, the sediment 
yields for the Ewaso N ’giro and Tana Rivers have increased 15 times the level of 
1970. Catchment degradation will invariably affect surface water availability as 
rivers and reservoirs will dry up.^
 ^ M Falkenmark, J Lundquist and C Widstrand, ‘Macro-scale Water Scarcity Requires Micro-scale 
Approaches: Aspects o f  Vulnerability in Semi-Arid Development’ (1989) 13 National Resources Forum 
258. For a review o f  other ways o f  measuring water scarcity, see FR Rijsberman, ‘Water Scarcity: Fact or 
Fiction?’ (2006) 80 Agricultural Water Management 5
 ^MWI-GOK (n 1) 1
^Ibid
® Ibid
’ Ibid 2
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The fact that an estimated 60 percent of the lakes, rivers and aquifers are international 
restricts the performance of the Kenyan government in the management and development 
of the resource/
An estimated 57 percent and 42 percent of the population has access to improved 
drinking water sources and improved sanitation facilities respectively in 2006. There is a 
wide gap between urban and rural supply coverage. Whereas there has been slight 
improvement in the coverage figure for rural areas, the contrary is observed for urban 
areas for a period between 1990 and 2006. The following tables present the proportion of 
the population using improved drinking water sources and sanitation facilities for urban 
and rural areas. The figures do not, however, show the proportion of households which 
are connected to official water supply networks. But as it is shown in a subsequent 
section in connection with the city of Kisumu, it is significantly low.
Table 5.1: Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources
YEAR URBAN RURAL TOTAL
1990 90 30 41
1995 88 36 46
2000 87 42 51
2006 85 49 57
Source: World Bank Millennium Development Goals tw1vw.data.worldbank.or2l 
Table 5.2: Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facility
YEAR URBAN RURAL TOTAL
1990 18 44 39
1995 18 45 40
2000 19 46 41
2006 19 48 42
Source: World Bank Millennium Development Goals (www.data.w0rldbank.0r2l
MWI-GOK, Report on Operationalisation o f  the Water Act 2002 in Water Resources Management (2005) 
12
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5.3. Water Laws and Policies
5.3.1. Brief Remarks on Constitutional and Legal Systems of Kenya
In a referendum held on 04 August 2010, 67 percent of voters supported a new draft 
Constitution/ The Constitution was signed into law on 27 August 2010.*® The new 
Constitution represents a departure from the previous one in many respects. It has, among 
others, significantly reduced the powers of the president and devolved powers to local 
governments at county levels. The devolution of power envisaged by the Constitution is 
short of being a federal one. Article 6(2) provides in this connection: “The governments 
at the national and county levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall conduct their 
mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation”.
The legislative branch of the national government consists of two houses: the National 
Assembly and the Senate.** The Parliament is the main legislative organ of government 
having also the power to amend the Constitution and alter boundaries of the counties.*^ 
Obviously, the parliament is not the only organ of government. The varied functions of 
government are such that delegation of legislative power is desirable and in certain ways 
also unavoidable. However, the Constitution provides that other organs of government 
may pass rules having the force of law only on the basis of power delegated in 
accordance with its provisions. In particular, it states that any delegation of lawmaking 
power “shall expressly specify the purpose and objectives for which that authority is 
conferred, the limits of the authority, the nature and scope of the law that may be made 
and the principles and standards applicable to the law made under the authority”.*^  The 
National Assembly “represents the people of the constituencies and special interests”.*"* It
® ‘Kenyans back change to constitution in referendum’ (01 August 2010 BBC) 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-afriea-10876635 . For a review o f  Kenya’s constitutional development see JB 
Ojwang, ‘Constitutional Trends in Africa— The Kenya Case’ (2000) 10 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 517
‘Kenya president ratified new constitution’ (27 August 2010 BBC) www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa­
l l  106558
Constitution o f  Kenya 2010 Art 93(1)
Ibid Art 94(3)
Ibid Art 94(6)
Ibid Art 95(1)
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makes laws; supervises the executive branch of the government; approves declaration of 
water; determines allocation of revenue between the national government and local 
governments; and supervises the use of national revenue and its expenditure.*^ Members 
of the National Assembly are of four kinds: “(a) two hundred and ninety members, each 
elected by the registered voters of single member constituencies; (b) forty-seven women, 
each elected by the registered voters of the counties, each county constituting a single 
member constituency; (c) twelve members nominated by parliamentary political parties 
according to their proportion of members of the National Assembly in accordance with 
Article 90, to represent special interests including the youth, persons with disabilities and 
workers; and (d) the Speaker, who is an ex officio member”.*^  The Senate, on the other 
hand, “represents the counties, and serves to protect the interests of the counties and their 
governments”.*^  The Senate is involved in the lawmaking process to the extent that a 
given bill concerns counties; determines allocation of national revenue among counties; 
and supervises the use of national revenue allocated to county governments.*^ The 
Senate consists of “(a) forty-seven members each elected by the registered voters of the 
counties, each county constituting a single member constituency; (b) sixteen women 
members who shall be nominated by political parties according to their proportion of 
members of the Senate elected under clause (a) in accordance with Article 90; (c) two 
members, being one man and one woman, representing the youth; (d) two members, 
being one man and one woman, representing persons with disabilities; and (e) the 
Speaker, who shall be an ex officio member”.*^  The executive branch of the national 
government consists of the president, the deputy president and other members of the 
Cabinet which ought to reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya.^® 
The president is elected by registered voters in a general election.^* The Constitution also 
establishes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and other
Ibid Art 95 
Ibid Art 97(1) 
’Hbid Art 96(1) 
Ibid Art 96 
Ibid Art 98(1) 
Ibid Art 130 
Ibid Art 136
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subordinate courts consisting of the Magistrates courts, the Kadhis’ courts and the Courts 
Martial.
The legal system of Kenya can be characterised as a mixed legal system which is heavily 
influenced by the English common law. In addition to the Constitution and laws passed 
by the national Parliament and county assemblies, sources include some Acts of 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, Acts of India, Islamic law, customary law and 
English common law.^^
5.3.2. Water Laws and Policies: Historical Background
Writing on east African water regimes, Nilsson and Nyanchaga stated that “indigenous 
cultures erected infrastructure as well as institutions to control and manage water long 
before the colonialists”.^  ^ The fact that these institutions were not written down has, 
however, rendered their study difficult.^"* In addition, customary rules tend to be ethnic- 
based and hence of variable content.^^ However, some characteristic features of the 
traditional rules of water are identified. One of the characteristics of customary law is its 
provision for community ownership of water resources and individual right to use water 
for domestic and personal uses.^^ Second, allocation of use rights are not permanent and 
hence are amenable to renegotiations in times of scarcity.^^ These customary rules and 
regulations governing the use and development of water resources are not merely a 
matter of historical interest. They have continued to regulate the interaction among 
people with respect to water, particularly at village or clan level.^* The customary rules
See Judicature Act (Chapter 8, Laws o f  Kenya); T Ojienda and LO Aloo, ‘Researching Kenyan Law’ at 
www.n\ailawglobal.org/Globalex/kenva.htm ; and MN Wabwile, ‘The Place o f  English Law in Kenya’ 
(2003) 3 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 51
D Nilsson and EN Nyanehaga, ‘East African Water Regimes: The Case o f  Kenya’ in JW Dellapenna and 
J Gupta, The Evolution o f  the Law and Politics o f  Water (2009) 106. See also D Nilsson and EN 
Nyanchaga, ‘Pipes and Politics: A Century o f  Change and Continuity in Kenyan Urban Water Supply 
(2008) 46 Journal o f  Modem African Studies 133.
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governing allocation and utilisation of water resources continued in operation even after 
colonisation, albeit on a diminished scale, being limited to native lands/^ As for the 
‘crown lands’, having a legal framework that provides security with respect to water 
rights was deemed essential owing to the ‘substantial economic interests in agricultural 
production’. The English common law provided this security until it was superseded by 
colonial statutory law.^ ®
The first statutory water law in Kenya is the Water Ordinance of 1929; The first set of 
legislation to contain rules on water rights were, however, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 
1902 (later repealed and re-enacted as the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915) and the Water 
Rules of 1903.^* The Water Ordinance of 1929, though was enacted by the Legislative 
Council in December 1929, did not come into effect until July 1935.^^ This statute vested 
the ownership of all water resourees, with the exception of ground water, with the state; 
established a government body, the Water Board, with powers to enforce the Ordinance 
and issue permits for water uses.^^ The Water Ordinance of 1929 was revised in 1951. 
The revision has introduced a number of substantive and organisational changes to the 
water sector:
This time, all groundwater was defined as state property. Furthermore, two new 
institutions were established instead of the old Water Board: the Water Resources 
Authority and the Water Apportionment Board. The Water Resources Authority 
advised the Minister in charge of water on all policy and development matters, 
while the Water Apportionment Board issues water permits. In addition, to ensure 
that the water resources were efficiently utilized and conserved, a Regional water 
Board for each of the major river basins was established to advise both the Water 
Resources Authority and the water Apportionment Board. "^*
After independence, the Water Ordinance of 1951 was replaced by Water Act 1972. The 
Water Act 1972 “covers most areas related to water such as municipal water, irrigation.
Ibid 108 
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sewerage, drainage, flood control, reclamation, and protection of sources and courses of 
water”/^  Section 3 of the Water Act 1972 provides: “the water of every body of water 
under or upon any land is vested in the government, subject to any rights of user in 
respect thereof which, by or under this Act or any other written law, have been or are 
granted, or recognized as being vested, in any other person”. And the Minister for Water 
is empowered to control the use of such waters.^^ Since the ownership of water was 
vested in the government and control of use was exercised by the Minister, individuals 
were required to get a permit to use water resources. Permits were issued by the Water 
Apportionment Board on behalf of the Minister. It should, however, be noted that the 
Water Act exempted three uses of water from the general permit requirement. First, 
permit was not required if water was abstracted for domestic purposes without employing 
‘works’. S e c o n d ,  permit was not also required for developing groundwater which is 
situated more than 92 metres from any surface water-body or 805 meters from an already 
existing borehole; however, permit was required if the development is within a 
‘conservation area’.^  ^The third exempted use was storage of water or abstraction from a 
dam in a channel which is declared by the Water Apportionment Board not to be a water 
course.^® So if a use was not covered by any of the above three exempted circumstances, 
one needed to have a permit. It has to be noted in this connection that an application was 
not directly made to the Water Apportionment Board but to a local agent called Water 
Bailiff."*® The Bailiff examined if all of the information contained in the application was 
accurate and forwarded the application together with any recommendation to the Water 
Apportionment Board which would publicise it with a view to bringing it to the attention 
of any potential objector (public inquiry)."** Any person whose interest might be affected 
by the application was entitled to make his objections known within 30 days."*^  Once an
MWD-GOK, The Study on the National Water Master Plan: Sectoral Report Laws and Institutions 
(1992)2
Water Act 1972 s 4
Ibid s 38
Ibid ss 50 & 74
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application had been approved, the Water Bailiff also supervised the construction of the 
necessary water works
Permits which were issued by the Water Apportionment Board for the use of any 
resources were often subject to conditions. The general conditions attached to any permit 
were provided in the Water Act 1972 and these include: installation of controlling and/or 
measuring devices at water intake; abstraction of 60 percent of the tested safe yield of 
groundwater; passing over of waste or surplus water; clearing of weeds in the canal to 
allow unobstructed passage of water; anti-pollution measures to be provided; and used 
water not to be returned to the watercourses.'*'^ In addition to the general statutory 
conditions, the Board might impose specific conditions on particular users or permit 
holders. For example, it might require the permit holder to keep a record of water 
abstraction, diversion and storage.'*^ The local Water Bailiff was responsible for the 
enforcement of such conditions. However, the level of enforcement had not been 
satisfactory because of financial constraints and because of the fact that the water bailiff 
had been occupied with several other functions and duties.'*^
Domestic water supplies were undertaken by public and local authorities or persons or 
bodies appointed as water undertakers by the Minister for Water Development after 
consultation with the Water Resources Authority.'*^ The Ministry of Water Development 
and the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC/^ were the 
largest water undertakers. This implies that, since the Ministry of Water had taken over 
the functions and powers of the Water Resources Authority, it had been discharging dual
Ibid
Water Act 1972 ss 28, 73 & 91
Ibid s 21
MWD-GOK (35) 8
Water Act 1972 s 124 The Water Resources Authority ceased to function in 1968 and since then its 
powers and functions were exercised and discharged by the Ministry for Water Development and as a result 
the requirement o f  consultation provided in this connection is not applicable. In this connection, a study 
made in 1992 identified two problems which need to be addressed. These are: first, the Water Resources 
Authority ceased to function but still exists in legal form and second, the Ministry o f  Water is discharging 
the functions o f  the authority without legal delegation o f powers. MOD-GOK (n 35)
The National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation was established by an Order in 1988 and 
mandated to supply water in bulk to authorities appointed as water undertakers.
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functions: as an authority of appointing water undertakers on the one hand and as largest 
water undertaker on the other hand. This was to be considered unacceptable and changed 
in the Water Act 2002; however, in another government report in 1992, the practice was 
defended from aspects of simplicity and efficiency of water resource management.'*^ In 
addition to the Ministry of Water Development and NWCPC, some municipalities were 
also serving as water undertakers. By the year 2000, there were already ten municipalities 
which were licensed to provide water services; altogether, these municipal water 
undertakers had been serving about 3.9 million urban dwellers.^^ For those municipalities 
who were not water undertakers, the NWCPC was responsible for the provision of water 
services. The NWCPC used to also provide bulk water to the undertaker municipalities 
who in turn used to supply to their customers.
5.3.3. National Policy on Water Resources Management and 
Development
The current reform introduced by the Water Act 2002 is said to have started with the 
publication of the National Policy on Water Resources Management and Development as 
Sessional Paper No.l of 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Water Policy).^* This policy 
paper indicates the major problems surrounding the country’s water sector and the legal 
and institutional changes required. Paragraph 1.11 states:
In general terms, the problems which have constrained the development of the
water sector and need to be addressed include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Shortage of funds for development, operation and maintenance of water 
supplies and management of water resources.
• Institutional weaknesses especially the scarcity of qualified manpower and lack 
of skills of the users to properly operate and maintain water supplies.
• Water resources availability due to its uneven distribution both in space and 
time.
• Poor choice of technology in water supply and sewerage development, and 
inconsistent project selection criteria which has resulted in adoption of 
technologies and delivery mechanisms which are not well suited to sector 
development.
MWD-GOK (n 35) 9
A Mumma, ‘Kenya’s New Water Law: An Analysis o f  the Implications for the Rural Poor’ presented at a 
workshop on African Water Laws: Plural Legislative Frameworks for Rural Water Management in Africa, 
26-28 January 2005, Johannesburg, South Africa
MWD-GOK, Sessional paper No. 1 o f  1999 on National Policy on Water Resources Management and 
Development (1999)
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• Lack of proper co-ordination of the various actors in the sector.
• Lack of proper inert-linkages with other water related sectors.
The Water Policy identifies specific objectives of the water sector:
• Preserve, conserve and protect available water resources and allocate it in a 
sustainable, rational and economical way.
• Supply water of good quality in sufficient quantities to meet the various water 
needs, including poverty alleviation, while ensuring safe disposal of wastewater 
and environmental protection.
• Establish an efficient and effective institutional framework to achieve a 
systematic development and management of the water sector.
• Develop a sound and sustainable financing system for effective water resources 
management, water supply and sanitation development.^^
The Policy calls for:
• Effective river basin management and practices
• Identification and delineation of water catchment areas
• Water catchment preservation and protection programs and
• Identification of groundwater conservation zones. ^
As an instrument for proper utilisation of water resources, the Policy demands imposition 
of levies and fees. '^* In relation to institutions for the management of water resources, 
Para.2.2.3 states: “The decision making process in respect to water resources 
management will be decentralised by adopting three water resources management levels 
(including National, Basin, Sub-basin/catchment levels) and setting up and or 
strengthening appropriate institutions clearly defining the role of each and how they 
relate to each other”. The policy acknowledged the fact that there had not been any 
comprehensive legal framework and calls for one:
The legal issues touching on the water sector are supposed to be contained in the 
Water Act [1972]. There are, however, a total of twenty-six other Acts of 
Parliament, which have a bearing on issues concerning water. For instance the 
Agriculture Act defines watercourses and catchment areas in relation to crop 
production and related activities.^^
“  Ibid [1.13] 
Ibid [1.2.2] 
Ibid [2.1.3] 
Ibid [2.4.1]
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This problem is compounded by inadequate enforcement of the existing law emanating 
from “lack of resources necessary to monitor the operations of the water users and the 
inadequacies in the provisions of the Act itself, including the less stiff penalties”/^  To 
address such problems, the policy requires the review of water and other Acts related to 
water resources management; in particular, it indicated the use of water fees and levies to 
strengthen the capacity of those agencies charged with the enforcement of the law/^
To minimise the environmental impact of water use and development, making 
Environmental Impact Assessment mandatory is suggested for at least major 
developmental activities/^ Recognising the increasingly growing problem of water 
pollution, the Policy demanded “strict stream effluent discharge standards” and making 
“water abstraction and disposal permits dynamic and economic instruments for water 
pollution control”/^  In addition, it states:
2.6.3 A Process of water quality monitoring of all water bodies and pollution 
control inspection of all potential polluting sources will be put in place. In this 
regard all factories and other waste water generating concerns will be required to 
incorporate in their designs the waste water treatment devices.
2.6.4 Discharge of undesirable substances in the water system will, therefore, not 
be allowed unless prior authority has been sought from the relevant government 
authorised agency. In this regard, levies on effluent discharges will be introduced 
based on the quantity of the effluent whose quality must conform to the 
requirements of the standards in force as per the law.
The Policy acknowledges the relationship between access to water and poverty and 
describes SIPs in a negative light: “In urban areas, most slum dwellers, 85% of which fall 
below the poverty line, depend largely on water vendors and communal water points 
where water, mostly of low quality, is bought at exorbitant price. The sanitation facilities 
in these areas are also of poor standards resulting in high incidence of illness”. T h e
Ibid [2.4.2] Another problem which relates to the low-level o f  enforcement o f  the law is the absence o f  
case law. MWD-GOK (n 35) 90
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most ‘significant’ reform contained in the Water Policy is the redefinition of the role of 
the state away from direct provider and developer to that of regulator and policy maker. 
In addition, it called for increasing the participation of the private sector:
4.1.3 The role of the government in the water sector will be redefined with 
emphasis on regulatory and enabling functions as opposed to direct service 
provision. In this regard, the organization structure of all the actors in the sector 
needs to be reviewed to be in consonance with the shift in policy. This will be 
accompanied by institutional reforms that promote integrated approach, including 
changes in procedures, attitudes and behaviour and ensuring gender balance in 
participation at all levels in sector institutions.
4.1.4 The government will support private sector participation and community 
management of services backed by measures to strengthen local institutions in 
implementing and sustaining water and sanitation programmes....
5.3.4. Water Act 2002: Introduction
The Water Act 2002 has been in force since 18 March 2003. The Act has created or 
envisaged the creation of several institutions. Such institutions include, but not limited to, 
the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA), Water Services Regulatory Board 
(WSRB), Water Services Boards (WSBs), Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF), Water 
Appeals Board (WAB), and Water Service Providers (WSPs). Among these, WRMA, 
WSRB, WAB and WSTF are national institutions.^* On the other hand, the WSBs and
WSPs are local institutions. The Water Act 2002 represents a radical departure from the 
past in terms of the legislative and institutional framework it has established.^^ Figure 5.1 
is a representation of the institutional framework established by the Water Act 2002.
OA A ’Akumu, ‘mainstreaming the Participatory Approach in Water Resources Governance: The 2002 
Water Law in Kenya’ (2008) 51 Development 56, 58 (The author is o f  the view that the Water Resources 
Management Authority can also be classified as regional organisation: “The WRMA is the state agent 
dedicated to the governance o f  water resources. Although the authority is classified as a national institution, 
it will also be running regional offices; hence, it can also be classified as a regional player in the spatial 
hierarchy”)
Ibid 56 (“Water management is undergoing tremendous change involving the deposition o f  traditional 
public sector-based management systems for multi-stakeholder governance systems. In Kenya, a new law 
the Water Act o f  2002 (Republic o f  Kenya, 2002) was passed. It repealed the water statute: the Water Act 
Chapter 272 o f  the laws o f  Kenya”)
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Figure 5.1: Institutional Framework in the Water Act 2002 (source: MWI-GOK, The 
National Water Resources Management Strategy (2007))
One of the main features of the water sector reform introduced by the national policy and 
operationalised by the Water Act is the separation of water resources management and 
water services supply. This separation is manifested by the creation of two separate 
government organs with separate set of functions.
The WRMA is entrusted with the management (conservation, protection and utilization) 
of water re s o u rc e s .I t  was established through Gazette Notice No. 8140 of 14* 
November 2003. '^* Its board comprises the chairman appointed by the President of the 
Republic of Kenya and ten other members appointed by the Minister.^^ The WRMA is 
given the power to make rules, regulations and standards with respect to the conservation, 
protection and utilisation of water resources. Such rules and regulations outline the rights 
and obligations of citizens with respect to conserving, protecting and utilising water 
resources. The Water Act 2002 provides the basic requirements necessary to acquire the 
right to utilise water resources and the general duties designed to conserve and protect 
water resources. Therefore, WRMA is expected to issue rules necessary to implement the 
Act. The Act invests the ownership of water with the state and individuals can have only
Water Act 2002 s 7
MWR-GOK (n 8) 14 
Water Act 2002 s 7(3)
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the right to use these resources. And the only way of acquiring such right is through 
permits. The WRMA has the power to issue, monitor and revoke water use permits.^^ In 
addition to its quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers, the Authority has also certain 
executive functions and powers. It is entrusted with the function of monitoring and 
assessing the state of the water resources.^^ It is responsible for gathering and publishing 
information with respect to the state of the water re so u rces .I t enforces the laws, rules 
and regulations and its decisions with respect to the conservation, management and 
utilisation of water resources.^^ It advises the minister of water on issues of water 
resources management.^**
The WSRB has been established and entrusted with regulating the supply of water 
services. It issues rules, regulations and standards that determine the rights and duties of 
persons with respect to the supply of water services.^* Both of these governmental organs 
are accountable to the Minister of Water and Irrigation. This aceountability is manifested 
in several forms. The Minister appoints the management of the WRMA and WSRB.^^ 
Second, it provides guidance on how the Authority and the Regulatory Board should 
exercise their powers and discharj 
undesirable feature of the new law:
ge their fu n c tio n s .A ’Akumu writes that this is an
The main undoing of the authority is that it is under the direct control of the 
Minister. The law states: “The authority shall, in exercise and performance of its 
powers and functions, be subject to such directions as may be given by the 
Minister”. However, it has two instruments at the national level (the NMISWR,
Ibid s 8(1) (c) & (d)
Ibid s 8 (1) (f)
Ibid s 8(l)(h)
Ibid 8(2)
Ibid s 8(1)0)
These powers and functions o f  the WSRB are discussed in Section 5.4.2. 
Water Act 2002 ss 7(3) and 51 
Ibid ss 8(4) and 47(4)
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permit) and one at the local level (CMS) that it can wield with some degree of 
independence/'*
The institution of the Ministry is supposed to have scaled down its powers to 
remain in the position of policy-making only. But this seems not to have taken 
place as the Minister maintains superintended control over all state agencies, who 
in turn deal with other actors according to the instructions of the Minister. The 
government is therefore still very active in the management of water through the 
Minister. The WRMA that is charged with regulation of the water resouree seetor is 
actually an agent of the Minister. The law categorically states that it has to function 
subject to the directions of the Minister. It is not an independent regulator as 
claimed in the policy rhetoric but a management agency of the government with 
branches at the local level.^^
One of the instruments mentioned by A’Akumu is the Catchment Management Strategy 
which, among others, prescribes the principles, objectives, procedures and institutional 
arrangements of the Authority for the management, use, development, eonservation and 
control of water resources within each catchment area.^^ The other instrument is the 
National Monitoring and Information System for Water Resources.^^ It is not clear, 
however, how this information system might be regarded as a powerful instrument to 
assert independence. But most importantly, A ’Akumu appears to have conveniently 
ignored important provisions in the Water Act 2002 which safeguard the independence of 
the WRMA and WSRB. Both sections 8(4) and 47(4) clearly state that the directions to 
be provided by the Minister do not relate to the contents of any reports or 
recommendations made by the WRMA and WSRB.
The Water Act 2002 requires the Minister to develop a National Water Resources 
Management Strategy which establishes the principles, objectives, procedures and 
institutional arrangements for the management of water resourees and according to which 
all other institutions should act.^* Third, certain decisions of the WRMA and WSRB are
A ’Akumu (n 61) 59 
Ibid 61
Water Act 2002 s 15(3)(c)
”  Ibid s 18 
Ibid s 11. See also the MWI-GOK (n 1)
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required to be approved by the Minister/^ In addition, the Minister is said to have the 
right to the use of water resources/** And it has also the residual power with respect to the 
supply of water services/* Despite the fact that the two governmental organs are 
accountable to the minister in the three ways discussed above, they are also independent 
to certain extent. Most of their decisions are final in the sense that the approval of the 
Minister is not required. Some of their decisions can, however, be reviewed by another 
organ called Water Appeals Board.^^
5.3.5. Regulation of Abstraction of Water
The state owns every water resources in the country. If individuals have any rights, it is 
the right to use water acquired from the government. '^* Water rights are allocated on the 
basis of permit issued by the WRMA at the request of individuals.^^ The Water Act 
requires permit as a precondition for the following purposes: any use of water from a 
water resouree^^; the drainage of any swamp or other land^^; and the discharge of
See, for example. Water Act 2002 s 17(1) (“Where the Authority is satisfied that special measures are 
necessary for the protection o f  a catchment area or part thereof, it may, with the approval o f  the Minister, 
by order published in the Gazette declare such an area to be a protected area”) and s 77 (“A  licensee may, 
in consultation with the Regulatory Board and with the approval o f  the Minister, fix and impose a sewerage 
services levy on all water services within the limits o f  supply o f  the licensee, to cover a reasonable part o f  
the cost o f  disposing o f  the water supplied within those limits”)
Ibid s 5 (“The right to the use o f  water from any water resource is hereby vested in the Minister, except 
to the extent that it is alienated by or under this Act or any other written law”).
Ibid s 67(1) (“The Minister shall retain residual power to provide water services to consumers”)
Ibid ss 84-88
Ibid s 3
Ibid s 5 (“The right to the use o f  water from any water resources is hereby vested in the Ministry, except 
to the extent that it is alienated by or under this Act or any other written law”)
Ibid s 25
According to s 2(1) o f  Water Act 2002, the term ‘use’ includes abstraction, obstruction or diversion o f  
water; and discharge o f  materials or substances into the water. The minister is authorised to issue rules that 
prescribe kind o f  activities which may be considered ‘use o f  water’ for the purposes o f  the Act.
According to s 2(1) o f  Water Act 2002, the term ‘swamp’ means any shallow depression on which water 
collects either intermittently or permanently and where there is a small depth o f  surface water or a shallow 
depth o f  ground water and a slight range o f  fluctuation either in the surface level o f  the water or o f  the 
ground level so as to permit the growth o f  aquatic vegetation.
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pollutant into any water resource. The Minister of Water and Irrigation is empowered to 
issue rules which enumerate other purposes requiring a permit/^ The Water Resources 
Management Rules (WRMR) 2007, issued by the Ministry, enumerate activities which 
require approval by the authority. These include: temporary abstraction for construction; 
abstraction from groundwater, either by a borehole or a shallow well; mixing of waters 
from different water sources; and hydropower generation.^** In addition, the rules delegate 
the power to specify further activities to the WRMA.^* There are some activities which 
are exempted from the permit requirement.^^ These include:
• Abstraction or use of water, without the employment of works, from or in any 
water resources for domestic purposes by any person having lawful access;
• Any development of groundwater none of the works necessary for the development 
are situated within one hundred meters of any body of surface water (other than in­
closed spring water) or within a groundwater conservation area; and
• Storage of water, or the abstraction of water from a dam constructed in any channel 
or depression which WRMA has declared, by notice published in the Gazette, not 
to constitute a watercourse for the purposes of the Act.^^
The above list is open-ended, for the Minister could issue rules that exempt certain other 
uses of water from the permit requirements. '^* Such rules might also prohibit the use of 
water in certain prescribed circumstances or require the consent or permission of WRMA 
for any such water use of a prescribed kind or description.^^ Nor is the above list
Ibid s 25(l)(a)-(c)
Ibid s 25(l)(d)
WRMR 2007 Fifth Schedule
91 Ibid
^  Water Act 2002 s 26(1)
The term ‘work’ is defined as any structure, apparatus, contrivance, device or thing for carrying, 
conducting, providing or utilising water or liquid waste, but does not include hand utensils or such other 
contrivances as many be prescribed by rules made under this Act. Ibid s 2(1)
Ibid s 26(4)
Ibid s 26(5)
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categorical, for the Minister could issue rules that require permit when the activity is 
carried out in prescribed circumstances/^
The Water Act 2002 subjects an application for a permit to public consultation and, as the 
case may be, to an environmental impact assessment/^ WRMA may, however, grant 
permits, for a period not exceeding one year, without the need to carry out public 
consultation “if in its opinion exceptional circumstances warrant such an action”/* 
Whether a given application is subject to the requirement of environmental impact 
assessment is to be determined based on the Environmental Management and 
Coordination Act 1999.
When an individual applies for a permit, third parties may lodge an application 
(objection) against the grant of the permit.^^ With respect to an application for or an 
objection against a permit, WRMA is required to comply with the rationality requirement 
provided in section 29(6) of the Act: “The applicant and any person who may have 
objected to the grant of the application shall be notified of the decision of the authority 
and, in the event of a rejection of an application or objection, as the case may be, of the 
reasons thereof’. In making its judgment on the outcome of an application for a permit, 
the WRMA is required to take into account the following factors: existing lawful uses of 
the water; efficient and beneficial use of water in the public interest; any catchment 
management strategy applicable to the relevant water resource; the likely effect of the 
proposed water use on the water resource and on other water users; the class and the 
resource quality objectives of the water resource; the strategic importance of the proposed 
water use; the quality of water in the water resource which may be required for the 
reserve; and the probable duration of the activity or undertaking for which a water use is 
to be authorised.***** In case of conflict among various uses of water, domestic uses will 
prevail over others.****
Ibid s 26(2)
Ibid s 29(4)
Ibid s 33 
Ibid s 29(5)
Ibid s 32(1)
Ibid s 32(2)
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Most importantly to the principal issue being considered here, if the applicant intends to 
supply the water to other people within the limits of supply of a WSP, no permit will be 
issued without the applicant having first secured the consent of the relevant WSP.***^  This 
is a provision which contradicts what is stated in the water Act 2002. The Act allows, 
within limits, supply of water without any licence or agreement. However, this 
permission would be rendered a dead-letter if in the first place the ability to abstract 
water is conditional upon the relevant WSP consenting to the activity. Second, even when 
the applicant intends to go beyond the limits (expressed in the Act in terms of number of 
households and volume of water supplied daily), what is required must not be the consent 
of the WSP but that of the relevant WSB.
In order to effectively exploit the benefits of having a permit, one might need to construct 
the required works on a land belonging to another. The mere fact of securing a permit to 
abstract water from a given resource does not, however, come with the right to build the 
required works on property of another person. The permit holder needs to secure an 
easement over that portion of the land. The Water Act 2002 provides the rules regarding 
the acquisition of such right. Easement for the purpose under consideration is primarily 
acquired through the agreement of the permit holder and the burdened landholder. A 
permit holder intending to acquire an easement serves a notice to the landholder and the 
WRMA.***^  The notice ought to contain those essential elements stated in the Water 
Act.***'* The agreement of the landholder to the proposed burden establishes and 
determines the extent of the easement.***  ^ The second mechanism by which easement 
could be acquired is by administrative decision. In the event that the landholder fails to 
agree, within two months, to the proposal contained in the notice, the permit holder may 
apply to the WRMA which is empowered to either grant or reject the claim of easement
WRMR 2007 rule 16(2)
Water Act 2002 Third Schedule s 6(1)
104 Ibid
Ibid Third Schedule s 7 (“If the landholder agrees to the claim o f  an easement, either as originally 
proposed or as modified by agreement, the permit holder: (a) shall embody the particulars and other matters 
pertaining thereto in a deed or other instrument suitable for registration; and (b) after its execution by the 
parties concerned, shall send two copies o f  such deed or other instrument certified by the Registry o f  Titles, 
to the Authority”)
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“with or without modification and subject to such conditions, and to the payment of such 
compensation, as to the Authority seems just”,***^
A permit for the use of water does not exist in the abstract; it is attached to a specified 
land or a portion of it. Hence, the permit will “pass with any demise, devise, alienation, 
transfer or other disposition thereof, whether by operation of law or otherwise”.***'' Under 
certain conditions, however, the Authority may, on a motion by the permit holder, 
“transfer the permit to another portion of land owned by the permit holder”.****
5.4. Supply of Water and Sanitation Services
5.4.1. Water Services Boards and Water Services Providers
So far there have been established seven Water Services Boards. At least legally 
speaking, there is no part of Kenya for which no WSB is established. Table 5.3 presents 
the seven WSBs, the area, population and districts served by each of them. One of the 
changes introduced by the Water Act 2002 is the separation of institutions that own and 
operate the water supply system. WSBs own the water supply system within their ‘limits 
of supply’. Not only are they owners of the system but they are also licensees with 
respect to the supply of water services within their jurisdiction. However, the Act 
precludes WSBs from being involved in the operation of the system.***^  Section 55 of the 
Act provides in this regard: “... water services board may.,, arrange for the exercise and 
performance of all or any of its powers and functions under the license by an agent, to be 
known as a water service provider”. From the text of this section, it seems to follow that 
ultimately it is the WSB that decides whether to provide water services directly itself or 
indirectly through a WSP. However, this suggestion will not be accepted particularly if 
we regard section 53(2) which provides employment of a WSP as a mandatory
Ibid Third Schedule s 9 
Ibid 2002 s 34(1)
The conditions for this to occur are: “(a) owing to a change in circumstance not under the control o f  the 
permit holder since a permit was granted, the water concerned cannot, in such circumstances, be reasonably 
beneficially used by the permit holder on the particular portion o f  land to which the permit is appurtenant; 
and (b) neither the public interest nor the rights o f others would be adversely affected by a transfer”. Water 
Act 2002 s 34(2)
Ibid s 53(2)
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requirement: “water services authorized by a license shall be provided by an agent of the 
board... except in circumstances where the Regulatory Board is satisfied that the 
procurement of such an agent is not possible or that the provision of such services by an 
agent is not practicable”.
Table 5.3: Water Services Boards
NAME OF WSB NO OF 
DISTRICTS
AREA IN KMS^ 1999
POPULATION
Coast 7 82,816 2,487,000
Nairobi 6 40,130 5,617,000
Central 13 52,777 5,032,000
Rift Valley 8 113,771 2,999,000
Northern 9 244,864 1,703,000
Lake Victoria North 11 16,977 5,135,000
Lake Victoria South 16 20,340 5,730,000
Total 70 571,675 28,703,000
Source: WSRB, Proposed Delineation o f Boundaries for Water Services Boards (2003)
The service provision agreement between the WSP and WSB is required to be made in 
writing and it (or any addition or amendment) is of no effect unless approved by the 
WSRB.**** Apart from specifying the powers and functions to be exercised and performed 
by the WSP, the agreement might also contain provisions on several matters such as the 
concurrent performance, by the water services board and the water service provider, of 
the same functions in different parts of the area defined by the board’s limits of supply; 
the indemnity by the water service provider of any liability of the water services board 
arising from the performance or non-performance of functions conferred by the licence; 
and the maintenance, rehabilitation and development, by the water service provider, of 
water service infrastructure and facilities of the water services board.***
WSBs do not have any right to be involved in the provision of water services just by 
virtue of their establishment. Their establishment gives them only the right to own water
Ibid s 55(2)
Ibid s 55(3) and (4)
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supply systems and infrastructure within their limits of supply. And hence, their right to 
be involved in the provision of water services emanates from the licence issued by the 
WSRB. The licence is expected to list all the powers and functions of the WSB with 
respect to the supply of waters services. As such, the licence forms the basis for any 
arrangement made between WSBs and WSPs. Therefore, a given WSB can arrange all or 
part of its functions and powers to be exercised by a WSP; it cannot validly arrange 
powers and functions (which are not given to it by the licence) to be exercised by the 
WSP. Section 55(6) provides “a power or function conferred by a licence or otherwise 
conferred by or under this Act which pursuant to an agreement approved under this 
section, may be exercised or performed by a water service provider shall be deemed, 
when exercised or performed by the water service provider, to have been exercised or 
performed under the authority of the licence”.
Another issue that might be raised is as to the nature and effect of the relationship 
between WSBs and WSPs. Is it an agency relationship whereby the WSP is merely acting 
on behalf of the WSB? Or is it merely a contract to supply services? It is first important 
to see what legal implications the nature of such relationship might have. One of the 
consequences of an agency relationship is that contracts made by the agent are considered 
to have been directly made by the principal and hence it is the principal who is liable to 
third parties for any default. That will not be the case if the relationship is merely an 
ordinary contractual relationship. Apart from requiring that any agreement or amendment 
should be in writing and approved by the regulator and providing the kind of clauses that 
might be included in the agreement, the Water Act 2002 does not directly and sufficiently 
deal with the nature and effect of such agreements. There are, however, some provisions 
which might shed some light. A first look of section 55(1) suggests that the WSP is only 
an agent acting on behalf of the WSB: “For the purposes of section 53, a water services 
board may, in accordance with this section, arrange for the exercise and performance of 
all or any of its powers and functions under the licence by one or more agents, to be 
known as water services providers”.**^  Though the above provisions shed some light on 
the nature and effect of the relationship, the exact details depend on the actual agreements 
so far concluded between WSPs and WSBs.
See also s.53 (2) which uses the term ‘agent’. 
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Going beyond the nature of the relationship, the next question that may be raised relates 
to the legal nature of WSPs. More specifically, one might wonder as to the organisational 
structure of the providers? Whether the provider is a public or private company? Whether 
the provider is a governmental or nongovernmental organisation? Whether the provider is 
a for-profit or non-profit organisation? These questions are important because the 
answers might shed some light as to whether a mechanism could be developed to create a 
relationship between WSBs and SIPs. The Water Act 2002 provides few clues on this 
point. In its section that defines the meaning of certain words and phrase, the Act defines 
WSPs as “a company, non-governmental organization or other person or body providing 
water services under and in accordance with an agreement with the licensee within whose 
limits of supplies the services are provided”.**^  This is a general definition that seems to 
include a range of organisational possibilities. However, such wide definition is narrowed 
by other provisions, though not primarily concerned with the issue. First, local authorities 
are not allowed to be WSPs; they may, however, have equitable interest in another WSP. 
As a result of their equitable interest, therefore, local authorities might have some 
influence on the provision of water services. On this point, section 55(5) provides: 
“notwithstanding any provision of the Local Government Act, a local authority shall not 
be competent to enter into an agreement under this section, but nothing in that Act or in 
this Act shall be construed as: (a) preventing a local authority from having an interest in 
any company or person which is a water service provider; or (b) preventing the Authority 
from approving of the terms of an agreement under this section entered into by a water 
service provider in which a local authority has an interest”. This is said to represent a 
clear break from the previous state of the law under which the local authorities could be 
appointed as water undertakers. Second, WSBs are required to get a licence before 
starting operation of any kind with respect to water supply. The WSRB issues such 
licences. In making a decision on any application for a licence, the regulator is required 
to take into account several factors, one of which is the technical and financial 
competence of the WSP: “the application shall not be granted unless the Regulatory 
Board is satisfied that... the applicant, or a water service provider by whom the functions 
authorized by the license are to be performed, has the requisite technical and financial 
competence to provide the services to which the license relates”.**'* There is no question 
that any person that intends to be involved in the provision of water services must have
" U b i d s 2
" U b i d s 5 7 ( 5 )
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satisfactory technical and financial competence. The question is, however, what kind of 
competence is considered satisfactory. The decision maker here is the WSRB. So we 
might expect the regulator to issue standards on the required level of financial and 
technical competence. To the extent that financial and technical competence determines 
whether a given person can legally be involved in the provision of water services and to 
the extent that the required level of financial and technical competence is to be 
determined by the regulator, one can argue that only those persons or organisations that 
can fulfil the requirements of the regulatory board can be involved in the provision of 
water services.
5.4.2. Water Services Regulatory Board
One of the institutions established by the Water Act is the Water Services Regulatory 
Board (referred here to as the regulator or WSRB).**^ As the name indicates, it is an 
agency which is principally concerned with the regulation of water services at the 
national level. Whereas the WSBs are established at regional levels, the regulator has 
jurisdiction all over the country. The WSRB consists of eleven members; the chairman is 
appointed by the President and the other members are appointed by the minister 
responsible for the management of water resources.**^ The Regulatory Board is endowed 
with several important regulatory powers.
The power to issue licences for the provision of water services. The main function or 
power of the regulator is to issue licences for the provision of water services.**'' An 
application for a licence may be made only by a WSB.*** In making its decision, the 
regulator is required to make sure that the applicant meets the requirements laid down in 
the Water Act 2002. These requirements include:
• Technical and financial competence of the WSB and its WSPs to provide the 
services to which the licence relates;
Ibid s 46(1) (“There is hereby established a board to be known as the Water Services Regulatory 
Board”)
Ibid s 46(3)
Ibid s 47(a)
Ibid s 57(1) (“An application for a licence may be made only by a water services board,, and shall be 
made to the Regulatory Board”)
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• Sound plan for the provision of an efficient, affordable and sustainable service;
• Satisfactory performance targets and planned financial and structural improvements 
and an acceptable tariff structure; and
• Provision of services on a commercial basis and in accordance with sound business 
principles.**^
The application is subject to public consultation and environmental impact assessment.*^** 
Following an invitation for public consultation, any person may object to the granting of 
a license by the regulator; the objection ought to be in writing.*^* A rejection of an 
application or objection by a third party has to be accompanied by a statement of the 
reasons.*^^The applicant or the third party who has objected to the granting of licence by 
the regulator to an applicant WSB may appeal to the Water Appeal Board against the 
decision of the regulator.
The power to determine standards for the provision of water services to consumers.
The WSRB has the power and function to determine standards for the provision of water 
services to consumers. *^  ^ There are several questions that could be raised in relation to 
this power. First, it is not apparent what kind of standards fall within the scope of this 
particular power. In the regulation of water service providers, quality is one of the issues 
that need to be addressed. Quality refers to the quality of water and quality of services. 
The issue is, therefore, as to whether the WSRB has the power to determine both water 
quality and service standards. In relation to this, the regulator is also empowered to 
“monitor compliance with established standards for the design, construction, operation 
and maintenance of facilities for waters services”.*^ '* What is not clear is whether the 
Board has the power to establish such standards. The other point that needs to be noted in 
relation to this power relates to the procedures that must be followed by the regulator in 
exercising the power or discharging the function. The questions are: how are the
Ibid s 57(2)
Ibid s 57(6)
•2'Ibid s 57(7)
Ibid s 57(8)
Ibid s 47(b)
Ibid s 47(d)
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standards made? How are interested parties able to participate? Are these published in 
any way? Is there a room for negotiation with WSBs or WSPs, if not an opportunity for 
general participation? Are the standards the same all over Kenya? The regulator is also 
empowered to: establish procedures for handling complaints made by consumers against 
WSBs; monitor and regulate WSBs and to enforce licence conditions; advise WSBs on 
procedures for dealing with complaints from consumers and monitor the operation of 
these procedures; develop guidelines for and provide advice on the cost-effective and 
efficient management and operation of water services; develop model performance 
agreements for use between WSBs and WSPs; monitor the operation of agreements 
between WSBs and WSPs and take appropriate action to improve their effectiveness; 
develop guidelines on regulations for the provision of water services to be adopted by 
WSBs; disseminate information about water services; promote water conservation and 
demand management measures; monitor, and from time to time re-assess the national 
water services strategy; determine (in accordance with the national water services 
strategy) fees, levies premiums and other charges to be imposed for water services; gather 
and maintain information on water services and from time to time publish forecasts, 
projections and information on water services; liaise with other bodies for the better 
regulation and management of water; and advise the Minister of Water and Irrigation 
concerning any matter in connection with water services.
What is not immediately clear from the list of powers and functions of the regulator is 
which of the decisions made by the regulator are binding? Terms such as ‘guidelines’, 
‘model’ and ‘advice’ normally indicate that they are non-binding statements. On the other 
hand, the regulator considers them to be binding regulatory decisions. For example, s 
47(g) of the Water Act 2002 states that the regulator may develop guidelines for the 
fixing of tariffs for the provision of water services. On the basis of this provision, it has 
come up with a draft document which provides at the outset that “compliance with these 
Guidelines is a condition of the License for Provision of Water Services granted to the 
WSBs by the Regulatory Board”.
5.5. Legal Status of Small-scale and Independent Providers (SIPs)
The Water Act does not contain any provision that expressly deals with small-scale and 
independent providers (SIPs). The question is: is the operation of SIPs legal? Mumma
WSRB, Tariff Guidelines and M odel (Draft) (2007) 4 
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writes that one of the changes introduced by the Water Act 2002 is the requirement of 
licence to provide water s e r v i c e s . B y  this he seems to suggest that the operation of 
SIPs is illegal as many of them operate without licence. However, the Water Act does not 
contain any provision which expressly requires a licence for a person to provide water 
and sanitation services. The text of section 56, that Mumma relied on for his assertion, 
seems to be intended to only serve as a legal basis for the monopolistic position of WSBs. 
The title of the section is Requirement fo r license. The title appears to suggest that the 
text of the section is designed to provide licence as requirement for the provision of water 
services. But the text is not as clear as what the title implies. It reads:
(1) No person shall, within the limits of supply of a licensee—
(a) provide water services to more than twenty households; or
(b) supply-
(i) More than twenty-five thousand litres of water a day for domestic 
purposes; or
(ii) More than one hundred thousand litres of water a day for any purpose, 
except under the authority of a licence.
(2) A person who provides water services in contravention of this section shall be 
guilty of an offence.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits-
(a) the provision of water services person to his employers: or
(b) the provision of water service the premises of any hospital, factory, school, 
hotel, brewery, research station or institution to the occupants thereof, in cases 
where the sources of supply of the water is supplied to it in bulk by a licensee.
As it can be seen from the above text, this is not a requirement for having a licence before 
one supplies water services. It is not the absence of licence that makes the act of 
providing water an offence and the person guilty. Even if this person attempts to get a 
licence, he/she/it cannot get it as it is clearly stipulated in the Act that only WSBs could 
be licensees. So the purpose of this provision is to give monopoly rights to WSBs. As 
it is stated above, WSBs are established by the Minister by a notice published in the 
Gazette. Their mandate is to ensure the economic and efficient provision of water 
services within their limits of supply, the geographic area within which they are 
mandated to operate. The limits of supply are defined in the establishing notice. After 
WSB is established, it applies for a licence. The criteria used by the regulator to decide 
whether or not to grant licence relate to the technical, financial, managerial, and 
commercial capacity of not only the applicant WSB but also its WSPs. Therefore, by this
Mumma (n 50)
Water Act 2002 s 57(1)
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time, it could be assumed that the applicant has found an agent. Now the above section of 
the Water Act 2002 comes into operation only after the regulator has granted the licence 
to the WSB. Before this time, the WSB is not yet a licensee and hence one of the 
elements which trigger the operation of the above section {within the limits o f  supply o f a 
licensee) is not fulfilled. What this implies is the following: if there is no WSB 
established to serve a given geographic area or if the WSB established to serve that area 
is not yet granted a licence by the regulator, any person can supply any number of 
households or any amount of water daily. And doing so is not committing the offence 
created by this section of the Act. On the other hand, if the WSB established to serve a 
given area is also granted the licence, then supplying water more than the number of 
households or volume of water prescribed by the section constitutes an offence. If a 
person supplies within the threshold of the number of households or volume of water, 
he/she/it is not guilty of the offence.
From this, it follows that the essential purpose of section 56 of the Water Act is to give a 
monopolistic privilege to a licensee, i.e. a WSB licensed by the regulator. Within the 
geographical area that a given WSB is established and licensed to serve, no one has the 
right to supply water beyond those limits and without entering into a service provision 
agreement with the relevant WSB. WSBs have a monopoly right to provide water 
services in areas which they have established and licensed to provide waters services. It is 
not, however, clear fi-om the text of the Act as to how and who might enforce such right. 
Obviously the beneficiary can initiate actions to enforce its right. However, it is not clear 
as to which organ of government is empowered to determine if contravention of the 
offence has occurred and if so, what sanction should be imposed on the offender. Under 
normal circumstances, courts are the proper venue for determining as to whether a rule of 
law has been contravened and, if so, the sanction. But the possibility of courts 
adjudicating such disputes is put into doubt because of the existence of the regulatory 
body which is authorised to act in a number of ways over a number of matters relating to 
water services. In relation to the prohibition that we are concerned with and other 
offences, section 105 provides that “a person who is guilty of an offence under this Act, 
or under any rules or regulations made under this Act, shall, if no other penalty is 
prescribed in respect of the offence, be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred 
thousand shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or to 
both”. Since there is no other penalty prescribed for the offence of transgressing the 
monopoly rights of the WSB, the applicable sanction is therefore what is provided above. 
The question now is: who decides if a person is guilty of such offence and what penalty
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to impose? Section 104 reads: “without prejudice to the rights of any person to bring 
proceedings in respect to an offence, the minister, the authority or regulatory board may 
institute and maintain criminal proceedings in any court against any person accused of an 
offence under this Act or under any rules or regulations made under this Act”. It follows 
therefore that the offence is a criminal offence and hence courts have the jurisdiction. In 
such proceedings, the parties are the regulator or the minister on the one hand and the 
person who is accused of the offence on the other hand. Section 104 also stipulates that 
any person having a right could bring proceedings in respect of the offence. And this 
right is the monopoly rights to provide water services within a defined area. It follows 
therefore that the relevant WSB can bring proceedings in respect of the offence. What is 
not clear is the nature of the proceeding: is it civil or criminal proceeding that the WSB 
can bring? As the text stands, both kinds of proceedings are possible. The WSB might 
decide to bring a civil proceeding seeking two possible kinds of relief. First, it might seek 
compensation for the damage of its interests protected by the monopoly right. Second, it 
might seek injunction order against the person who is supplying water in contravention of 
its monopoly right. And the other is the criminal proceedings seeking a criminal penalty 
against the person committing the offence. I believe the proper way to understand the 
above section it to limit the right of the WSB to bring a civil action only. This is because 
of two reasons. First, criminal cases are of public nature and hence it should be a public 
organ that should bring such cases and WSB, though an entity established by a minister, 
is just a private individual whose right is violated by the commission of the offence. The 
second reason is: whereas the power of the minister or the regulator to bring a criminal 
proceeding is substantiated by other sections of the Water Act, no where is similar 
provision found with respect to the WSB.
From the above discussion it follows that as a licensee WSBs have exclusive rights to 
supply water to more than twenty households daily and more than 25 (100 for other 
purposes) thousand litres of water daily. This does not mean that the WSB does not have 
a right to provide water to less than twenty households or less than 25 thousand litres a 
day. It has the right to do so but this is not an exclusive right. Any other person could 
provide such amount of water or to such number of households daily without a need for a 
licence. That means the Water Act recognises competition between WSBs and other 
independent providers in certain limited situations but it prevents such competition in 
most cases.
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There are two remarkable things about the case of the monopoly right given by Water 
Act 2002 to licensed WSBs. First, at least in theory, it allows the existence of other 
suppliers in limited circumstances as far as they are within the limits of the daily volume 
of water and number of households served. Second, it gives protection to WSBs by 
insulating them from competition coming from other suppliers despite the fact that the 
relevant WSB is unable or/and unwilling to provide services to the customers concerned. 
Under normal circumstances, it might be assumed that the need by the WSB to resort to 
such protection comes at a time when it is able and willing to provide services to those 
people who are being supplied by another. If things proceed as one normally and 
reasonably expects them to proceed, in most cases law could have been unwanted. 
Although we might normally and reasonably expect the WSB to follow the normal course 
of behaviour, there is no guarantee that this will happen. On the other hand, experience 
shows (Chapter Two) that utilities who have a monopoly right but not capacity to 
provide a universal service decide to prevent others from supplying households which are 
not being served by the utility.
The other point that must be mentioned here is the fact that suppliers other than the WSB 
could continue to provide water to any number of people or any amount of water daily as 
far as they made an agreement with the WSB. This could be logically defended because 
the monopoly right is a benefit accorded to the WSB and it is up to the beneficiary to 
decide whether to use this benefit and prevent others from the specified activity. Not only 
this is logical but it could also be justified based on the provisions of the Water Act 2002. 
The Act requires the licensee to provide the services through an agent and it could also 
procure several agents for this purpose.*^* This implies that the WSB could decide to 
allow other suppliers to continue providing water even if it is above the amount and 
number specified in the act. But this possibility is subject to approval by the regulator and 
other requirements provided in the Act or formulated by the regulator. One such 
requirement is that which says providers must be constituted for an exclusive purpose of 
providing water.
Water Act 2002 s 55
129 Ibid s 57(5)(c)
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5.6. Regulation of Water Providers: The Case of Kisumu
5.6.1. Introduction
In the previous sections, an attempt has been made to provide the national legal 
framework for the regulation of water providers in Kenya. In this section, an attempt is 
made to show such a legal framework in motion by taking the case of Kisumu. Such a 
study might shade some light to issues which are not sufficiently and clearly dealt with in 
the national legal framework. As was shown in the previous section, the Water Act 
envisages the establishment of a number of institutions. So in order to understand the 
interaction and interrelationship among these institutions, it is desirable to investigate this 
in the context of certain geographic area. Kisumu, found on the shores of Lake Victoria, 
is the third largest Kenyan city. The city is the headquarters of the Kisumu District and 
Nyanza Province. It is approximately 417 square kilometres, of which 297 is dry land and 
approximately 120 is under water. It has an estimated population of 450,000.*^** The 
population grows at an annual rate of 2.8 percent. Owing to the fact that it is an important 
commercial centre in the region, the population of the city grows to about 600,000 during 
the day.*^* About 60 percent of the population live in informal settlements. The official 
system of water supply covers only 40 percent of the city.*^^
5.6.2. Lake Victoria South Water Services Board (L VS WSB)
Since the enactment of the Water Act, the government has established seven WSBs; there 
is no part of Kenya for which no WSB is established. Lake Victoria South Water Services 
Board (LVSWSB) is one of them. LVSWSB is a public corporation which is established 
to develop and own water supply facilities in Lake Victoria South basin and is a licensee 
based on the Water Act. Since the water supply infrastructure which precedes the Water 
Act 2002 is owned by the municipal council of Kisumu, LVSWSB had made an 
agreement with the latter for the lease of such facility.
PL Ombogo, 'Strategy for Access to Water and Sanitation Services in Informal Settlements: The 
Kisumu Experience' presented at Africities Conference 20 September 2006 Nairobi, Kenya
Ibid
Ibid
CEO, LVSWSB (May 2007, Kisumu)
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5.6.3. Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (KIWASCO)
As it is stated in connection with the national legal framework, WSBs, though licensed to 
provide water services in their respective service areas, are not allowed to directly do so. 
They are required to contract another company for the purpose of operating the water 
supply system and actually providing water and sewerage services to residents. In line 
with this national requirement, KIWASCO is contracted by LVSWSB to operate the 
water supply system and provide water and sewerage services to residents of the city of 
Kisumu. Established by the municipal council of Kisumu under the Companies Act in 
November 2001, KIWASCO became operational in July 2003.* '^* It is mandated under its 
memorandum and articles of association, to carry out the business of water and sanitation 
within the area of jurisdiction of the municipal council of Kisumu and surrounding 
districts.**^ The articles of association cover the abstraction, treatment, transmission and 
distribution of water and the collection, transmission, treatment and disposal of sewage. It 
may be remarked in this connection that the establishment of KIWASCO predates the 
implementation of the Water Act 2002. Hence, at the beginning, it provided water and 
sewerage services to residents of the city on behalf of the municipal council of Kisumu. 
The relationship between KIWASCO and the municipal council is defined by the Agency 
Agreement dated 04 July 2003. It should be noted that KIWASCO is wholly owned by 
the Kisumu Municipal Counci 1.*^  ^ Once the LVSWSB is established, however, the 
authority of KIWASCO to provide water and sewerage services emanates not from the 
agency agreement that it has made with the municipal council but from the service 
provision agreement that it has entered with LVSWSB. The municipal council of Kisumu 
has an interest in the supply of water and sewerage services only because it owns 
KIWASCO and large portions of the water supply infrastructure. For the latter, it has 
made a lease agreement not with KIWASCO but with the LVSWSB. KIWASCO has two 
conventional water treatment plants with a total throughput capacity of abut 18,000 cubic 
meters per day and with a treated water storage capacity of 7,200 cubic meters. The water 
treatment plants and the distribution network are aged and inadequately maintained.
LVSWSB, Identification o f  Implementation and Management Arrangements fo r  Improved Water and 
Sanitation Services to Informal Settlements in Kisumu (2005) 7
Ibid
Commercial Manager, KIWASCO (April 2007, Kisumu)
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Furthermore, the two sewage treatment plants and the sewer network have a small 
catchment area, compared to the municipal area/^^
Reliability of supply measured in terms of number of hours for which running water is 
available is not satisfactory; there are frequent breakdowns, often associated with the 
motor that pumps water from the lake. KIWASCO does not have its own power 
generator. Therefore, the availability of its services is tied to the availability of electric 
power in the city, which is itself fraught with so many problems. In addition, a customer 
satisfaction survey conducted indicated that there is a lot to be desired with respect to 
reliable service and billing: “KIWASCO would need to address the quality of customer 
service. The complaints raised by customers include unreliable, or interrupted, or 
insufficient supply, poor quality and expensive prices in addition to inappropriate billing 
and revenue collection”.
Before the national water sector reform, the level of unaccounted-for water in the city of 
Kisumu stood at 70 percent. Now things have improved but the level of unaccounted-for 
water is still significant, 60 percent. A lot of it is believed to be due to high level of 
illegal collections. KIWASCO, with the approval of LVSWSB, has been developing what 
they call ‘delegated management model’ both to minimise the level of unaccounted-for 
water and to reach households in informal settlements and slum areas.
Like so many other countries, the fee that is to be paid to get connected and inflexibility 
of payment arrangements that would eventually get poor households disconnected could 
also be mentioned as connection barriers in the case of Kisumu. But the most important 
problem as far as direct connection of households is concerned is the lack of the water 
supply infrastructure in the informal settlements. The official supply network exists in 
some settlements such as Kondele/Nyawita and Manyatta but is not functional. In some 
other settlements the network does not exist.
S Kayaga and others, ‘Improving Utility Management: Case Study from Kisumu, Kenya’ paper 
presented in 3 WEDEC International Conferenee, Kampala, Uganda 2005
LVSWSB (n 134)7
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5.6.4. The Relationship between LVSWSB and KIWASCO 
5 6.4.1. The Rights and Duties of LVSWSB
The Water Act 2002 envisages a service provision agreement to be concluded between 
the WSB and the WSP. In addition to the service agreement, the Act also contains some 
provisions on the matter. Accordingly, the relationship between LVSWSB and 
KIWASCO is governed by the service agreement concluded between them and approved 
by the regulator, WSRB. WSRB is also empowered by the Water Act 2002 to formulate 
model service agreements which WSBs and WSPs might choose to use. The wording of 
the Act is such that such agreements are only models and hence the WSBs and WSPs 
might choose to ignore them. However, considering the provisions in the Water Act 
which make enforcement of the service agreement contingent upon the approval by the 
regulator, the seven WSBs invariably stick to the model service agreement prepared by 
the regulator.
One of the issues that might be raised with respect to the relationship between WSBs and 
WSPs relates to the nature and effects of such relationship. Is it an agency relationship 
whereby the WSP is merely acting on behalf of the WSB? Or is it a contract to supply 
services? It was remarked earlier that the exact nature of such relationship is not apparent 
from the national legal framework. Apart from requiring that any agreement between the 
WSP and the WSB should be in writing and approved by the regulator and providing the 
kind of clauses that might be included the Water Act does not directly and sufficiently 
deal with the nature and effect of such agreements. Consequently, the exact nature 
depends on the actual agreement so far concluded between existing WSBs and WSPs. It 
is for this purpose that the case of KIWASCO and LVSWSB is examined here. In 2005, 
LVSWSB and KIWASCO have entered into a service provision agreement that generally 
empowers the latter to provide water services in K i s u m u . T h e  service provision 
agreement is made for a period of five yeas after which it might be renewed or LVSWSB 
may choose to appoint another service provider. Any one of the parties who does not 
intend to renew the service provision agreement is obliged to give notice to the other at
Public Relations Head, WSRB (May 2007, Nairobi)
CEO (LVSWSB) (n 133)
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the latest six months before the expiry of the agreement. The main aspects of this 
agreement are discussed in the following pages.
The duty to let KTWSCO use assets: LVSWSB has agreed to provide KIWASCO all 
necessary access to, and exclusive use of the assets and without responsibility for any 
debt charges on such assets and without interruption from any other person. This does 
not, however, affect the ability of LVSWSB to visit, inspect and conduct tests on any of 
the assets, provided that such visits, inspections and tests are conducted at ‘reasonable 
times and places’. The service provision agreement defines ‘assets’ to include buildings, 
rights, mains, pipes, sewers, works, plant and equipment associated with the management 
and administration of water supply and sewerage services and abstraction and collection 
of raw water and the conveyance and treatment of sewage; the treatment, storage and 
distribution of potable water; plant, equipment and facilities used for the purpose of 
scientific analyses or for the measurement of water and sewage. The term ‘assets’ does 
not, however, include consumables.
The duty not to engage other providers: LVSWSB is required not to engage any other 
provider within the service area of KIWASCO. The exception is where such alternative 
provision is caused or made necessary by any failure of KIWASCO to perform its 
obligations under this agreement. This negative obligation does not also bar LVSWSB 
from employing contractors for the purposes of carrying out capital works as defined in 
the agreement. Borehole and well operators and other forms of SIPs are allowed to 
continue to serve till KIWASCO is in a position to extend its services in those areas. In 
this regard, the agreement also recognises that, in the future, special arrangements could 
be made regarding borehole and well operators by LVSWSB after consulting 
KIWASCO.
5.6.4.2. Rights and Duties of KIWASCO
By virtue of the agreement, LVSWSB has transferred all of its powers and rights with 
respect to the service area (as defined in the agreement) to KIWASCO. These include: 
rights of disconnection of services to properties for non-payment of charges for water or 
sewerage; rights of entry to premises and properties; rights to abstract water and control
Water Service Provision Agreement between Lake Victoria South Water Services Board and Kisumu 
Water and Sewerage Company (June 2005)
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discharges to sewers and make discharges to watercourses; rights to manage, use and 
operate assets; and rights to take legal action for breach of obligations by customers and 
others causing damage or adversely affecting services.
The duty to maintain assets: It is the responsibility of KIWASCO to maintain assets 
which are entrusted to it by LVSWSB. This includes the duty to obtain insurance 
coverage for claims, losses, damages or destruction relating to the assets, works and the 
services. Provision and replacement of operating and small equipments is the 
responsibility of KIWASCO.
Rights of exclusivity: According to the service provision agreement, KIWASCO has the 
exclusive rights to deliver piped potable water and sewerage services; and maintain any 
works, assets, and pipe work for the water supply and sewerage systems.
Right to buy w ater in bulk from others: The service provision agreement recognises 
the right of KIWASCO to enter into an agreement for the supply of bulk water. This 
agreement is required to be approved by the LVSWSB and the regulator. But the 
agreement also states that LVSWSB may not unreasonably withhold or delay such 
approval. This is an important aspect of the contract in that it might be used to alleviate 
the water shortage problem in the city caused by the inadequate capacity of KIWASCO 
to produce an amount of water sufficient to satisfy the daily demands.
5.6.5. KIWASCO and Water Customers
The relationship between KIWASCO and water customers is mainly contractual. The 
contract is made in a form made according to the requirements contained in the service 
provision agreement between LVSWSB and KIWASCO. In particular, KIWASCO is 
required to consult LVSWSB and to get the approval of the regulator. It is also required 
to consult with ‘such other organisations or persons as either the regulator may so direct 
or as the service providers considers to be representative of groups of customers or as 
otherwise appropriate with a view to the establishment of such customer agreements’. In 
addition, the service provision agreement between LVSWSB and KIWASCO contain 
important clauses that pertain to the relationship between the latter and customers.
• KIWACO is required to supply water and sewerage services to any customer 
in its service area who applies for such service, provided that it is reasonably
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possible for the service provider acting in accordance with sound water and 
sewerage engineering practices.
• Reconnection of an existing service connection should be made within two 
days of receipt of payment from the customer
• New connections requiring service pipe or drain lengths up to fifty metres 
shall be made within six weeks, between fifty and two metres within three 
months and greater than two hundred meters within agreed period of time 
(based on sound water and sewerage engineering practices) of receipt of a 
deposit from the customer
For households which are, for the first time, getting connected to the water supply 
network, there is favourable concession which is agreed between KIWASCO and 
LVSWSB: connection will be made without charge to the customer. The cost is covered 
by a fund which is established for this purpose. First Time New Domestic Water Supply 
Connection Fund. There is an important qualification, however: the customer will be 
responsible for the costs relating to any part of the service pipe and accessories within the 
boundary of his/her property and any length of service pipe and accessories in excess of 
thirty metres which is necessary to reach the boundary of the customer’s property from 
the connection to the water main. Such costs do not include the costs of customer metre 
and any other accessories which are normally financed by the fund on a connection of 
thirty metres or less regardless of the installed location of such accessories, and the 
customer metre. In cases where the distance from the nearest suitable distribution main to 
the point of connection with the customer’s service is more than thirty metres, the 
customer may elect to use a contractor of his own choice to install the service pipe. He 
should, however, secure the consent of KIWASCO regarding the materials to be used and 
the method and location of the connection. Such consent may not be unreasonably 
withheld. Installation, maintenance and replacement of customer meters is at the expense 
of KIWASCO provided that such meters have not been misused, damaged or tampered 
with. In the case of the latter, the customer is liable.
5.7. Small-scale and Independent Providers in Kisumu
5.7.1. Standpipe Operators (Water Kiosks)
In Kisumu, where the performance of the official water provider is limited not only by 
the limited network coverage but also by insufficient amount of daily water production.
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the demand left unsatisfied is catered by various forms of SIPs. This section describes the 
various types of SIPs in Kisumu. Standpipe operators have in most cases contractual 
relationship with KIWASCO. They are connected to the official water supply network. 
There are two kinds of standpipe operators. Some of them have contractual licence to 
resell water to other people and are also charged a flat rate by KIWASCO. There are 
others who are connected to the official network like any household and resell the water 
to other people. They do not have contractual licence and hence are not also beneficiaries 
of the fiat rate. In the case of those standpipes that are licensed to resell water, 
KIWASCO recommends the price of water to be charged by the standpipe operators; 
however, such restrictions are not adequately and proactively enforced.Standpipe 
operators sell water directly to consumers (usually those households which are nearby) 
and to mobile water vendors, which are the other forms of SIPs. Figure 5.2 depicts a 
standpipe that normally serves individual households and Figure 5.3 shows mobile 
vendors filling their carts at a stand pipe operator.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
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Figure 5.3. M obile vendors at one of the water filling stations (Picture by J Chenoweth)
5.7.2. Master Operators in Delegated Management Model
In the past few years, KIWASCO has started working in collaboration with SIPs in what 
is called delegated management model. This is an attempt to take the already existing 
standpipe operators beyond selling water at a given point. According to this model, 
KIWASCO would extend the network up to a certain point extensions from which are 
done and managed by appointed operators. The water from this point would be metered 
and the operator would be charged based on the meter reading, albeit at a reduced flat 
rate. The operator in turn can establish different water collection points from extending 
the pipeline from the main metre or could even connect households directly to the 
secondary network. It is said to be in the interest of poor households and people living in 
slum areas and informal settlements. It is expected to result in reduction of unaccounted- 
for water as it is now in the interest of the operator to detect and repair any leakage.
5.7.3. Well and Borehole Operators
Well and borehole operators are people who have dug a well or sunk a borehole in their 
premises and sell the water directly to consumers and to mobile water vendors. They do 
not have any relationship with KIWASCO. They do not have also a permit to abstract 
water and in most cases they are not also required to do so. Figure 5.4 show a shallow 
well from which water is pumped by electric motor up to the storage tank from which 
water is sold to households nearby and mobile vendors. Once it is pumped into the 
storage, some operators claim to use different treatment technologies before selling it to
WSP, ‘Improving Water Utility Services through Delegated Management: Lessons from the Utility and 
Small-scale Providers in Kisumu, Kenya’ (2009) Field Note
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consumers. Figure 5.5 is another shallow well from which water is mechanically pumped. 
Whereas mobile vendors normally address the problem of access resulting from the 
inadequacy of the physical infrastructure to reach all consumers, well and borehole 
operators address the problem of access emanating from inadequate production of water 
by the official utility.
Currently there is one small-scale provider which can be characterised as a mini-utility. 
Its operation resembles conventional water utilities. This provider abstracts water from 
Nyamasaria River to its treatment plant. After the water is treated, it is sold to nearby 
households or mobile water vendors. As opposed to well and borehole operators 
described earlier, abstracting water in this manner and in such an amount requires a 
permit from the WRMA. The owner of this water supply system has acquired permits for 
abstracting river water and building the water treatment facility.
Figure 5.4. Well with water storage tank (Picture by J Chenoweth)
Proprietor, Nyamasaria Water Works (April 2007, Kisumu)
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Figure 5.5 Water pumped mechanically from a well (Picture by J Chenoweth)
In addition, the owner claims to have an agreement with the LVSWSB to continue 
supplying water until KIWASCO manages to extend its water supply infrastructure to the 
surrounding area.'"^  ^ Nyamasaria Water Works was originally intended for irrigation 
purposes. However, the owner decided to take advantage of the gap left by the official 
utility in serving the surrounding areas. Currently, it supplies water to nearby households, 
handcart pushers and tanker-truckers.
5.7.4. Mobile Water Vendors
There are two main types of mobile water vendors; handcart pushers and tanker-truckers. 
Handcart pushers are numerous in number; they operate a cart which carries 12 jerrycans 
each of which carries 20 litres. They purchase water from standpipes, wells and boreholes 
and move it around the city in search of customers. There are few tanker-truckers in the 
city. This is not surprising considering the start-up capital which is required for this 
model of water supply. The existing truckers purchase their water from borehole 
operators and usually sell it to high water users such as factories, bakeries and hotels.
Ibid
208
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
5.8. Relationship among SIPs, KIWASCO and LVSWSB
One of the legal problems faced by SIPs relates to the fact that the official water provider 
is usually given a monopoly status which renders their operation illegal. As far as Kenya 
is concerned, it has already been indicated, in connection with the national legal 
framework, that WSBs have the monopoly of providing water services in their area of 
service. The problem with this legal provision is that it does not admit any exceptions 
regarding areas over which it has legal but not physical competence. The consequence of 
this is that no entity is entitled to provide water services for which WSB is established but 
not operating. Despite the position of the national regulatory regime on this point, there 
seems some room for the legal operation of SIPs by striking an agreement with the 
respective WSBs in their areas. Part of the preamble of the service agreement concluded 
between KIWASCO and LVSWSB reads as follows; “...when the contract...is in force, 
the powers, duties and functions of the Licensee to provide water services in the area 
specified in the Agreement shall be exercised and performed by the Service Provider and 
that the Licensee shall retain the powers to perform the functions and discharge 
responsibilities stipulated under such Act in areas in which the Service Provider has not 
extended services”. As it is stated earlier, the Water Act 2002 gives the privileges of 
monopoly not to WSPs but to WSBs. However, by virtue of the agreement concluded by 
the WSPs and WSBs, such privilege can be transferred to the provider. That is what is 
done in the above paragraph. As a result, WSPs have a monopoly status where and when 
they are contracted by WSBs to provide water services. During such transfer, however, 
an important clause has been introduced; that the provider does not have the exclusivity
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right on areas on which it has not yet extended its services. In such areas, the board 
retains the right to provide water services. It is to be noted that one of the areas where 
SIPs are currently operating are those where KIWASCO is not providing such services. 
That means, regarding these areas, KIWASCO does not have any claim until it extends 
its services. It follows from this that SIPs in these areas can legalise their operation by 
making a service provision agreement with the LVSWSB.
From the preamble of the service provision agreement, it appears that KIWASCO does 
not have any claims of exclusivity on areas where it has not yet extended its services. 
Based on this it is argued, in the previous paragraph, that there is room for SIPs in such 
areas to reach an agreement with the LVSWSB with a view to legalising their operations. 
However, a counter to this argument can be made on the basis another part of the service 
provision agreement:
For the whole period of this Agreement (subject to the provision of Article 7) the 
Licensee will not retain, use or employ another contractor or Service Provider, or 
employ any other person or body to perform the services within the service 
provider’s area or any of those services or operate in any way which shall hinder, or 
be in conflict with, the service provider in the proper performance of its 
responsibilities under this Agreement, unless such alternative provision is caused 
or made necessary by any failure of the service provider to perform its 
obligations under this Agreement or if it is deemed necessary by the Licensee to 
employ other contractors to carry out capital works (in which case the practical 
consequences will be agreed between the parties (emphasis added).
The provision seems to have the effect of negating what is stated in the preamble. If  the 
WSB makes service provision agreement in areas where the provider has not extended its 
service, it might amount to a breach of the service provision agreement with KIWASCO 
unless the agreement with SIPs is caused or made necessary by any failure of KIWASCO 
to perform its obligations. The issue is therefore as to whether failure by KIWASCO to 
extend services in areas where SIPs are operating amounts to a breach of its obligations 
under the service provision agreement.
A section of the service provision agreement seems to limit the application of the above 
constraining provisions when it comes to SIPs. However, the wording of the section does 
not actually solve the problem. Section 1.6(b) (iii) provides:
However, subiect to the provisions of the A ct there are at present in existence 
private and community wells and boreholes, which supply water, and these, shall be 
allowed to continue unless and until the service provider is in a position to supply
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an equivalent amount and quality of water. In the event of the service provider 
making such supply, the arrangements for the substitution of the service 
provider’s supply for the previous private supply shall be agreed between the 
licensee, the service provider and the person who had the previous supply, 
and, shall be subject to the approval of the regulator (emphasis added).
In the absence of the underlined phrase in the above paragraph, this would be a very good 
safeguard for SIPs operating in areas where KIWASCO has not yet extended its services. 
This is because it would enable them to legally continue their operations “unless and until 
the service provider is in a position to supply an equivalent amount and quality of water”. 
This is not, however, the case because of the phrase ‘subject to the provisions of the Act’. 
That means, SIPs would continue to operate only subject to the provisions of the Water 
Act 2002. The limitations embodied in the Act regarding the supply of water services 
have already been noted; SIPs are allowed to operate subject to number of households 
and volume of water supplied daily. The number of households and volume of water 
allowed to be provided by SIPs is such that many of the existing providers would exceed 
such limitations. That means, there is nothing new and favourable which is introduced by 
such provision. So if SIPs are to continue to supply the number of households and 
volume of water that they do now or if they are to extend their supply to more than what 
is allowed in the Water Act, they should make an agreement with the LVSWSB and any 
such agreement ought to be approved by the regulator. LVSWSB can contract SIPs after 
consulting the provider and subject to the control of the reg u la to r .N o w  the issue is if 
there is any procedure established by the LVSWSB for making service provision 
agreement with SIPs.
In the preceding section, it was indicated that Nyamasaria Water Works which is located 
in an area where KIWASCO is yet to extend its water supply infrastructure has agreed 
with LVSWSB to continue supplying consumers. In addition, LVSWSB has set up a 
scheme to register well and borehole operators in the city. The purpose of this scheme is 
said to be not to deny permission to some. Instead, LVSWSB argues that the purpose is to 
identify the number and location of wells and boreholes for providing technical assistance 
and providing effective interventions in case of public health emergency. By the time the 
preliminary findings of this research project were presented in Kisumu, however, no well 
or borehole operator has taken up the call for registration. Members of the well-owners 
association doubt the real purpose of this scheme. They believe that the purpose is to go
This is what is provided in the Water Act and in the service provision agreement between KIWASCO 
and LVSWSB.
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after them once they are identified or to collect payments in the same way as KIWASCO 
and Nyamasaria Water Works are paying the LVSWSB. The problem here is that of 
creating trust. On the one hand, members of the well-owners association need recognition 
and some sort of regulation. They, for example, are calling for the authorities to restrict 
new individuals from digging or sinking wells and boreholes on the grounds that the 
groundwater is being over-abstracted. On the other hand, they are concerned that once 
they come public, they are prone to unfavourable action by KIWASCO and LVSWSB. It 
should also be noted that there is an issue of fairness here. KIWASCO and LVSWSB are 
both recent creations. Well and borehole operators have been in the business for 
relatively longer period of time. As such they do not accept the legitimacy of a 
requirement that they should stop supplying water, if not now but sometime in the future 
when KIWASCO manages to extend the services to those areas. The same concern is also 
expressed by the owner of Namasari Water Works. There could be strong reasons to limit 
the operation of these forms of SIPs, but should not this entail payment of compensation 
to the owners of wells and boreholes? Or should not they be allowed to continue serving 
in so far as they manage to survive in competition with KIWASCO?
5.9. Regulation of Water Safety
According to the service provision agreement, KIWASCO is required to monitor the 
quality of raw and potable water for compliance with WHO guidelines. Such monitoring 
is done by collecting and testing water samples. Samples are taken from points which are 
agreed between KIWASCO and LVSWSB. The samples are analysed in a laboratory 
approved by the board. Currently KIWASCO uses the laboratory of the LVSWSB. The 
results of the laboratory analyses are submitted to the LVSWSB on a monthly basis. 
Independent testing will be arranged, in case the board challenges any of the water 
quality reports, for the purpose of taking and analysing fresh samples from selected 
sources. If the results of the new test support the challenges of the board, KIWASCO will 
be expected to cover the costs. In the event that the results vindicate KIWASCO, the 
costs will be covered by the board. In addition, the service provision agreement 
recognises the right of the board to conduct spot checks or carry out such tests as may be 
necessary to monitor the quality of raw or potable water.
If tests disclose non-compliance with potable water quality standards, depending on the 
level of danger that it poses to public health, two kinds of measures are taken: emergency 
and non-emergency measures. Emergency measures are to be taken when the non-
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compliance is or may become a direct danger to public health. In such cases, KIWASCO 
is required to inform LVSWSB, the regulator, local and health authorities, the media and 
customers directly affected or likely to be affected. In addition, it is required to take all 
necessary measures to protect the health of consumers. On the other hand, where the tests 
show a deterioration which, if nothing is done about it, it might endanger public health, it 
is considered to demand non-emergency measures. This involves KIWASCO making 
improvement proposals, for supplementary works or new installations necessary to raise 
quality levels, to the LVSWSB. KIWASCO is also required to formulate and issue water 
hygiene policy for all its employees who would normally come in contact with treated 
water. This might include procedures for periodic medical examination to prevent 
waterborne diseases. The service provision agreement states that failure to meet water 
quality benchmarks (measured in percentage of water samples meeting recommended 
standards) entails financial penalties.
With respect to borehole and well operators, there is a potential tool that can be used to 
ensure the safety of water they supply; however at this time this is not being 
implemented. The public health department of the municipal council is responsible for 
sanitation and hygiene in the municipality. One of the bylaws of the municipal council 
provides for restrictions in the construction of shallow wells and pit latrines within the 
municipality. The situation on the ground is that the wells and pit latrines are sited in 
close proximity creating a potential and serious contamination problem. The municipal 
council of Kisumu has not, however, intervened in this development. This remains a 
challenge in the informal settlements as the latrines are a major method of human waste 
disposal and shallow wells are a significant source of water.
With a view to reaching unserved households, particularly in informal settlements and 
slum areas, KIWASCO in consultation with the LVSWSB has formulated and put in 
action the delegated management model which is described earlier. This model is 
intended to also minimise the level of unaccounted-for water. The idea is that KIWASCO 
undertakes to expand the service up to a certain point, usually a point where the informal 
settlement begins. At that point a meter is attached. From there, a master operator extends 
its water supply system and distributes it to different water collection points within the 
settlement or even extends individual households. This arrangement creates a potential
LVSWSB, Identification o f  Implementation and Management Arrangements fo r  Im proved Water and  
Sanitation Services to Informal Settlements in Kisumu (2005) 8
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health hazard that needs to be addressed. The current legal framework does not provide 
mechanisms to maintain the quality of water within the distribution system owned and 
operated by the master operator.; this is a loophole that needs to be addressed.
5.10. Regulation of Price
The Water Act 2002 empowers the WSRB to develop guidelines for the fixing of tariffs 
for the provision of water services. These guidelines are yet to be promulgated. The 
discussion here is therefore based on the 2007 draft. The goal of the guidelines is to 
establish tariffs that balance commercial, social and ecological interests by ensuring 
access to all while allowing WSBs and WSPs recover ‘justified costs’.R e g u la t io n  of 
the price of drinking water is based on five objectives: financial sustainability, right to 
water, efficiency, conservation and simplicity. The objective of financial sustainability 
requires that in the medium to long term, WSPs should recover the full cost of providing 
water services: “Full cost recovery means that the total cost of providing service 
(including operating costs, capital costs, and administrative/regulatory costs) are met. 
Without cost recovering tariffs, systems will deteriorate and service delivery decline”. 
The guidelines require the use of cross-subsidisation as an affordability instrument.’ ®^A 
WSP intending to make adjustments to existing tariffs would submit the proposal to the 
relevant WSB which will forward the request the regulator for approval.’^’ There are 
three types of tariff adjustments: regular tariff adjustment, extraordinary tariff adjustment 
and automatic tariff ad j u s t men t . I n  submitting a tariff adjustment proposal, WSPs and 
WSBs are required to include their operation and maintenance costs; repayment of debts; 
investment and depreciation and production of w a t e r . T h e  regulator classifies WSPs 
into three types. Type-1 providers are those which have not yet achieved full coverage of 
operation and maintenance costs:
WSRB, Tariff Guidelines and Model (Draft) (2007) 4
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In this category the economic viability of the provider is a priority concern of 
WSRB. As long as Providers operate with a deficit, important performance 
improvements will not be possible. Debts will be accumulated and the companies 
will remain on government subsidies. WSRB wants to achieve tariff adjustments 
leading to a level, where 100% of O&M costs can be covered. At the same time 
targets will be set to achieve a continuous convergence of the minimum service level 
defined by the Regulator. The Tariff for WSPs Type I include as well as the 
Regulatory Levy and Administrative Cost for the respective WSB.’ '^’
Type-2 providers are those which have managed to cover the operation and maintenance 
costs but not repayment of debts. In relation to these providers, “WSRB wants to achieve 
a Tariff level, where a WSP is able to realize the discharge of financial debts, taking into 
account the ability to pay of consumers and the performance and cost structure of the 
Provider. The increase of tariffs in this category is strongly tied to the achievement of 
acceptable performance levels”. T y p e - 3  providers are those which have covered 
between 100 and 150 percent of the operation and maintenance costs and which have 
repaid or are repaying debts. With respect to the third type of providers, the regulator 
intends to ensure that full cost recovery is achieved within 10 years.
Determination of the price of drinking water by the regulator is not solely based on the 
estimation of costs provided by WSBs and WSPs. It will make two important 
adjustments. First, it will determine if the estimated costs are justified costs to avoid any 
inefficiency on the part of WSBs and WSPs.’^^  Second, the justified administrative and 
operation and maintenance costs will be adjusted based on performance of the provider 
on key indicators included in the water service provision a g r e e me n t . T h e  regulator 
requires the WSBs and WSPs to adopt progressive tariff structure and cross­
subsidisation.
What is remarkable about the draft tariff guidelines is the requirement that is imposed on 
WSPs to regulate the price of drinking water charged by standpipe operators:
Ibid 7 
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For the poor, a household connection is a rather costly way of getting access to 
water. There is a connection fee due when it is installed, maintenance costs for the 
meter are due as well as costs for monthly billing for consumption as a standing 
charge. From the high rates of outstanding debts of customers in low income areas 
it can be concluded that there is a high number of households which cannot afford 
to pay a monthly bill regularly. Once important sums over several months have 
been accumulated it is out of reach for them to pay their bill. For them a water 
kiosks system has to be provided, where the water price per cubic metre should not 
be higher than the social block of the tariff. This price should already include the 
margin of the kiosk operator if possible but should not be significantly higher than 
the social tariff for household connections plus the standing charge divided by the 
cubic metres of the first block. The provider has the obligation to control tariffs 
at the kiosks to ensure that the poor can afford to pay the price and that they 
benefit from the social lifeline tariff. The implementation of new Kiosks should 
consider that the margin of the Kiosk operator should be sufficient to set incentives 
for a sustainable operation. Therefore a minimum number of consumers need to be 
reached (e.g. 300-500 per tap). Other income generating activities of the kiosks 
operator should be promoted to enhance operational incentives, but not in 
conflictive with the core-business of water selling.
It should also be noted that the regulation of price does not include mobile water vendors 
and well and borehole operators. The desirability and the practicality of controlling the 
price of water by SIPs are analysed in chapters six and seven.
5.11. Regulation of Quality of Service
The service provision agreement imposes a number of obligations with respect to quality 
of service. Some of these obligations entail financial penalties and others do not. There 
are some which need to be further developed and refined to be enforceable.
W ater pressure. KIWASCO undertakes to ensure that the water supply is maintained in 
accordance with the minimum pressure standards. The problem with this undertaking is 
that the service provision agreement does not contain any specific minimum standards. 
One of the problems with separating ownership from operation of water supply systems 
(as is done in Kenya in general and Kisumu in particular) is that sometimes it might be 
difficult to hold any specific party liable, particularly in those situations where a given 
outcome is attributable to either one of the parties. Water pressure is one such instance. 
The water supply infi-astructure is developed and owned by the LVSWSB. And the 
pressure of the water supply depends on the specific nature of the infrastructure. On the 
other hand, it is the operator, KIWASCO, which has knowledge of any specific elements
Ibid 14
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of this system that needs to be improved to bring the pressure to a certain level. In this 
regard, therefore, the failure to specify the minimum water pressure standards is 
understandable. The service provision agreement does, however, impose an obligation on 
the part of KIWASCO to identify and suggest to the board elements of the system that 
may need to be improved. In addition, KIWASCO is responsible for controlling 
maximum water pressures in the system and imposing restrictive measures designed to 
ensure that excessive water pressure does no occur with a view to preventing harm to 
third parties reducing leakage levels and customer wastage.
Public service obligation. For the purposes of fire fighting, KIWASCO is contractually 
obliged to supply water free of charge. The fixed fire hydrants, as they are considered 
capital costs, are to be provided by the board.
Continuity of service. Burst mains should be repaired without delay in accordance with 
good industry practice. KIWASCO ought to arrange basic alternative supply to customers 
(including provision of water via water tankers) in cases where service is or is likely to be 
interrupted for more than twenty four hours. Any scheduled and unforeseen interruptions 
of service should be recorded (number, duration, location). Where interruptions for a 
period exceeding twelve hours are necessary for carrying out planned maintenance or 
renewal works, twenty four hours notice ought to be given to customers.
The service provision agreement exempts KIWASCO from any penalty for interruptions 
caused by events which are entirely beyond its control. Such events, the agreement states, 
include electrical power outages. In such events, however, KIWASCO should take 
measures in accordance with good industry practice to limit the impact of the event. This 
supplies a good excuse to KIWASCO, for, as it is stated earlier, the frequent interruptions 
of water services usually follow the power interruptions. One may still argue however 
that in a situation where there is frequent power interruption that the prudent response to 
minimise the impact is to arrange alternative power source.
Undertakings backed by financial penalties. These are called in the service provision 
agreement ‘key performance targets’. The penalty for failure to meet the key performance 
targets is equivalent to 0.5 percent of the revenue collected in the month for each key 
performance target not achieved. Key performance indicators include:
• increasing the water supply coverage from 27 percent in 2004/5 to 32.7 
percent in 2007/8
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• increasing the estimated served population from 93,520 in 2004/5 to 156,520 
in 2007/8
• increasing coverage to low income (slum) area from 16,000 in 2004/5 to 
24,800 in 2007/8
• reducing unaccounted-for water from 66% in 2006/5 to 55 percent in 2004/5 
to 30 percent in 2007/8
• reducing number of staff per 1000 connections from 19.4 in 2004/5 to 10 in 
2007/8
• increasing collection efficiency from 64 percent in 2004/5 to 84 percent in 
2007/8
• reducing the cost per cubic metre of water produced from 21 in 2004/5 to 18 
KSH in 2007/8
• increasing average number of days per year that the water infrastructure s 
functional from 312 days to 360 in 2007/8
• increasing the percentage of water samples complying with recommended 
standards from 65 percent to 90 percent in 2007/8
Undertakings not backed by financial penalties. In addition to the above key 
performance targets backed by financial penalties, the service provision agreement 
contains other performance targets which are not backed by financial penalties. These are 
programmatic targets:
• reducing incidences/days of stoppage from 48 in 2004/5 to 6 in 2007/8
• reducing the percentage of budget spent on administration from 30 percent in 
2004/5 to 20 percent in 2007/8 and
• reducing the ratio of staff cost to operational costs from 33 percent in 2004/5 
to 25 percent in 2007/8
5.12. Conclusion: Comparative Synthesis
In this chapter and in the previous one, the legal frameworks for the regulation of water 
providers in Ethiopia and Kenya have been presented. This section concludes the 
discussion by making some comparative remarks.
Small-scale and Independent providers. There is noticeable difference between Addis 
Ababa and Kisumu in the absence of independent providers in Addis Ababa. It has been 
found out that forms of SIPs that operate in Addis Ababa rely on the official water
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provider for bulk water supply. On the other hand, in Kisumu, hundreds of well operators 
supply water directly to households or through mobile vendors. Independent providers 
complement and in some ways compete with the official provider. In addition, it is 
remarkable that Kenyan law permits self-supply and limited small-scale water provision. 
In Addis Ababa, the monopoly privilege given to AAWSA includes also the limitation on 
self-supply. There are, however, a number of boreholes developed by factories, perhaps 
with the consent of AAWSA. These factories are high volume water users and if 
AAWSA manages to supply them itself, the revenue could be used to target the subsidy 
structure to many low income households.
Property rights on water. Between Ethiopia and Kenya, there is no difference regarding 
ownership of water resources. However, some differences regarding the details of the 
licensing system are observed. More uses of water are exempted from the permit 
requirement in Kenyan than Ethiopia. This, seen in light of the fact that Kenya suffers 
more from scarcity of water than Ethiopia, is remarkable. It might be useful for the 
Ministry of Water to see if there is a need to have such a broader category of uses 
requiring permits. In Kenya, WRMA and its regional offices classify every water 
resource in their jurisdiction and allocation and protection decisions are made on the 
basis of this classification system. Though the Water Proclamation in Ethiopia envisages 
the enactment of detailed rules and regulations, not much has been forthcoming. The 
framework law itself, compared to the Water Act 2002, is terse and lacks guidelines on 
what areas and how the Ministry of Water may develop secondary legislation. The permit 
itself is not a property, according to the Water Proclamation. And hence, any undertaking 
to transfer a permit to another person has to be approved by the Ministry. In Kenya, 
however, permits are attached to land and they will transfer together with the land.
Supply of w ater and sanitation services. In Addis Ababa, the official provider is a 
horizontally and vertically integrated utility forming part of the city government. On the 
other hand, the Water Act 2002 envisages the separation of ownership and operation of 
water systems. This might introduce private sector efficiencies in the water sector of 
Kenya without risking the deterioration of the water supply infrastructure. Government 
could better access long-term loans and aids for the capitalisation of the infrastructure. 
Whether the expected private sector efficiencies will be gained remains to be been. But 
currently, it should be noted that, at least as far as Kisumu is concerned, the provider is 
not a private company; it is a company owned by the municipality of Kisumu.
219
220
Chapter Six
Should Small-scale and Independent Providers (SIPs) be 
Regulated? The Right to Water, and Public Interest Theory 
and Evidence of Regulation
6.1. Introduction
The statement that ‘SIPs are largely unregulated’ does not represent the reality in 
Ethiopia and Kenya. It is arguable that they are not properly or adequately regulated or 
that legal requirements are not effectively enforced. An activity is unregulated when no 
legally-prescribed entry barriers (for example, licensing requirements) and conduct 
standards (for example, minimum quality standards and price limits) exist. There are two 
alternative approaches that law could take with respect to SIPs. First, the law could 
positively recognise (rather not prohibit) them without providing entry barriers and 
standards of conduct. Hence, any person may at anytime abstract water from anywhere 
and sell it for any price to anyone. This is an option of total and complete freedom. 
Second, the law may provide for entry barriers and/or conduct standards. Regulation 
basically involves restricting the freedom of individuals.’ For example, SIPs might be 
allowed to operate by first securing a licence for abstracting and supplying water. Or they 
might be required not to sell water beyond a given threshold defined in terms of 
geography, volume and/or number of households. This is the case in Kenya where the 
law stipulates that anyone may supply more than a specified volume or number of 
households only on the basis of a service provision agreement.^ Limited freedom could 
also mean no freedom as when SIPs are prohibited from operating. Prohibition of an 
activity constitutes an extreme and severe form of regulation.^ It is, therefore, arguable
’ E Groom, J Halpern and D Ehrhardt, ‘Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation o f  Water and 
Sanitation Services’ (2006) 6 World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper 
Series 8 (“regulation means restrictions on the normal freedom o f  operation o f  people and enterprises”)
 ^ Water Act 2002 (Kenya) s 56 (defining the threshold in terms o f twenty five thousand litres and twenty 
households)
 ^ C Hepburn, ‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review o f  Instrument Choice’ (2006) 22 
Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy 226 ,229  (calling prohibition o f  an activity quantity regulation)
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that, in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Kisumu (Kenya), SIPs are regulated, albeit rarely 
enforced. What should be asked is to what extent and how SIPs should be regulated.
In what way should SIPs be regulated is a second-order question. The first-order question 
is: is there any prima facie  case for regulation? It is prima facie because any need for 
regulation identified at this stage is merely tentative; it will be abandoned if there are not 
cost-effective instruments of regulation.'’ Separating the two questions helps to avoid 
instituting costly and unnecessary regulatory measures.^ It also helps to effectively target 
the regulatory instrument and thereby achieve the underlying objectives, affordability and 
safety of potable water.
This chapter examines if the case for regulation of SIPs can be corroborated by public 
interest theory, human right to water and empirical findings with respect to the price and 
quality of water provided by SIPs. The chapter concludes that there is a strong public 
interest case for regulating the quality of water. The same cannot be said about regulating 
price and competition among SIPs. One may, however, argue, to the extent price has 
public health implications and out of some fundamental equity considerations, drinking 
water must be made affordable to the urban poor. Nevertheless, there is no public interest 
case for the use of price regulation. The public interest case for regulating the quality of 
drinking water is also examined in light of the results of price and quality of water studies 
in Addis Ababa and Kisumu. This further refines and in some way confirms the 
theoretical case. The public interest theory and the price and quality findings establish the 
extent of the need to regulate which translates into an obligation owing to the human 
right status of water. Rooted in economic and social rights, the right to water raises issues 
of enforceability. It is argued, in this chapter, that right to water gives rise to a few 
immediately enforceable rights and obligations. One of these is the duty to regulate 
providers to make water safe and affordable.
 ^ See Chapter Three
 ^ See, for example, R Schmalensee, The Control o f  Natural Monopolies (1979) 1 (stating that separating the 
two questions helps to make regulatory tools effective by matching them to the characteristics o f  the 
problem addressed); and D Helm, ‘Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden’ (2006) 22 
Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy 169 (arguing that regulations have allocative, compliance and 
administrative costs and that there are good theoretical reasons for expecting that regulation can be 
oversupplied and hence it is important to consider the why and how questions separately in every 
regulatory area)
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6.2. Regulation of Price: Public Interest Case and Evidence
6.2.1. The Public Interest Case
6.2.1.1. Regulation to Minimise Problems of Natural Monopoly
Price is one object of regulatory systems governing water providers.^ It is argued, in 
chapter two, that the question of whether there is a need to regulate SIPs is not adequately 
discussed in the literature. This section examines the question from the perspective of 
public interest theory. It first presents the theory that justifies regulation of conventional 
water utilities. It then determines the extent to which such theory is applicable to SIPs.
Regulation, according to the public interest theory, needs to remedy market failures.^ 
Natural monopoly, as a market failure, is “perhaps the most important public interest 
rationale” for regulating price.^ Monopolies generally function inefficiently by increasing 
price and reducing output. Competition policy aims to prevent formation of monopolies 
and minimise adverse effects significant market power.^ However, monopolies are at 
times desirable and unavoidable. As Ballance and Taylor indicated:
A natural monopoly occurs where there are continuing economies of scale in 
production. That is, the unit cost of production continues to decrease as production 
volumes increase. [A natural monopoly can be defined] as having a number of 
characteristics, most importantly, economies of scale, but also as having capital 
intensity, non-storability with fluctuating demand, locational specificity, producing 
necessities for the community and involving direct connections to consumers. In 
this situation, competition between multiple suppliers for the same group of 
customers would result in higher costs through, for example, duplication of the 
industry’s asset base.’®
 ^ See Chapter Three 
’ See Chapter Three
* R Geddes, ‘Public Utilities’ in B Bouckaert and G De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia o f  Law and Economics
(1999)1165.
 ^ T Ballance and A Taylor, Competition and Economic Regulation in Water: The Future o f  the European 
Water Industry (2005) 5 ( also stating that the best response is promotion o f  competition as it is “likely to 
be cheaper to implement, as the information requirements o f  structural regulation should be much less 
demanding”).
Ibid. See also RA Posner, ‘Natural Monopoly and its Regulation’ (1969) 21 Stanford Law Review 548, 
550-553; and R Sherman, The Regulation o f  Monopoly (1989) 5-6;
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In such cases, attempts should be made to regulate price,”  This argument is also made to 
justify private or public statutory monopoly, for competition under these conditions is 
deemed wasteful.’^  Though public ownership of water utilities is often presented as an 
alternative to regulation, the evils of monopoly will not necessarily cease to exist. Hence, 
state owned monopolies ought to be regulated as well.”  Economists argue that natural 
monopoly is not sufficient reason for regulation.”  The case becomes stronger where 
demand is insensitive to price changes. It is in such cases that monopolies will behave 
inefficiently by increasing price and decreasing output.”
6.2.I.2. Conventional Model of Water Supply as a Natural 
Monopoly
The price of water should be regulated, for a conventional model of water supply exhibits 
attributes of natural monopoly and the demand for water services is relatively insensitive 
to prices.”  Supply of water services involves the following activities.”  First raw water is
" A Nickson and R Franceys, Tapping the Market: The Challenge o f  Institutional Reform in the Urban 
Water Sector (2003) 128 (stating that “economic regulation is therefore a necessity”).
For a counter argument, see, for example, A Bamzai, ‘The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural 
Monopoly Regulation’ (2004) 71 The University o f  Chicago Law Review 1525, 1526 (stating “the very 
fact that the government grants an exclusive monopoly right...will induce competition to gain that right, 
creating wasteful duplication on another margin”).
Nickson and Franceys (n 11) 128 (“public direct providers also commonly abuse their monopolistic 
position over piped supplies through over-investment in treatment processes as well as through corruption 
and inefficiency...maintaining tariffs that are so far below any reasonable level...public providers equally 
need to be regulated”); I Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition 
(2004) 227 (“Government ownership o f  water systems is no substitute for regulation because public 
monopolies also have incentives to overcharge consumers with no alternative supply, and to run down the 
capital stock and underinvest”.); and Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt (n 1) 7
See, for example, Posner (n 10) 635-636 (“The benefits o f  regulation are dubious...the evils o f  natural 
monopoly are exaggerated.. .the effectiveness o f  regulation.. .is highly questionable... regulation costs a 
great deal...Regulation may be likened to the treatment o f  an ailment whose gravity is not known with a 
costly and dangerous drug whose efficiency is highly uncertain. It can be improved, but I do not see how 
we can realistically hope to transform it into a fruitfiil instrument for advancing the public welfare”)
Schmalensee (n 5) 8-9 (also stating “one would worry more, on efficiency grounds, about an 
uncontrolled water supply monopoly than about a similarly situated cable television firm in a large city”)
S Cowan, ‘Regulation o f  Several Market Failures: The Water Industry in England and Wales’ (1993) 9 
Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy 14, 15 (calling the water industry a classic case o f  natural monopoly); 
and Groom, Halpern and Ehrhardt (n 1) 6 (“the value o f  water piped to the premises is so great and the cost 
o f alternatives so high that customers are often willing to pay several times the reasonable cost o f  the 
services, rather than go without the service completely”)
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abstracted from underground and surface sources; groundwater being more expensive/^ 
It will then be stored in order to cope with seasonal variation in availability of 
particularly surface water. Depending on the locations of the treatment and water storage 
facilities, raw water will be transported for treatment. The water is treated to make it safe 
and acceptable for drinking. The level and nature of treatment required depends on the 
quality of the raw water, generally groundwater being less expensive. The treated water 
will be transported to storage in order to cope with diurnal variation in demand; to 
provide reserve water for emergencies; to stabilise pressure; and to blend different water 
sources. The water will be distributed through network of pipes to customers. Services 
such as connections, billing and payment services are also provided. Wastewater will be 
collected and transported into sewage treatment plants. The sludge removed will be 
incinerated, dumped or used as fertilisers; and the effluent will be treated and discharged 
into the environment.
The above activities may be grouped into three distinct processes: production, 
distribution and retailing. The distribution infrastructure includes the pipes, valves, 
storage tanks, reservoirs, meters, fittings, and other hydraulic accessories that connect 
treatment plants or well supplies to consumption taps.^° The distribution process exhibits 
more attributes of natural monopoly than other public utilities such as electricity and gas:
Even in comparison to other fixed utilities, water utilities require substantial 
investment in fixed assets relative to the variable costs of production (including the 
cost of raw water, energy, and treatment of chemicals). Using the standard of 
capital investment per revenue dollar, water supply is among the most capital- 
intensive of all utility sectors. Capital investment in water supply mainly is a 
function of the need to establish production capacity; maintain a complex storage, 
transmission, and distribution network; and meet both fire protection specifications 
and peak demands. However, the capital intensity of the water supply industry also 
can be explained by the industry’s relatively low variable (operating) costs, which 
translate into relatively low operating revenues.
Ballance and Taylor (n 9) 10 and Cowan (n 16) 16 
** Cowan (n 16) 15 
Ibid
National Research Council, Drinking Water Distribution Systems: Assessing and Reducing Risks (2006) 
15-43
JA Beecher, Consolidated Water Rates: Issues and Practices in Single Tariff Pricing (1999) 31.
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In addition, Ballance and Taylor explain why the distribution element of the water 
industry is a natural monopoly:
Economies of scale are present, in part, as a result of a physical reality. The cost of 
pipes may increase in proportion to their length and diameter, and perhaps 
thickness, but their capacity increase in proportion to their diameter to the power of 
about 2.6 because the cross-sectional area increases as the square of the diameter 
and because friction between the water and pipe decreases with size.
These networks are generally constructed with a significant excess capacity due to 
the irreversibility of the investment and the high adjustment costs associated with 
having to change the level of capacity. As a result, the low marginal costs of 
transporting additional water and the high sunk costs of network investment form a 
formidable barrier to new entry.^^
Economies of scale, huge fixed assets which are largely sunk and the imperative to enjoy 
public rights of way make the conventional model of water supply a case of natural 
monopoly. One may wonder as to whether competition among various producers of water 
(like producers of electricity) is possible. In England and Wales, for example, the 
economic regulator is charged with promoting competition.^^ Competition among 
companies in the production of water raises some complex regulatory issues regarding 
quality and access to common carriage.^"* Robinson discusses challenges of introducing 
competition into the water market. First, there might be significant public objections to a 
permission to develop new water supply sources.Second,  high costs of transporting 
water long distance has precluded the development of a national grid o f water distribution 
and thereby limiting the practicality of competition in water.^^ Third, mixing of water in
Ballance and Taylor (n 9) 11-12
See S Cowan, ‘Competition in the Water Industry’ (1997) 13 Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy 83 
(discussing different types o f  competition); JW Sawkins, ‘Yardstick Competition in the English and Welsh 
Water Industry Fiction or Reality?’ (1995) 5 Utilities Policy 27; M Cave and J Wright, ‘A Strategy for 
Introducing Competition in the Water Sector’ (2010) 20 Utilities Policy 116; and M Cave, Independent 
Review o f  Competition and Innovation in Water Markets: Final Report (2009)
For an illustrative discussion o f  the issues regarding access to networks and its regulation , see F Parker, 
‘Applying the Costs Principle— Ofwat’s First Wholesale Access Price Determination’ (2007) 18 Journal o f  
Water Law 187; F Parker, ‘The Legalities o f  Competition in Water Markets— Comparing Scotland with 
England and W ales’ (2007) 18 Journal o f  Water Law 167; and Kessides (n 13) 223-224
C Robinson, ‘Introducing Competition into Water’ in ME Beesley (ed). Regulating Utilities: Broadening 
the Debate (1997) 168; and Ballance and Taylor (n 9) 14 (discussing the difficulty o f  developing new 
sources o f  water)
Robinson (n 25) 168; DM Newberry, Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation o f  Network Utilities
(2000) 3-4; Ballance and Taylor (n 9) 13 (“...the transportation costs o f  water relative to the cost o f
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common network raises questions of responsibility regarding its quality/^ Fourth, in 
relation to the third challenge, the separation of economic and social regulators 
complicates the task of introducing competition into the water sector?^ If common 
carriage is to be used, all water consumers ought to be metered and, in a situation where 
many households pay a fixed sum, introducing competition would be challenging?^ 
Robinson admits that these challenges are not insurmountable and argues in favour of 
introducing competition through inset appointment, cross-border competition, or 
requiring open access on regulated terms or separating the ownership of the distribution 
infrastructure. Perhaps the strongest argument not mentioned is that competition 
precludes the use of cross-subsidies, an affordability tool, by allowing high-volume water 
users to be able to switch or self-supply.^® It should be noted in this connection, though 
incidentally, that the values of introducing competition into the water sector might be a 
justification to allow the operation of SIPs which do not raise any issue of common 
carriage. (This point is discussed in the next chapter). Because of the difficulty of 
introducing competition, water utilities have largely remained vertically integrated 
monopolies.^^ Although competition in distribution and production might not be desirable 
and/or feasible, it might be introduced in retailing through competitive contracting. 
Private enterprises may also compete to supply services such as the supply of raw 
materials; meter reading; planning studies; construction and rehabilitation; general repair
production are also high particularly when compared to gas and electricity. As such, the potentially 
‘competitive’ elements (e.g., o f  raw water and possibly treatment) o f  the supply chain comprise only a 
small element o f  the overall cost, which in itself makes the potential benefits from competition less 
rewarding than in others”); and Cowan (n 16) 16
Robinson (n 25) 168
Ibid 168-169
Ibid 169
Kessides (n 13) 231 (stating that exclusivity enables cross-subsidies)
Ibid 224 (“The natural monopoly character o f  water supply is so strong... making vertical integration o f 
utilities dominant even in industrial countries. Horizontal integration is also common, in the sense o f  a 
single utility being responsible for an entire urban market (multiple utility providers within a city are 
relatively rare, though more likely in large cities”. Ibid 228)
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and maintenance; and computer and payroll services?^ Competition can also be 
introduced, not within the market but, for the market?^
6.2.13. Regulation to Make Water Affordable
The foregoing case for regulation of price posits that the public interest is served by 
efficient use of resources. The idea is to set the price of water based on the cost of its 
production, distribution and disposal.^"  ^ The objective is to avoid both over and under 
production/consumption of water services. In connection to this, Beecher notes the 
following;
An efficient price signal leads consumers to consume, and producers to produce, an 
appropriate amount of a good or service. Prices that are too low can lead to 
overconsumption (and underproduction); prices that are too high can lead to 
underconsumption (and overproduction). The mismatch of supply and demand, and 
the ‘welfare loss’ associated with it, has rippling effects throu^out the economy 
because in using excessive resources to produce a good, or spending too much for 
that good, society forgoes opportunities to use those resources to make those 
expenditures elsewhere”.^ ^
So long as regulation is solely concerned with efficiency, its mission is to mimic, and 
thereby set a price which would have prevailed in, a competitive market.^^ The resulting 
price may be, however, unaffordable to some people who would have bought more of it
32 Ibid 231
Ibid 232-234 See also, the seminal article on this point, H Demsetz, ‘Why Regulate Utilities’ (1968) 11 
Journal o f  Law and Economics 55.
The costs o f  water services should in principle include operational costs, capital charges, opportunity 
costs, and economic and environmental externalities. P Rogers, R del Silva and R Bhatia, ‘Water is an 
Economic Good: How to Use Prices to Promote Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability’ (2002) 4 Water 
Policy 1,3
Beecher (n 21) 22
This way price regulation is a substitute for market competition. Economists argue that it is an inferior 
substitute. See, for example, TJ Brennan, ‘Regulation and Competition as Complements’ in MA Crew and 
M Spiegel (eds). Obtaining the Best From Regulation and Competition (2005) 4 (arguing that “the 
conventional perspectives o f  treating regulation and competition overemphasizes the ‘substitutability’ 
between regulation and competition... [leading to] neglect o f  the ways in which careful and creative use o f  
one o f  these can help attain the best from the other”.)
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had it been cheaper?^ There will also be people for whom the price is cheaper and hence 
would have bought the same had the price been higher.
That regulation is concerned largely with attaining efficiency might be true in most cases. 
But it should also be pointed out that there are other values that underlie public policy.^ ^  
Regulation of the price of water should take into account, on top of efficiency, other 
values. Weimer and Vining, in this connection, write:
Of course, efficiency is not the only societal value. Human dignity, economic 
opportunity, and political participation are values that deserve consideration along 
with efficiency. On occasion, public decision makers or ourselves as members of 
society may wish to give up some economic efficiency to protect human life, make 
the final distribution of goods more equitable, or promote fairness in the 
distribution process.
Price regulation should, therefore, be concerned with equitable outcomes. The need to 
ensure equitable outcomes occupies a higher position within a set of objectives that 
economic regulators in developing countries should strive to achieve.'^® But one should 
differentiate concerns which are purely of equitable nature from concerns which, though 
formulated in terms of equity, are also largely about efficiency. For example, writing on
EB Bluemel, ‘The Implications o f  Formulating a Human Right to Water’ (2004) 31 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 957, 962-963 (stating that “treating water as an economic good in an attempt to ensure water 
resources for all by minimizing inefficiencies in the system through pricing techniques...can lead to 
inequities in supply o f  and access to water, particularly when the provision o f  water is guided by the ‘full 
cost recovery’ principle. This principle, which seeks recovery o f  all investments related to the provision o f  
water through the pricing o f  water, may price water higher than some poor and marginalized communities 
can afford, effectively denying them access to an adequate clean water supply necessary to meet their basic 
needs”)
Some economists argue that regulation should solely be about ensuring efficiency: See, for example, 
Schmalensee (n 5) 11 (also see the same, 20-22 for non-efficiency objectives o f  regulation). Helm argues 
that “there are other objectives, including equity and freedom, and many o f  the justifications for 
intervention are for non-efficiency reasons” and in some cases efficiency is not even a necessary condition 
for regulation; Helm (n 5) 171; and Groom, Halpem and Ehrhardt (n 1) 7
Beecher, (n 21) 19 (quoting DL Weimer and AR Vining, ‘Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice’)
E Gerlaeh, ‘Regulating for the Poor’ in R Franceys and E Gerlach, Regulating Water and Sanitation fo r  
Public and Private Partnerships (2008) 41 (“In view o f  the major service gaps commonly found in 
developing countries it is now becoming clear that the regulatory rationales necessarily differ from those in 
developed countries. Widespread poverty pushes social objectives higher onto the politieal-and hence 
regulatory-agenda”); and Kessides (n 13) 219
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price regulation and arguing that prices should also be equitable, Beecher identifies three 
requirements of equity:
Horizontal equity suggests that those who impose similar costs should pay the same 
rate. A related ratemaking principle is that rates should be non-discriminatory. 
Vertical equity suggests that those who impose different costs should pay different 
rates that reflect those cost differences. Ratemaking allows for ‘due discrimination’ 
when costs among customer groups vary substantially.
Finally, intergenerational equity considers along a temporal dimension, suggesting 
that one generation of customers should not be forced to cover costs imposed by 
another generation of customers."^*
The above requirements are not really requirements of equity but efficiency. The 
consequence of following the above principles of ‘equity’ is exclusion of an even larger 
number of low income households or neighbourhoods from the official network. From 
the discussion in Chapter Two, it is clear that one of the reasons why poor 
neighbourhoods are often excluded from the official network is that they are costly to 
serve and utilities are therefore reluctant to extend the network to these areas. If, in the 
name of equity, it is argued that price should reflect the cost of serving a particular 
household, then the unavoidable conclusion is that poor neighbourhoods should pay more 
than rich neighbourhoods. It seems that this after all is not an equitable outcome.
Once it is accepted that price regulation should also be concerned with equitable 
outcomes, it might be necessary to set the price at a level that is below the level which 
would have prevailed in a competitive market (below marginal cost). This will make it 
affordable to all or at least to a greatest section of the population so that they would be 
able to buy more of it than they would have done. Therefore, making the price of water 
services affordable is and should be one of the objectives of economic regulation.
This raises a question as to why regulation should be concerned with making water 
affordable. A number of reasons could be provided: some relate to the wider political 
objective of ensuring fair distribution of wealth and others relate to strategy rather than 
principle (like when Beecher said that it will be a public relations nightmare if prices are 
not affordable)."^^ Affordability has implications for public health as well as the 
sustainability of the whole water supply system. So it appears that it is in the interest of
Beecher (n 21) 22
Ibid 35-36
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the public and, in some ways the providers, that water services are affordable. If water 
services are not affordable, some people would have less of it than required to lead a 
healthy life. This will have a spill-over effect on the public health system."*  ^ Expensive 
water means not only less water but also less of the other necessities of life: “For low- 
income customers, who have little choice but to buy a service from the local utility, 
paying more for basic water service means going without less essential and more 
discretionary products and services. Thus, rising water prices can contribute to 
deterioration in the quality of life for low-income utility customers”."*"* An OECD report, 
in this connection, reads:
[High prices] induce the household to cut its water use to such an extent as to 
jeopardise private and public health, and thus the general welfare of the family and 
immediate community. The problem is magnified if the household includes 
someone with a health condition whose treatment or stabilisation requires the use of 
large amounts of water (in which case special attention by the relevant health 
authority or the water utility is called for)."*^
If water services are not affordable, it will have also the effect of making water more 
expensive even for customers who can afford the current price:
The problem of affordability affects customers in terms of increased arrears, later 
payment, disconnection notices, and actual service terminations. Affordability 
affects utilities in terms of expenses associated with credit collection, and 
disconnection activities; revenue stability and working capital needs, and bad debt 
or uncollectible accounts that other customers must cover. ^
By reducing the customer base, unaffordable water prices would also threaten the 
sustainability of the whole water system:
Kessides (n 13) 222 (“Although there is ample evidence linking water supply and quality— combined 
with sanitation— to health outcomes, private consumers’ valuation o f  safe water and especially o f  
sanitation’s health benefits may be less than the social value o f  public health. Thus incentives (such as 
subsidies), coupled with public education, may be needed to ensure socially desirable minimum 
consumption”.)
Beecher (n 21) 36. See also S Caimcross and J Kinnear, ‘Elasticity o f  Demand for Water in Khartoum, 
Sudan’ (1992) 34(2) Social Science and Medicine 183 (stating that the high price o f  water in urban Sudan 
is probably a major cause o f  the malnutrition prevalent in the squatter areas)
OECD, Social Issues in the Provision and Pricing o f Water Services (2002) 53
Beecher (n 2 1 )3 5
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If a customer base cannot support the cost of water service, potential lenders may 
be concerned about the utility’s financial health and ability to meet debt 
obligations. Moreover, disconnecting residential water customers can present a 
public relations nightmare for utilities, particularly because essential services are 
involved. Increasingly, problems of bad debt also extend to non-residential utility 
customers. Financial distress and bankruptcies in the commercial and industrial 
sectors can leave utilities holding the bag."*
Any policy to make water services affordable should address the following questions. 
When is water affordable? What are the policy tools that can be used to ensure that water 
is affordable? Is regulation an appropriate policy instrument?
How is affordability to be measured? There are two ways of measuring affordability. The 
first and most appropriate one is to estimate the share of water expenses in total 
household expenditures."*^ The second way is to measure water expenses as a percentage 
of household income. In both cases, if the results exceed a certain threshold, water is 
deemed unaffordable. What threshold must be set is a normative question."*  ^ Different 
organisations and governments have developed their own thresholds. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible for the regulation of the quality 
of drinking water, is also required to take into account the cost implications of its quality 
standards. To discharge this duty, it has determined that water is unaffordable if the cost 
exceeds 2 percent (1.25 percent for poorer households) of household expenditure.^® The 
World Bank uses threshold ranging from 2 to 5 percent; the British government 3 
percent; and the Asian Development Bank 5 percent.^* Measuring affordability in terms 
of expenses as a percentage of household expenditure requires adequate information 
regarding the latter. This is unavailable for this research. Therefore, resort could be made
Ibid 35-36
S Fankhauser and S Tepic, ‘Can Poor Consumers Pay for Energy and Water? An Affordability Analysis 
for Transition Countries’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 1038
Ibid 1038; and E Feitelson and J Chenoweth, ‘Water Poverty: Towards a Meaningful Indicator’ (2002) 4 
Water Policy 263
US Environmental Protection Agency, Information for States on Developing Affordability Criteria for 
Drinking Water, Washington DC, 1997 cited in S Tully, ‘A Human Right to Access Water? A Critique o f  
General Comment N o .15’ (2005) 23 Netherlands Quarterly o f  Human Rights 35
Fankhauser and Tepic (n 48) 1038; JW Sawkins and VA Dickie, ‘Affordability o f Household Water and 
Sewerage Services in Great Britain’ (2005) 26 Fiscal Studies 225 (stating that the three percent threshold is 
used for illustrative purposes and arguing for the need to develop criteria by which judgments may be made 
as to the affordability o f  water and sewerage services)
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to the second way of measuring affordability. The threshold of the WHO is used to 
determine if water by SIPs is affordable in the case study areas. The WHO has 
determined that no more than three to five percent of an individual’s income should be 
spent on w a t e r . I t  might be noted here that examination of the issue of affordability 
should not be restricted to consumption and should include access affordability.
6.2.1.4. Regulatory Tools to Increase Affordability
There are a number of , policy tools that can be used towards making water services 
affordable to the largest section of the population.^^ First, preferred by economists and 
consumer associations, is direct governmental subsidy to make up for the difference 
between what a customer can afford and what it costs the utility to serve that particular 
customer.^"* In this non-regulatory instrument, the utility is merely a cooperating partner 
of the government. A second tool to ensure affordability is to set a regulatory framework 
that allows and requires cross-subsidisation. This might necessitate prohibiting water 
resale or self-supply and the legal recognition of monopoly.^^
A third set of tools consists of regulatory requirements and approaches that involve 
minimising costs of the water supply system. The following are used and/or proposed for 
use in the economic regulation of conventional water utilities. First, the right way of 
regulating price should be adopted, for some have the perverse effect of encouraging 
wasteful capital investment. For example, a rate-of-retum approach to price regulation 
does not provide the right incentive to use an efficient level of capital; on the contrary it 
encourages utilities to ‘gold-plate’ the supply system aggravating the affordability
Bluemel (n 37) 966
See, for example, OECD (n 45); and A Estache, V Foster and Q Wodon, Accounting fo r  Poverty in 
Infrastructure Reform: Learning from  Latin A m erica’s Experience (2001) 57-80
See, for example. National Consumer Council, In the Absence o f  Competition: A Consumer View o f  
Public Utilities Regulation (1989) 169 (In the context o f  fuel poverty stating: “ ...the most attractive [option 
is where] the industries are enlisted in the efforts to tackle fuel poverty, the costs being met for the most 
part out o f  general taxation. In this way, the functions o f  welfare and commerce are properly separated out 
while the inevitably crucial role o f  the industries is recognised”.)
P Beato, ‘Cross-subsidy Prices in Public Utilities’, in P Beato and JJ Laffont (eds). Competition Policy in 
Regulated Industries: Approaches fo r  Emerging Economies (2002) 199-215 (arguing that price 
discrimination and cross-subsidy may be desirable from an efficiency standpoint but are not voluntarily 
sustainable and hence ought to be accompanied by exclusivity privileges)
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problem?® Second, regulating the rate of revenue collection will also help the 
affordability objective?^ This involves setting requirements on the proportion of water 
billed and collected. As the proportion of water billed and collected increases, the actual 
unit cost of water supply will decrease. Third, there should be standards regarding the 
quality and performance of the distribution system to reduce water losses to an optimal 
level.®  ^Water losses, apart from the environmental and public health implications, would 
increase the cost and thereby the price of water services.®^ Fourth, the use of meters may 
be permitted and required, for, by providing the right incentive, it reduces wastage and 
overall reduction in the cost of the system. However, in some cases, requiring metering 
might exacerbate the problem.®® Fifth, the use of cheap and alternative technologies to 
reach the poor households could also be permitted or required.®*
Another controversial tool is to require the utility to subsidise the costs of providing 
water to the poorer sections of the population. This, in other words, is a requirement 
addressed to shareholders to receive a lower return.®  ^ The problems surrounding this 
option are provided as follows in the context of fuel poverty:
In this scenario some consumers, by virtue of their low-income status, would 
receive fuel subsidised wholly or in part by the industries. This is an unrealistic 
proposition. It conflicts with the profit motive and confuses the separate activities 
of commerce and welfare. Furthermore, it involves the industries in deciding which 
consumers qualify for the subsidy and which do not. There is the ethical question of 
whether such decisions should be made by private enterprises or public authorities.
This effect is commonly known as the Averch-Johnson effect following their article. See H Averch and 
LL Johnson, ‘Behaviour o f  the Firm under Regulatory Constraint’ (1962) 52 American Economic Review  
1052; see also ME Beesley and SC Littlechild, ‘The Regulation o f  Privatised Monopolies in the United 
Kingdom’ in C Veljanovski (ed). Regulators and the Market: An Assessment o f  the Growth o f  Regulation 
in the UK  (1991) 32-42; Nickson and Franceys (n 11) 129
K Komives, V  Foster and J Halpern, Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from  Utility 
Subsidies? (2005) 155
Ibid 154
See, for example, generally J Thornton, Water Loss Control Manual (2002)
OECD (n 45) 52 (stating “introducing metering may induce a low-income households (depending on the 
tariff structure) to reduce consumption too much, in terms o f  private and public health; and/or it may 
increase the household’s general financial stress”)
Komives, Foster and Halpem (n 57) 149-164; Kessides (n 13)
National Consumer Council (n 54) 167
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If the industries were to be involved in selective welfare allocation it would be 
reasonable to require some public accountability of their decision-making processes 
and criteria. Clearly, in practice the industries are inadequately resourced to take on 
this function. In any event, unless the industry has access to subsidised capital the 
burden of significant subsidy cannot be shifted to the shareholders without 
jeopardising the financial future of the industry.®^
The above paragraph clearly provides the opposition to overcome and, in a way, has also 
supplied the counter-argument: subsidy by shareholders cannot be justified unless they 
benefit from subsidised capital. It is exactly this point, that water utilities are 
beneficiaries of a number of privileges, which justifies a regulatory requirement on 
shareholders to forgo some profit in order to serve the poor. Such privileges range from a 
statutorily protected monopoly status, right to access public and private land to lay and 
repair pipelines, free or low-priced raw surface or ground water and so on. In conclusion 
it can be argued that both efficiency and equity considerations lead to regulation of the 
price of water in order to make it reflect costs and in some cases to make it affordable to 
the poor.
6.2.I.5. SIPs Are Not Natural Monopolies
Considering the structure of the market for small-scale water provision and the nature of 
the providers, the question now is whether the above discussion leads to regulation of 
price. In this regard, therefore, the first question to answer is whether the market where 
SIPs operate is a natural monopoly.
When it comes to SIPs, it should be noted that we are dealing with a market with a 
different kind of business model. First of all, the market is characterised by little or no 
sunk cost. SIPs do not rely on complicated and expensive network of pipelines, as used 
by conventional water utilities, which is considered the main sunk cost. The kinds of SIPs 
that currently operate in the case study areas have been described in Chapters Four and 
Five. Mobile vendors such as hand-cart pushers serve as ‘virtual pipelines’ overcoming 
the huge sunk cost required. Lack of significant sunk cost is true with respect to small- 
scale water production.
Ibid and Schmalensee (n 5) 6 (stating that “eontrol meehanisms must focus on the efficieney o f  resource 
use directly and not limit attention to the level o f  profits”.)
235
Second, they operate in competition with one another. The fact that they have emerged in 
the water supply sector is also one good reason to suspect that the water supply sector is 
not in fact a natural monopoly in some cases.
It is on the basis of this that some have argued against price regulation. For example, the 
following is found in a World Bank publication on small-scale providers in Manila:
Whether the tariffs charged by [SIPs] should be regulated depends mainly on 
whether they are expensive. A review of the average price per cubic meter of water 
charged by [SIPs] provides little evidence that [SIPs] charge excessive prices. 
Consequently, the need for their economic regulation may not be as pressing as 
often thought... It seems the threat of competition, either from the (formal 
providers) or from, others [SIPs] in the market, is a good substitute for economic 
regulation, as it keeps the price of water competitive, albeit not necessarily low.®"*
Writing on the economic regulation of water companies, Klein mentions that even if 
systems for the distribution of drinking water were invented a long time ago, the spread 
and use of such systems was slow and as a result SIPs played a significant role for a long 
time:
Water vendors were indispensable in every town in the world in the 18* century 
and continue to be so in many cities of the developing world. Where water vendors 
provide services, consumers have choice. They can bargain over price, they can 
check quality. In China, the boiling of suspect water was recommended and 
vendors sold boiling water in the streets. Where vendors compete, consumers can 
thus judge the quality of water and switch suppliers when no longer satisfied with 
their current vendor. The vendors in turn are free to ask for prices that cover their 
costs, but consumers can turn to cheaper suppliers when price quotes are excessive. 
Inefficient vendors can go out of business, but consumers are interested in paying 
sufficiently high prices to keep as many vendors in business as needed.®®
Later in the following section, I will return to the assertion that competition among the 
various SIPs results in the optimal quality of drinking water. For now the emphasis is on 
how competition checks the price of water by SIPs. The following section discusses the 
problem of affordability in relation of SIPs in Addis Ababa and Kisumu.
WSP, ‘The Experience o f  Small-Scale Water Providers in Serving the Poor in Metro Manila’ (2004) 
WSP Field Note 6
MU Klein, ‘Economic Regulation o f  Water Companies’ (1999) World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 1649.
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6.2.2. Price of Water Provided by SIPs
As part o f the project, which this research is a part (see the appendix), a survey was 
conducted on the price of water charged by the official providers and the various types of 
SIPs in the case study areas. The discussion in this section is based on key findings from 
this study.®® The price of water varies depending on the type of provider. The following 
table provides the findings of the survey for Addis Ababa.
Table 6.1: Price of water in Addis Ababa
TYPE OF PROVIDER PRICE IN 
BIRR/M^
PRICE IN 
USD/M=
Neighbour sellers and water kiosks 30 3.09
Public fountains (standpipes) 5-10 0.515-1.031
Common tap 6.5 0.67
Private connection to AAWSA 1.75 0.180
Commercial users 3.3 0.34
As reported in the literature, low-income households who are not connected to the official 
water network spend many times more than those people who are better off and who are 
connected. From the above table it appears that households who buy their water from 
neighbour sellers and water kiosks spend per unit seventeen times more than those who 
are connected to the official network. Some have challenged the use of subsidised rates 
by official utilities on the ground that they do not benefit those they are supposed to, poor 
households, and on this basis argue for abolition of such rates.®  ^ The rate used by the 
official provider is a highly subsidised rate; however low income households pay 
seventeen times more than this rate. Does this warrant the abolition of this rate? It is 
counterfactual but one should not ignore the possibility that the current price which poor 
households are paying may be much higher had it not been for the subsidised rate. On the 
contrary, in the case of Addis Ababa, it is possible that the specific tariff structure used
^  M Ayalew and others, ‘Towards Safe and Affordable Water by Small-scale and Independent Providers: 
A Manual on the Use o f  Legal Instruments’ (2010) Centre for Environmental Strategy Working Papers
See, for example, AC McIntosh, Asian Water Supplies: Reaching the Urban Poor (2003) 45
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by AAWSA might have the result of increasing the price of water which low income 
households are paying.
Household water expenditure when using a shared tap amounts to an average of 4.7 
percent of the income of poor households. The expenditure ranges from 19.3 to 34.3 
percent (from 28.5 to 50.7 percent during dry season) when relying on neighbour sellers, 
water kiosks and public fountains. Low income households spend an average of 10.2 
percent (15.4 percent during dry season) of their income on water when no distinction is 
made regarding the source of supply. Applying the threshold used by the WHO, three to 
five percent, one can observe that there is serious problem of affordability of water. 
Public fountains, household resale and water kiosks, though very important sources of 
water for low-income households, are not affordable. Households spend more than two 
times the affordability threshold.
Table 6.2: Price of water in Kisumu
TYPE OF PROVIDER PRICE IN 
KSH/M^
PRICE IN 
USD/M^
Handcart 100-500 5.97-7.46
Private connection (1-lOm^) 33 0.49
Standpipe operators 150-200 2.34-2.99
Namasariya water works 125 1.86
Wells 100 1.492
The difference between the price of water by the official utility and those who do not 
have a private connection and thus rely on other sources in Kisumu is not as big as that 
observed in the case of Addis Ababa. It should also be noted that handcart pushers rarely 
serve poor households. Poor households directly collect water from standpipe operators 
and wells. Considering the average expenditure for all sources, household expenditure 
ranges from 12.2 to 16.3 percent (from 21.4 to 28.5 percent during dry season) of the 
monthly income of poor households. This is not, however, as revealing as the figure per 
water source. Handcart operators charge the highest and hence expenditure on handcart 
vended water ranges from 50 to 66.7 percent of the monthly income of poor households. 
Expenditure on well water ranges from 4.7 to 6.3 percent (15.8 to 21 percent during dry
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season) of the monthly income of poor households. The burden of water expenses on 
poor households is noticeable mainly during the dry season.
6.2.3. Will Price Regulation Increase Affordability?
It is observed in the previous section that price regulation is necessary to correct 
problems of natural monopoly. Since small-scale water supply does not exhibit any of the 
attributes of natural monopoly, regulation is not necessary to that extent. Regulation is 
also concerned with affordability. From the water price survey conducted in the case 
study areas, it has been found out that there is serious problem of affordability; that 
households spend two or three times more than the affordable level. The question is as to 
whether this problem can be addressed by regulating SIPs. The problem of affordability 
can be addressed by employing a number of regulatory and non-regulatory tools. 
Unfortunately, none of these regulatory tools are applicable to the problem under 
consideration or they do not involve regulation of SIPs. The different model of water 
supply means that those affordability instruments are not relevant to SIPs. Ironically, 
however, this problem might be addressed by regulating the official utilities (see section 
7.5.2). In conclusion, it can be said that there is no prima facie case for regulation of 
price by SIPs. Since affordability is still a serious problem, the following chapter 
explores the range of regulatory and non-regulatory tools that might be deployed towards 
making SIPs affordable (see section 7.5.1).
6.3. Regulation of Safety: Public Interest Case and Evidence
6.3.1. The Public Interest Case
6.3.1.1. Regulation to Correct Problems of Natural Monopoly
It is argued in this section that there is a strong prima facie case to regulate the quality of 
water by SIPs. To make that point, one should first identify the reason why regulators are 
concerned generally with the quality of drinking water. The next task will then be to see 
which of these reasons are applicable to SIPs.
Conventional water utilities are subject to not only price but also safety regulation. There 
would often be a separate regulatory agency charged with the task of developing water
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quality standards and ensuring that water utilities comply with these standards?* It may 
be noted that regulation of the quality of a monopoly service or product can be justified 
on the basis of natural monopoly as a market failure?^ A natural monopoly poses a 
problem, not only in giving the producer unfettered market power to set the prices, but 
also to determine the quality of the product. The monopoly would not have adequate 
incentives to improve the quality of its product particularly when the product is an 
essential product and there are no alternatives:
In more general circumstances, however, an unregulated monopolist may find it 
profitable to either oversupply or to undersupply quality, the outcome depending on 
demand conditions. Once the firm is subject to a (binding) price ceiling, however, 
then it will always be profitable for the utility to set quality below the level which is 
efficient, given the particular price ceiling. The price-cap regulated utility 
undersupplies quality because whilst an increment in quality generates additional 
revenues—associated with the additional units demanded as a result of the rise in 
quality—drese do not capture (absent perfect-price discrimination) the benefits to 
existing (intra-marginal) consumers of the higher levels of quality.^
The lack of incentive will be more pronounced when the monopoly is subject to price 
regulation.^* Therefore, just in the same way that regulators are concerned with price, 
they should also be concerned with the quality of the product or the service. It has already 
been explained in the previous section that the conventional market for the supply of
For example, water utilities in United States are subject to economic regulations as formulated and 
enforced by agencies established at state or municipal levels. The details are different across the US. In 
addition to these economic regulators, water utilities are also subject to water safety standards developed by 
the Environmental Protection Agency on the basis o f  the Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 and its various 
amendments. The water quality standards are, however, implemented by States. In England and Wales, the 
economic regulator, Ofwat (Water Services Regulation Authority) regulates the price, quality o f  service 
and competition in the water supply market. In addition, water utilities are expected to comply with the 
quality standards set by the government and originating in the European Union. Such standards are 
monitored by the Drinking Water Inspectorate. See Cowan (n 16) 14 (arguing that “the economic, 
environmental and quality regulators are separate and there exists a danger that the appropriate trade-offs 
are not being properly taken into account”)
Cowan (n 16) 14
L Rovizzi and D Thompson, ‘The Regulation o f  Product Quality in the Public Utilities’ in M Bishop, J 
Kay and C Mayer (eds), The Regulatory Challenge (1995) 337-338; see also P Asch, Consumer Safety 
Regulation: Putting a Price on Life and Limb (1988) 35 (stating that in some cases the monopolist might 
have an incentive to supply the optimal level o f  quality: “If the monopolist can produce some extra safety 
at a profit, that company simply has no reason to ‘ignore’ the wishes o f  customers”.)
Cowan (n 16) 19. See generally DL Weisman, ‘Price Regulation and Quality’ (2005) 17 Information 
Economics and Policy 165 (discussing as to whether revenue-share penalty or profit-share penalty give the 
right incentive to maintain quality)
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water services is a natural monopoly. Therefore, regulators should set not only the price 
but also the quality of water services provided by conventional water utilities. If this was 
the only justification for regulating the quality of drinking water, the following would 
have been the logical outcomes. First, the same agency that regulates prices would also 
regulate the quality of the service. The quality of water services has a number of 
dimensions. The first dimension is the quality of customer interface. This involves setting 
standards regarding, for example, customer complaint handling or water pressure or 
procedures for repair, connection or disconnection and enforcement of such standards. To 
this extent it is true that the same organ that regulates price is also often endowed with 
such p o w e r s . T h e  second dimension is the quality of the water itself. This involves 
setting and enforcing microbiological, chemical and physical attributes that drinking 
water should possess. To the extent that regulation of quality is concerned with the latter, 
the above outcome does not reflect the reality in many countries where economic 
regulators are not directly involved in the setting and enforcing of such standards.^®
Second, there would be no need to be concerned with the quality of drinking water by 
SIPs, for small-scale water provision is a competitive market where there is no significant 
entry and exit barrier.
There are some who followed the second line of reasoning above and who argued that 
there was no need to be concerned with the quality of water provided by SIPs. In its Field 
Note on small-scale water providers in Manila, the World Bank took account of the issue 
of whether consumers have found it safe to drink or not:
Another rationale for regulating [SIPs], however, is rooted in public health 
concerns over the quality of water they provide...the Sanitation Code of the 
Philippines requires all municipalities to have a local drinking water quality 
monitoring committee, and other legislations provide for routine water safety 
testing. In general, however, the enforcement of regulatory provisions requires 
improvement. Nonetheless, it is interesting that the majority of small-scale water 
providers’ consumers tend to rate the qualitv of the water high, with about 80 
percent characterising the water supplied to them as drinkable (emphasis added).
See Chapters Four and Five for the situation in Ethiopia and Kenya 
Ibid
WSP (n 64) 6
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It must be remarked at this point that the fact that the majority of the customers have 
found the water drinkable is not an adequate ground to rule out the possibility of 
regulating the safety of water. Often it is the case that safety and public perception of 
safety do not coincide.^® McIntosh also makes the same point: “To a large extent, the 
market promotes regulation through customer choice concerning price and quality of 
water”.^ ® Such lines of arguments are based on premises that, as long as there are many 
buyers and sellers in a market each too small to influence the market outcome and as long 
as there is not significant entry and exist barrier, there is no need to control the quality of 
goods and services. In this section, such arguments are challenged and it is argued on the 
contrary that there is a prima facie case for regulation of the quality of water, at least as 
far as some form of SIPs are concerned.
6.3.1.2. Regulation to Correct Information Asymmetry
Markets result in efficient outcomes when, among other things, the participating 
economic actors have sufficient information to make informed choices.^^ Markets leave 
the power of decision making to individual economic units on the assumption that they 
will make the best choice for themselves and the society. Making such decisions requires 
sufficient information. The problem with certain markets is that the required information 
is not available or is difficult to discover or comprehend. Even if there is a possibility for 
a separate market that supplies the required information to emerge, this market by itself is 
pervaded with problems of incentives.^* When the problem of information is manifested
See generally WK Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities fo r  Risk (1995)
McIntosh (n 67) 45
GJ Stigler, ‘The Economics o f  Information’ (1961) 69 Journal o f  Political Economy 213, 224 
(“Ignorance is like a subzero weather: by a sufficient expenditure its effects upon people can be kept within 
tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be wholly uneconomic entirely to eliminate all its 
effects. And, just as an analysis o f  man’s shelter and apparel would be somewhat incomplete i f  cold 
weather is ignored, so also our understanding o f  economic life will be incomplete i f  w e do not 
systematically take account o f  the cold winds o f  ignorance”.)
Information has a public good nature with characteristics o f  non-excludability and non-rivalry resulting 
in diminished incentives for individuals to be involved in its production and dissemination compared to 
other economic goods. See, for example, KJ Arrow, ‘Information and the Organization o f  Industry’ in G 
Chichilnisky (ed). Markets, Information and Uncertainty: Essays in Economic Theory in Honour o f  
Kenneth J. Arrow  (1999); Viscusi (n 75) 155 (“In reality, however, a firm marketing a potentially 
hazardous good in a world with a capricious tort system may have too much to lose by informing 
consumers o f  the risky characteristics o f  its products”)
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in the form of a buyer having inferior information regarding the quality of a product in 
comparison to what the seller has, the continued deterioration of quality will be the result.
George Akerlof argued the market for second-hand cars is not always efficient.^^ It is 
surrounded with uncertainty generated by information asymmetry, unequal information 
between buyers and sellers. The owner-seller knows the real quality of his car. The buyer 
does not have that advantage. All he knows is the car may be either very good or a 
‘lemon’. Faced with this uncertainty, the buyer is willing to pay only an average price. 
Those who believe their car is worth more than the average price would leave the market. 
Only those who have cars worth less than the average price remain in the market. This 
process will continue until only ‘lemon’ cars remain in the market. The bad cars would 
drive the good cars out of the market.*®
Further researches in the field of economics and marketing have refined this hypothesis. 
Now the accepted view is that the market itself would take care of the problem. And it is 
only when the asymmetry relates to the experience (in some cases) and credence (in most 
cases) attributes of a product or service that regulatory response is justified.
The quality attributes of a product are of three types: search, experience and credence.** 
Search attributes are those which can be ascertained (assessed) prior to purchase. On the 
other hand, experience attributes are those attributes of a product which cannot be 
assessed prior to purchase; however, it can accurately be assessed after purchasing and 
experiencing the product. There are attributes of a product which remain largely 
unknown even after purchase; these are known as credence attributes. A given product
GA Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 
Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 488
*® N  Ireland, ‘Information Asymmetries and Product Quality Regulation’ in M Bishop, J Kay and C Mayer 
(eds). The Regulatory Challenge (1995) 192 (“For example, i f  there were some forged £5 notes in existence 
you may be reluctant to give five one pound coins in exchange for a £5 note. (You may be even more 
reluctant to give four one pound coins in exchange for a £5 note!) Second, the forged £5 notes would lead 
to the partial withdrawal from use o f  £5 notes and the inconvenience o f  using other denominations o f  notes 
and coins as substitutes. Thus the ‘bad’ notes drive out the ‘good’ from the market, and no one wants to 
hold £5 notes”)
See, generally, Stigler (n 77); MR Darby and E Kami, ‘Free Competition and the Optimal Amount o f  
Fraud’ (1973) 16 Journal o f  Law and Economics 67; P Nelson, ‘Information and Consumer Behavior’ 
(1970) 78 Journal o f  Political Economy 311; P Nelson, ‘Advertising as Information’ (1974) 83 Journal o f  
Political Economy 729
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may have all of these attributes.*^ For a certain good, the attribute that is most relevant is 
its credence or experience attribute. Which attribute is most important in the decision to 
purchase depends on the preference of a particular consumer. Compared to goods, it is 
believed that most quality attributes of services are characterised as that of credence.**
The ramifications of information asymmetry and the appropriate response turn on the 
form of attribute over which there is unequal information between the parties.
Assuming the asymmetry affects the search attribute of a product and it is the search 
attribute that is considered significant by consumers, does this result in a ‘lemon’ market 
as suggested by Akerlof? Information asymmetry affecting only the search attribute of a 
problem can be overcome by spending some amount of time and money. The buyer can 
get the car inspected by a professional. Or the buyer could spend some time examining 
the physical attributes of the car or checking other dealers and so on. Advertisements are 
explained as a way of minimising search costs by informing consumers of the existence 
and price of a product.*"* Information asymmetry affecting search attributes do not, 
therefore, pose significant problem as they can easily be overcome by buyers. The widely 
accepted legal maxim—let the buyer beware—can therefore be justified with respect to 
search attributes.
The question here is whether information asymmetry affecting experience attributes of a 
product would result in a lemon market as suggested by Akerlof? The answer is not 
necessarily. This is because of a number of reasons. If it is one which is frequently
SS Srinivasan and BD Till, ‘Evaluation o f  Search, Experience and Credence Attributes: Role o f  Brand 
Name and Product Trial’ (2002) 11 Journal o f  Product and Brand Management 417 (stating: “Produets may 
have one, two, or all three o f  those types o f  attributes. For example, in the case o f  mouthwash, a search 
attribute would be color, an experience attribute would be taste, and a credenee attribute would be plaque 
reduetion”.)
D Aseh and B Wolfe, New Economy, New Competition: The Rise o f  the Consumer! (2001) 35 (“It is 
notable that the intangibility, heterogeneity, and inseparability o f  services lead them to possess few search 
qualities and many experienee qualities. Intangibility means services eannot be displaeed, physically 
demonstrated, or illustrated; heterogeneity means that consumers cannot be certain about performance on 
any given day, even if  they use the same service provider on a regular basis, inseparability o f production 
and consumption means the buyer usually participates in producing the service, thereby affecting the 
performance and quality o f  the service. Credence qualities dominate many services, especially those 
provided by professionals and specialists (for example, lawyers, accountants, medical practitioners)”).
Ireland (n 80) 194 (also diseussing the problems assoeiated with advertising and explaining why 
advertising should also be regulated).
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purchased, the seller will have the incentive to produce a product which possesses the 
requisite experience attribute, for buyers would punish it by opting for an alternative. 
With respect to such products, therefore, it can be observed that the market is a self- 
correcting institution. Hamilton’s characterisation of how the market works fits 
experience attributes of a product which is frequently purchased:
The producer, in order to remain in business, must respond to the dictates of the 
consumer in the marketplace. If he should produce shoddy, he will find few buyers. 
If he should cheat the consumer by fraud and deception, the consumer will pass him 
by on the next round of purchases... Failure by the producer to obey the dictates of 
the sovereign consumer is tantamount to signing his own economic death warrant.*®
The problems are more pronounced in the case of durable products which are not 
frequently purchased. Even then, brand names and reputation operate to minimise 
problems of information asymmetry in experience attributes.*® To some extent also it is in 
the interest of the producers (sellers) to provide some pre-sale information regarding 
experience attributes. Free samples and test products could be explained as a way of 
overcoming information asymmetry. Consumers would not be willing to pay for 
attributes which cannot be examined before purchase. Hence, it is in the interest of 
producers to as much as possible provide such pre-sale information and through that 
develop willingness to pay on the part of consumers. Advertisements also play an 
important role. For durable products, after-sale services and warranties by sellers increase 
the willingness of consumers to pay for alleged experience attributes.*^
The problem of information asymmetry is more pronounced in the case of credence 
attributes. In such cases, it is possible for Akerlof s ‘lemon’ market to emerge. If 
consumers are not able to verify whether or not a product or service possesses a certain 
desirable credence attribute, then they will not be willing to pay for it. It also means that
Asch (n 70) 3 quoting DB Hamilton, The Consumer in Our Economy (1962)
Srinivasan and Till (n 82) 417 (investigates the role o f  brand name I shaping consumers’ evaluation o f  
search, experience, and credence attributes. The findings confirm that, prior to trial, brand name inereases 
consumer’s perception o f  experience and credence attribute performance evaluations. However, prior to 
trial, brand name is found not to affect consumers’ perception o f  search attributes); C Shapiro, ‘Premiums 
for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations’ (1983) 98 Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 659; C 
Shapiro, ‘Consumer Information, Produet Quality and Seller Reputation’ (1982) 13 Bell Journal o f  
Economies and Management Science 20
Ireland (n 80) 195-197 (discussing the use and limitations o f  warranties as tools to overcome problems o f  
information asymmetries)
245
the producers would not have any incentive to incur costs to improve the credence 
attribute of a product. When the really important attribute of a product cannot be verified 
before and after consumption, consumers tend to make a decision taking the search and 
experience attributes as a proxy. Reporting on a study that investigates consumers’ views 
of the role of quality in the market for domestic appliances, Asch and Wolfe reported:
Physical appearance was very highly correlated with perceived quality. This is 
somewhat surprising given that the product under study are all experience products, 
and one would expect that only a limited amount of quality-related information 
could be gleaned by merely inspecting the product. Consumers, obviously, think 
otherwise. *
This finding has an important implication. If consumers take physical appearance which 
is a search attribute as a proxy for experience attributes or search and experience 
attributes as a proxy for credence attributes, producers would have an incentive to spend 
greater amount of resources into perfecting the search and experience attributes than 
would have been optimal.
There is a strong case for regulation of quality when there is a great deal of information 
asymmetry with respect to the credence attributes of a product or service. This is the main 
public interest explanation for quality (safety) regulation and consumer protection even in 
markets where there is a great deal of competition. This argument applies in a range of 
markets. The same line of reasoning is adopted to justify, for example, regulation of the 
quality of services provided by higher education institutions. The quality of a higher 
education may be evaluated using three benchmarks: provenance of the degree awarded, 
quality of tuition, and construction of the course. These are all dimensions which are 
difficult to be ascertained and assessed ex ante.*^ In such cases, considering that higher 
education is often a one-off purchase and that reputations are not protected by property 
rights, reputation alone would not solve the problem. Similarly, warranties are fraught 
with moral hazard problems underscoring the need for regulating quality.^®
Asch and Wolfe (n 83) 31
M Cave, R Dodsworth, and D Thompson, ‘Regulatory Reform in Higher Education in the UK: Incentives 
for Efficiency and Product Quality’ in M Bishop, J Kay and C Mayer (eds). The Regulatory Challenge 
(1995)108
Ibid 108-109
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6.31.3. Competition among SIPS Results in Deterioration of 
Quality
Coming to the market for the supply of water services, in particular the market for the 
supply of drinking water, the fact that it is a natural monopoly justifies regulation of not 
only price but also quality. Regulation of the quality of drinking water is also required 
even when the market is characterised by competition. In other words, competition 
among water service providers does not necessarily result in improved (safe) drinking 
water. On the contrary, considering the fact that the most relevant safety attributes of 
drinking water are credence attributes, that they cannot be confirmed even after purchase 
and consumption, one might reasonably expect a ‘lemon’ market (or literally a market of 
dangerous waters).
SIPs operate in competition with one another. Competition in this respect has two 
aspects: price and quality. Price competition involves lowering the price which is a good 
thing for consumers. Competition on quality of water should encourage them to improve 
the quality of water. The quality of water can be improved by raising the price of water as 
doing so requires investments in the treatment of water and protection of sources from 
contaminants. The advantage is that by improving water quality (assuming the price of 
alternatives is constant) one could expect to get additional customers if the improved 
quality is appreciable and the increased price because of the improved quality does not 
exceed what customers are willing to pay. Willingness to pay of customers depends on 
whether they can tell, by simple inspection of water for the improvement of which the 
provider has invested a certain amount, whether or not the provider’s claim about quality 
is true. Consumers are expected to be willing to pay a certain premium which 
corresponds to the improved quality as observed by colour, taste or odour. The 
consequence of this is that SIPs, even in cases of competition among themselves on 
quality, are expected to invest only in improving the colour, odour and taste of water they 
are selling.
This has four potential consequences. First, there will not be real and effective 
investments in enhancing and treating or care in maintaining the chemical and 
microbiological quality of water. Second, there will be inefficient investment in 
improving the physical quality of the water: flavouring and dying it in different colours 
and tastes. Third, in worst cases, they would resort to measures that would degrade the 
chemical and microbiological quality of the water while making it smell, taste and look 
better. Fourth, even the optimal level of investment for enhancing the physical quality of
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water is not guaranteed as the price of competitors does not necessarily remain constant. 
When one provider invests that level of effort and capital on physical attributes of its 
water that the consumers are willing to pay in the form of increased price, the other 
providers would lower their price making sure that the difference is high enough to 
influence customers to choose theirs. Even if one has invested optimal amount of effort 
and resources to improve the physical attributes of the water and even if that is 
appreciated by customers, the difference between the resulting price and that of 
competitors would no more correspond to what customers are willing to pay.
It should be emphasised that the problem emanates because of the difficulty of 
determining the quality of water. The physical qualities such as taste, odour and colour 
are its search attributes. The chemical and microbiological qualities of water are its 
experience or credence attributes. As far as safety of drinking water is concerned, the 
most important are its microbiological and chemical qualities.®* However, consumers will 
not be able to easily determine whether a given water is safe chemically and 
microbiologically.®^ As a result they would rely on its physical attributes as proxies and 
that has undesirable consequences. That consumers would routinely use physical 
attributes of drinking water as proxies for its microbiological and chemical attributes is 
also confirmed in some surveys measuring consumers’ perception of safety.®*
It might be contended that insufficient information by itself is not important since the 
market will be able to correct this by itself. For example, in frequently purchased 
products and services information asymmetry with respect to its experience attribute is 
not a problem as the buyer would soon ascertain if the product possesses the requisite 
experience attribute and would punish or reward the seller depending on the outcome.
Cowan (n 16) 19
Kessides (n 13) 227; C Hood, H Rothstein and R Baldwin, Government o f  Risk: Understanding Risk 
Regulation Regimes (2001) 80 (speaking o f  pesticides residues in drinking water: “ ...pesticide residues in 
food and water are.. .hard to detect by taste or sm ell.. .the costs to individuals o f  testing water for pesticides 
residuals are substantial. At the time o f  writing it costs about £250 in the UK to have a single water sample 
tested for this purpose. Even if  a well-functioning market were to reduce such costs, individuals concerned 
about pesticide residuals would need to have their water tested regularly.. .with weekly testing running at 
around £13,000 a year at current price levels”.)
NF Gray, Drinking Water Quality: Problems and Solutions (2008) 454-456 (discussing Ofwat surveys o f  
consumer satisfaction with the quality o f  tap water. Gray states that “the public perception o f  drinking 
water is largely based on the physical characteristics o f  their own water supply, rather than its quality in 
relation to the prescribed standards”).
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The problem as far as safety of water is concerned is that even if it is a frequently 
purchased product, the real attributes that matter from health perspective are also 
credence attributes and hence the market would not self-correct in the above sense.
The problem is further exacerbated regarding customers of mobile vendors. The link 
between the producer and consumer of water is disconnected. As a result, customers will 
not be able to make decisions on the basis of source of water and physical characteristics 
of the source (well or utility). Such conditions make it profitable for mobile vendors to 
buy water from cheaper sources and pass it as safe and expensive water. From the survey 
of the water in the case study areas (particularly in Kisumu) (see the appendix), it is clear 
that mobile vendors buy their water at a reduced rate variable depending on the source 
(utility, well, standpipes). But the amount which the final customer pays to mobile 
vendors does not depend on the source. And considering that well water is sold to mobile 
vendors at cheaper rate than utility water, a profit maximising mobile vendor will have a 
strong incentive to cheat.
6.3.1.4. Regulation to Correct Externalities
The efficiency-based public interest case for regulating the quality of water provided by 
SIPs is also supported by the spill-over effects of consuming unsafe water.®"* Water borne 
diseases impose significant costs on the public health system and the general economy.®® 
That means the effect is not restricted to the person who has consumed unsafe water. This 
strengthens the public interest case for control. The public health implications of the 
safety of water has in certain cases resulted in court orders requiring connection to a 
public water supply even when the individual concerned does not want it. Cooper and 
Howsam discuss one American case in this connection:
...the public health argument...can also be used conversely to enforce connection 
to the mains water supply against a citizen’s will. This is shown in the US case of 
Stern v Halligan...ihQ Stems were refusing a legally enforced connection to the 
newly available mains water supply as they had privately owned well water of 
‘pure’ quality and were not happy to have to pay for a service they felt they did not 
need. To win their case they needed to prove the ‘irrationality’ of the law. They
R Franceys and E Gerlach, ‘Economic Regulation’ in R Franceys and E Geralch (eds). Regulating Water 
and Sanitation fo r  the Poor: Economic Regulation fo r  Public and Private Partnerships (2008) 21 and 
Kessides (n 13) 224
See section 1.1
249
could not do this because it was argued that law, while not always being popular 
with all citizens, is made to protect the health, safety and general welfare of all 
inhabitants, and this is done in the public interest. On the other hand, ‘private wells 
can be unsafe for a disturbingly long list of reasons’. Potential harm was considered 
to provide ample justification for government action that would safeguard its 
citizens. It was further concluded that ‘because pure water is a precondition for 
human health, regulating the water supply is a basic and legitimate governmental 
act.^ ^
But not least, there are also equity concerns surrounding the safety of drinking water. 
Poor households, as the largest category of SIPs customers, are also the primary victims 
of the adverse health ramifications. In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that there is a 
strong prima facie public interest case for control of SIPs with a view to ensuring the 
safety of water they are providing.
6.3.1.5. Failure of Private Law
Market failures such as information asymmetries and externalities are strong grounds for 
regulation when they are accompanied by private law failures.^^ The relevant private law 
in the case of water resulting in adverse health effects is tort law. If  tort law works 
perfectly, one would expect that the threat of being liable to pay damages provides 
adequate incentives to providers with respect to the quality of water.^^ However, tort law 
does not always work perfectly. Drawing on Shavell’s discussion of the relationship 
between tort law and regulation, some limitations of tort law could be identified.^^ Tort 
law is not adequate when potential defendants are not able to pay in full the damage they 
are made liable to pay.^^° In this regard, the relative size of the asset of the defendant 
compared to the probable magnitude of harm is i m p o r t a n t . I n  the case of SIPs, their 
assets, compared to the public health risk they pose, are negligible and hence tort law
M Cooper and P Howsam, ‘Right to Water? A Northern Ireland Case Explored’ (2007) 18 Journal o f  
Water Law 122, 124
A Ogus, ‘Regulatory Institutions and Structures’ (2002) 73 Annals o f  Public and Cooperative Economics 
627
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (n 92)
^  S Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation o f  Safety’ (1984) 13 Journal o f  Legal Studies 357 
Ibid 360-362 
Ibid 360-362
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cannot provide adequate incentives. In addition, difficulties of proving causation and 
identifying the particular SIP responsible for the harm would dull the deterrent edge of 
tort law.^°^
6.3.2. Quality of Water by SIPs
A water quality analysis, carried out in the case study areas (see the appendix), confirms 
the prima facie case of regulation. This analysis covers both the microbiological and 
chemical qualities of water samples taken along the water supply chain to determine if 
there is a deterioration of water quality as it passes from the source to the final customer. 
The samples were tested for presence of thermotolerant coliforms as indicators of faecal 
contamination and hygiene. In addition, nitrates and fluoride content of groundwater 
sources were determined. The following is a discussion of the results of the water quality 
study done in the case study areas.
6.3.2.1. Microbiological Status
The standards for microbiological quality of drinking water in Ethiopia and Kenya are 
similar to what is provided in WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality. This is a 
zero presence of coliforms in a 100ml sample of drinking water and < 50 cfu/lOOml for 
untreated community water sources. There is a suggested relaxed guideline value of < 10 
cfu/lOOml for piped water which cannot meet the current high standard for piped water. 
Seventy four percent of all samples (from various sources) analysed for thermotolerant 
coliforms were positive for thermotolerant coliforms. Overall more samples fi'om Kisumu 
were positive for thermotolerant coliforms than in Addis Ababa as summarised in Table
1. Piped water collected from public water taps/standpipes had better microbiological
Ibid 363 and Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (n 92) 80 (“A contract or tort law solution to the problem is 
likely to be difficult, given that harm may be incurred through cumulative long term exposure as well as 
sudden acute exposure. A tort-law solution would require individuals, or their bereaved relatives, to sue 
food or water companies for exposure over decades... In the present state o f  scientific knowledge, the cost 
o f such a tort-law solution appears substantial, in overcoming evidential hurdles, establishing causation, 
and resolving uncertainties in the law in the absence o f  any regulatory standard”.)
This part o f  the thesis is based on the water quality study done by Ms Loma Okotto and published as a 
working paper; see Ayalew and others (n 66)
WHO, Guidelines fo r  Drinking-water Quality: Third Edition Incorporating the First and Second 
Addenda Volume 1 Recommendations (2008)
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quality than other sources. However, compliance rate was higher in Addis Ababa (80%) 
than in Kisumu (73.9%) but the difference was not statistically significant.
Table 6.3: Summary of samples taken for microbiological analysis and results of 
thermotolerant coliforms presence^
WATER SOURCES NO POSITIVE TTC DETECTS (%)
Combine
d
Kisumu Addis Ababa
All samples 414 73.7 84 40.2
Tap (standpipes/house 
taps)
81 23.5 26.1 20
Well 98 96.9 96.9 100*
Handcart container 39 69.2 69.2 -
Household storage 184 86.4 100 51.9
Borehole 6 66.7 50 50
Tanker 3 0 0 0
Spring 4 50 - 50
* There was only one well sample from Addis Ababa.
Although samples from boreholes from both cities were few, the majority complied with 
the relaxed guideline value for piped and untreated community water sources. There were 
few samples from tanker trucks, borehole and springs. No sample from tanker trucks had 
thermotolerant coliforms. Levels of thermotolerant coliforms contamination in samples 
from springs and borehole were low. All samples from households in Kisumu had 
presence of thermotolerant coliforms compared to 51.9% for Addis Ababa. The levels of 
thermotolerant coliforms were much higher in Kisumu and significantly different from 
Addis Ababa. In Kisumu, water obtained from wells and stored in the house had 
significantly higher levels of thermotolerant coliforms than tap water stored in the house. 
This suggests the impact of source quality. Household water quality was significantly 
different from well and handcart.
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6.3.2.2. Quality across the Supply Chain
Results of water quality analysis of samples taken from different points in the water 
supply chain indicate that no significant contamination occurs when water is transported 
by mobile vendors. This suggests that handcarts are able to maintain relatively good 
water quality up to the point of delivery. This could be due to the short time taken to 
collect and transport water to customers or good hygiene practices. However, this may 
not be the case always. Deterioration in quality for tap water occurred within the 
household. Comparison of the source water and water stored in the house shows that 
deterioration in water quality can occur during storage. Poor hygiene practices related to 
water transport and/or storage can lead to good quality source water becoming 
contaminated at the household level.
6.3.2.3. Chemical Quality
The failure rate with respect to nitrates and fluoride levels was lower than for 
thermotolerant coliforms. For fluoride, the standard value for Kenya is 1.5 mg/1. 
Ethiopia’s standards provide for a value 3.0 mg/1. Fluoride concentration in the samples 
analysed range from less than 0.5 mg/1 to 13 mg/1. Kisumu had higher concentrations 
which reach 13 mg/1. Samples from Addis Ababa had very low concentrations. All the 
samples from Addis Ababa and the majority from Kisumu (71.5%) were within the 
recommended guideline value for fluoride (< 1.5mg/l). For Addis Ababa all the samples 
were, therefore, also within the maximum limit set in the national standard.
The WHO guideline value for nitrate is 50 mg/1 as NO3 (11.3 mg/1 for nitrate as Nitrogen 
NO3-N). This is the value adopted by Ethiopia. But Kenya’s standard provides for a 
maximum of 10 mg/1. Nitrate concentrations (Nitrate as Nitrogen NO3-N) for the water 
samples analysed range from <0.1 mg/1 up to 45 mg/1. Kisumu had the highest 
concentrations reaching up to 45 mg/1. Samples from Addis Ababa had very low 
concentrations. Overall the majority of the samples (71.1%) in Kisumu and all the 
samples from Addis Ababa were within the WHO guideline. The majority (62.7%) of 
samples from Kisumu were also within the Kenya standard of <10 mg/1.
6.3.3. Conclusion
Those attributes determining the safety of water, the chemical and bacteriological 
parameters, cannot be verified before consumption by simple physical examination. In
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such cases, there is no incentive for each provider to invest in quality enhancing or 
maintaining measures as the cost cannot be reflected in prices. This is also supported by 
the empirical finding with respect to the quality of drinking water in the case study areas. 
It is found that the quality of water from sources other than the official provider in 
Kisumu, mainly wells, are unsatisfactory. Well-owners allege that they invest in 
technologies of water treatment. This is not verifiable nor is there a guarantee that such 
technologies are consistently used. In addition, from conversation with standpipe 
operators in Kisumu, it is clear that some mobile vendors source their water from wells 
and market it as if it was from standpipes. The standpipe operators are obviously alarmed 
because they are losing their competitive advantage. But this point, most importantly, 
underscores the inability of consumers to discriminate between mobile vendors based on 
the quality of water.
There is no significant water quality problem introduced during transportation of water. 
This concerns mobile water vendors. This might be explained by the short period of time 
for which the water is transported. But most importantly it might have to do with the fact 
that mobile water vendors take measures that would maintain the quality of their water 
(washing of their jerrycans): the purpose is to market their water rather than being 
genuinely concerned with the safety of the water. Such mobile vendors cannot afford to 
ignore the cleanness of their jerrycans as it can easily be picked up by potential buyers.
Safety of water is not purely a matter of private affair. It has also public implications. 
Supply of unsafe water imposes external costs on others in the form of water borne 
contagious diseases and the costs the tax payer incurs for maintaining and financing the 
public health system.
Regarding Addis Ababa, there is no significant water quality problem which can be 
attributed to the way SIPs operate mainly because most of the water is eventually traced 
back to the official utility. Most problems of water contamination usually occur during 
storage which by itself is not a case for regulation of SIPs.
Representatives o f  the well-owners alleged that during the stakeholders conference in May 2009 
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6.4. Regulation of Competition
Competition is identified as one of the things which should form the object of any 
regulatory regime extending to SIPs/^^ The concern in particular is the possibility or 
apparent observation of cartels (concerted practices) among such providers. It is argued 
in this section that the nature of the market is such that there is no real reason for 
proactive enforcement of competition law. Note the emphasis. In the literature, the 
issue of competition is phrased in terms of whether or not to regulate competition among 
SIPs (whether or not to have competition law extending to SIPs), largely the argument 
being in the affirmative. What should be remarked is that competition law is not like 
economic regulation which is different from one sector to another. There is no general 
economic regulation. The price of drinking water from conventional utilities is regulated 
but not the price of bottled water. There is one economic regulator for water utilities and 
there is often another for railways. Competition is not like that. If there is competition 
law in a given legal system, it extends to all sectors of the economy unless some are 
specifically exempted for different reasons. And there will be one regulatory agency 
entrusted with its enforcement, though sometimes this agency might have to work with 
specific economic regulators.'®^
Both Ethiopia and Kenya have competition laws and policies. Like competition laws of 
other countries, Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s are also applicable to the whole economy. 
Kenya’s competition law applies to all sectors and economic units (whether state or 
private owned) unless a given sector or enterprise is exempted or differently regulated.'®^ 
The same observation applies to the case of Ethiopia. According to Article 4 of the Trade 
Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation, the law applies to every sector and 
every legal and physical person except “the sovereign act of the state which is exclusive 
of public enterprises; basic utilities; basic goods and services subject to decision of the 
Council of Ministers to price regulation; and collective agreements applying to employer 
and employee relationships”.'®^  What is notable is the exclusion of basic utilities defined
See Section 2.5.6
In England and Wales, for example, the Competition Commission works with the Office o f  Fair Dealing 
and the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) to ensure that regulated water utilities comply with 
the requirements o f  competition law.
Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act 1988 ss 73 and 5
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation 2010
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by the same law as “utilities such as water, electricity, telephone and the like”."® It might 
be argued that SIPs are not utilities in the conventional sense of the term because of their 
different way of doing business. Compared to its Kenyan counterpart, the scope of the 
Ethiopian law is narrower particularly regarding state enterprises.
If therefore Kenya and Ethiopia have general competition laws, the issue is not whether 
there should be competition law for SIPs. The issues are, first, whether the competition 
law as it exists in Ethiopia and Kenya is sufficient to prevent anticompetitive behaviour 
in the small-scale water supply market and second whether such law as it exists should be 
proactively enforced with respect to SIPs. And related to this is a question as to additional 
measures that could be taken to minimise the ramifications of any probable anti­
competitive behaviour.
The starting point in the discussion of competition law and policy is its purpose. 
Competition law is concerned with an attempt to bring the real world markets closer to 
the ideal model of perfect competition. The ideally and perfectly competitive market has 
a number of characteristics:
(a) All market shares are small. No supplier enjoys a share of the market which is 
large enough to enable him to influence the price of that category of product.
(b) No collusion. Each supplier acts independently.
(c) No harriers to entry. There is nothing to prevent any new supplier from entering 
the market for any category of product.
(d) Homogeneity o f product. All suppliers of each category of product are known by 
all buyers to supply identical products.'"
Competition policy sets in motion whenever the real market departs a great deal from the 
four conditions stated above. Parts of competition law on abuse of dominant position and 
prevention of mergers and acquisitions are concerned with failure of condition (a) and 
condition (c). When an entity has significant market share and there are entry barriers, it 
is said to have dominant position and competition law prevents this entity from abusing 
its dominant position by prohibiting predatory pricing, tying up distribution networks to 
exclude competitors from the market, denying competitors access to essential facilities.
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation 2010 Art 2(2)
*** N  Gardner, Guide to United Kingdom and European Union Competition Policy  (2000) 4
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tying up products and price discrimination, among others. Having a significant share in a 
market, characterised by significant entry and exit barriers, on itself is not illegal. Nor are 
pricing below cost, tying up products and refusal to deal illegal. What is illegal is the 
combination. And competition law ensures that they are not combined in a way that 
significantly limits competition. The Kenyan law on this matter is concerned with 
prevention of ‘unwarranted concentration of economic power’. The Minister of Finance 
is directed by law to particularly observe certain concentration of power and deal with 
them when they are considered unwarranted. Such instances include cases where a person 
controls distributing units the value of which exceeds one-third of the relevant market; or 
where a person controls two or more manufacturing units which together supply more 
than one third of the domestic market; or a person has a benefit interest exceeding twenty 
percent in one manufacturing (or distributing) units and at the same time has an interest 
in another distributing (or manufacturing) unit. Such concentration of economic power is 
deemed unwarranted if it results in ‘unreasonable increase’ in the cost of production or 
distribution; or in the price of goods or services; or in profits from production or 
distribution; or in the deterioration of the quality of products and services. Article 5 of the 
Ethiopian law provides a general prohibition: “No businessperson, either by himself or 
acting together with others, may carry on commercial activity openly or dubiously 
abusing the dominant position he has in the market”. Article 8  provides a list of practices 
which might constitute abuse of dominant position and they include predatory pricing, 
product tying, and price discrimination.
The market where SIPs operate is such that no SIP has a dominant position. There are a 
number of wells, boreholes and standpipes in the city of Kisumu. There are many kiosks 
and neighbour sellers. There are many more mobile water vendors. No single SIP has 
significant ‘market power’ which can be considered ‘unwarranted concentration of 
economic power’ in the case of Kenya and ‘dominant position’ in the case of Ethiopia."^ 
In addition, owing to the fact that there are no significant natural entry and exit barriers, 
no single SIP may unilaterally manipulate price and other aspects of the market. 
Therefore, there is no place for that part of competition law on abuse of dominant 
position to be applied here.
According to Article 6 o f  the Ethiopian competition law a person is deemed to have a dominant position 
“if  he has the actual capacity to control prices or eliminate or utterly restrain competition in the relevant 
market”. And pursuant to Article 7, the person’s market share and his capacity to set entry barriers will be 
taken into account in the determination o f  dominant position.
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However, there are two points that should be noted here. First, if the market is defined in 
such a way as to include the official utilities in the case study areas, the official utilities 
emerge as having dominant position."^ In such cases, therefore, the law should rightly be 
concerned with the competitive effects of the behaviour of the official utility. The utility 
should not refuse to deal with SIPs. It should not be involved in predatory pricing.
Second, the competitive nature of the small-scale water market could further be improved 
by exploring and eliminating any artificial entry barriers. It should be noted here that in 
some cases licensing and registration requirements might constitute entry barriers. This 
point is further examined in the next chapter.
Parts of competition law on cartel are concerned with failure of condition (c). Cartels are 
anticompetitive. Cartels exist “where two or more firms agree among themselves to fix 
prices, limit production, divide markets up geographically or rig bids when tendering for 
government contracts”." '' To the extent they are likely to occur, the state should try to 
prevent them. Article 11 of the Ethiopian law provides the general prohibition: “An 
agreement between or concerted practices by businesspersons or a decision by an 
association of businesspersons is prohibited if it has the object or effect of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition”. Article 13 provides an exhaustive list of agreements 
which are categorically prohibited and for which no defence is recognised. One of such 
agreements is that which fixes prices or allocates markets geographically. Section 3 of the 
Kenyan law provides an ambiguous prohibition of ‘acts that eliminate opportunities in the 
market’. Section 6  provides a list of such acts and these include cartels, resale price 
maintenance and so on.
The problem with the prevention of cartels is their secrecy and the resulting problem of 
proof. And fortunately they are inherently unstable and hence in most cases they will 
crumble soon or will not be formed in the first place. Game theoretic analysis suggests
This is o f  course without losing sight o f  the rule that excludes AAW SA from the scope o f  the 
competition law
S Joekes and P Evans, Competition and Development: The Power o f  Competitive Markets (2008) 6
The pioneering work on the stability o f  cartels is: GJ Stigler, ‘A Theory o f  Oligopoly’ (1964) 72 Journal 
o f Political Economy 44.
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that there is significant incentive for one member of a cartel to cheat and that frustrates 
sustaining the agreement."^ This does not mean that they never materialise. In the words 
of Adam Smith, “people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices”."^ In some cases, cartels may be formed and sustained. A 
proper use of enforcement resources is to identify such circumstances and to focus on 
them."^ The question is therefore whether the small-scale water market is one of such 
cases where cartel can probably be formed and sustained.
Since there is a strong incentive to cheat, the stability of a cartel depends on a number of 
factors. The first factor is the ease with which the other members can monitor 
compliance. This might involve monitoring the prices of transactions and the level of 
output by a given member. The second factor is the ease with which any member who 
departs from the common agreement can be punished. Considering that cartels are illegal, 
the members could not rely on the legal procedure for enforcement of transactions. They 
have to, therefore, find extra legal ways of punishing cheaters. This might require the 
other members to sell below cost to drive the cheater out of the market. Or it might 
involve enlisting the assistance of the local mafia. The third factor is the extent of entry 
barriers. This is because if a cartel becomes successful and the members start to reap 
rents, it might easily attract new entrants which would eventually dissipate the rent.
Considering these factors, it is argued here that the nature of the small-scale water supply 
market is such that no successful cartel can be sustained unless the members somehow 
manage to enlist the assistance of the state. This is for the following reasons. Monitoring 
possible cartel agreements will be very difficult. Let us take the possibility well owners in 
Kisumu having managed to come to an agreement to cooperate and fix prices. Well 
owners have two kinds of customers: individual households and mobile water vendors. 
How can the members of the agreement make sure that each well owner is selling water 
at the prescribed price and no less? The amount paid by a household or mobile vendor for 
a unit of water is not recorded. It is private to the well owner and the household or the 
mobile vendor. An agreement to divide the market geographically is not also possible as
KN Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (2003) 68-69 
A Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations (1864) 54 
Hylton ( n i l  6) 69
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the business model is such that water is transported by mobile-vendors long distance. If 
households were the only customers of well owners, it might be possible to monitor if a 
given well is serving only those households that it is supposed to serve. It is even more 
difficult to monitor any cartel agreement between mobile vendors. One mobile vendor 
could suspect that someone else is cheating when all of a sudden a few of his regular 
customers have stopped buying from him. But how can he identify the cheater among 
several mobile vendors.
Even if the challenge of monitoring is to be overcome, the other challenge is that of 
punishing cheaters. Once the cheater is identified, it has to be punished. The agreement 
must be enforced. The problem again here is the inability to use contract law. They have 
to engage in predatory pricing, for example. Who will be willing to sell below cost with 
the purpose of only punishing the cheater? Predatory pricing requires excess capacity to 
absorb temporary losses, which does not exist in the small-scale water market. Another 
sanction is to deny the cheater a source of water. This is particularly the case when there 
is a cartel among mobile vendors but it requires the assistance of well owners and the 
official utility to refuse to sell water to a particular mobile vendor. Again it is highly 
unlikely.
The third factor is the ease of entry. There is no significant entry barrier, all it requires is 
to sink a well or buy dozen of jerry cans and a cart. That means that if any cartel is 
formed and the members start to earn extra-competitive rent, it will attract new entrants 
which would eventually dissipate the rent. For these reasons therefore it might be argued 
that cartel among SIPs is not a probable outcome and does not deserve sustained focus of 
the competition authorities.
But the configuration could easily shift if there is an association of SIPs and this 
association is government supported."^ In the case of Kisumu, there exists an association
Smith (n 117) 54 (warning any attempt by the state to facilitate meeting o f  people o f  the same trade: “It 
is impossible, indeed, to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people o f  the same trade from 
sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render 
them necessary. A regulation which obliges all o f  those o f  the same trade in a particular town to enter their 
names and places o f  abode in a public register, facilitates such assemblies. It connects individuals who 
might never otherwise be known to one another, and gives every man o f  the trade a direction where to find 
every other man o f  it. A regulation which enables those o f  the same trade to tax themselves, in order to 
provide for their poor, their sicks, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage, 
renders such assemblies necessary”); B Collignon and M Vezina, Independent Water and Sanitation
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of well-owners. This association could be used as cartel enforcing machinery. At the 
same time, the association could be used for beneficial purposes. The next chapter 
explores how structural measures could be introduced to harness the potential of 
association of SIPs by preventing the formation of sustainable cartels.
6.4. The Regulatory Implications of the Right to Water
6.4.1. Introduction
Individuals in Ethiopia and Kenya have the right to water which is generally based on the 
national constitutions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)'^®, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)'^' as interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR).'^^ The relevant interpretations of the CESCR are contained in General 
Comment No. 15 on the right to w a t e r . T h e r e  are also other international human rights 
instruments specifically dealing with the right to water, albeit with respect to specified 
groups, women and children.'^'' Whether the right to water is a derivative or stand-alone
Providers in Africa Cities: Full Report o f  a Ten-Country Study (2000) 41 (discussing how government 
interference could facilitate formation o f  sustainable cartels in the small-scale water supply market)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) consists o f  independent experts who 
monitor the implementation o f  ICESCR by States Parties. The covenant entrusts the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with the task o f  monitoring its implementation by States Parties. 
The council in turn delegated this mandate to CESCR under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 o f  28 May 
1985. The committee examines periodical reports submitted by States Parties and makes recommendations 
to the reporting State Party. In addition, the committee also published its interpretation o f  the provisions o f  
the covenant. These are knows as general comments. It should be noted that although general comments 
‘are not binding per se, because the Committee has no authority to establish new obligations under the 
ICESCR, it is argued that General Comments provide a critical mechanism for developing a normative and 
contextual ized understanding o f  the provisions o f  the ICESCR’: SMA. Salman and S Mclnemey-Lankford, 
The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy Dimensions (2004)
CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The right to water’ (26 November 2002) E/C. 12/2002/11.
See Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Discrimination against Women (adopted on 18 
December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW) and Convention on 
the Rights o f  the Child (adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990) 1577 
UNTS 3 (CRC).
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right is debatable.'^^ The extent of entitlement it confers on individuals and the extent to 
which it is justiciable are also fraught with controversies. However, at a minimum, 
according to CESCR, it requires the government to establish a regulatory framework that 
has the objective, among others, of ensuring that water services provided by third parties 
such as SIPs are safe and affordable. Therefore, the right to water requires governments 
in Ethiopia and Kenya to set up a legal framework for the regulation of SIPs and such 
duty to regulate arises when there is a need to regulate. The extent of the need to regulate 
SIPs has already been discussed and the right to water transforms this need into a legal 
obligation. What is more, it is argued here that, regulating any aspect of the activities of 
SIPs when there is no public interest case for doing so might amount to violation of the 
right to water. The right to water has also implications in what way SIPs may be 
regulated. This section is structured as follows. First, the legal foundations of the right to 
water are presented. The next sub-sections present the normative content and regulatory 
implications of the right to water.
6.4.2. The Right to Water: Overview of International Legal Instruments
6.4.2.I. Express Right to Water in International Human Rights
The first human rights instrument to expressly mention water is C E D A W . A r t i c l e  
14(2) of this convention partly reads:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination in 
order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in 
and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women 
the right... [t]o enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation 
to...sanitation.. .and water supply...
The reason why water is given express recognition is the fact that collection of water 
imposes uneven burden on women, particularly rural women, in developing countries.
EB Bluemel (n 37) 963 (stating: “This human right to water can be recognized as a means to achieve 
other rights, such as the right to life or health. It can also be conceived as an independent human right. State 
obligations differ depending upon how a right to water is recognised under international law. Exactly how 
these obligations differ has yet to play out on the international scene, but the differing State obligations 
demanded by the various international legal instruments under which a right to water may be categorized 
counsels that policymakers should take caution before deciding under which regime to locate a right to 
water. Whether recognised as a subordinate right necessary to achieve other human, cultural, or economic 
rights or as an independent human right, recognising a right to water has far-reaching implications”.)
CEDAW (n 124)
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The conditions listed in Article 14 which State Parties are called up to ameliorate could 
also affect rural men; however, the effect on women is devastating.'^* The right to water 
in Article 14 should also be seen in connection with the right to health in Article 12. The 
Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women urged State 
Parties submitting periodical reports on the implementation of the Convention, in 
particular Article 12, to consider also the right to water in Article 15 as it is 
interconnected with the right to health.
The second and only other binding instrument of international human rights to explicitly 
state water is the CRC.'^® Considering the particular impact of poor water services on 
infant and child mortality'^'. Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
provides:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standards of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and 
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is 
deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, 
shall take appropriate measures: ...(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, 
including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the 
application of readily available technology and through the provision of 
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration 
the dangers and risks of environmental pollution;
Likewise, Article 14(2) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
specifically obliges States Parties “to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe 
drinking water”. I n  the CRC, water is mentioned in the context of the health of
J Scanlon, A  Cassar and N  Nernes. Water as a Human Rights (2004) 6
NK Hevener, ‘An Analysis o f  Gender Based Treaty Law: Contemporary Developments in Historical 
Perspective’ (1986) 8 Human Rights Quarterly 70, 75
CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24 (20* Session, 1994) [28] (available at:
httD://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm ')
CRC (n 124)
PB Anand, ‘Right to Water and Access to Water: An Assessment’ (2007) 19 Journal o f  International 
Development 511,516
See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o f  the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), 
entered into force Nov. 29, 1999.
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children and hence it is argued that “water quality rather than any other issue is 
emphasized”. I t  is, however, arguable despite the specific reference to water quality, 
other aspects of water like quantity and affordability are also important for health and 
hence included in the right.
Even if these two international human rights instruments explicitly mention water, they 
are flawed in many ways. First, it is argued that the two conventions are not 
comprehensive: “The CRC’s provision related only to certain aspect of water, that of 
quality (safety). The provision is also framed in relation to the right to health, rather than 
as an independent right to water”. S e c o n d ,  both of the instruments “offer too little 
clarification as to the normative content of the right to water and its correlative 
obligations”.'^^
6.4.2.2. Right to Water Implied into International Human Rights
The three instruments which together constitute the International Bill of Human rights, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'^®, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR do not 
contain any specific and explicit reference to the right to water. This does not, however, 
mean that the drafters have opted against recognising water as a human r i g h t . T h e  
failure of the draftsmen of the International Bill of Human Rights to explicitly recognise 
water as a right could be interpreted in two ways. First it could be the case that the 
drafters have considered water so fundamental that there is no need for explicit 
provision.'^* Or that they had not ‘realised that water was to be such a scarce resource in 
the future’, and the idea is to read the right to water implicitly into any of the explicitly 
recognised rights such as the right to life, health, to adequate standard of living or to life. 
Gleick argues that the International Bill of Rights contain rights which are less
Scanlon, Cassar andNemes (n 127) 6
A Cahill, “The Human Rights to Water— A Right o f  Unique Status’: The Legal Status and Normative 
Content o f  the Rights to Water’ (2005) 9 International Journal o f  Human Rights 389,391
Ibid
Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (adopted on 10 December 1948) General Assembly Resolution 
217 A(III) United Nations Document A/810, 71 (1948) (UDHR)
See generally PH Gleick, ‘The Human Right to Water’ (1998) 1 Water Policy 487
Ibid 491
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fundamental than water that it could not be the intention of the drafters to exclude right to 
water.
6.4.2.2.I. Right to Water Implied into the Right to Life
The textual bases for the right to life in the International Bill of Rights are Articles 3 and 
6  of the UDHR and the ICCPR respectively. Article 3 provides: “everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of the person”. Article 6(1) reads: “every human being has the 
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life”. The right to life is the most fundamental of all the rights: “All other 
rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for 
their operation”.''*® It is also “one of the more controversial rights, due to the inherent 
problems in defining its scope at the peripheries”.''"
There has been a noticeable shift in the scope of the right to life as understood in 
international human rights law. The initial understanding was that it merely imposes an 
obligation on the state not to arbitrarily and unlawfully take the life of individuals. In 
relation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dinstein argued:
The right to life, in effect, is the right to be safeguarded against (arbitrarily) killing. 
To be sure, homicide may be carried out through a variety of means, including 
starving someone, exposing a person to extreme temperature or contamination with 
disease. But, for example, the mere toleration of malnutrition by a State will not be 
regarded as a violation of the human right to life, whereas purposeful denial of 
access to food, e.g. to a prisoner, is a different matter. Failure to reduce infant 
mortality is not within Article 6 , while practising or tolerating infanticide would 
violate the article.''*^
A related restrictive view of the right to life as it is embodied in the European Convention 
of Human Rights is expressed by Fawcett:
139 Ibid
RKM Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (2010) 210; F Menghistu, ‘The Satisfaction o f  
Survival Requirements’ in BG Ramcharan (ed). The Right to Life in International Law  (1985) 63
Smith (n 140)210
Y Dinstein, ‘The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty’ in L Henkin (ed), The International Bill 
o f Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) 114.
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It might be argued, for example, that failure to impose speed limits on the roads, or 
to enact safety legislation for industrial work, engaged the responsibility of a 
contracting State under Article 2 for accidental deaths on the roads or in factories. 
But this argument ignores the fact that it is not life, but the right to life, which is to 
be protected by law. This is a legal concept which implies that no-one may be 
deprived of his life save on conditions prescribed by law, those conditions being 
further defined in the rest of Article so as to set limits on the taking of life by public 
authority, and to permit the State to declare killing in self-defence to be on certain 
conditions lawful. It could also reasonably be implied that the state must make the 
deliberate taking of life by individuals a punishable offence. But the failure to 
prosecute such offences cannot be made the ground of an individual application to 
the Commission.''*^
The earlier narrow interpretation of the right to life is based on the now obsolete 
distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and 
cultural rights on the other.*'*'* According to this old distinction, civil and political rights 
impose mainly negative obligations on states and hence are absolute and immediate. On 
the other hand, social and economic rights, when and if at all they are considered as legal 
rights, are considered to impose positive obligations with ‘significant budgetary 
implications’ and hence are subject to progressive realisation instead of immediate 
enforcement.*'*^ This distinction is “neither factually accurate nor true to the nature of
human rights”:
Both categories of rights require a combination of positive and negative state of 
conduct. Both categories include some rights that are more expensive to enforce 
than others. Human rights are interdependent, indivisible and symbiotic. Civil and 
political rights cannot be effectively protected without adequate enjoyment of basic 
social and economic entitlements.' ^
JES Fawcett, The Application o f  the European Convention on Human Rights (1987)
SC McCaffrey, ‘A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications’ (1992) 5 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 2, 9 (stating that “[t]here is thus a line o f  thought 
according to which Article 6 does not require the state to take affirmative actions to ensure that its citizens 
have access to adequate sustenance, but only obliges it to refrain from practicing or tolerating arbitrary 
deprivations o f  life. It would therefore be difficult to infer a right to water under this interpretation o f  
Article 6”.)
M Pieterse, ‘A Different Shade o f  Red: Socio-Economic Dimensions o f  the Right to Life in South 
Africa’ (1999) 15 South African Journal o f  Human Rights 372, 372; McCaffrey (n 144) 12-17; A Eide and 
A Rosas, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge’ in A Eide, C Krause and A 
Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2001) 4-5; P Alston and G Quinn, ‘The Nature 
and Scope o f  States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 159
Pieterse (n 145) 372; McCaffrey (n 144) 14-15 (stating that “one could well question the premise that 
the differential nature o f  the obligations under the two Covenants is justifiable on the ground that a
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In arguing against the narrow interpretation of the right to life which imposes merely 
negative obligations on states, Menghistu argues: "If deprivation of the lives of millions 
of people through lack of access to survival requirements is not a right to life issue, we 
can only say that the concept and notion of the right to life in its restricted and narrow 
sense does not apply to more than a billion people around the globe”.
Earlier proponents of the recognition of water as a human right attempted to present it as 
a right implied into the generally recognised right to life.*'** This is consistent with the 
recently accepted broader interpretation of the right to life: “The right to life was 
originally read narrowly and did not include basic life necessities. The right to life is now 
read more broadly to include the prevention of murder, war time atrocities and measures 
that increase life expectancy like personal health and hygiene”.*'*^  This is also consistent 
with General Comment No 6  on the right to life issued by the Human Rights Committee:
The right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression ‘inherent 
right to life’ cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner and the 
protection of this right requires that states adopt positive measures... it would be 
desirable for States Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality 
and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate 
malnutrition and epidemics.'^®
Scanlon, Cassar and Nemes argue that even disregarding the recent relatively liberal 
approach to the interpretation of the right to life, one could still argue that the right to 
water of a limited scope: “the protection against arbitrary and intentional denial of access
government’s obligations under the [ICCPR] are largely ‘negative’ ...w hile obligations under the [ICESCR] 
are ‘positive’ .... This premise, on examination, seems illusory. Susan Okin has pointed out that ‘liberty 
rights’ not only require the state to refrain from various types o f  activity, but also require ‘that the state 
undertake various types o f  activity, which are frequently complex and require much in the way o f  
expenditure’. As examples, she cited the establishment o f  police forces, judicial systems and prisons, all o f  
which ‘are necessary to maintain the highest achievable degree o f  security o f  these rights’. She points out 
that the protection these institutions provide is ‘enormously expensive and involves the maintenance o f  
complex bureaucratic systems’, yet even that protection is not always adequate.
Menghistu (n 140) 63
Scanlon, Cassar and Nemes (n 127) 18-19
149 HJ Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2000) 734
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6 on the right to life, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 /Rev. 1 (1994)
[5]
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to sufficient water, because this is one of the most fundamental resources necessary to 
sustain life”.'^' Bluemel argues that “the amount of water supported by [the right to life], 
however, ensures only the barest minimum quantity of affordable water—that necessary 
to support life—and therefore does not ensure water sufficient for personal consumption 
or even for all forms of hygiene. The right to life thus falls short of ensuring the amount 
of water necessary to effectuate the right to the highest attainable standard of health 
recognised by the International Bill of Rights”.
6.4.2.2.2. Right to Water Implied into the Right to Health and the 
Right to Adequate Standard of Living
The right to health is provided among others in Article 12 of the ICESCR:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and 
for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other disease;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medial service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.
Considering the importance of having access to adequate, safe and affordable water to the 
health of individuals, one could also argue on this basis that the right to health should 
include the right to water. Right to water implied into the right to health will have broader 
content than that implied into the right to life: “The right to health thus ensures not only 
access to clean and safe water to drink, but also water to assist in the disposal and cleanup 
of waste and the protection of existing bodies of water from contamination”.'^^
Article 25(1) of the UDHR also provides that “everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security
Scanlon, Cassar andNemes (n 127) 4 
Bluemel (n 37) 968-969 
Ibid 969
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in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control”.'^ '* Water is not expressly mentioned in 
this provision. However, a study of the debate preceding the declaration indicated that the 
list is not meant to be exhaustive but representative and hence water can be taken as one 
of the elements of this p ro v i s i o n . Th i s  seems obvious considering the fact that a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of a person and his family could 
not be realised without an adequate supply of water suitable for d r in k i ng . Th i s  right 
also ‘presumes an adequate supply of water to sustain agriculture to the extent necessary 
to feed a state’s popu l a t i onLi kewi se ,  Article 11 of the ICESCR is concerned with the 
right of individuals to an adequate standard of living. It partly reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent (emphasis added).
The use of the term ‘including’ in the above paragraph is taken to imply that the list is 
merely illustrative; it is not meant to exhaustively contain the elements essential for an 
adequate standard of living. On this basis, therefore, it is arguable that water should be 
read into this provision as it is an essential element for an adequate standard of living. 
Discussing Article 25 above, Scanlon, Cassar and Nemes, for example, argue:
One may wonder why ‘water’ was not incorporated in this formulation; perhaps 
water was considered to be implicitly included. The term ‘including’ shows that the 
component elements listed were not meant to form an all-inclusive list, but serve as 
an indication of certain factors essential for an adequate standard of living.
“As a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration is not binding per se. However, its most 
fundamental provisions are generally thought either to have passed into customary international law, or to 
constitute an authoritative interpretation o f  relevant U.N. Charter provisions, or both”. McCaffrey (n 144) 8
Gleick (n 137)488
McCaffrey (n 144) 8
Ibid. Gleick, on the other hand, argues that the right to food does not necessarily assume the right to 
water for production o f  food. Gleick (n 137) 491 (stating “An important distinction can be made between 
water for food and the much smaller amount o f  water required to support the health and well-being o f  
individuals. In particular, the food necessary to meet the rights described in Article 25 can be produced in 
distant locations and moved to the point o f  demand. It can this be argued that the provision o f  adequate 
food to satisfy Article 25 does not require local provision o f  water”.)
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Satisfying the standards of the Declaration cannot be done without water of 
sufficient quantity and quality to maintain human health and well being.
In one of the earliest publications on the right to water, McCaffrey takes it as “self- 
evident... that the right to an adequate standard of living defined in article 11 includes a 
supply of water that is at least adequate to meet basic human needs”.
It should be remarked that the CESCR has relied on the right to health and adequate 
standard of living enshrined in Articles 11 and 12 of ICESCR in formulating its General 
Comment on the right to water:
Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant specifies a number of rights emanating 
from, and indispensable for, the realization of the right to an adequate standard of 
living ‘including adequate food, clothing and housing’. The use of the word 
‘including’ indicates that this catalogue of rights was not intended to be exhaustive. 
The right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for 
securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most 
fundamental conditions for survival. Moreover, the Committee has previously 
recognized that water is a human right contained in article 11, paragraph 1, (see 
General Comment No. 6 (1995)). The right to water is also inextricably related to 
the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12, para. 1) and the rights to adequate 
housing and adequate food (art. 11, para. 1). The right should also be seen in 
conjunction with other rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, 
foremost amongst them the right to life and human dignity.'^®
From the foregoing discussion, it is now clear that the right to water is both an explicit 
and implied right; it is implied into the right to life, the right to health and the right to 
adequate standard of living. It is explicitly provided in relation to rural women and 
children. The international legal foundation of the right to water is further bolstered by 
explicit recognition in a body of declarations and resolutions known as ‘soft law’. 
Together, they provide a concrete foundation to the right.
Scanlon, Cassar andNemes (n 127) 2
McCaffrey (n 144) 11
CESCR (n 123) [3]
270
6.4.2.2.3. Right to Water in International ‘Soft Law’
In international law, declarations of conferences and resolutions are considered to be ‘soft 
law’.'^' Even if they are not strictly legally binding, they provide impetus to the 
development of not only treaty law but also customary law. Several declarations and 
resolutions have explicitly recognised the right to water. At the end of the 1977 Mar del 
Plata conference, the participants issued resolutions, among others, recognising that “all 
peoples, whatever their stage of development and their social and economic conditions, 
have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their 
basic needs”. T h i s  is considered as “the starting point for the debate on the right to 
water, and it has indeed provided the basis for the current discussion on the issue of 
human right to water”.
Another source of soft law worth noting is the Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development, a result of the 1992 International Conference on Water and 
The Environment held in Dublin. Principle 4 of this statement declares that “water has an 
economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an economic 
good”.'®'* It also underlined the importance of recognising “the basic right of all human 
beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price”. Agenda 21 of 
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development took it further by 
recognising that satisfaction of basic water needs should be given priority in the 
competing uses of water resources.'®®
Generally on ‘soft law’, see PM Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law o f  the Environment’ 
(1991) 12 Michigan Journal o f  International Law 420, 420-422 (discussing the underlying reasons for the 
emergence o f  soft law); H Hillgenberg, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’ (1999) 10 European Journal o f  
International Law 499 (arguing that to some extent non-treaty agreements and other sources o f  soft law are 
binding); J Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy o f  Soft Law’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal o f  International Law 167 
(arguing that the functions ascribed to soft law can be performed by the binary conception o f  law)
Report o f  the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata (March 14-25, 1997) No.E.77.II.A. 12
Salman and Mclnemey-Lankford (n 122)
ICWE, The Dublin Statement and Report o f  the Conference (International Conference on Water and the 
Environment, Dublin, 1992)
Chapter 18 o f  Agenda 21 deals with protection o f  the quality and supply o f  fresh water. It is available 
on: httD://www.un.org/esaMsd/agenda21/res-agend^i21-18.shtml
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Recently, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted (122 in favour and 41 
abstentions with no vote against) a resolution which recognised access to clean water and 
sanitation as human right.'®® By doing so, it acknowledged “that safe, clean drinking 
water and sanitation were integral to the realization of all human rights”.'®^  This 
resolution calls on “States and international organizations to provide financial resources, 
build capacity and transfer technology, particularly to developing countries, in scaling up 
efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for 
all”.'®* Ethiopia and Kenya abstained. Ethiopia’s representative, however, spoke of the 
natural right to water and abstained because the resolution does not contain any 
references to the sovereign rights of states to natural resources.'®^ It remains to be seen 
what impact this resolution is going to have in international human rights law. The 
Bolivian representative who introduced the resolution remarked that the right to water 
was not included in any of the existing international human rights instruments except 
CEDAW and CRC. This goes against General Comment 15 on the right to water. In this 
General Comment, the CESCR has located the right to water in Article 6 (right to life) of 
the ICCPR, Article 11 (right to adequate standard of living) and Article 12 (right to 
heath) of the ICESCR. The CESCR argued that these rights cannot be satisfied without 
adequate water for domestic and personal uses. Therefore it argued the right to water is 
implied into these rights. It considered the fact that the right to adequate standard of 
living uses the term ‘including’ which indicates that the list is illustrative. Another 
proponent of the right to water argued that these covenants contain rights less 
fundamental than the right to water and hence it could not possibly be the intention of the 
drafters to exclude the right to water from the scope of international human rights law. 
The question is: does the recent resolution further cement the foundation of right to water 
in international human rights or does it erode the ground which is already claimed by 
General Comment 15 and the arguments of many other proponents of the right?
The various sources of soft international law which make explicit mention of the right to 
water further bolster the implied and express legal bases of the right to water in
Sixty-Fourth General Assembly Plenary 108* Meeting,
http://w\v\v.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga 10967.doc.htm
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
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international human rights to law. The following section discusses the status of the right 
under the laws of Ethiopia and Kenya.
6.4.3. The Right to Water in Ethiopia and Kenya
6.4.3.I. The Right to Water under Ethiopian Law
The term ‘water’ is specifically used in Ethiopian Constitution in two places. The first is 
with respect to the powers of the federal government: that it has the power to administer 
water bodies connecting or crossing two or more states.'^® The second reference is to be 
found in the part of the Constitution which lists national objectives and policies. These 
are expected to guide the activities of govemments-federal, state and local: “any organ of 
government shall, in the implementation of the Constitution, other laws and policies, be 
guided by the principles and objectives specified under this Chapter”."'' One of the social 
objectives which are provided is in Article 90(1): “to the extent the country’s resources 
permit, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, 
clean water, housing, food and social security”.
Despite the fact that the constitution does not expressly recognise the right to water, it 
contains a number of provisions which imply the right to water. The constitution has a 
section which lists the fundamental rights of citizens. These rights are not merely civil 
and political rights but they also include a number of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Article 13 (1) prescribes “all federal and state legislative, executive and judicial organs at 
all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to respect and enforce’" (emphasis added) 
these rights and freedoms. This indicates that such rights and freedoms as recognised in 
the constitution impose not only negative but also positive obligations on government 
organs. This is consistent with the current thinking in international human rights as 
discussed in the previous sections. In addition. Article 13(2) stipulates that interpretation 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution has to conform to 
international human rights law and treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It must be noted that 
International human rights law is relevant not only as an interpretive tool but also as part
Proclamation o f  the Constitution o f  the Federal Democratic Republic o f  Ethiopia 1995 Year N o.l 
Federal Negarit Gazetta Art 51(11)
Ibid Art 85(1)
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of Ethiopian law. Article 9(4) recognises all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia 
as an integral part of the law of the land.
Article 14 states that “every person has the inviolable and inalienable right to life, the 
security of person and liberty”. This is further elaborated in Article 15: “every person has 
the right to life. No person may be deprived of his life except as a punishment for a 
serious criminal offence determined by law”. It should be remarked that with respect to 
this right governmental organs at all levels have the obligation to not only respect but 
also “enforce”. It is not clear if the term “enforce” includes positive obligations and if so 
what kind of positive obligations are included. This needs proper constitutional 
interpretation. And as one of the most fundamental rights in the Constitution, right to life 
is also to be interpreted in accordance with international human rights law. In this regard, 
therefore, one should take note of General Comment 6 and 14 on the right to life by the 
Human Rights Committee. Accordingly, therefore, governments at all levels have 
positive obligations with respect to the right to life.
Article 41 (3) also provides that “every Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to 
publicly funded social services”. The phrase ‘social services’ includes health, education 
and water. Therefore, it is arguable here that when water services are publicly funded, 
every national will have the right to equal access. This does not mean that publicly 
funded social services are ‘open access’ services. It is inevitable that rules will be 
adopted to determine who will have access to these services. However, no such rules 
should be discriminatory and against the rights of individuals to equality. Sub-article 4 
stipulates that “the state has the obligation to allocate ever increasing resources to provide 
to the public health, education and other social services’.
The constitution also contains provisions relating to the right to development. Article 
43(1) states: “the peoples of Ethiopia as a whole, and each nation, nationality and people 
in Ethiopia in particular have the right to improved living standards and to sustainable 
development”. The right to improved living standards discussed here is different from 
that contained in ICESCR in that it is provided as a group right. Hence it is an addition to 
those set of rights which might be implied into Ethiopia fi'om international human rights 
instruments. Article 44 also recognises the right of persons to ‘a clean and healthy 
environment’. This arguably includes the right to a clean and healthy water environment.
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6.4.3.2. The Right to Water under Kenyan Law
Kenya has adopted on the basis of a referendum a new Constitution.^^^ The Constitution 
makes a specific provision regarding the right to water: “every person has the right to 
clean and safe water in adequate quantities”. The state has the duties “to observe, 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the Constitution including the right to 
life.*^ "* With respect to social and economic rights of which the right to water is one, the 
state is obliged to “take legislative, policy and other measures to achieve the progressive 
realization of the rights”.^ ^^  The Constitution also directs the state to promulgate and 
implement laws necessary to fulfil its international human rights obligations.*^^
Individuals might bring actions to the High Court for the enforcement of any rights 
recognised in the Constitution and in appropriate cases will be entitled to remedies 
ranging from injunction to compensation.*^^ It might be possible for a state organ which 
is alleged to have breached the right to argue that no resource is available to implement 
the right. In such cases, however, the Constitution provides that the burden is on the state 
to prove that.*^* In addition, the state should “give priority to ensuring the widest possible 
enjoyment of the right or fundamental freedom having regard to prevailing circumstances 
including the vulnerability of particular groups or individuals”.*^  ^However, the court is 
not authorised to “interfere with a decision by a state organ concerning the allocation of 
available resources, solely on the basis that it would have reached a different 
conclusion”.*^**
See Section 4.3.1172
Constitution 2010 Art 43(l)(a) 
Ibid Art 21(1)
Ibid Art 21(2)
Ibid Art 21(4)
Ibid Art 23
Ibid Art 20(5)
Ibid Art 20(5)
Ibid A rts 20(5)
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In addition to the explicit recognition of the right to water, the new Kenyan Constitution 
also recognised other rights closely related to water. Article 26 provides for the right to 
life. Article 42 provides the right to persons to a clean and healthy environment. Article 
43(1) (a) and (b) deals with the right of persons to the “highest attainable standard of 
health” and “reasonable standards of sanitation”. Article 46(1) (c) stipulates that 
consumers have the right to “the protection of their health, safety, and economic 
interests”.
It should be noted that though it is the first time that the Constitution recognised the right, 
several documents and policies are used to locate the right before. One report provides: 
“The government of Kenya has formally recognised the human right to water and 
sanitation in its national strategies and policy documents”.*** The same report states that 
“the legal basis for the right to water in national Kenyan law is the Water Act of 2002”.**^  
This is an assertion which does not have any basis in the text of the Water Act. This 
report also states that the Water Services Regulatory Board is responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the requirements of the right to water. Again this is not supported by any 
of the provisions in the Water Act dealing with the powers and functions of the 
regulatory board. However, the National Water Services Strategy which was developed 
on the basis of the Water Act mentions access to safe and affordable water as a human 
right.**'
6.4.4. Content of the Right to Water: General Comment 15
It has to be noted that, though the two conventions, CEDAW and CRC, explicitly 
recognise the right to water and despite the possibility of reading the right to water into 
the International Bill of Rights, a problem still exists as to the content of the right to 
water and the corresponding state obligations. Determining the scope of this right is 
essential because as Gleick remarked “a right to water cannot imply a right to an 
unlimited amount of water”.**'* There has been a great deal of uncertainty until the 
publication of General Comment 15 which sets out the normative content of the right to
181 GY2, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation: Translating Theory into Practice (2009) 2 
Ibid 5
GOK, National Water Services Strategy (2007)
Gleick (n 137)
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water. The uncertainty is that depending on the express right (right to life, right to health, 
or right to adequate living standards) into which it is implied, the breadth and width of 
the right to water vary:
The quantity of water necessary to ensure each primary right and the obligations of 
States differ for each primary right. Because the right to water has traditionally only 
been recognized as subordinate to a primary human or socio-cultural right, the right 
to water has depended upon a violation of a particular primary right. The extent of 
the right to affordable water, and the ability to achieve this right, depend greatly 
upon which primary right is affected by a lack of access to affordable water. Since 
State obligations differ by primary right, a violation of one primary right does not 
necessarily mean that another primary right has been violated. This framework has 
resulted in a fragmented recognition of the right to water.**'
As it has already been discussed, the CESCR has based the right to water principally on 
the right to adequate standard of living and the right to health and secondarily on the right 
to life and other express rights. The General Comment provides that everyone is entitled 
to “sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal 
and domestic uses”.**' It further states that “an adequate amount of safe water is 
necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease 
and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic 
requirements”.**^
It is obvious that water has multiple uses. Some of these uses may conflict with the 
personal and domestic uses the right to water is said to include. What is more, water may 
also be required for realizing other rights such as the right to adequate food and the right 
to health (environmental hygiene). In such cases. General Comment 15 recognises the 
supremacy of water for personal and domestic uses.*** It also states that “priority should 
also be given to the water resources required to prevent starvation and disease, as well as 
water required to meet the core obligations of each of the Covenant rights”.**^  One of the 
limitations of the General Comment in this regard is its failure to clarify which elements
Bluemel (n 37) 968
CESCR (n 123) [2] 
Ibid [2]
Ibid [6]
Ibid
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of the right are the ‘core’ and which are ‘part of the scope of the right but not as 
essential’.*^** It should be pointed out that the General Comment provides for a list of core 
(minimum) obligations; what is not clear is if these minimum set of obligations 
correspond to the core content of the right.
The priority given to personal and domestic uses is said to contradict other uses such as 
cultural uses of water which are equally protected by international (human rights) law.*^ * 
The General Comment while recognising the priority of personal and domestic uses of 
water also states that “any national measures designed to realize the right to water should 
not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights”.*''^  Smith and Ross commented 
that this clause “could certainly create interpretational inconsistencies in international and 
national adjudication and litigation” as it will be difficult to implement the prioritised 
uses without stepping into other uses of water, even if protected by other human rights.*^'
In a further blow to the traditional distinction between liberty and positive rights, the 
right to water is said to contain freedoms and entitlements.* '^* One such freedom is “the 
right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to water, and the 
right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary 
disconnections or contaminations of water supplies”.* '^ In a previous section, a reference 
was made to an American case where a household was forced to get connection to the 
networks of a local water utility despite the fact that they insisted on using their own 
private well.*^' The question here is whether this might constitute a violation of the 
freedom which the right to water contains, the right to maintain existing sources of water 
supply. It is clear from the above statement that the freedom is not absolute and that what 
constitutes a violation is an arbitrary interference. The entitlement includes “the right to a
Cahill (n 134) 399
ZA Smith and KL Ross, ‘Human Rights to Water’ in KV Thai, D Rahm and JD Coggbum (eds). 
Handbook o f  Globalization and the Environment (2007) 119
CESCR (n 123) [45]
Smith and Ross (n 191)
CESCR (n 123) [10]
Ibid
Cooper and Howsam (n 96) 124
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system of water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity for people 
to enjoy the right to water”.
According to the Committee the adequacy of water is to be assessed according to the 
following benchmarks; availability, quality, physical accessibility, economic 
accessibility, non-discrimination, and information accessibility.
Availability: The notion of availability refers to the continuity and amount of water 
supply. The continuity and amount of the water supply must be sufficient for personal 
and domestic uses.*^* It should be pointed out that the human right to water does not 
require availability of running water around the clock. It only requires that the water 
supply should be regular to be able to put the water for personal and domestic uses. 
Personal and domestic uses include “drinking*^^, personal sanitation^ ****, washing of 
clothes, food preparation^***, personal and household hygiene^** .^ What amount of water is 
sufficient for these personal and domestic uses is to be determined taking into account the 
guidelines of the WHO^**' and the committee also requires allowance to be made for the 
additional water requirement of some individuals and groups owing to health, climate and 
work conditions.^**'*
197 CESCR (n 123) [10]
Ibid [12(a)]
According to the committee the term ‘drinking’ here refers to consumptive use o f  water through 
beverages and foodstuffs.
Personal sanitation means disposal o f human excreta. Water is necessary for personal sanitation where 
water-based means are adopted.
Food preparation include food hygiene and preparation o f  food stuffs, whether water is incorporated 
into, or comes into contact with, food.
Personal and household hygiene means personal cleanliness and hygiene o f  the household environment.
In this connection the Committee makes a reference to J Bartram and G Howard, Domestic Water 
Quantity, Service Level and Health: What Should be the Goal fo r  Water and Heath Sectors (WHO, 2002); 
see also PH Gleick, ‘Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic N eeds’ (1996) 21 
Water International 83
CESCR (n 123) [12(a)]
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Quality: The human right to water requires that water available for personal and 
domestic purposes should fulfil the quality parameters set by the WHO. In particular, the 
water “must be safe, therefore free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and 
radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health”. In addition, it must have 
acceptable physical attributes: colour, odour and taste. The problem here is with respect 
to the water quality parameters, particularly the chemical one. Whether the presence of a 
certain chemical of a specified amount in drinking water is a threat to health cannot be 
determined precisely. Therefore, it is always a matter of value judgment and it involves 
making a trade-off between increased safety and affordability. Whether the elements of 
the right to water are adequate from water quality perspective is to be determined on the 
basis of WHO guidelines. The question is now the implication of a country adopting a 
water quality standard which sets a value for a certain contaminant beyond what is 
provided in the WHO guidelines. Does this violate the right to water?
Physical accessibility: The physical accessibility of water supply sources refers first to 
the distance between the point of consumption and the water supply source. In this sense, 
the General Comment required that water facilities and services “must be within safe 
physical reach for all sections of the population” including education institutions and 
workplace.^" In addition, the facilities “must be of sufficient quality, culturally 
appropriate and sensitive to gender, life-cycle and privacy requirements”.^"
Economic accessibility: “Water, and water facilities and services, must be affordable for 
all. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water must be 
affordable, and must not compromise or threaten the realization of other Covenant 
rights”.^ **^ The dimension of affordability is not further elaborated on. But it is clear that 
the price must not be such that a person, once he paid for the water, will not have enough 
left to afford to buy other necessities to realise other Covenant rights such as the right to 
health and the right to food.
Ibid [12 (c)(1)] 
Ibid
Ibid [12 (c) (ii)]
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Non-discrimination: “Water and water facilities and services must be accessible to all, 
including the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population, in law and in 
fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds”.^ ***
Information accessibility: This dimension means people have “the right to seek, receive 
and impart information concerning water issues"/**^
6.4.5. Implications of the Right to Water
One of the questions that can be raised in relation to the human right to water is as to 
whether there is any value added by the human rights perspective to the national and 
international efforts to expand access to safe and affordable water: how does the human 
right status of water help in expanding access to safe and affordable water? Discussing 
the implications of a human rights perspective on Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and after identifying ‘some of the many international human rights provisions 
relevant to’ the eight MDGs, Anand writes that “[a] human rights perspective both 
legitimates the MDGs and highlights taking action as an obligation and not as a 
charity”?*** Stated in other words, it transforms the development goals from hortatory and 
aspirational to legally binding targets—targets to the progressive realisation of which 
governments are obliged to take “a positive and pro-active pursuit of protecting and 
promoting the rights, not merely the negative and passive role of avoiding violation”?**
Likewise, Cahill states that “the advantage of utilising the human rights approach is that 
water needs are transformed into water rights”?*  ^McCaffrey discusses as to whether and 
the extent to which the right to water of individuals in one state restricts the ability of 
another state to exploit international water bodies. He argues that the right to water gives 
a standing for individuals to challenge a riparian state in international forums for the
Ibid [12 (c) (Hi)]
Ibid [12 (c) (iv)]
Anand (n 131)511-516  
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Cahill (n 134)390
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enforcement of human rights instead of those traditional international mechanisms for 
holding a state responsible?*'
Others are cautious about the value added by the human right rhetoric to the water sector. 
For example, Varis surveys the progress of Arabic states in meeting the targets set at the 
Millennium summit and concludes:
The everyday right to water is still a distant dream for a considerable proportion of 
the population in most of the MENA countries. What we often forget is that rights 
usually come along with responsibilities. Discussion without responsibilities—by 
whom, for whom, etc—should be included in the rights related discussion. Talking 
about water as a human right may be useful, but certainly fundamental is the need 
to improve the everyday lives of the tens of millions of MENA region inhabitants 
whose lives are not improving at the pace articulated in the Millennium 
Development Goals of the United Nations. Whose responsibility this is, is the key 
question?*'*
In order to understand the significance of the human right approach to water in ensuring 
access to safe and affordable water, one has to go beyond the content of the right and see 
the duties which flow from the right.^*' It is important to first see state duties in the field 
of human rights generally. The initial distinction between negative rights (or civil and 
political rights) and positive rights (or economic, social and cultural rights) is almost 
abandoned. Even in civil and political rights, states are required to take certain proactive 
measures for the realisation of such rights. It has now been accepted that human rights 
give rise to five kinds of state duties.^*' These include the duty to respect rights of others; 
to create institutional machinery essential to realisation of rights; to protect rights/prevent 
violation; to provide goods and services; and to promote.
McCaffrey (n 144)
O Varis, ‘Right to Water: The Millennium Development Goals and Water in the MENA Region’ (2007) 
23 Water Resources Development 243, 266
HJ Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals 
(2008) 185 (stating: “To understand the significance and implications o f  the rights stated in the ICCPR, 
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significance and even eontent o f  the related rights. It also points to strategies to realize a right, as by 
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The duty to respect imposes a duty of ‘hands o ff  on governments with respect to all of 
human rights and in some of the rights on individuals and nonstate entities as well?*^ 
This is the most fundamental of the other obligations in the sense that if states observe 
this even without observing the other duties, it would “lead to a vast improvement in the 
human condition...would avoid most of the worst calamities.” *^* In the traditional 
dichotomy of rights, this duty has been improperly restricted to civil and political rights. 
The right to water also imposed the duty to respect on states. States are generally 
prohibited from engaging in acts that directly or indirectly interfere with the enjoyment of 
the right.^*^ In particular, this requires the state to refrain from:
• denying or limiting equal access to adequate water;
• arbitrary interference with customary or traditional arrangements for 
water allocation;
• unlawfully diminishing or polluting water; and
• limiting access to or destroying water services and infrastructure as a 
punitive measure
Human rights also impose the duty on the part of the state to create institutional 
machinery essential for realising right. This is different from the duty to respect because 
it involves the use of public resources.^^* In the case of the right to vote, this means the 
government has the duty to maintain fair electoral system.^^^ In the case of the right to 
water, this means that states ought to “take positive measures to assist individuals and 
communities to enjoy the right”.^ '^
Related to the above (because it involves spending of resources) is the duty to protect 
rights from being violated by others. It involves the duty to provide a preventive and
Ibid 187 (stating “my right to bodily security mean little unless my neighbours are prohibited by the 
state from violating it”)
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remedial system (tort law, criminal law, courts, jails, police force) for violations of 
human rights by state or non-state organs and individuals?^'* The right to water also 
imposes a general duty on states to protect the right of individuals from being interfered 
with by third parties (individuals, corporations, groups)?^' This obligation “includes, 
inter alia, adopting the necessary and effective legislative and other measures to restrain, 
for example, third parties from denying equal access to adequate water; and polluting and 
inequitably extracting from water resources, including natural sources, wells and other 
water distribution systems”?^' Most importantly, the duty to protect requires the state to 
formulate a legal framework for the regulation of water providers whatever their model 
of distribution:
Where water services (such as piped water networks, water tankers, access to rivers 
and wells) are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties must prevent 
them from compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe 
and acceptable water. To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system must 
be established, in conformity with the Covenant and this General Comment, which 
includes independent monitoring, genuine public participation and imposition of 
penalties for non-compliance.^^^
The duty to protect as it is stated in the above paragraph requires the state to adopt 
equitable price regulation. Therefore, price regulation is not solely about correcting the 
problems of natural monopolies but also about ensuring affordable water services.^^* This 
is particularly important for the low income households: “Any payment for water services 
has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately 
or publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. 
Equity demands that poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with 
water expenses as compared to richer households”.^ ^^
Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 215)
CESCR (n 123) [23]
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The duty to protect is not restricted to regulating water providers. It might also mean 
regulating other users of water so as to ensure that elements of the right to water are 
protected:
States parties should adopt comprehensive and integrated strategies and 
programmes to ensure that there is sufficient and safe water for present and future 
generations. Such strategies and programmes may include: (a) reducing depletion 
of water resources through unsustainable extraction, diversion and damming; (b) 
reducing and eliminating contamination of watersheds and water-related eco­
systems by substances such as radiation, harmful chemicals and humane excreta; 
(c) monitoring water reserves; (d) ensuring that proposed developments do not 
interfere with access to adequate water; (e) assessing the impacts of actions that 
may impinge upon water availability and natural-ecosystems watersheds, such as 
climate changes, desertification and increased soil salinity, deforestation and loss of 
biodiversity; (f) increasing the efficient use of water by end-users; (g) reducing 
water wastages in its distribution; (h) response mechanisms for emergency 
situations; (i) and establishing competent institutions and appropriate institutional 
arrangements to carry out the strategies and programmes.^'**
In some cases, it might be essential for the state to provide goods and services to realise a 
specified right such as the right to food. The goods and services required could be 
produced by the government or bought from the private sector.^'* Or the government 
could indirectly provide by subsidising private provision of the goods and services.^'^ In 
the case of water, the General Comment requires states to provide water for personal and 
domestic uses to those people who are unable to provide for themselves.^" Moreover, 
states are required to adopt measures to increase affordability of water services. Some of 
these measures like the use of pricing policies, regulations to minimise wastage and 
contamination of water, regulations mandating the use of low-cost technologies might be 
regulatory and hence might qualify as elements of duty to protect. In addition, however, 
some of the measures might rightly be considered elements of the duty to provide if they 
involve public expenditure. These measures include:
• use of a range of appropriate low-cost techniques and technologies;
• appropriate pricing policies such as free or low-cost water; and
Ibid [28]
Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 215) 189
Ibid
233 CESCR (n 123) [25]
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• income supplements?''*
The last duty is the duty to promote rights. This involves the use of resources in 
education and awareness raising programmes regarding human rights." ' In the case of 
water, the duty to promote is a requirement on the part of the state to engage in 
“appropriate education concerning the hygienic use of waste, protection of water sources 
and methods to minimize water wastages”.^"
A look at the state duties emanating from the right to water underscores the significance 
of the human right approach to the right to water. Now that the state duties are clearly 
articulated, limited budget may not serve as adequate affirmative defence for states 
failing to realise the right to water. The right to water does not necessarily require the 
state to actually provide water for domestic and personal uses. However, there are other 
duties that may go a long way in alleviating problems of access worldwide. Of course, 
other duties of the state such as the duty to regulate may equally need expenditure of 
public resources. However, the level of expenditure required is not as great as that 
required by the duty to provide. In addition, the General Comment reiterates a principle 
of progressive realisation regarding the right to water: states must take measures which 
are “deliberate, concrete and targeted towards the full realization of the right to water”. '^  ^
In addition, it provides that regressive measures are strongly presumed to be a violation 
of the right to water.
It has been demonstrated in an earlier section that the right to water is incorporated in 
Ethiopia through international human rights instruments which Ethiopia has ratified and 
in Kenya through the new Constitution and international human rights instruments which 
Kenya has ratified. The fact that representatives of Ethiopia and Kenya have abstained 
from the vote in the recent General Assembly resolution does not undermine the status of 
the right to water because at least as the representative of Ethiopia has remarked water is 
‘a natural right’. In giving effect to the right to water in Ethiopia and Kenya, therefore.
Ibid [27]
Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 215) 189
CESCR (n 123) [25] 
Ibid [17]
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regard should be given to the normative content of the right and the corresponding state 
obligations as articulated in the General Comment 15.
6.4.6. Regulatory Implications of the Right to Water
The previous section discussed the general legal implications of the right to water. This 
section outlines the regulatory implications of the right as it relates to SIPs. First of all, 
states are required to have a framework for regulation of all third party water providers, 
which may be state or privately owned."* The water providers to be included could also 
be conventional water utilities or small-scale and independent water providers. The exact 
phrase used in the General Comment is “where water sources are controlled by third 
parties”. A question that can be raised here is as to whether it is meant to exclude water 
supplies owned and operated by community-based organisations. It is not also clear if the 
phrase includes water sources used exclusively for private uses and government as direct 
provider through its departments or state enterprises.
Second, the objective of this framework should be, among others, to ensure adequate, 
safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable water.^'^ Third, the framework should 
incorporate independent monitoring, sanction for breach of regulatory standards and 
public participation."** The requirement of ‘independent monitoring’ might suggest that 
the term ‘third parties’ includes government departments and public enterprises as 
providers of water."* Fourth, the framework should comply with the requirements of 
General Comment 15 and the Covenant."^ One of these requirements is that any 
regulatory instrument should not constitute an arbitrary interference.^'*' Other 
requirements include: the need to incorporate equitable pricing; that regulatory standards
Ibid [24]
^^"Ibid
"'°Ibid
Groom, Halpem and Ehrhardt (n 1) 20-21 (discussing how traditionally public ownership was 
considered as a substitute for regulation but recently there is a recognition that the objectives o f  regulation 
cannot be achieved through state ownership alone)
CESCR (n 123) [24]
Ibid [21]
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should not be discriminatory; low cost technologies should be used in appropriate cases; 
and regulatory standards should aim at preventing loss of water during distribution.
What constitutes arbitrary interference? The previous section has explored if there is 
adequate reason for regulation of price and safety of water by SIPs and concluded that 
there is no prima facie case for regulation of price. Even if there is concern of 
affordability, this cannot be solved by regulating SIPs. Regulating price in such cases 
might have the effect of taking some of them out of the market. This might constitute 
arbitrary interference. Therefore, as far as SIPs in Ethiopia and Kenya are concerned, any 
regulatory regime extending to SIPs should not attempt to regulate price. This does not 
mean that the regulator or the state should not be concerned with affordability. Rather it 
means that this concern cannot be effectively addressed by imposing a maximum retail 
price. On the other hand, doing so might drive some of the suppliers out of the market 
and that might constitute arbitrary interference. The state should, however, try to ensure 
that the price of conventional water utilities are affordable not only to those who are 
directly connected but also those who indirectly use this water through SIPs. The state 
should also explore other regulatory and non-regulatory instruments for increasing 
affordability. But it is legitimate as well as obligatory to have a framework for regulation 
of the safety of water by SIPs. In this regard, it may be noted that there is already concern 
expressed that the current ‘unregulated’ status of SIPs amount to a breach of human right 
obligations."'*
The prohibition of arbitrary interference operates at the level of not only the first order 
question but also the second order question regarding choice of instruments and 
institutions. It is true that the human rights status of water transforms the need to regulate 
the safety of water into an obligation to regulate. In addition, it also implies that the 
instrument chosen for regulation of SIPs must be such that it does not constitute arbitrary 
interference. This point will further be explored in the next chapter.
6.5. Conclusion
This chapter have addressed one of the questions set at the beginning and which this 
research is expected to address: should SIPs be regulated? Conventional water utilities 
are subject to a range of regulatory controls which are illustrated in Chapter Two. Of
GTZ(n 181)8
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these price and quality regulations are the concern here. The public interest theory has 
been used to explain regulation of conventional water utilities. The chapter has also 
investigated if these theories also lead to regulation of SIPs. The findings in this regard 
can be summarised as follows.
Quality of Drinking W ater: The quality of water can be ascertained by examining 
certain features. Some of these features are physical such as colour and odour. Others are 
microbiological and chemical such as arsenic content and presence of microbes. Despite 
the contention of some, that competition among SIPs results in good quality water, 
insights from public interest theory suggest that competition among SIPs could at best be 
expected to result in water possessing only acceptable physical attributes. As far as the 
microbiological and chemical content is concerned, insights from economics of 
information and consumer behaviour under limited information suggest a scenario where 
‘safe’ water will be driven off by unsafe water. Private law remedies such as tort actions 
against SIPs supplying ‘unsafe’ water are not effective for a number of reasons. This 
suggests a strong prima facie case for regulating the quality of water by SIPS. This 
conclusion based on the public interest theory of regulation is also confirmed in part by 
the water quality study made in the case study areas. In particular, in the case of Kisumu 
where water from the utility and other private sources are being supplied, significant 
proportion of samples taken and tested have failed the current water quality standards. It 
is also found that the problem affects only some forms of SIPs. Water quality studies 
carried out at different stages of the water supply system indicate that there is not a 
serious contamination problem associated with the fact that water is being transported 
manually. This excludes mobile water vendors from the prima facie case for water 
quality regulation. Despite the presence of SIPs in Addis Ababa, the water they supply is 
the water they get from the utility and even though some of them transport water from 
one place to another, there are not serious contamination problems. In the light of the 
public interest theory of regulation and economics of information, the empirical finding 
that there are not serious contamination problems during transportation has been 
explained. To put it in one sentence, there is a prima facie case for quality regulation of 
SIPs that have their own source of water such as wells and boreholes. This obviously 
applies to cases where there are such kinds of providers excluding the case of Addis 
Ababa from further analysis. This does not mean that there are no water quality problems 
in Addis Ababa. Nor does it mean that there are no water quality problems in Addis 
Ababa other than those which relate to wells and boreholes. In fact the water quality 
study has confirmed that there are problems. But these problems are due, in part, to the
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quality of the water at the source or to the way water is stored at the household level. And 
such problems are not good grounds for quality regulation of SIPs. Even then, these are 
serious problems that should be addressed. So the following chapter would investigate if 
regulatory tools targeted at entities other than SIPs could be designed to overcome the 
above water quality problems.
Price of Water: The principal rationale of price regulation is correction of problems of 
natural monopolies. Certain parts of the business model of conventional water utilities are 
characterised as natural monopolies. This justifies price regulation. However, price 
regulation does not solve all of the problems associated with natural monopolies. For 
example, quality regulation is also needed to correct problems of natural monopolies. Nor 
is regulation solely about basing pricing decisions on costs. Prices should in general be 
based on costs but they should also be based on the ability of consumers to pay. That 
water should be affordable is an efficiency, equity and human rights requirement. There 
are a number of regulatory requirements and tools that might be used to make water 
affordable. To the extent that equity and efficiency point to the same outcome, some of 
these regulatory tools are also tools of economic regulation in general. An investigation 
of the business model of SIPs indicates that they are not natural monopolies. This is 
because they do not use the conventional way of water distribution. They carry the water 
from the source to the point of use. In a way they serve as virtual pipelines. Others are not 
involved in distribution at all but in sale of water at source. There are no significant sunk 
costs baring entry and exit. However, the studies of water prices in the case studies show 
that there are serious problems of affordability in the case study areas. But these 
problems cannot be solved or minimised using price regulation of SIPs. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that there is no prima facie case for price regulation as far as SIPs are 
concerned for two reasons. First, the market for small-scale water provision is not a 
natural monopoly. Second, price regulation of SIPs does not solve the problems of 
affordability. Since affordability is however a serious problem, the next chapter takes up 
this issue and explores if there are other regulatory and non-regulatory tools that can be 
used to lower the price of water.
Duty to Regulate: In this chapter, an attempt is also made to find out to what extent 
governments have the duty to regulate SIPs. The right to water, which is based on a 
number of rights expressly recognised in national constitutions and international human 
rights instruments, imposes a number of obligations on governments. Traditionally such 
obligations were not taken seriously on the ground that they are subject to resource
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availability. There is now an understanding that only certain obligations of governments 
are subject to resource availability. The duty to protect, for example, as opposed to the 
duty to provide, is not a resource intensive obligation and is often taken as an immediate 
obligation. In this Chapter, I have argued that the duty to regulate SIPs to the extent that 
regulation helps to make water safe and affordable is a duty to protect. This is also clearly 
provided in the General Comment No. 15. The right to water, therefore, translates the 
need to regulate (as identified based on public interest theory and evidence of regulation) 
into a duty to regulate. The next chapter considers alternative regulatory tools and 
requirements towards making water safe and affordable.
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Chapter Seven: How to Regulate Small-scale and Independent 
Providers? Choice of Regulatory Instruments and Institutions
7.1. Introduction
Lack of regulation and the absence of legal framework governing the activities of SIPs 
are identified as leading legal problems the sector is fraught with. Examination of the 
legal status of SIPs in Kisumu and Addis Ababa has suggested that their activities are 
legally limited, though playing in practice very important roles. In the case of Addis 
Ababa, SIPs, which are largely involved in the resale of water, operate illegally as the law 
which has established the official utility, AAWSA, provides that no other person is 
allowed to resell water without the consent of AAWSA and the procedure which is in 
place for getting this consent recognises only kebelle or community managed standpipes. 
There are no standards that are meant to control the quality and price of water by SIPs. In 
the case of Kisumu, they can operate without any licence to the extent that they do not 
exceed the specified threshold. Beyond the threshold, any provider is required to make a 
service provision agreement, with the local Water Service Board (LVSWSB in the case 
of Kisumu), which ought to be submitted to the regulatory board for approval. In 
practice, most forms of SIPs actually operate beyond the threshold provided. They should 
have secured service provision agreement from the LVSWSB but they did not. Many of 
them use electric pumps to abstract water from the wells; this is a technology the use of 
which requires a permit. In practice, none of the existing SIPs in the town of Kisumu 
(except the Namasaria water works) abstract water on the basis of a permit issued by the 
WRMA.
It can be asserted, therefore, that SIPs are at least legally speaking subject to regulation. 
This statement should be followed by the following two caveats. First, the regulation in 
the case of Addis Ababa takes the form of prohibition with the exception of kebelle 
managed standpipes. Other water kiosks are operating illegally. Though the prohibition is 
not in practice directly enforced, these water kiosks are indirectly punished through the 
tariff structure. The existing forms of SIPs are dependent on AAWSA for the bulk water. 
Even those which operate with the permission of AAWSA are not subject to any water 
safety regulatory requirements. From the discussion in Chapter Six, it has emerged that 
there is no prima facie case for price and water safety regulation. This research has not 
found any SIP, in Addis Ababa, that has a separate source of water. However, the law is 
not adequate to deal with the problems that may be posed by the emergence of SIPs
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operating their own water source. In this regard, therefore, one may ask as to the 
appropriate way of regulating such providers whenever they emerge (if at all they do) in 
the future. That price regulation of SIPs is undesirable and unnecessary is one of the core 
points of this research. However, this chapter explores other regulatory and non- 
regulatory instruments that might be used to increase the affordability of water in Addis 
Ababa.
In the case of Kisumu, the national legal regime recognises the operation of SIPs. To the 
extent they operate within a limited scale, the law stipulates that they are exempted from 
any regulatory regime at least as far as entry, price and quality controls are concerned. If, 
however, they exceed the established threshold, they need to obtain a service provision 
agreement. From the discussion in Chapter Six, it has emerged that there are theoretical, 
empirical and legal bases for regulating the safety of water provided by SIPs in Kisumu. 
At this time it is not clear as to what kind of regulatory standards are built into such 
agreements. Are they going to (and should they) be subject to the same standards which 
are built into the water service provision agreement between the LVSWSB and 
KIWASCO? This and related questions are addressed in this chapter.
In this chapter, different regulatory instruments are examined if they can be appropriately 
used in the regulation of SIPs. The Chapter first sets out the case for adopting a light- 
handed form of regulation. The case is based on three characteristics of small-scale 
providers: size, number and informality. This light handed form of regulation relies on 
collaboration and support rather than command and control traditional regulation. It also 
uses process standards as opposed to product standards. Even if it has already been 
indicated in Chapter Six that price regulation is not desirable and in some ways will 
amount to breach of the right to water, a section in this chapter is devoted to the 
discussion of why price regulation is not practical.
7.2. Challenges of Regulating SIPs 
7.2.1. Too Small to Be Regulated?
7.2.1.1. SIPs as Micro-Enterprises
It is important to take into account several factors which are peculiar to SIPs and which 
might determine the approach and the means of regulation that should be adopted. These
293
are factors which make regulation of SIPs very difficult compared to regulation of 
conventional water utilities. The factors relate to the size, number and degree of 
formality of SIPs.
SIPs can be referred to as the micro and small enterprises (MSEs) of the water sector. 
MSEs are defined as:
...income-generating activities other than primary production which employ 50 or 
fewer workers. Home-based enterprises are included as long as at least half of the 
output is marketed. Within the MSE category, micro enterprises are those with ten 
or fewer workers; small enterprises range in size from 11 to 50.*
Others define MSEs in terms of annual turn-over, value added or capital assets of 
enterprises.^ The classification that relies on the number of workers might better capture 
the existing MSEs as they often do not keep financial records and hence difficult to 
categorise them on the basis of annual turn-over.' Different countries have different 
definitions of MSEs.'* Therefore it is possible for enterprises considered micro in one 
country to be small or medium or even large enterprises in another country.' The United 
Nations Development Organisation (UNIDO) offers a classification system applicable to 
developing countries.' Accordingly, if a firm has between 5 and 19 workers, it is 
considered a small enterprise in the context of developing countries and if it has less than 
5 workers, it is considered as a micro-enterprise. However, for industrialised countries, a 
firm is small if it has 99 or less workers.^
‘ MA McPherson, ‘Growth o f  Micro and Small Enterprises in Southern Africa’ (1996) 48 Journal o f  
Development Economics 253, 253
 ^ G Reinecke and S White, Policies fo r  Small Enterprises: Creating the Right Environment fo r  Good Job 
(2004) 81. For a World Bank’s definition in terms o f  number o f  employees, total assets and total annual 
sales, see IFC, Financing Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises: An Independent Evaluation o f  IF C ’s 
Experience with Financial Intermediaries in Frontier Countries (2008) 5
 ^McPherson (n 1) 261
Reinecke & White (n 2) 3
 ^Ibid 81
® P Quartey, Regulation, Competition and Small and Medium Enterprises in Developing Countries (2001)
7 Ibid
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SIPs as they exist in Addis Ababa and Kisumu can, therefore, be categorised as micro­
enterprises, whichever definition is used. Except one small-scale provider in Kisumu 
which is involved in the treatment and sale of river water, almost all SIPs are single­
person operations. They are self-employed individuals. In the case of Ethiopia, water 
kiosks are small general grocery shops often solely owned.
MSEs make a significant contribution to the economy of developing countries. Mead and 
Liedholm wrote the following in the context of sub-Saharan Africa:
House-to-house baseline surveys make clear that the number of micro and small 
enterprises is far larger than what is reported in most official statistics, which often 
cover only registered firms. Survey results indicate that 19-27% of the population 
of working age are employed in MSEs. Employment densities-the number of 
people engaged in MSE activities per 1,000 persons in the population-raged from 
70-90 in Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho and Malawi to well over 100 in the Dominican 
Republic, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. In the five African countries surveyed, the 
estimated total number of people engaged in micro and small enterprises is nearly 
twice the level of employment in registered, large scale enterprises and in the 
public sector.*
Small-enterprises employ a large proportion of the population in several countries. They 
are involved in the provision of vital goods and services like drinking water. They have 
significant potential in alleviating poverty and fuelling economic growth. However, little 
has come in the way of assistance from governments until the 1970s.^ By supporting such 
enterprises, it is argued first that, one can ensure that equitable income distributions and 
economic growth occur simultaneously.*** Second, supporting small enterprises “may 
serve as entrepreneurial seed bed, with entrepreneurs graduating to run the larger 
industries”.** Governments are therefore urged to provide different forms of assistance 
ranging from policy reform to ensure that policies are not biased against MSEs to training 
of entrepreneurs in management, bookkeeping and marketing and making available 
credits on favourable terms. *^  It is often argued that regulation imposes disproportionate
* DC Mead and C Lidholm, ‘The Dynamics o f  Micro and Small Enterprises in Developing Countries’ 
(1998) 26 World Development 61
® McPherson (n 1) 254
Ibid
" Ibid
Ibid
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costs on MSEs and might affect their flexibility which is identified as one of the strengths 
of these enterprises.*' Therefore, the following section examines how size of enterprises 
is taken into account to exempt some of them from some regulations or to regulate them 
differently. It also examines the implication of that in addressing the second-order 
question relating to SIPs; in what way should SIPs be regulated? Is there a case for 
exemption of SIPs from regulations? If  not, what other implications does size have in 
designing a regulatory framework?
7.2.1.2. Exemptions
7.2.1.21. General Case for Exemptions
The size of enterprises has an implication on whether, and how, to regulate. It could be 
argued that they impose limited danger to public health compared to the regulatory 
burden on them and hence should be ignored on the basis of the de minimis principle. 
This is mainly a principle of law enforcement which requires that certain violation of law 
and regulatory infractions might be ignored if the harm they impose is trivial.*'* It could 
also be considered as a principle of public policy design rather than enforcement and as 
such it implies that micro and small enterprises ought to be exempted to maximise the net 
benefits of regulations and regulations should by design apply to only larger enterprises. 
It features in different branches of the law including criminal law.*' Bradford points out 
the usual economic argument in favour of regulatory exemptions: efficiency requires that 
the benefits of regulation should be greater than its corresponding costs. Exemptions are 
one way of maximising the net benefit of regulations:
A regulation is efficient only if it produces a net benefit—that is, only if the total 
benefit produced by the regulation exceeds its total cost... The idea that a 
regulation’s benefits should exceed its costs is relatively simple but often 
overlooked. At times, the focus is almost exclusively on benefit, with little 
consideration of cost... Over the past twenty years, the cost of regulation has 
become a more important consideration. Benefit and cost are not always explicitly 
balanced, but there is at least recognition that regulation imposing ‘excessive’ costs 
is bad... Economists, of course, recognize that a regulation is not efficient merely
Quartey (n 6)
See, for example, CR Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future o f  Regulatory Protection  (2002) 33- 
41 (discussing American court decisions which held that regulatory agencies have inherent power to refuse 
regulating trivial risks)
See, for example, American Model Penal Code s 2.12(2)
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because its benefits exceed its costs. Efficiency requires not just a net benefit, but 
the greater possible net benefit. A regulation that produces a net benefit should be 
refined further, if possible, to maximize the net benefit. This economic insight 
underlies regulatory exemptions, which attempt to increase the net benefit of a 
regulation by excluding firms or transactions whose regulation imposes a net cost.*'
Regulation is needed to correct problems. But if the cost of regulation is greater than the 
benefits of correcting the problem at least with respect to certain enterprises and 
transactions, by excluding such enterprises and transactions from the scope of the 
regulatory regime, the net benefit of regulation could be maximised. It is on the basis of 
this argument that small transactions or small enterprises are excluded from many 
regulatory regimes.
The impact of size on regulatory costs of compliance: Regulations generally impose 
two kinds of costs: compliance and enforcement costs.*^ Compliance costs are incurred 
by the regulated. Enforcement costs are costs of developing, monitoring and enforcing 
regulatory rules. Such costs are incurred by the regulator. Most entities subject to 
regulation incur compliance and administrative costs. Compliance costs could be defined 
as costs of satisfying the substantive requirements of regulations.** If the water quality 
standard sets a maximum level for a certain contaminant, the cost of treating the water to 
ensure that it does not contain an amount of the contaminant exceeding the regulatory 
level can be regarded as compliance cost. Administrative cost is the cost of complying 
with the administrative aspect of regulations such as costs of record keeping and 
reporting.*^ These parts of compliance costs are what are sometimes called costs of 
information obligations.^' Another way of classifying the costs of regulations on
CS Bradford, ‘The Cost o f  Regulatory Exemptions’ (2004) 72 UMKC Law Review 857, 859-860
CS Bradford, ‘Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis o f  Small Business Exemptions from 
Regulation’ (2004) 8 Journal o f  Small and Emerging Business Law 1, 5-6
I Bickerdyke and R Lattimore, Reducing the Regulatory Burden: Does Firm Size Matter? (1997) 26
Ibid
J Torriti, ‘The Standard Cost Model: When ‘Better Regulation’ Fights Against Red tape’ in S Weatherill 
(ed). Better Regulation (2007) 85 (Information obligations can be defined as the “obligations arsing from 
regulation to provide information and data to the public sector. In other fords, an information obligation is a 
duty to procure or prepare information and subsequently make it available to either a public authority or a 
third party”.)
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enterprises is into one-off costs and recurring and ongoing costs?* One-off costs include 
the costs of building capacity, costs of equipments and buildings, and costs of legal and 
consultancy services all incurred to meet requirements of regulations?^ Recurring and 
ongoing costs include costs of labour and consumables?'
It is argued that the burden of compliance costs is heavier on small enterprises?* This is 
because “small businesses have fewer units of output over which to spread regulatory 
costs, regulatory costs are higher per unit of output; and small businesses lack requisite 
size to take advantage of economies of scale in regulatory compliance, personnel, and 
data systems”? ' An estimate puts the costs of compliance for health, safety and tax 
regulations to be ten times greater for small firms than larger rivals?' Another study 
suggests that compliance costs are 35 percent higher for firms having less than 20 
employees than those having 500 employees?^ It should be noted that these estimates on 
the relative burden of regulations define firms liberally and as a result, it can be expected 
that the burden on what are considered micro and small enterprises in the less developed 
countries such as SIPs could even be much higher. The fact that the size over which 
regulatory costs could be spread is very small puts micro and small enterprises at a 
competitive disadvantage.
See, for example. Ibid 88-89 (classifying costs o f  information obligations into recurrent and ongoing 
costs)
^  Bickerdyke and Lattimore (n 18)
Ibid
J Kitching, ‘Is Less More? Better Regulation and the Small Enterprise’ in S Weatherill (ed). Better 
Regulation (2007) 156. See also I Fletcher, ‘A Small Business Perspective on Regulation in the UK’ (2001) 
21 Economic Affairs 17.
PR Verkuil, ‘A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility A ct’ (1982) Duke Law Journal 213. See also 
Kitching (n 24) 161 (“Much o f  this cost is fixed and small businesses are said to be unable to spread these 
costs across large-scale operations due to their lack o f  internal resources (time, money, specialist expertise) 
with which to handle regulations and, because o f  the lower asset base, are less resilient to regulatory 
shocks”.) See Bradford (n 17) 7-11 (discussing sources o f  economies o f  scale in compliance)
SC Parker, ‘Law and the Economics o f  Entrepreneurship’ (2007) 28 Comparative Law and Policy 
Journal 695, 702 citing W Brock and D Evans, The Economics o f  Small Businesses: Their Role and  
Regulation in the U.S. Economy (1986)
F Chittenden, S Kauser and P Poutziouris, Regulatory Burdens o f  Small Business: A Literature Review  
(2002)
298
The impact of size on benefits of regulation: Size affects not only the costs of the 
regulation but also the benefits of regulation. It should also be noted that small size could 
at times mean that the benefits of regulation are also smaller. This is particularly true for 
public health regulations. The products or services of micro or small enterprises are not 
as widely circulating as larger enterprises. The extent of public exposure is limited and 
hence the benefit of regulating them could be much lower than that of regulating their 
larger counterparts.^*
And hence small and micro enterprises should be exempted: Therefore it is argued 
that in order to maximise the net benefits of regulation, small enterprises should be 
exempted from the regulatory regime and resources should be concentrated on bigger 
enterprises and p rob lems . I t  is argued in this connection that exemption is not justified 
for the sake of saving small businesses but it is in order to maximise the benefits of 
regulation by directing regulatory resources to larger businesses."
Bradford argues that this case for regulatory exemptions is incomplete as it ignores the 
transaction costs of exemptions: specification costs, the cost of strategic behaviour, 
enforcement costs, and third-party information costs.'* He argues that regulatory 
exemptions are efficient only when the gains they produce exceed the transaction costs. 
Bradford’s notion of specification costs includes the cost of creating an exemption and 
the cost of errors. In order to create an exemption, one has to identify that segment of the 
market for which the cost of regulation exceeds the corresponding benefits. Bradford 
writes: “It is difficult enough to estimate regulatory costs and benefits for the regulated 
industry as a whole. Obtaining reliable cost-benefit data for subsets of the regulated
Bradford (n 17) 15-16
For an argument against exemption o f  small firms from regulations see RJ Pierce, Jr, ‘Small is Not 
Beautiful; The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment o f  Small Firms’ (1998) 50 Administrative Law 
Review 537. For a response to Pierce’s case, see Bradford (n 17) 19-20
Bradford (n 17) 22 (“A small business exemption is not justified merely because regulation will put small 
firms out o f  business. If the total benefit o f  regulating a firm exceeds the total compliance cost (and all 
other regulatory costs), an exemption is not efficient, even if  the firm cannot incur the compliance cost and 
remain competitive. Since the total benefit o f  regulating the firm exceeds the total cost, the firm should not 
be exempted. Regulatory economics does not support the survival o f  small businesses i f  continuing to 
operate those businesses produces an economic loss”).
Bradford (n 16) 864
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industry is even more difFicult”.^  ^ The costs of creating an exemption also include the 
difficulty of drafting “a rule that defines as accurately as possible the entities or 
transactions to be exempted”.^  ^ If the exemption is to be enacted through the regulatory 
agency, depending on the administrative procedure the agency is required to follow, there 
are costs of the rulemaking process/'^ A related cost is that of making an error. Bradford 
writes: “no matter how well-crafted the exemption and no matter how careful and 
vigorous its enforcement, exemptions will usually be both over-and under-inclusive”.^  ^
There will always be false negatives and false positives.^^
The transaction costs of regulatory exemptions also include the costs of strategic 
behaviour. Because regulations have compliance costs, firms “have an economic 
incentive to modify their behaviour to fit within an exemption if the cost of doing so is 
less than the cost of complying with the regulation”.^  ^ Exemptions also increase 
enforcement costs:
Enforcement is easier if there are no exemptions. The regulator only has to search 
for firms not complying with the regulation; any non-compliance observed by the 
regulator violates the regulation. Exemptions, however, make some non- 
compliance legal, forcing the regulatory to make two determinations: (1) whether a 
particular firm is complying with the regulation; and (2) if not, whether the firm is 
exempted. The cost of this second determination is a cost of having exemptions. 
Distinguishing exempt entities or transactions from regulated entities or 
transactions is often difficult. Regulated entities have an incentive to disguise for an 
exemption even when they do not.^^
Finally, exemptions involve ‘third-party information costs’. These are costs incurred by 
third parties to verify if a given firm is regulated or exempted when this status might be 
relevant in determining the quality of a product or service. If this status cannot easily be
Bradford (n 16) 864; Bickerdyke and Lattimore (n 18)) 
”  Bradford (n 16) 864 
Ibid
35 Ibid 865
False positives are regulated entities for which regulation is inefficient because the cost o f  regulation 
exceeds the benefit and false negatives are exempted entities for which regulation is efficient. Ibid
”  Ibid 869-870
Ibid 871
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ascertained by third-parties, Bradford argues that it might result in a ‘lemons’ market/^ 
Therefore it is argued that the complete case is that exemption is efficient only when the 
benefits (the difference between the costs and benefits of regulation) exceed the 
transaction costs of exemptions.
7.2.1.2.2. Small Water Suppliers Exempted
This section provides demonstrative discussion of the use of exemptions and the nature of 
exemptions in the regulation of drinking water quality. It examines the category of 
suppliers who are exempted from drinking water regulations in United States and 
England. It compares these exemptions with that provided in Water Act of Kenya. The 
purpose is to illustrate how size of water suppliers is considered to exempt some of them 
from regulatory requirements. The general case for such exemption has been discussed in 
the previous section.
Exempted W ater Suppliers in United States: The current law in Kenya incorporates 
exemption (of a limited scope) of small water suppliers: small-scale providers which 
supply to not more than 25 households a day are exempted from any requirement to get 
service provision agreement or to comply with water quality s ta n d a rd s .A  similar 
provision is found in the Safe Drinking Water Act 1974."^  ^ This Act applies to public 
water systems. Public water systems are defined as water systems that provide drinking 
water to at least 15 service connections or an average of twenty five people per day for at 
least 60 days per year."^  ^This implies that the requirements of the 1974 Act do not apply 
to water systems which provide to less than 15 service connection and who serve less 
than twenty five people a day or who serve more than twenty five people a day but for 
less than 60 days per year. Wells used for private purposes are not covered by the
Ibid 875 
Chapter Five
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974, Title XIV o f  the Public Health Service Act 42 U.S.C. 300f-300j-26. For a 
summary o f  the Act and its requirements, see M Tiemann, Safe Drinking Water Act: A Summary o f  the Act 
and Its major Requirements (2008); AD Tarlock, ‘Safe Drinking Water: A  Federalism Perspective’ (1992) 
21 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 233;
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 S 300f(4).
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requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act/^ In Kenya, a provision of water to more 
than twenty households a day even if it is for one day or a week, is required to be 
regulated/'* In United States, a provision of water to more than twenty households will be 
regulated only when this provision continues for at least 60 days per year. It should be 
noted that whether you apply the American or the Kenyan threshold for exemption, the 
conclusion with respect to the SIPs in Kisumu is that they should be regulated.
Exempted Small Supplies in England. The current drinking water quality standards are 
based on a European Union Directive.'*^ The Directive is transposed into England through 
two sets of regulations. The first set applies to water undertakers and licensed water 
suppliers on the basis of the Water Industry Act 1991.^ *^  The second set of regulations. 
Private Water Supplies Regulations 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations), 
apply to private water systems.
Any water supplier providing lOm^/day or serving 50 or more persons and any water 
supplier (whatever its size) part of a commercial or public activity (e.g. bed and breakfast 
establishments) are bound by the requirements of the Directive.'*^ The Directive 
authorises Member States to exempt those suppliers who provide less than lOmVday or 
who serve less than 50 persons but not those who are part of commercial or public 
activity.'*^ The Regulations, however, exempted only supplies to single dwellings 
“because the people consuming water and food prepared from water derived from these 
small supplies are entitled to the same level of health protection as people served by large 
private supplies and public water supplies”.'*^  The exemption in the case of England is 
narrower than United States and Kenya.
M Tiemann, ‘Safe Drinking Water Act: Implementation and Issues’ in TW Carter, Safe Drinking Water 
Act and Its Interpretation (2006) 5
Chapter Five
DWI, Legislative Background to the Private Water Supplies Regulations 2009: Section 9 (E&W) o f  the 
Private Water Supplies: Technical Manual (2010) 7
Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2000 as amended by the Water Supply (Water Quality) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2001, 2002,2005 and 2007
DWI (n 45) 8
Ibid
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302
Though the scope of the exemptions is different from one system to another, it is 
observed that size of suppliers is taken into account in deciding whether or not to 
regulate. Size in the water supply is defined not in terms of number of workers but in 
terms of volume of water (Kenya and the EU Directive) or number of people (US and EU 
Directive) or households (Kenya and England) supplied. Only self-supply is exempted in 
England. Self-supply is also exempted in Kenya and United States. It is not clear if self­
supply is exempted from the water quality standards in Ethiopia but apart from the permit 
to abstract water, the person should also get a permit to supply himself/his family. In 
Kenya supplying more than 20 households requires consent and might potentially subject 
the supplier to water quality standards. In United States, supplying more than 25 people 
for a period of more than 60 days a year is required to subject the supplier to the water 
quality regulations.
7.2.1.2.3. Should SIPs be Exempted?
Total exemption of SIPs: If we apply Bradford’s ‘complete’ theory of regulatory 
exemptions to SIPs, exemption will be appropriate only when the benefits of exempting 
SIPs exceed the transaction costs of exemptions. It should be noted that exemption of all 
forms of SIPs means perpetuating the status quo in the case study countries. To determine 
if this is ‘desirable’, the status quo has to be compared with two possible scenarios. The 
first scenario is regulating all forms of SIPs: all well owners, mobile vendors and 
standpipe operators. The second scenario is to exempt some of the providers and 
regulating those who have higher risk.
Total regulation of SIPs: On the other hand, regulation could impose compliance costs 
on SIPs who are going to pass these on to consumers and that would further decrease the 
affordability of water. It might be impossible for some of the producers to comply and 
hence might leave the market. This will also further decrease the affordability of water by 
making the market less competitive. Regulation will increase the level of public health by 
increasing safety of water. But, at the same time, the increased public safety could be 
offset by the negative health effects of reduced affordability. In addition, now public 
resources are spent monitoring and enforcing regulations which could have been spent 
somewhere else. The overall desirability of this option depends on whether the health 
impacts of less affordability and the costs of enforcement are less than the benefits of 
improved safety.
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Exempting some producers of w ater who are less risky: The benefit is increased 
safety, but less than complete regulation because some of the providers are exempted. 
Exempting some of the producers will have a number of costs, some of them more 
detrimental than the others. The first cost is the cost of identifying producers that should 
be exempted. That might involve identifying water producers who should be exempted— 
those which pose little risk to public health (may be because they serve limited number of 
households or because they have a source water of better quality). Considering that wells 
in Kisumu serve not only nearby households but also distant households through mobile 
vendors, this task will be very difficult further increasing what Bradford calls the 
‘specification cost’. Related to the specification cost is the cost of errors: some producers 
who pose less risk may wrongly be regulated and some producers who pose greater risk 
may be wrongly exempted. The second cost of partial exemption is the increased 
enforcement cost. The enforcement cost here must be distinguished from the enforcement 
cost in the case of total regulation. The enforcement cost may be lower because some of 
the producers are exempted and hence they do not have to be monitored. However, this 
reduction may be offset by another cost: the cost of determining if a given producer is 
exempted or regulated. This may not, however, be as significant as Bradford painted.
The third and the most detrimental cost is the possibility that the water market may 
develop into a ‘lemons market’. In this scenario (partial regulation), there will be two 
producers of water: regulated and exempted. The price of water from the regulated 
producers can be expected to be higher than the exempted because it includes costs of 
compliance. Households who are directly collecting water can easily know which 
supplier is regulated and which is not. That knowledge will determine their willingness to 
pay. On the other hand, customers of mobile vendors will have difficulty determining if 
the water is from regulated or exempted sources. Therefore, they would be willing to pay 
only the price of exempted sources. Mobile vendors also have an incentive to buy only 
from exempted sources. This results in the segregation of the market. The market for 
mobile vendors and exempted well owners will form one group. The market for regulated 
well owners will form another group. In the second group, only people who directly 
collect their water are involved and no mobile vendor is involved. And the price in the 
second market will be higher than the price in the first market. This is a distortion of the 
market. This is because of two reasons. First in the current situation people who directly 
buy from wells and other water sources such as standpipes are those who are of lower 
income. Customers of mobile vendors are better off—this is because it is expensive to
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buy water from mobile vendors. Now the combination of regulation and exemption has 
distorted the market and reversed the situation. Now the people for whom the burden of 
affordability is already heavier (low income households) are going to pay more and those 
people on whom the burden is not that heavy are going to pay less. If  the increase in price 
because of regulation is greater than the increase in price because of water transportation 
through carts, even households nearer to regulated wells and who will be able to know 
that fact might nonetheless opt for mobile vendors. At any rate, the situation will not 
affect the interest of mobile vendors because they maintain their customers and might 
even gain additional customers (low income households). This will possibly result in 
extinction of the regulated wells.
Apart from problems of transaction costs associated with exemptions, it should be 
pointed out that any case for regulation should establish that benefits of regulation are 
minimal compared to that of regulating formal utilities. It might generally be true that the 
benefits of regulation are dependent on the size of firms. The meaning of size should, 
however, be carefully analysed. The usual definition of size in terms of number of 
employees may not be appropriate here. The appropriate definition is in terms of number 
of people served. Accordingly, it can be said in the context of regulation of drinking 
water quality that benefits of regulation are related to the number of people served. When 
fewer people are served, the benefits are minimal. That justifies the exemption of 
residential wells in England, Kenya and the United States from regulation. It also justifies 
why suppliers serving less than twenty people or more than twenty people but for less 
than sixty days a year are exempted in United States. The case for exemption of SIPs in 
Kenya and Ethiopia may not, however, be strong, for the water from these sources 
reaches a number of households owing to mobile vendors. In addition, the fact that 40 
percent of the water in Kisumu, for example, comes from wells and boreholes underlines 
the benefits of regulation. The benefits of regulating SIPS are as much as the benefits of 
regulating the formal utility. From the above qualitative comparative analysis it follows, 
therefore, that exemption (total or partial) is not desirable.
It should be noted this qualitative analysis assumes that the choice is among complete 
regulation, part-regulation and no regulation (exemption). It is as if regulation involves 
the same costs of compliance. It assumes that if a given independent provider is 
regulated, it is regulated just in the same way as the official utility is regulated. However
305
this is not true/® Regulation can be of different forms. One form of regulation could be 
applied with respect to one enterprise and another form with respect to another enterprise. 
Depending on the form of regulation used, the costs of compliance could also be 
different. If  the cost of compliance is different from that which would have been obtained 
had they been regulated in the same way as official utilities, then the above problem of 
the lemons market and the disintegration of the market could be prevented. That means 
the choice is also among several forms of regulations (Rl, R2...), total exemption and 
partial exemption. The idea is: it is possible to address concerns necessitating exemptions 
by simply adopting a different approach and form of regulation. The following section 
provides a brief outline of how the size of the water supply system is considered in the 
regulation of providers in England and Wales and the United States.
7.2.1.3. Small Water Suppliers Differently Regulated 
7 2.1.3.1. Differentiated Regulation in England
Private water supplies are defined as those supplies other than water undertakers and 
licensed water suppliers.^* The quality of water provided by water undertakers and 
licensed water suppliers is regulated by the Drinking Water Inspectorate.^^ The quality of 
drinking water provided by private water suppliers is regulated by local authorities^^ 
under Private Water Supplies Regulations 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Regulations). The Regulations divide private water supplies into three categories:
• Water supply for single dwelling (self-supply);
• Large private supply which provides more than lOm^/day or serve more than 50 
people or is part of a public or commercial activity;
• Small private supply which provides less than lOmVday or serve less than 50 
people.
Bradford (n 17) 21 
Water Industry Act 1991 s 93
Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2000 as amended by the Water Supply (Water Quality) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2001, 2002,2005 and 2007
^ S 219 o f  the Water Industry Act 1991 defines a local authorities as “the council o f  a district or o f  a 
London borough or the Common Council o f  the city o f  London (but in relation to Wales this means the 
Council o f  a Country or County Borough)
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Water supplies for single dwelling are exempted from the requirements of the 
Regulations. Large and small private supplies are however required to meet the water 
quality standards in the Regulations. What is noticeable here for large as well as small 
private supplies is the absence of any requirement to use any treatment technologies or 
any duty to carry out frequent water quality tests and to report the results of the reports. 
The duty to monitor through sampling and analysing is, on the other hand, imposed on 
local authorities. Local authorities may, however, charge private water supplies for the 
costs of monitoring and risk assessments.^'* The Regulations provide a schedule of such 
fees.^^ What is relevant for the purpose of the discussion here is how differently small 
water systems are regulated from larger formal water utilities. Local authorities are 
required to make a risk assessment of each large private water supply in their jurisdiction 
every five years.^^ The purpose of the risk assessment is “to establish whether there is a 
significant risk of supplying water that would constitute a potential danger to human 
health”.^  ^ The risk assessment aims to identify risks of contamination in the catchment 
area of the water source and the distribution system; and to determine measures to reduce 
the risk through source protection measures and/or treatment methods.^^
The Regulations also require the local authority to monitor private water supplies.^^ 
Monitoring involves taking water samples and analysing the content to determine if they 
satisfy the water quality standards provided in the Regulations.^® The parameters to be 
monitored and the circumstances are also provided for in the Regulations.^* For example, 
one of the parameters is Aluminium. A local authority is required to monitor the level of 
Aluminium in the water if it is used as a flocculant or where the water originates from, or 
is influenced by, surface waters. On the other hand, the taste of the water is to be
Private Water Supplies Regulations 2009 R 21(1) 
Ibid
Ibid R 6
57 Ibid 6(2)
DWI (n 45)31-32
Private Water Supplies Regulations 2009 R 7 
Ibid Schedule 1 
Ibid Schedule 2
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monitored in all large private supplies. The frequency of sampling is provided in the 
Regulations and it varies depending on the volume of water supplied each day—ranging 
from once a year for suppliers that provide 10 or less m^/day to more than 34 times a year 
when the volume exceeds 10,000m^/day.^^ The local authority may carry out more 
frequent and/or extensive monitoring if that is warranted by the results of the risk 
assessment.^^ The frequencies may also be reduced depending on the previous monitoring 
results but may not be less frequent than half of the prescribed amount. '^* The Regulations 
also provide for another kind of monitoring called audit monitoring which is less frequent 
but more extensive than check monitoring.
The nature and frequency of monitoring with respect to small water supplies is different. 
For large private supplies, the lowest frequency is once a year and the mandatory 
parameters to monitored are numerous. For small private supplies, the mandatory 
frequency is once every five years and the parameters to be monitored are fewer (such as 
conductivity, E Coli and turbidity).^^ The local authority may conduct more frequent and 
extensive monitoring if that is warranted by the results of the risk assessment.^^
In case failures are identified from the analysis of samples, the Regulations provide the 
procedures to be followed. First the local authority will determine if there is potential 
danger to human health. In the event of potential danger, it is required to inform 
consumers and give advice to minimise the danger; to serve a notice on the relevant 
person; and to inform the consumers about the n o tic e .T h e  notice served consists of a 
prohibition or restriction of the use of the supply and specified remedial measures if 
known at the time.^^
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid R 10 
Ibid
Ibid R 14
Ibid R 18
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If the failure does not pose any significant danger to human health, the local authority 
will investigate the source of the failure unless it is trivial and unlikely to recur/^ 
Following the results of the investigation, the local authority will recommend remedial 
measures and will try to informally ensure that the cause is remedied. During this time, it 
is possible for the supplier to be granted ‘authorisation’. The authorisation is the 
permission to continue to supply water to a lower standard than prescribed in the 
Regulations.^® The authorisation can be granted for a maximum period of three years and 
in no case will this be given for any of microbiological parameters in the Regulations.^* If 
no authorisation is granted and the person is not willing to take the recommended 
remedial measures, the local authority is required to serve a formal notice indicating the 
recommended m e a su re s .I f  not complied, the local authority may on its own take the 
remedial measures and claim the costs.^^
From the discussions above it is clear that size of water supplies is an important 
consideration in the regulation of drinking water quality. The frequency of sampling 
differs according to the number of people or volume of water served. The parameters to 
be sampled are also different depending on size. There is also a possibility of getting a 
temporary permission to depart from most of the standards provided for different 
parameters other than microbiological ones. Even if not expressly mentioned, the purpose 
of these differentiated regulatory forms and approaches are a reflection of the cost burden 
on suppliers and the minimal level of health risk posed (measured in terms of number of 
people or volume of water supplied). One can also discern a departure from what are 
known as product standards to process standards. '^* The purposes of the periodical risk 
assessments are to identify the potential risks, and to suggest to the supplier source 
protection and/or treatment measures. Prohibition or restriction is used as a last resort 
only when there is danger to public health. Even then the local authorities are required to
Ibid
Ibid R 17 
Ibid 
Ibid 
Ibid
See Section 7.4.4. 
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make sure that the prohibition or restriction is not more dangerous than the unrestricted 
use of a particular water supply.
7.2.1.3 2. Differentiated Regulation in United States
The primary water quality standards are set by the federal environmental regulator, EPA, 
on the basis of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). However, the Act envisages 
delegation of primary enforcement and implementation mandate to a state if  that state has 
adopted quality standards “no less stringent than the national primary drinking water 
regulations” and adequate enforcement programme.^^ Accordingly, the Act is now being 
enforced by all states except two with respect to which the EPA assumes the primary 
enforcement mandate.^^ SDWA applies to water systems that provide piped drinking 
water to at least 15 service connections or an average of twenty five people per day for at 
least 60 days per year.^^ However, a number of mechanisms have been adopted to take 
into account the special case of small water supplies which nonetheless serve an average 
of 25 people for more than sixty days a year.
Affordable drinking w ater quality standards: One of these mechanisms is the 
requirement in the SDWA that the EPA should consider the cost implications of its 
regulatory standards.T his is particularly important for small suppliers. Therefore EPA 
ensures that its water quality standards are affordable. It considers a standard affordable if 
after complying with the standard the monthly bill for water does not exceed 2 percent of 
household expenditure.^^ There has been a concern, however, about how EPA discharges 
its responsibility. It has been indicated that in determining whether a given standard is 
affordable, EPA considers the costs on larger water systems which serve more than
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 s 300g-2(a) (1) and (2)
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 s 1413. See also Tiemann (n 43) 5 
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 s 3001(4)
Ibid
EPA, Information fo r  States on Developing Affordability Criteria fo r  Drinking Water (1997) cited in S
Tully, ‘A Human Right to Access Water? A Critique o f  General Comment No. 15’ (2005) 23 Netherlands
Quarterly o f  Human Rights 35
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20,000 people; these water systems constitute less than 2 percent of community water 
systems but serve 56 percent of the population served by these systems/®
Temporary exemptions: The exemption discussed earlier is automatic and is built into 
the legal framework as passed by the legislature as part of the definition of public water 
systems/* There is another exemption which can be called an administrative 
exemption/^ It is administrative because even if it is consistent with the intention of the 
legislature as clearly manifested in the Safe Drinking Water Act, it is the administrative 
agency (the Environmental Protection Agency) that decides whether to exempt a 
particular provider from the requirements of the water quality regulations. It is also 
different from the above exemption in that this one is specific in two senses. First only 
specific providers are exempted. And they are not exempted generally from all 
requirements of the water quality regulations but from some specified requirements. And 
finally it should be noted that they are exempted not permanently but for a specified 
period of time. The fact that water systems providing service to as little as 15 service 
connections or to 25 people per day for sixty days a year are required to meet water 
quality standards developed by the EPA has raised a number of concerns relating to the 
financial, technical and managerial capacity of small systems to comply with the 
regulations. As a result the 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act recognised 
the possibility of exempting small water systems from compliance of some of the 
standards for a certain period of time. Small systems may be granted exemption for a 
maximum of three times, each for a period of tw o-years.T he amendments also provide 
the procedures for granting exemption. First, there should be a public hearing. '^* Second, 
there should be finding that the extension will not result in an ‘unreasonable risk to 
health
M Tiemann, ‘Arsenic in Drinking Water: Regulatory Developments and Issues’ in SV Thomas (ed). 
Water Pollution Issues and Developments (2008)
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 s 3001(4)
Tiemann (n 43) 21
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 s 1416
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Different sampling frequency: Size is also considered in determining required sampling 
frequencies. For example, under the Total Coliform Rule which attempts to ensure public 
health protection from microbial contamination, the frequency ranges from one sample 
per month for water systems serving 25 people to 480 samples per month for the largest 
of water systems serving about 4 million people.*^
General exemption from specific standards: Some water systems are exempted owing 
to their size and capacity from some of the standards. For example, public water systems 
serving less than 10,000 people are exempted from the Trihalomethane Rule because 
“EPA was concerned that smaller systems would not have sufficient expertise available 
to deal with elevated levels of THMs without compromising microbiological safety”. 
[Trihalomethane is formed as a by-product predominantly when chlorine is used to 
disinfect water for drinking. It results from the reaction of chlorine and/or bromine with 
organic matter present in the water being treatedJAnother example comes from the lead- 
cooper drinking water standards which exempted small water systems serving less than 
3,300 persons from many of the regulatory requirements.^^
In addition to this, public water systems are divided into three: community water systems, 
transitory-non-community water systems and non-transitory-non-community water 
systems. Community water systems are those that serve the same people all year. They 
are required to comply with all water quality standards.*^ Non-transient-non-community 
water systems are those which have their own water supply but serve the same 
individuals for more than six months but not year-round. Transient-non-community water 
systems are those which have their source of water and serve transient customers. On the
National Research Council, Drinking Water Distribution Systems: Assessing and Reducing Risks 
(National Academies Press, 2006) 50
Ibid 51
** EPA, The Cost Effective Regulation by EPA and Small Business Impacts (1993) 16 (“These requirements 
included conducting comparative corrosion control studies, developing a corrosion control treatment plan, 
and demonstrating (after implementation o f  the plan) that treatment has been optimised if  certain action 
levels o f  lead and cooper were not met. The regulations gave the responsibility for these actions to the state 
agencies with primacy over the regulations. EPA judged that small and possibly medium-sized water 
systems had neither the fiscal nor the technical resources to perform these activities. Indeed, the size cut-off 
for small water systems was based largely on the lack o f  technical expertise o f  systems serving fewer than 
3,300 persons”)
Tiemann (n 43) 5
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other hand, the other two are exempted from some of the regulatory standards even if 
they are required to comply with microbiological standards/®
Affordable compliance technologies: According to the 1996 Amendments the EPA is 
now required to indicate affordable technologies that comply with the standard set. 
Therefore, when it sets a maximum contaminant level for a given contaminant, the EPA 
is also required to identify technologies which can be used to comply with the specified 
level and which are affordable to the three categories of small public water systems.^* 
[Public water systems are divided into five depending on the number of people served: 
very small, small, medium, large and very large]
Affordable variance technologies: According to the 1996 Amendments the EPA is now 
required to indicate affordable technologies that do not meet the maximum contaminant 
level but are protective of public health. If such technologies are determined by EPA, 
small systems may apply to their respective states to use the variance technologies.^^
From the discussion in the previous paragraphs, it is clear that size is an important 
consideration in not only regulatory decision-making in general but also in the regulation 
of drinking water quality. One can discern some similarities between the cases of 
England and Unites States in how small water systems are treated in water quality 
regulation. The most obvious is the use of various sampling frequencies depending on the 
size of water supplies. The second one is the use of temporary ‘authorisations’ in private 
water supplies regulation in England and ‘exemptions’ in United States. The third is the 
tendency to use process standards as opposed to product standards.^^ In the case of 
England, local authorities are required to make risk assessments to identify risks of 
contamination from the source catchment and during distribution and, based on that, 
recommend remedial source protection and treatment methods. These are process 
standards. In addition, whenever failures to meet the water quality standards are detected, 
remedial measures are recommended to the person by the local authority. If the failure
Ibid 
Ibid 20 
''Ibid
"  Section 7.4.4 in this Chapter discusses the choice between process and product standards. 
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causes a significant danger to public health, the local authority imposes a prohibition or 
restriction of the use of the water supply only if doing that is not more dangerous to 
public health. In the United States, the requirement to indicate affordable compliance or 
variance technologies for different categories of small water systems is also an indication 
of the preference for process over product standards when it comes to small water 
supplies.
The purpose of the above discussion is not to find out regulatory techniques that can be 
transplanted into Kenya and Ethiopia but to highlight the fact that when it comes to 
regulation size matters. It matters because regulations impose heavier burdens on the 
smallest enterprises. If  these smallest enterprises are the providers of vital services and 
sources of employment like SIPs, there is a strong case for taking this into consideration 
in regulatory decision making. It was argued earlier that exemption is not the appropriate 
response because of several reasons. First, the analysis for exemption wrongly assumes 
that there is only one form of regulation. Second, partial exemption might result in some 
fundamental distortions to the existing small-scale water market. Third, owing to mobile 
vendors and the failure of the official utilities, wells provide water to about 40 percent of 
the population in Kisumu; this is a size that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the preferable 
option is to regulate but to regulate in a different way, not necessarily in the way small 
water supplies are regulated in England and United States but in a way that reflects local 
conditions.
7.2.1.4. Differentiated Regulation and the Right to Water
The argument for differently regulating small water suppliers, because uniform regulation 
imposes a heavier burden on them, might raise an issue as economic considerations are 
injected into what is principally regarded as a public health concern. One may even 
challenge this on the ground that it violates the right to water, the very right which is used 
to argue for the duty of governments to regulate water providers including SIPs. '^*
The right to water entitles individuals to safe and affordable water for domestic and 
personal uses. The issue of regulatory costs is directly related to affordability of water. 
Whatever costs are incurred by water providers to comply with quality regulations will 
find their way in the price consumers will pay. Improved water quality will come only at
See Section 6.4
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the cost of increased prices unless the capital and operational costs required to meet 
regulatory standards are fully covered or subsidised by the government. Therefore, there 
is a trade-off to be made between affordability and safety of water, both of which are 
elements of the right to water. The right to water does not prioritise among these two 
elements. When the General Comment provides that water for personal and domestic 
uses must be safe, it did not provide any safety standards. To what extent water should be 
safe is therefore left to the discretion of State Parties to the Covenants on which the right 
to water is based. When it comes to SIPs, affordability is already a serious concern 
considering in particular that these providers often serve low income neighbourhoods. 
There is considerable equity concern with the fact that middle and upper income 
households who have private connection pay less per unit of water than low income 
households. To require SIPS to comply with the same quality standards as official 
utilities is to further exacerbate this problem. There is a concern about the safety of water 
provided by SIPs. Exempting them will further exacerbate the problem as discussed 
earlier. Therefore, to argue that SIPs should be regulated but in a different way, in a way 
that is cost-effective and less burdensome, is not to ignore the safety of water but to take 
into account the fact that public health depends on safety and affordability of water; 
improved safety comes with increased price; and therefore an attempt should be made to 
strike a balance between safety and affordability. Examination of how small water 
supplies are considered in regulation of drinking water quality in England and United 
States also supports this approach.
7.2.I.4. Conclusion
This section has explored the relationship between size of water suppliers and form of 
regulation. Regulations impose a heavier burden on small enterprises such as SIPs and 
hence measures should be taken to exempt some of them or adopt a light-handed form of 
regulation. It is argued that exemption of SIPs will result in a distorted market and 
ultimately will be ineffective. Therefore, the other option is to adopt a light-handed form 
of regulation, the same approach which is followed in other countries in dealing with 
small water utilities.
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7.2.2. Too Many and Too Informal to be Regulated?
One of the characteristics of SIPs in general and those in Kisumu and Addis Ababa in 
particular is their number/^ They are many—hundreds of well-owners and mobile 
vendors in Kisumu and innumerable kiosks, mobile vendors and neighbour sellers in 
Addis Ababa. The other characteristic of SIPs is their informal nature—informal in the 
sense that most of them, if not all, operate without registration. In Kisumu, standpipe 
operators, operators in the newly implemented delegated-management model and the 
Namasarya Water Works are formalised operations. Well-owners and mobile water 
vendors are operating informally and illegally. The authorities do not know the number of 
active wells and mobile vendors.
These characteristics of SIPs are not of mere academic interest. They determine to some 
extent the regulatory approach that should be adopted. Mainly because of the fact that 
they are too many and unregistered, it is argued in this section that, one should not solely 
rely on the use of sticks (sanctions) to discipline the conduct of SIPs. There will be a low 
probability of detection and enforcement. As a result, the deterrent edge of any legal 
sanctions will be blunted. This indicates the need to ensure trust in and fairness and 
legitimacy of any regulatory system instituted to control them in order to induce 
voluntary compliance.
For any regulatory measure to be effective, it has to have certain attributes. The sanctions 
for not complying with regulatory requirements must be severe and the probability of 
being detected and punished must be reasonably high. Otherwise it would not be 
effectively deterrent. To some extent there can be a trade-off between these attributes of a 
deterrent regulatory instrument. A more severe sanction would be adopted when the 
probability of detection is low. This describes what is called the ‘deterrence model of 
compliance’. T h e  problem with the deterrence model both as a descriptive and 
prescriptive model of regulation is that, first, it does not sufficiently describe the motives 
of individuals complying with regulatory requirements. There are circumstances where
See Section 6.3
See, for instance, KE Hickman and CA Hill, ‘Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory 
State’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 1151, 1159-1160; TP Malloy, ‘Regulation, Compliance, and the 
Firm’ (2003) 76 Temple Law Review 451, 453-455; JC Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: 
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem o f  Corporate Punishment (1981) Michigan Law Review 386, 
389-407
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people obey the law not because they are motivated by the rewards and punishments. 
Second, the model might result in a policy prescription that involves increasing the 
punishment or the level of monitoring and enforcement. Such prescription will be in 
some cases ineffective and in others costly.
The second model of compliance, known as the accommodation or cooperative model, 
states that regulated parties “respond more positively to persuasion, education, and 
assistance than penalties”.^  ^It is argued that people would often obey those requirements 
which they consider as legitimate even though the sanction is lenient or the level of 
monitoring and enforcement is low.^^
It should be noted that the two models are not mutually exclusive and hence can be used 
in tandem.^^ To the extent that the deterrence model does not describe a given regulatory 
relationship, the accommodation model can be used. The prescriptive implication is that 
in cases where increasing the punishment for failure to comply with a given regulatory 
requirement is costly or entails counterproductive effects or where monitoring and 
enforcement is very difficult, compliance can effectively be attained by applying the 
policy implications of the accommodation model. These include negotiation, persuasion, 
education, assistance, participation and so on. This is not however at the expense of 
sanctions and enforcement. In cases where it is “impossible to specify in unambiguous 
legal rules the behaviour required to achieve intended policy purposes”, cooperative 
strategies are said to be superior to coercive measures.*®®
"  See, for instance, Hickman and Hill (n 96) 1160
See, for example, TR Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006) 3-4, 22-27 (arguing that people tend 
naturally to obey laws which they perceive as legitimate and that in “democratic societies the legal system 
cannot function if  it can influence people only by manipulating rewards and costs”); AF Gardner, ‘Beyond 
Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement Environmental Management Systems’ (2003) 11 New  
York University Environmental Law Journal 662, 664-667; C Parker, ‘Compliance Professionalism and 
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When it comes to regulation of SIPs, the deterrent edge of regulatory instruments would 
be blunted owing to several factors. First, small-scale providers as they are characterised 
in the literature and as it is also demonstrated in the case studies are operating in an 
unregistered (informal) manner. Consequently, it will be difficult to monitor the 
operation of any regulatory requirement such as licensing systems, quality standards and 
so on. Second, they are many in number and hence the costs of enforcement would be 
prohibitive. Third, they are small and as a result if severe penalties are imposed, it would 
not only affect the property and personal interest of the actors but also the public interest 
by taking them out of business.
Therefore, it can be argued that the policy prescriptions of the cooperation model of 
compliance should be preferred to those of the deterrence model. This would mean that 
attempts should be made to persuade, educate and assist them on the need and manner of 
improving and maintaining the quality of the water and complying with any regulatory 
standards. Attempts should be made to develop trust between them and the regulator. 
Measures to enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory system must be taken.
7.3. The Propriety of Prohibiting SIPs
7.3.1. Prohibition as a Regulatory Instrument
Once it is established that there is a case for regulation, the next point is to identify the 
most appropriate regulatory tools for the task. Such tools can be identified on the basis of 
cost effectiveness: which tool helps to achieve the objective at the least cost. The costs of 
regulatory instrument include the costs imposed on the regulated and those incurred by 
the government for monitoring and enforcement. Though overall costs incurred by the 
regulatory agency are as important as costs incurred by the regulated, the paramount 
emphasis in the case of regulation of drinking water quality by SIPs is on reducing the 
costs on the regulated as such costs have direct impacts on affordability. A related 
consideration is choice of the least intrusive regulatory tool: when two or more 
instruments can equally achieve the regulatory objective, a choice must be made for that 
which is least intrusive to individual liberty.*®*
TM Pope, ‘Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics o f  Smoking Regulations’ 
(2000) 61 University o f  Pittsburgh Law Review 419,432
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Prohibition of a specified activity is one of the regulatory instruments.*®^ The prohibition 
may be either built into the statute enacted by the principal legislature in one legal system 
or developed by the regulatory agency. Another regulatory instrument is entry regulation. 
Entry regulation involves prohibiting engaging in specified activity without a license that 
can be acquired only after fulfilling certain technical competence, educational and/or 
capital requirements. This is also sometimes known as screening regulation in the area of 
risk regulation.*®^ The third regulatory instrument is regulation of conduct. This involves 
setting of standards that must be observed by people engaged in a specified activity. This 
is sometimes known as standard-setting regulation.*®'* These requirements could involve 
prescription of process or technology that must be used or goal that must be achieved. It 
could involve imposing a duty to disclose specified types of information to specified 
group of people. It should be noted that entry regulation and regulation of conduct are not 
mutually exclusive. These instruments can be put in descending order of their degree of 
intrusiveness as follows:
• prohibition
• entry regulation with minimum capital requirement
• entry regulation with minimum technical competence requirements
• conduct regulation specifying technology to be used
• conduct requirement specifying goal to be achieved
• conduct requirement imposing information disclosure obligations
It should be noted that if a given regulatory objective can be achieved by any of these 
regulatory instruments and the paramount importance is preserving as much liberty of the 
regulated as possible, information disclosure regulation might be preferred to the others.
Sometimes prohibition is forwarded as an alternative to regulation instead o f  a type o f  regulation. See, 
for example, TE Loscalzo and SJ Shapiro, ‘Internet Gambling Policy: Prohibition versus Regulation (2000) 
7 Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 11 and R Marks, ‘Prohibition or Regulation: An 
Economists’ View o f  Australian Heroin Policy’ (1990) 23 Australia and New Zealand Journal o f  
Criminology 65
Screening regulation is defined as “a process o f  regulating risk by advance scrutiny and approval or 
rejection”. P Hubler, ‘The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation’ (1983) 69 Virginia Law Review 1025, 
1030
Standard-setting regulation can be defined as a process that “seeks to encourage risk-reducing 
transformations through mandatory, or occasionally, suggested guidelines directed at specific activities or 
products”. Hubler (n 103) 1030
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On the other hand, if the concern is to minimise costs, depending on which costs 
(enforcement or compliance costs) is of paramount importance, the choice might be 
different. It should also be noted that it is rarely that all of the instruments can be equally 
effective.
As it is stated above, one of the instruments of regulation of human behaviour in general 
and of public health in particular is prohibition. In its extreme form, it involves 
prohibiting the relevant activity. In its more diluted, modem and more practical form, it 
prohibits bringing about of a certain result. It is the oldest form of regulation. Criminal 
law which mainly consists of prohibiting rules is a classic example of this type of 
regulatory instrument. This section examines the propriety of using prohibition of SIPS 
as regulatory instmment to make drinking water safe and affordable.
In a situation where the official utilities (AAWSA, KIWASCO and LVSWSB) are not in 
a position to supply water to every household, it looks obviously improper to prohibit 
resale or supply of water. But at the same time, it is argued in Chapter Six that 
governments in Ethiopia and Kenya have the duty to regulate the safety of drinking 
water. And one may wonder if prohibition is an appropriate regulatory tool. This section 
argues that prohibition of the activities of SIPs is not the appropriate instmment for 
public health protection. In addition, it examines other possible arguments that may be 
forwarded in favour of prohibition such as prohibition as a tool to minimise problems of 
natural monopoly or prohibition as a tool to practise price-discrimination (cross-subsidy). 
It concludes that none of these arguments justify prohibiting the operation of SIPs. One 
may wonder regarding the purpose of this discussion as in both case study areas the 
activities of SIPS are not prohibited. It might be true that in the case of Kenya at least the 
activity of SIPs is not prohibited. At least the law allows them to operate at a limited 
scale and requires a service provision agreement for those exceeding the threshold. The 
purpose of discarding prohibition as a regulatory instmment at the beginning helps also to 
do away with any legal, regulatory and administrative requirements that have prohibitive 
effects. So even if the law does not prohibit the activities of SIPs, the argument that 
prohibition is nonetheless an inappropriate regulatory instmment also means that none of 
the other regulatory instmments should in practice have prohibitive effect. Likewise, in 
the case of Addis Ababa, the national framework does not prohibit people from self- 
supplying nor does it prohibit people from supplying others. It, however, provides for a 
requirement of licence. When it comes to Addis Ababa, it is unlikely that this permit will 
be secured without the consent of the official utility (AAWSA) and it is found in this
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research that this consent will only be given for communal taps or kebelle administered 
public fountains. Yes it is true that this is not proactively enforced. However, the tariff 
structure of the utility is meant to have such prohibitive effect.*®^
7.3.2. Prohibition to Protect Public Health
A possible argument is to consider the prohibition of supply o f water or resale of water as 
regulation rooted in public health concerns. The argument is that resale of water or 
supply of water from sources other than the official utility might be considered as unsafe 
or in fact as so dangerous that it should be responded to by clear prohibition of that 
activity. As it is stated earlier, prohibition is the extreme and the harshest form of legal 
response. It is employed with respect to activities which impose social harm without any 
form of social benefits or even if they bring social benefits it is such that they are dwarfed 
by the associated danger and there is no way of minimising the danger. So, for example, 
when criminal law prohibits the killing of a human being the general idea is that killing of 
a human being imposes social harm without bringing any social benefit or even if it 
brings social benefits it is such that they are dwarfed by the costs which cannot be 
minimised in any way. Even then the law recognises situations where a person could be 
excused or justified in killing another person; rules of self-defence, duress and necessity 
are used for this purpose.
Now when it comes to prohibition of SIPs as one regulatory response, it can only be 
justified under two conditions. First, it should be established that small-scale water 
provision (in particular wells and other forms of independent providers) do not have 
benefits or even if they have benefits they are dwarfed by the associated costs; and the 
associated costs cannot be minimised in any way. If the above two conditions are 
established in a given case, then prohibition will be the legitimate regulatory response. 
The study of the role of SIPs generally and in Addis Ababa and Kisumu in particular 
shows, however, that they play an important role in serving the urban poor. About 60 
percent of the population in Kisumu rely on SIPs in general and 40 percent on well- 
owners and boreholes in particular.*®  ^It is, however, true that they have safety problems
Section 4.5.6 
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as it is found out in the water safety study.*®  ^ This alone is not adequate ground for 
legitimating prohibition. It is not clear if the benefits of their activity (increasing access) 
are not justified by the possible public health concerns from unsafe water they may 
supply. More importantly, it should also be established that the water safety problems 
cannot be minimised in any way, an argument difficult to maintain. There could be some 
wells which are unsafe and beyond cure but this does not mean that all form of small- 
scale provision should be prohibited. Mobile vendors transport water; but from the 
quality study it has become clear that no significant contamination occurs during 
transportation.*®* This study may not be conclusive and further studies might have to be 
carried out. But it is proper at this time neither to prohibit the operation of SIPs nor to 
adopt any regulatory instrument that has prohibitive effect. In discussing the propriety of 
affording exclusivity privileges to official utilities, which in effect prohibits the operation 
of some forms of SIPs, Kessides writes: “governments may also use exclusivity to 
discourage consumers from using unsafe water sources and to avoid negative 
externalities from private well drilling. But exclusivity can work against the public 
interest if water coverage is low and utility performance is poor—as in most cities in low- 
income countries”.*®^ It should also be noted that the right to water as discussed in 
Chapter Six also means that adopting prohibition as a public health instrument might 
amount to arbitrary interference and hence breach of the obligation to respect. It is 
arbitrary because the concerns underlying prohibition can be addressed using a less 
intrusive regulatory instruments.
Attention should also be directed at the cost effectiveness of prohibition as a regulatory 
instrument. The private costs of compliance consists of foregone private benefits of not 
being able to sell water from one’s well. And the enforcement costs are the costs incurred 
by the relevant organ in monitoring compliance and sanctioning non-compliance. It was 
argued earlier that the sheer number and informality of SIPs means that the costs of 
enforcement are substantial.**® The government has to use severe sanctions and increase 
the probability of detection of non-compliance and punishment. It is unlikely to rely on
Section 6.3.2 
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voluntary compliance when adopting such a severe regulatory instrument as prohibition. 
The most significant costs are not, however, private but social. Prohibition of SIPs means 
that there will be less water in supply resulting in increased price. This will make 
drinking water even less affordable resulting in perhaps equally severe public health 
concerns. It is doubtful if prohibition can also be effective. The other social cost is that of 
rent-seeking behaviour by law enforcement officials where because of the high costs of 
increasing probability of detection the government chooses to increase the punishment. In 
such cases, it creates an opportunity for officials to trade tolerance for private benefits 
from SIPs. When demand is to some extent less elastic like in the case of water, 
prohibition might result in a more informal and underground market.*** And controlling 
this will be more difficult and ineffective.
In conclusion, it can be argued that prohibition is not an appropriate regulatory 
instrument because of three major reasons. First, it is the most liberty-restricting 
regulatory instrument whose underlying objective can be achieved by the use of less 
intrusive instruments. Second, its private compliance costs will make voluntary 
compliance unlikely resulting in substantial enforcement costs. The social costs of 
prohibition (less affordability) are to some extent as important as the social benefits of 
increased safety. Third, there is a risk of taking them deeper in the underground 
(informal) market further increasing the enforcement cost or making regulation 
ineffective.
7.3.3. Prohibition to Protect Exclusivity Privileges of Official Utilities
It has been pointed out in Chapter Six that the conventional water supply model is a 
natural monopoly owing to the huge fixed and sunk costs required, the economies of 
scale involved and public rights of way necessitated to put out the necessary 
infrastructure.**^ The term ‘natural’ does not necessarily mean that there are natural 
barriers to the entry of competitors in the market. Of course the huge sunk cost is a 
natural barrier. But in addition to this natural barrier, two arguments are made to make 
the water utility a statutory monopoly with exclusivity privileges. First, if any other 
person attempts to enter into the market, even if ultimately because of economies of scale
This is observed in many contexts. See, for example, Marks (n 102) 
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only one of them is able to survive, it is considered nevertheless a wasteful competition. 
Second, the facts that supply of market involves a huge fixed cost which can only be 
recovered over a long period of time and that most of this is sunk with little or no 
alternative use mean that investors need exclusivity guarantee as a security for their 
investment. So, the argument goes, the law should erect an artificial barrier and that can 
be done by declaring one company monopolist within a defined area and prohibiting 
others from similar activities. If this argument is accepted, one can only call for a 
proactively enforced prohibition of SIPs in all places including Kenya and Ethiopia.
A closer scrutiny of the matter, however, suggests otherwise. First, there would not be 
any waste of resources as the small-scale providers which currently exist in the city of 
Addis Ababa, for example, do not compete with the official utility; instead they 
complement the functions of the official utility. Second, even though an argument is 
made to the effect that they are competing, like in the case of well operators in Kisumu, 
the nature of small scale providers as they currently exist is such that they do not make 
any significant sunk costs (relative to what is required in the conventional model) and 
hence even if they ultimately are driven out of the market because of the increased 
performance of the utility, their past existence would not amount to a wasted resource. 
Third, even if there is some possibility for other providers to incur significant sunk costs 
by investing in treatment works and laying out distribution infrastructure, the proper 
response should, considering that the current utilities are not effectively covering all 
areas, is to prohibit latecomers from operating in areas which are already covered by the 
official utility instead of a blanket prohibition of supply of water or resale of water in any 
area of the city. Fourth, the idea that exclusivity is essential to encourage people to invest 
in the official utility is out of place when it comes to Addis Ababa and Kisumu. In 
Kisumu, KIWASCO which is closer to a private company (even if totally owned by the 
municipality) does not own the infrastructure and is not required to make investments in 
the infrastructure. The infrastructure is owned by the government. Likewise, in Addis 
Ababa, the government owns and operates the water supply infrastructure. As 
governments, they are not motivated by profit considerations when they decide whether 
or not to invest in the infrastructure. Therefore, it can be concluded that the need to 
enforce privileges of exclusivity is not an adequate reason to use prohibition as a 
regulatory instrument.
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7.3.4. Prohibition to Increase Affordability
The third possible argument in favour of the prohibition of supply or resale of water 
relates to the notion of price discrimination. Price discrimination is a practice of charging 
different consumers different prices. The market price is a kind of average price. There 
will be consumers who are able and willing to pay above the market price. Similarly there 
will be consumers who are able and willing to buy a given product or service if the price 
is lower than what currently prevails in the market. By charging each consumer or groups 
of consumers the maximum price that they are willing and able to pay, the producer is 
involved in price discrimination and hence will be able to increase the total level of 
production or supply. Price discrimination generally has a positive effect on total welfare 
but a negative one on consumer welfare (at least the welfare of some group of consumers 
who would have bought the product or service at a lower market price).
For price discrimination to occur, there are certain preconditions that must exist. 
Otherwise, it will not be a feasible strategy. Van den Bergh and Camesasca state these 
conditions as follows:
Three necessary conditions must be satisfied to enable a firm to engage in price 
discrimination and make it a profitable strategy. First, the firm must possess some 
market power. In perfectly competitive markets firms have to take the market price 
as given and cannot practice price discrimination... All that is necessary is that the 
firm faces a negatively sloped demand for its products, as do all firms selling 
unique products (monopolistic competition). Second, the firm must have 
information about the maximum prices (different groups of) consumers are willing 
to pay (i.e. information about die reservation prices). Third, arbitrage must be 
prevented. ..F o r this reason price discrimination often occurs for goods that cannot 
be stored (such as electric power) and for services (for example, in the sector of the 
liberal professions).
First of all, are AAWSA and KIWASCO engaged in price discrimination? This requires 
having regard to the tariff structure of the utilities.**"* The tariff structure is such that two 
different consumer groups are charged differently. In this regard, the categories are: 
domestic users, commercial and industrial users and operators of standpipes. In addition, 
individuals in each category pay different rates per volume of water consumed depending 
on the total volume of water consumed. Hence, one can say that both AAWSA and
RJ Van den Bergh and PD Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Perspective (2001) 254-255
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KIWASCO are involved in practices called second-degree and third-degree price 
discrimination. As it is stated in the above quoted paragraph, being able to prevent 
arbitrage is one of the necessary conditions. As such prohibiting resale of water enables 
the official utilities to effectively price discriminate as it would prevent low-priced 
consumers from reselling water to high-priced consumers. Secondly, having a market 
power is one of the other conditions. Market power can be defined as “the ability of a 
firm to set price profitably above competitive levels”.**^  This ability is directly linked to 
the presence or absence of entry barriers, for a firm can have ability to set prices above 
competitive prices only if the market is characterised by significant entry barriers.**^ The 
fact that supply of water involves significant sunk-costs can be considered as entry 
barrier.**^ However, the barrier as emanating from sunk-costs in the industry is not 
sufficient to enable AAWSA and KIWASCO to effectively price discriminate as some 
high-users of water might rather choose to self-supply themselves with little sunk-cost. 
As most of SIPs do, they will overcome this barrier by adopting an entirely different 
business model that does not involve significant sunk costs. As a result, one may propose 
prohibition as an artificial barrier put by the law as a bulwark against high-priced and 
high-volume water users being able to supply themselves and against low-priced users 
from re-selling water to high-priced users and bar the utilities from price- 
discriminating.**^
In the previous paragraph, prohibition of supply and resale of water are presented as entry 
barriers that would enable utilities to exercise price discrimination. That does not, 
however, explain the propriety of the prohibition. To explain the propriety or otherwise 
of the legal prohibition, one has to come up with a convincing case that price 
discrimination by AAWSA and KIWASCO is desirable. In addition, since currently this 
prohibition is not enforced in the case study areas, the reality on the ground should
115 Van den Bergh and Camesasca (n 113) 105
Ibid 107 (stating “generally, if  markets are easily accessible and if  new entrants can leave without 
impediments, the threat o f  new entry will withhold incumbent firms from raising prices above competitive 
levels”)
" H b id l4 3
Ibid 142 (“Monopoly rights granted to a single trader or a group o f  professionals constitute entry 
barriers for potential competitors who are not allowed to sell similar goods or perform similar services. 
Monopoly rights that were granted to public utilities to supply consumers with gas, electricity and water are 
clear examples o f  legal barriers to entry”.)
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indicate that high-priced consumer groups are self-supplying or that low-priced consumer 
groups are reselling water to high-priced consumer groups. There are also legal systems 
which prohibit price discrimination and as a result it might here be asked as to the legal 
status of price discrimination in Ethiopia and Kenya.
What are the legal consequences of price discrimination under Ethiopian and Kenyan 
laws? Are water utilities allowed to be engaged in price discrimination? Article 5 of 
Ethiopia’s competition law reads: “No business person, either by himself or acting 
together with others, may carry on commercial activity by openly or dubiously abusing 
the dominant position he has in the market”.**^  One of the trade practices considered 
abuse is imposition of discrimination between customers, in prices and other terms and 
conditions in the supply and purchase of goods and services.*^** Consequently, it seems to 
follow from the above provisions that any practice of price discrimination is illegal and 
hence the law should not be used to facilitate it. However, the prohibition of price 
discrimination does not apply to public utilities such as A A W S A .K en y a’s competition 
law also contains general prohibition on abuse of dominant position, or ‘unwarranted 
concentration of economic power’.C o n cen tra tio n  of economic of power is deemed 
unwarranted if it causes certain specified r e su l t s . P r i ce  discrimination might constitute 
unwarranted concentration of p o w e r . T h e  problem here is that companies which are 
subject to price regulation may be involved in practices if approved by the regulator even 
though such practices would normally be considered a violation of competition law.*^  ^
Therefore, it can be argued here that price discrimination as practised by KIWASCO and 
AAWSA is legal.
Trade Practice and Consumers’ Protection Proclamation No. 685/2010 
Ibid Art 8(6)
Ibid Art 4(3) (b)
UNCTD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: Kenya (2005) (discussing Restrictive Trade 
Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act 1988)
Ibid
Ibid
Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act 1988 ss 5 & 73
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Putting aside the issue of legality, one may wonder as to the desirability or necessity of 
such practices. The desirability of price discrimination from efficiency perspective 
depends on the kind of price discrimination used. First-degree price discrimination is said 
to be beneficial from total welfare perspective. Society benefits even if some consumers 
as a group might be charged higher. This might raise questions about the distributional 
effects and the social costs of rent-seeking behaviour this might bring on.*^  ^ Second- 
degree pricing is also favoured from efficiency perspective not only because it maximises 
total welfare but because it also maximises the welfare of consumers:
Block pricing (i.e. charging a decreasing average price with increasing use), often 
practised by public utilities, and quantity discounts are two forms of second degree 
of price discrimination. If average and marginal costs decrease by expanding 
output, block pricing may be encouraged. Consumer welfare can thus be increased, 
even though allowing for greater profit to the company. The reason is that prices 
are reduced overall, while the savings from the lower costs per unit allow a 
reasonable profit.
However, it should be noted that the above assertion is restricted to the use of block 
pricing (one form of discrimination). The problem is the form of price discrimination 
used by AAWSA and KIWASCO is not decreasing block pricing; rather it is progressive 
tariff structure, charging increasing unit price with increasing use. From the perspective 
of efficiency, therefore, this is objectionable if the highest unit price is more than the 
marginal cost of supply. The same is true to the third degree price discrimination 
exercised by the two utilities, charging different users different per unit price. This is said 
to be desirable from efficiency perspective only when the two groups of consumers are 
different in the cost to supply them.*^^ However it has already been discussed in Chapter 
Six that efficiency is not and should not be the only objective of public policy. This is 
particularly true in the areas of supply of services as vital as drinking water. It has been 
suggested that if efficiency considerations were to exclusively take the centre of 
regulatory decision making, some consumers would go without these essential services. 
As a result it is suggested that some ways should be found to ensure that water services 
are affordable to as much as possible the largest sections of the population. This is also
Van den Bergh and Camesasca (n 113) 255-256 
Ibid
Ibid 256 
Ibid 256-257
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one of the requirements of the right to water. It is also indicated in Chapter Six that a 
regulatory requirement and permission to use cross-subsidies should be one of these 
affordability measures. Cross-subsidy in the form of progressive tariff structure or 
differentiated rate according to consumer group is one form of price discrimination. 
Hence from social objective perspective, it is a desirable practice. It can also be said that 
progressive tariff structure encourages conservation and efficient utilisation of water. In 
conclusion, it is argued here that it is desirable that competition laws of Kenya and 
Ethiopia exempt water utilities from the general prohibition of price discrimination.
For the prohibition of supply or resale of water to be justified as an instrument enabling 
desirable and legal forms of price discrimination, it must be bolstered by an argument 
that if not for this prohibition low-priced customers would resell water to high-priced 
customers. The reality on the ground is, however, the contrary. It is not low-priced users 
who are reselling water to high-priced users; instead it is those who have access to the 
utility’s network that are reselling to households who, for different reasons, are not 
directly connected. Even if resale of water appears to violate the prohibition that is 
designed to enable price discrimination, what has actually happened is resale of water is 
being used to achieve the purpose which price discrimination is supposed to achieve. 
Similarly, self-supply and supply of others from independent sources also does not 
contradict the ultimate purpose which price discrimination is supposed to achieve. This is 
because people are sinking wells to supply themselves and others, not to avoid the 
discriminatory rate being applied by the utilities.
In conclusion it can be said that prohibition of resale could not be justified as an 
instrument to protect the exclusivity privilege of public utilities or to protect public health 
or to enable utilities to price discriminate to achieve social purposes. The last argument 
may, however, be used to prevent high-volume users from self-supplying or low-priced 
consumers from reselling to high-priced users. Even that could only be justified in a 
situation where the official utilities are in a position to satisfy the demands from high- 
volume users adequately. This is without overlooking the objection that might be raised 
from competition perspective. Economic regulators in some countries such as England 
and Wales are trying to facilitate competition in the water sector by allowing high- 
volume water users to self-supply or to switch utilities. This is done because in such 
systems price discrimination (or cross subsidy) is not adopted as a regulatory instrument 
to increase affordability.
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7.4. Regulation of Entry and Conduct
7.4.1. Simplified and Unified Permit System for Well-Owners
Once prohibition as a legal response to the issue of water safety and affordability is 
eliminated the next task is to determine if it might be beneficial to impose any restriction 
to entry into the small-scale market. Regulation of entry generally involves providing for 
a requirement of a license as a condition to enter into a specified market.*^ ** Any 
application for a permit might be granted or rejected depending on whether the applicant 
has fulfilled specified requirements. The purpose is usually to ensure that only people 
having the requisite technical and financial competence as required by the nature of the 
activity enter into the market. Sometimes, it might also have the object of ensuring that 
applicants will have the resource to cover eventual liability they might incur in 
connection with the activity they are licensed to carry out. The requirements also reflect 
the general purposes of licensing systems. Licensing systems are also used in regulation 
of water suppliers in general. The purpose is to make sure that they have the financial, 
organisational, technical, and insurance required by the nature of the water supply 
business. Often the underlying concern is economic, to ensure that the water supply 
system is run as efficiently as possible by a competent monopolistic provider. In some 
cases, the purpose is to protect public health. This section proposes a simplified and 
unified permit system for entry regulation of SIPs with the object of minimising risks to 
public health.
It has been pointed out that, in Kenya, small-scale providers are allowed to operate on a 
limited scale without the need to secure a permit for abstraction and supply of water. 
They can supply if they supply no more than twenty households and 25 thousand litres of 
water per day. The purpose of this limitation as it currently stands is ambiguous. On the 
one hand it might be taken as a measure to minimise risks to public health. This, upon 
closer scrutiny, is not however true. The law allows provision of water beyond twenty 
households so long as it is based on a service provision agreement between the provider 
and the relevant WSB (in the case of Kisumu, LVSWSB). The problem with this 
possibility is that there are certain provisions of the Water Act which constrain SIPs from 
getting such service provision agreement. For example, the Water Act requires any WSP 
to be constituted as a separate entity exclusively for the purpose of supplying water
For an economic and legal analysis o f  entry regulation, see S Svorny, ‘Licensing, Market Entry 
Regulation’ in B Bouckaert and G De Geest (eds). Encyclopedia o f  Law and Economics (1999)
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services.*^* In addition, there are no requirements that the service provision agreement 
should contain rules which protect public health by requiring that it has the resource and 
competence to ensure the safety of water. The initiative to register and offer service 
provision agreements to SIPs in Kisumu is also facing obstacles as there are serious 
issues of fairness and trust. Likewise the use of input and output standards such as those 
applied to conventional water utilities is of questionable relevance to SIPs considering 
their limited capacity to comply with such standards.
It may, however, be proposed that the permit requirement, with some modifications, 
might effectively be used to address the issue of water safety. As the law stand now in 
Kenya, well-owners who mechanically draw water are generally exempted from the 
requirement of obtaining a permit for abstraction of water. On the contrary, if they use 
electric powered motor to draw water, they need to get a permit from WRMA. This 
distinction is necessitated by the environmental impact of these two different ways of 
abstracting w a t e r . A  number of well-owners in Kisumu use electrically powered 
motors implying that they should have first secured permit from the WRMA. At the same 
time a number of wells supply more than twenty households and again implying that they 
should have first secured a service provision agreement from the LVSWSB. Note that the 
two permit requirements have different objectives. The first has the environmental 
objective-that of ensuring that the groundwater is not over-abstracted. The second has an 
economic objective: protecting the monopolistic position of the LVSWSB. Three 
problems are apparent from these two permit systems. First, there is no system between 
the two for ensuring that only safe ground water is licensed to supply water by competent 
(public health perspective) operators. The very reason for regulating SIPs is safety of 
water. If safety is not addressed by any one of the two permit systems, one may wonder 
regarding the purpose of particularly the second system. Second, requiring SIPs to 
comply with the requirements of two permit systems would be burdensome. The need to 
adopt a light-handed form of regulation and the need to consider the cost implications of 
regulatory standards has already been discussed.*^"* Third, SIPs do not raise any question
Water Act 2002 s 57(5)(c) 
Sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3 
Section 5.3.5 
Section 7.2.1.
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of economic regulation owing to their unique business model and there is no purpose in 
subjecting them to a requirement of getting service provision agreement approved by the 
national economic regulator. Even if the Water Act recognises that licensees (WSBs) are 
monopolist providers of water services, this exclusivity should not extend to SIPs. The 
role of WSBs is to develop and own infrastructure as is required for the conventional 
supply of water services. They are not even allowed to operate these services except with 
the approval of the national economic regulator under exceptional circumstances. The 
requirement of a service provision agreement is justified with respect to providers who 
would like to use the infrastructure developed and operated by a given WSB. To extend 
this requirement to SIPs who do not use such infrastructure is however not justified. The 
presence of SIPs does not also prevent WSBs from investing in such infrastructures. 
Therefore, it is argued on the basis of the above considerations that the current system 
must be reformed.
How could this be simplified and made more effective? The two systems can be 
simplified by requiring that all abstraction and supply of water in the city should be on 
the basis of one permit. This permit system should have two objectives: environmental 
and public health. And compared to KIWASCO or even LVSWSB, WRMA is in a better 
position to administer this permit system. This is for three reasons. First, WRWA makes 
a periodic survey of the water resources in the area and could monitor small-scale 
providers as part of its regular ac tiv itie s .S eco n d , compared to KIWASCO and 
LVSWSB, WRMA appears neutral as it is not involved in supply of water services. 
Third, KIWASCO and LVSWSB do not have any public interest to promote here.
It should be emphasised here that the objectives of this unified and simplified permit 
system should principally be: to control unsustainable abstraction of water and to ensure 
that no source of water which is ‘incurably unsafe’ is used by incompetent operators 
(public health consideration) to supply households and mobile vendors. Depending on the 
standard used to determine if a given water source is ‘hopelessly unsafe’, only few wells 
will fail this test. In the water quality analysis, many of the wells in Kisumu have failed 
the national standards. Application of a more relaxed value for the parameters sampled 
and analysed has suggested that only a few will fail the test.*^  ^The performance of those
Official, WRMA (September 2008, Kisumu)
Ayalew and others (n 66)
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who have failed might also be improved by taking some source protection and treatment 
measures.
Regulation of entry is generally not favourably seen by economists. Proponents of public 
choice theory in particular are of the view that entry regulation is not in the interest of the 
public but the regulated. This is in part supported by some empirical findings which 
suggest that entry regulation enables those already in the market to earn higher profit 
rates by serving as an artificial barrier to entry and limiting the level of competition.*^^ 
For example, Djankov and others identified a strong correlation between the level of 
entry regulation on the one hand and the level of corruption and the size of the informal 
sector on the other hand.*^* Fishman and Sarria-Allende further refined this hypothesis 
and argued that in markets with low natural entry barriers, high entry regulation results in 
few, large firms.*^^ That means that high level of entry regulation works to the 
disadvantage of small firms. The implications of these studies upon the issue of 
regulation of SIPs are very important for two reasons. First, the research is on SIPs in 
Africa where corruption is often cited as a leading governance problem. Adding another 
licensing system provides officials with yet another opportunity for rent-seeking 
behaviour. Second, SIPs are the micro enterprises of the water sector and the finding that 
entry regulation works against small firms should be taken seriously. If more and more 
SIPs are excluded owing to entiy regulation, it will have significant impact on the level of 
competition and the issue of affordability. It will also enable anti-competitive behaviour 
by licensed providers. To allow free entry is not, however, an alternative to entry 
regulation. Instead the licensing system should be made rational and transparent.
The use of permit system as a regulatory instrument means that some applicants might be 
refused and some granted. This discretionary power should be rational and transparent.*"***
See, for example, LN Edwards and PR Edwards, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness o f  Regulation: The Case 
o f Bank Entry Regulation’ (1974) 17 Journal o f  Law and Economics 445
S Djankov and others, ‘The Regulation o f  Entry’ (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 1
R Fishman and V Sarria-Allende, ‘Regulation o f  Entry and the Distortion o f  Industrial Organization’ 
(2004) NBER Working Papers Series, No 10929
In developing countries, lack o f  transparency and legitimacy is mentioned as one o f  the problems that 
render ineffective regulation o f  infrastructure services such as water. A Eberhard, ‘Infrastructure 
Regulation in Developing Countries: An Exploration o f  Hybrid and Transitional M odels’(2007) 4 PPIF 
(World Bank) Working Paper No 4
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One requirement of fairness in administrative decision-making is the use of generally 
known and relevant criteria. The WRMA could continue to use its environmental criteria 
that are used to determine if an application for a permit to abstract water should be 
granted. In addition to those, it should also develop public health criteria. The public 
health criteria should be based on the public health objectives. The public health 
objective is to ensure that only competent operators are selling water from a safe water 
source. It is proposed here owing to also other proposals and discussion in the remainder 
of this Chapter that the following two criteria could be used. First, the applicant must be a 
member of the stakeholders’ forum.*"** The purpose is to ensure that operators of wells 
and other private sources of water get continued technical support and training in 
maintaining and enhancing safety of water. It would also give incentive for other properly 
licensed operators to report anyone not having a license and thereby enhance the 
enforcement of regulations at the least cost. Second, the particular source to be used is 
such that it can be used to supply safe water with cost-effective treatment and source 
protection measures. Any permit should be granted with conditions attached regarding 
affordable source protection and treatment methods.
Ethiopia’s national framework for water resources management also requires two permits 
for a person to abstract water, and to supply the water to others. Both of these permits are 
issued by the same organ. Ministry of Water Resources or regional water offices. So far it 
is not clear on what basis the Ministry and regional water offices are issuing permits. The 
mandatory requirements that must be fulfilled for someone to be granted permits for 
abstraction of water and supply of others are not stated in the principal water legislation. 
The Ministry and the Council of Ministers have not come up with any secondary 
legislation that provides such legal framework. The only secondary legislation that exists 
is too general to be of any guidance or is concerned with the financial aspect of the 
permit system. But it is likely that public health considerations will not be considered as 
it is not within the general remit of the ministry and regional water offices. It is 
recommended here that the ministry and the regional water offices should impose 
relevant and appropriate public health requirements in cases where the applicant intends 
to use the water to supply others. In the case of Addis Ababa, there is a provision in the 
law establishing AAWSA that no one is allowed to supply water without the consent of
141 See section 7.6.2.
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AAWSA. This requirement should also be repealed. The discussion with respect to 
Kisumu and Kenya also applies here.
7.4.2. Differentiated Maximum Contaminant Levels
In relation to the point discussed in the preceding section, a question that needs to be 
addressed is which safety standards should the regulator use to regulate SIPs. From the 
water safety study it has become apparent that almost all the wells would fail if the 
current water quality standards set based on the WHO Guidelines, the same standards 
which are applied to KIWASCO and other official water utilities in the country, are used. 
Therefore, incorporating these standards in the proposed simplified and unified permit 
system might have the effect of prohibition the use of which is considered and discounted 
in the previous section. Therefore, it is suggested that a different safety standard be used 
in deciding whether to grant, revoke, renew or refuse permits for the abstraction and 
supply of water from wells and boreholes. Provided that such relaxed standards are 
complemented by other technical supports and provided that the standards are set at a 
level which do not admit serious and immediate health impacts, such proposal is 
acceptable. In addition, planning laws which are not currently being enforced regarding 
the siting of latrines might be consolidated together with this proposed permit system.*"*  ^
The experience of the United States discussed earlier might be taken; a lower standard is 
applied to small water systems which are also totally exempted from some of the water 
quality standards. In the case of England and Wales, when monitoring of private water 
supplies is done, only contaminants which will directly and immediately affect pubic 
health are sampled and measured. The argument is that national water quality standards 
should be flexible and variable to be of meaningful use. This observation applies to the 
case of Ethiopia which also adopted uniform water quality standards. The reality is that 
water systems are not uniform across the two countries. The danger they pose and the 
burden of regulatory standards are different from one supplier to another. It will be 
prohibitive to require SIPs to comply with the same water quality standards which 
KIWASCO and AAWSA are required to comply.*"*^
Section 5.9
For similar call for differentiated and flexible water quality standards, see M Ince and G Howard, 
‘Developing Realistic Drinking-Water Quality Standards’ (1999) presented in 25* WEDC Conference on 
Integrated Development for Water Supply and Sanitation, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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7.4.3. No Entry Regulation for Dependent Providers
It is proposed here that standpipe operators in Kisumu and water kiosks in Addis Ababa 
should not be included in the permit system which is suggested above. This is for the 
simple reason that they only resell the water which they themselves have bought from the 
utility. It is, of course, true that the current practice in Kisumu is to apply to the utility for 
a connection to be used for standpipe operation. When this connection is allowed, the 
person does also benefit from the flat rate applicable to standpipe operators. The 
argument here is, however, it should not be a matter of discretion for the utility to grant 
permission to operate standpipes. No water quality issues can be addressed by giving this 
discretion to the official utility.
In the case of Addis Ababa, the law which prohibits resale of water without the consent 
of AAWSA is not justifiable; neither is the practice of giving this consent to only 
communal taps and standpipes managed by kebelle. It is true that this also is not 
proactively enforced. It is because there is no need to enforce it as the progressive tariff 
structure is supposed to discourage resale of water. Resale of water can only be prevented 
by addressing the underlying need. So long as there are people without a private 
connection and/or the service provided by the utility is not reliable, this practice will 
continue. Resale of water continues in the city but with increased price owing to the tariff 
structure. So the proposal to liberalise the resale of water also implies a reform of the 
tariff structure to subject water kiosks to flat rate and hence contribute to alleviate the 
affordability problem.
There are not many mobile vendors in Addis Ababa. In Kisumu, the problem with mobile 
vendors is the inability of consumers to determine the source of water. As a result, they 
have a tendency to buy water from cheaper (and probably also lower quality) sources. 
This problem cannot however be addressed by providing entry requirements as that 
which is suggested for wells. Another problem which is mentioned generally in relation 
to SIPs is the water quality problem, contamination occurring during transportation of 
water from the source to the point of use. In the case studies, it has been observed that no 
serious contamination occurs at this stage. Further studies could also be carried out to 
confirm that. But the point here is: with respect to mobile vendors, any entry requirement 
would not address such problem to the extent it exists. In conclusion, it can be argued that 
entry barriers in the form of permit requirements are not appropriate instruments with 
respect to mobile vendors and standpipe operators.
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One form of standpipe operation which has recently emerged in Kisumu is what is known 
as the delegated management model. Operators in the delegated management model are 
not mere operators of standpipes. Apart from the standpipes which they administer, the 
idea is to mandate them to make also private connections and further extensions from the 
network, collect bills and so on. This kind of operation raises quality issues. 
Contaminants could be introduced during the distribution of water in the pipelines 
extended by these operators. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that these operators are 
properly trained and competent. One way of addressing this is to require the official 
provider (KIWASCO in the case of Kisumu) to only delegate to properly trained and 
competent individuals.
7.4.4. Process versus Product Standards
It is argued earlier that the parameters for which water from independent providers 
should be sampled and analysed in monitoring of their operation for the purpose of 
issuing or renewing permits should be different from those that are used for the official 
utilities. This is for two reasons: SIPs pose different kind and level of risks compared to 
official utilities and subjecting them to the same regulatory standards as official utilities 
will be prohibitively burdensome. In addition, it is argued that the values for each of the 
relevant parameters will have to be relaxed for the same reasons. Once this is done, the 
next question is what kind of behaviour is expected from well operators to comply with 
such standards. Stated in other words, what kinds of standards are appropriate to the 
circumstances? Process or product standards?
Product standards, variously named as performance-based or output standards, are 
standards that specify the outcome required but leave the concrete measures to achieve 
that outcome to the discretion of the regulated entity.*"*"* On the other hand, process 
standards, also known as design or technology-based standards, specify exactly the 
behaviour that is required to comply with a certain regulatory requirement.*"*^
C Coglianese, J Nash and T Olmstead, ‘Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in 
Health, Safety and Environmental Protection’ (2003) 55 Administrative Law Review 705
Coglianese, Nash and Olmstead (n 144)
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The same regulatory objective can be achieved more or less by using any one of these 
standards. In certain cases, the underlying object of the regulation will determine whether 
a process or product standard is suitable.*"*  ^ In deciding which form of standard to use, 
attention should be directed at the relative advantage and disadvantage of each. First, 
product standards afford flexibility by specifying the outcome required and leaving the 
choice of instruments (process, technology or equipment) to firms. Firms therefore will 
be able to find a cost effective way of achieving the required outcome. Second, such 
standards are said to encourage technological innovation.*"** They also accommodate 
technological changes and the emergence of new hazards.*"*  ^ These are advantages of 
product standards. They can also be taken as disadvantages of process standards. Process 
standards are inflexible and as a result might not necessarily be cost effective for one firm 
even if they might be for another. They also constrain the development of technologies.
One of the disadvantages of product standard is the difficulty of specifying the required 
outcome.*^** If it is a standard for a certain contaminant, the problem is specifying the 
exact quantity up to which water suppliers are expected to reduce the level of the 
contaminant. That might depend on the health effects of such contaminants under 
different doses and conditions. A related attribute of product standards is the difficulty of 
measuring the performance of regulated firms with respect to a required outcome.*^* This 
is particularly the case when performance cannot be continuously evaluated and 
verified.*^^ Second, product standards “may impose excessive costs on business, 
particularly small firms, because firms must search for ways to meet regulatory standards. 
Some firms may simply prefer to be told exactly what to do, rather than incur costs to
TE Josling, DH Roberts and D Orden, Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global 
System (Peterson Institute, 2004) 22
Ibid 23
Coglianese, Nash and Olmstead (n 144)
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Josling, Roberts and Orden (n 146) 23 (stating that “a process standard designed to reduce microbial 
contamination in food might be a superior regulatory tool to setting specific product standards, given the 
expense o f  microbiological tests and the recurrent nature o f the pathogen hazard”)
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identify steps needed to achieve” the required o u t c o m e . T h i s  can be mentioned as 
advantages of process standards. In some cases, verifying whether a product satisfied a 
given product standard might involve the costly destruction of the final product; this 
aspect favours the use of process standards.*^"*
Considering that product and process standards have advantages and disadvantages, the 
task in a given situation is to identify the appropriate form of regulation for particular 
purposes and conditions. What do these two standards involve when it comes to 
regulation of drinking water quality? In regulating SIPs, which of these two standards is 
more appropriate? Product standard involves setting the maximum level of, for example, 
E. coli or Arsenic and requiring the water supplier to meet that level with the use of any 
process, equipment or technologies that it prefers. On the other hand process standard 
involves identifying a process, technology, and/or equipment that can be used to bring the 
level of E. coli or arsenic to a desirable level and requiring water suppliers to adopt such 
standards.
For a product standard to be effective, the performance of the water supplier must be 
monitored continuously or very frequently. This is costly. But this can be overcome by 
shifting the burden over to the water supplier by requiring it to regularly sample, test and 
report results. And such self-monitoring and reporting duties can be augmented by 
random sampling and testing by the regulator. The advantage is that no two water 
systems in a country are the same in size and capacity and therefore, it would enable 
them to find a cost-effective way of meeting the required outcome. To some extent it 
might also result in technological innovation. But from small water supplier perspective, 
process standards may be desirable mainly owing to the cost of finding technologies. In 
addition, the duty to self-monitor and report would be very burdensome and when it 
comes to SIPs can be impossible. Whereas product standards may be effective with 
respect to large utilities, process standards are more effective in regulating small water 
supplies. It should be emphasised that even for larger conventional utilities process 
standard is also preferable because of the difficulty of monitoring performance 
continually.
Coglianese, Nash and Olmstead (n 144) 
Josling, Roberts and Orden (n 146) 23
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The cases of England and Wales and the United States, discussed earlier, also support 
this.*^  ^In the case of the United States, EPA is required by the legislature to identify two 
kinds of technologies affordable to small water supplies. First is what is known as 
compliance technologies. These are technologies that can be used to comply with the 
maximum contaminant level set by EPA. When such technologies are provided, small 
supplies are allowed to opt for the process instead of the product standard. When no 
affordable compliance technology is available, EPA is required to identify variance 
technologies. These are technologies known to protect public health even if may not 
result in the required outcome. Small supplies may be allowed to use such technologies. 
The same approach is used in the case of private water supplies in England. First of all no 
duty to self-monitor and report is imposed on such supplies. Second, the very purpose of 
risk assessment required to be undertaken by the local authority with respect to each 
private supply is to identify risks of public health from particular water source and 
recommend measures of source protection and/or treatment methods to the operators. 
This is a characteristic of process standard.
As far as SIPs are concerned, therefore, the task must be one of identifying particular 
health risks from existing water sources and adopting process standards. This could 
involve requiring operators to protect the source in specified manner or to prevent access 
of animals to the source; specifying how water may be collected in tanks from wells and 
so on. It certain cases, this might also involve requiring well operators to adopt specified 
affordable water treatment technologies. This does not mean that the quality of water 
must not be monitored. The quality of water from each independent source could be 
regularly monitored against selected and very important parameters to identify risks and 
methods of minimising those risks.
7.5. Affordability of Water and Regulatory Tools
7.5.1. Setting Maximum Retail Price as a Regulatory Tool
It was argued in Chapter Six that there is no prima facie case for regulating the price of 
water by SIPs. This is because of two reasons. First, the market is a competitive one with 
little or no natural entry barriers. Second, even if there are concerns of affordability, 
regulation of price will not effectively address those concerns. The fact that it is
155 See section 7.2.1.3
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competitive and non-piped also means that regulatory tools of affordability targeting SIPs 
are ill-equipped. Setting the maximum retail price will also drive some of SIPs out of the 
market making the market less competitive. It will make some parts of the city 
unattractive to mobile vendors. As it is discussed in relation to the right to water, setting a 
maximum retail price might constitute arbitrary interference and hence a violation of the 
right.
Even if one is to overcome or ignore this problem, price regulation also raises significant 
issues of implementation. The first challenge is the difficulty of determining the 
maximum retail price. In regulation of conventional utilities, there are two general 
approaches to price regulation: price-cap regulation and rate-of-retum (cost-of-service) 
regulation. In price-cap regulation, utilities are allowed to increase the price of water 
by a specified rate. This specified rate is the rate of inflation minus X where X is a 
number designating efficiency improvement. Therefore, the utility benefits by improving 
its operational efficiency. Allowance will also be made for costs of investment: 
expansion of the network and replacement of old networks. In rate-of-retum regulation, 
the regulator determines the cost of providing service based on the cost accounting 
submitted by the utility and decides a fair return on the investment. Rate-of-retum 
regulation is easy to apply compared to price-cap regulation. However, it is also said to 
be deficient because it does not provide adequate incentives to the utility to be efficient. 
On the contrary, it provides perverse incentive; it might encourage unnecessary 
investment in the water system if an attractive rate is set by the regulator.*^* Other 
approaches include ‘building-block’ approach and sliding scale regulation.*^**
For the discussion o f  the distinction between and the relative advantage and disadvantage o f  price-cap 
regulation and rate-of-retum regulation, see, for example, ME Beesley and SC Littlechild, ‘The Regulation 
o f Privatised Monopolies in the United Kingdom’ (1989) 20 Rand Journal o f  Economics 454
D Parker, ‘Economic Regulation: A Review o f  Issues’ (2002) 73 Annals o f  Public and Cooperative 
Economics 493, 502
Ibid 501 (also mentioning the difficulty o f  policing cot padding and o f  reaching agreement on what is a 
fair return)
E Groom, J Halpem and D Ehrhardt, ‘Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation o f  Water and 
Sanitation Services’ (2006) 6 Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series, 48
Parker (n 157) 502-503
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Determination of the maximum retail price: When a regulator decides (against the 
advice which forms a part of this thesis) to regulate the price of SIPs, the question is how 
to determine the maximum retail price. Because it is easier, let us for the sake of the 
discussion use the rate-of-retum approach to price regulation. This requires ascertaining 
costs to provide a unit of water. For a well owner, it may be easier because this involves 
the costs of drawing water from the well. This might include portion of the cost of 
sinking the well; the electric cost (when electric pumps are used) or the labour cost (when 
mechanical means are used) of pumping water; the cost of treatment if any, and the 
labour cost of administering the water point. Having ascertained this, a ‘fair’ rate will be 
determined by the regulator. The challenge is that there are many water producers (in 
hundreds) in Kisumu. That means for each producer, the cost of producing a unit of water 
ought to be ascertained and a ‘fair’ rate determined. As the costs may be different from 
one water producer to another, the maximum retail price is also going to different.
Water producers are not the only forms of SIPs in Kisumu. There are also mobile water 
vendors. For them two, the cost of supplying a unit of water to a household should be 
determined. This obviously includes the capital cost of the cart and jerry cans; the labour 
cost; and the cost of water. The challenge is that the labour cost can not be determined 
precisely as SIPs do not have specified area of supply. And the distance from the source 
to a household to which water is delivered is variable and as a result the cost can not be 
precisely determined. The alternative is to use the cost of a day’s worth of labour to 
calculate the cost of transporting water. This again will not be helpful as this day’s worth 
of labour should be divided by the total units of water transported in a day. Ascertaining 
the total units of water transported in a day is almost impossible unless the regulator 
assumes that one provider will transport specified units of water in a day. This further 
diminishes the utility of setting maximum retail price toward making water affordable. If 
the regulator sets the total daily units transported too low, it is unlikely to achieve its 
purpose: affordable water. If it sets the amount too high, it will drive some providers out 
of the market. It should also be noted that the daily business of mobile vendors is variable 
depending on the season and other factors such as the availability of utility’s service. This 
further makes price regulation challenging. Compared to water producers, the cost of 
transportation, if the above obstacles are overcome, is not very much different from one 
mobile vendor to another. They use the same technology and the main cost is the labour 
cost. The cost of a unit of water by mobile vendors also includes the cost of water. This is 
because such providers buy the water from well owners and standpipe operators. Since 
this price is also determined by the regulator, it will be easier to know if only there was a
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uniform maximum retail price by regulators. However, considering the fact that the cost 
of water producing and hence the resulting regulator-set price is different from one well 
owner to another, the challenge is to identify from which particular well a given mobile 
vendors has bought the water. The regulator might chose to use the average of the 
regulated maximum retail prices of well water. That way it could overcome the 
challenge. However, this further reduces any competition that may exist between mobile 
water vendors as they all go to secure water from a well whose maximum retail price is 
below the amount considered by the regulator. That means that it will be no more 
attractive for mobile vendors to buy water from a well whose maximum retail price is 
above the average.
Compared to mobile vendors and well operators, the case for regulation of price is 
stronger (relatively speaking) with respect to those SIPs which acquire their water from 
the official utility on favourable rates. In return for these favourable rates, measures could 
be imposed to ensure that they are also selling water at an affordable rate. Setting the cost 
of a unit of water for standpipe operators is relatively easier. Standpipe operators buy 
water from the official utility at a flat rate. The other cost will be the labour cost of 
administering the standpipe. Assuming that the standpipe is open all day, the regulator 
could take into account the cost of a day’s labour. In most cases it will be fair. But the 
service of the official utility in Kisumu as in many other countries in the developing 
world is not reliable. That means there will be days where there will not be any running 
water. It means that in such cases, the standpipe is not operational. The question is 
therefore who is going to cover the labour cost of the person whose time is already pre­
allocated to the administration of the standpipe. Because there is no running water and 
there is no sale, it means that the labour cost has remained uncompensated. It is difficult, 
at the time when the retail price is determined, to give allowance to such costs as by their 
nature are unpredictable. It will therefore discourage people from operating standpipes or, 
even if they operate, it will be economical for them to operate the standpipe at certain 
times of the day only.
Ascertaining the unit cost of water from operators in the delegated management model is 
more difficult. This is because such operators do provide additional services. They 
operate standpipes. They also provide household connections. Therefore, there is the cost 
of extending and maintaining extensions from the network. There is the cost of collecting 
bills from households connected to the system. Above all, there is water loss as the water 
leaves the utility’s network and goes into the network administered by the delegated
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operator. The operator has already paid for this water lost in the distribution because the 
water is metered as soon as it left the pipes of the utility. It is in the interest of the 
operator to minimise such costs. This is one of the reasons why delegated-management 
model is said to be innovative. However, loss of water in distribution cannot be avoided. 
It can only be minimised. Therefore, to some extent, the cost of some of the water lost 
should be taken into account in rate determination.
Enforcement of the maximum retail price: Once the rate has been determined, the task 
in the regulatory process is to enforce the rate. This requires monitoring transaction 
prices. In the case of official utilities, households are billed and bills are collected 
periodically. Therefore inspection of the accounts of the utility will provide information 
as to whether the utility is complying with the regulation. Once violation is detected, a 
sanction will be imposed. Of course, there is usually a legally prescribed procedure for 
the decision to impose sanctions.
The informality of the small-scale water market is one of the challenges facing regulation 
of price. Payments are made on the spot. No records are kept. This applies to standpipe 
operators, well owners and mobile vendors. The question is therefore ascertaining the 
transaction price and determining if that is within the limit determined. It might be 
possible for inspectors to spend time at water collection points (standpipes and wells) to 
monitor compliance. But this does not ensure universal compliance. Monitoring the 
transaction price of mobile vendors is almost impossible. For them transaction price is a 
private information between the household and the vendors.
The cost of regulation: Determining the costs of maximum retail price, amending it 
from time to time and monitoring has its own costs. The question now is therefore as to 
whether the cost of the regulation will in the end justify the benefit if there is any. There 
is no guarantee that the price of water taking also the cost of regulation will actually be 
any different from the current price which obtains in the market without any regulation.
It is already stated that there is no prima facie case for regulating the price of water by 
mobile vendors. To the extent one may argue that there is a normative case, there is 
however no practical and effective way of controlling price. Imposing uniform maximum 
price on mobile vendors will leave out parts of the city, which are costly to serve because 
they are relatively far from water sources. In addition, it is almost impossible to establish 
a system of monitoring the price being charged by mobile vendors.
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In all cases price regulation should be approached with caution as it might end up putting 
many SIPs out of business. In addition, under certain circumstances it might have 
counter-productive effects. Prescribing maximum prices as in the case of standpipe 
operators and operators in delegated-management model provides inadequate incentives 
for the operators to take cost-effective precautionary measures to protect the water from 
contamination once it leaves the system for which the utility is responsible. Results of 
water quality studies conducted in Kisumu indicated that the quality of tap water in low 
income neighbourhoods where the utility’s delegated management model is being 
implemented is poorer than the quality of tap water in other areas.*^* It might be possible 
that such providers are using low quality but cheaper pipes to make extensions. Where 
the price is regulated, the incentive to use cheaper and low quality pipes is stronger.
In conclusion it is argued here that economic regulation in its narrow sense involving 
setting maximum retail price is not the appropriate instrument to make SIPs affordable. 
This argument should be distinguished from a related argument usually espoused by 
economists. Here is a typical one:
Having identified the sector objectives, governments must decide whether 
economic regulation will help to achieve them. Economic regulation may be the 
solution, only part of a solution, or not a solution at all. For example, economic 
regulation is well suited to keeping tariffs in line with reasonable costs, but cannot 
by itself achieve social objectives (such as extending service to large numbers of 
customers who cannot afford to pay the full cost of service).(emphasis added)*^^
In the above paragraph, the authors are of the view that cross-subsidies should not be 
required nor permitted during regulation of price and hence assume that it does not fall 
within the scope of economic regulation. They have defined economic regulation in terms 
of its purpose which they said is correcting problems of natural monopoly. If by 
definition affordability is distinguished from economic regulation, then obviously 
economic regulation is not the solution to problems of affordability. This is not the 
approach of this research. In this research, regulation is defined in terms of what it 
involves and not in terms of its objectives. As such economic regulation includes all 
instruments used by the government such as price regulation, quality of service
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regulation, regulation of water loss and so on excluding environmental and water safety 
regulation. Most often than not, what are here defined to constitute economic regulation 
are also carried out by a single regulatory agency. In this section, it is argued that setting 
maximum retail price for SIPs is not appropriate instrument to make SIPs affordable. 
This is not because price regulation should not be concerned with objectives of 
affordability. Rather it is because setting and monitoring prices are very costly and 
sometimes almost impossible; have counterproductive effects; and a requirement of 
cross- subsidy cannot be incorporated in the tariff owing to their typical business model.
7.5.2. Regulating Utilities to Make SIPs Affordable
How could KIWASCO and AAWSA be regulated to make SIPs affordable? This is 
particularly important for those households who rely on standpipes and water kiosks in 
Addis Ababa and Kisumu. First, as it is indicated earlier, AAWSA could adopt flat rates 
for water kiosks. Therefore, the city government, who according to the current 
arrangement, determines the tariff structure applied by AAWSA, could incorporate a 
clause whereby people who currently resell water could be identified and reclassified as 
public fountains to benefit from the flat rates. Second, both in Addis Ababa and Kisumu, 
the procedure for getting standpipe connections and in Addis Ababa for getting public 
fountain status must be simplified and should not be determined at the discretion of utility 
officials. Third, and most importantly, there are significant problems of efficiency 
associated with official utilities in the form of water loss and inefficient bill collection. 
The cost for unaccounted water is usually taken into account in determining water tariff. 
If the performance of the utilities in this regard is improved, it will contribute in making 
the price of water affordable to most people.
7.6. Choice of Organisations
7.6.1. Choice among Existing Governmental Organs
In finding the most suited organisation to be entrusted with the regulation of SIPs, it is 
appropriate to start with the existing organisations in the case study areas: “the best 
architecture will be the one that makes the best use of existing organizational capacities 
and achieves consonance with local legal and administrative traditions’’.*^  ^ So who is
Ibid 25
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currently mandated to regulate SIPs in Kisumu and Addis Ababa? In Kisumu, licence for 
abstraction of water is obtained from WRMA and the permission to supply the abstracted 
water is to be conducted with the permission of the LVSWSB when the supply exceeds 
the maximum threshold established by the Water Act. The permission takes the form of 
service provision agreement. Currently almost all forms of SIPs exceed this threshold. 
There have been attempts to register them and make them sign a water provision 
agreement but except for the Namasari Water Works and standpipe operators, no one has 
currently signed this agreement. The purpose of this agreement is to control prices more 
than anything and to give exclusivity to WSBs. This statement is justified because the 
agreement has to be approved by the WSRB, which is the economic regulator. The safety 
of water utilities is monitored and regulated by a separate regulator. But currently, it is 
merged together with the instrument for economic regulation in the form of the service 
provision agreement signed between KIWASCO and LVSWSB. It has already been 
suggested that it is not advisable to try to regulate the price of SIPs. The concern is only 
with the safety of water provided. To that extent, therefore, the utility of maintaining the 
current arrangement (allowing LVSWSB, KIWASCO and WSRB) to control safety is 
doubtful.
The other reason is that since these providers, who currently operate without water 
service provision agreement and which also pose the issue of water safety, are 
competitors with LVSWSB and KIWASCO, it is not fair to mandate the latter to regulate 
the safety of water provided by SIPs. The issue of conflict of interest was also raised by 
representatives of well owners during the stakeholders’ workshop in Kisumu.*^"* 
KIWASCO and LVSWSB have been trying to register the current well owners in the 
city. Well owners are concerned for two reasons. First, they think that these two formal 
organisations are created recently but the well owners have been operating for longer 
period of time. And they consider it unfair for these organisations to try to restrict their 
operation. Second, they are concerned that these two organisations are not neutral. It is 
argued here that KIWASCO and LVSWSB should not be mandated to control SIPs.
How about the regulatory board? This is not suited for the task. First off, this board is an 
economic regulator. But the concern with SIPs is not a problem that is to be fixed through 
economic, such as price, regulation. Second, the regulatory board is not suited to
Stakeholders Workshop in Kisumu (May 2009) (notes taken by the researcher during the workshop) 
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controlling thousands of wells across the country. It is a national regulatory agency which 
is more suited to control few larger regional WSBs. The same consideration also suggests 
that other national government organs such as Ministry of Water are not the most 
appropriate organs.
This will take us to WRMA. WRMA is a national government organ but it has also 
regional offices. One of the regulatory powers of the authority is licensing of water 
abstractions. It has been suggested earlier that the current dual licensing system (permit 
for abstraction and agreement for the supply of water) should be simplified and unified. 
The unification of the permit system means that a well owner ought to have only one 
permit. In deciding whether this permit should be granted, the regulator should take into 
account both environmental and public health considerations. If WRMA is currently 
doing the environmental regulation as far as water abstractions are concerned, then it 
seems appropriate to also mandate the same to take into account public health 
considerations. WRMA also makes regular audit of the quality of the water sources in the 
region. It would therefore be an efficient use of governmental resources to also monitor 
the quality of water provided by the various well owners in the region. Most important 
for the effectiveness of this regulatory system, WRMA appears neutral compared to 
KIWASCO and WASBs. WRMA also has the expertise to identify the various public 
health risks associated with the use of the various water sources in the region. Therefore, 
it would also be able to set process standards for well owners.
It has been remarked earlier that, in Addis Ababa, the field research has not identified any 
independent water providers in the sense of having a separate source of water (see the 
appendix). As a result there are no issues of water safety. It is possible that these 
providers might exist in other parts of the country. In that case a question might be raised 
as to the appropriate governmental organ to be entrusted with their regulation. The 
federal law on water resources requires a permit for abstraction and supply of water. 
Ethiopian law on this point is different from its Kenyan counterpart in two respects. First, 
it requires a permit for the supply of one’s family even if the water is not intended for 
others. Second, permits for abstraction of water and supply of others are to be acquired 
from the same organ, the Ministry of Water or regional water offices. Like the Kenyan 
law, there is no system to ensure that public health considerations are taken into account 
in granting, renewing or revoking such permits. So a proposal is made for the 
incorporation of public health considerations into the current structure.
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7.6.2. A Forum of Control, Cooperation and Support
7.62.1. Self-Regulation
In this section an argument is made for the formation of a forum of control, cooperation 
and support of SIPs, particularly independent providers like well-owners in Kisumu. This 
is in addition to the proposal for the unified permit system discussed earlier. This 
proposal can be regarded as a proposal for a modified form of self-regulation.
In the literature on SIPs, self-regulation is promoted as an appropriate response to the 
problems posed by SIPs.*^  ^ In this section, the question whether self-regulation is the 
appropriate institutional arrangement for regulating the safety of water provided by SIPs 
is addressed. In Chapter Three, it has been made clear that the term ‘regulation’ does not 
cover the notion of self-regulation as referring to activities by an organisation to 
‘regulate’ the behaviour of its members “to keep certain standards, for their own mutual 
benefit”. Such kind of activities cannot be considered regulatory as the term is defined 
in Chapter Three. After stating that the essence of self-regulation lies in its collective and 
regulatory character. Page writes;
I stress its regulatory character in order to exclude those associations which have 
simply succeeded in fending off outside control, or which only provide facilities for 
the settlement of trading disputes between their members. These appear to be more 
appropriately described as examples of non-regulation; self-regulation by contrast 
involves a degree of control, or attempted control, by the association of the conduct 
of its members.
Organisations are also involved in the regulation of the behaviour of their members with 
a view to attain other objectives. Baggott discusses these objectives:
Secondly, organizations may wish to regulate themselves with respect to the public 
interest. To secure public approval, support or even tolerance, organizations have 
their own rules and regulate the conduct of members. Third, private organizations 
self-regulate in order to avoid direct regulation by the state. Rules and regulations 
are often drawn up in order to pre-empt direct control, to obviate (at least from the
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organization’s point of view) the need for such intervention, and to placate public 
concern.
Taken as having the above two objectives for the purpose of this section, self-regulation 
can, therefore, be defined as “a range of public interest-oriented regulatory systems which 
allow the regulated to manage the regulatory process”.
Baggot uses three benchmarks to classify the different arrangements of self-regulation: 
the degree of formality, legal status and the extent to which persons other than members 
are involved in the p r o c e s s . T h e  degree of formality is a benchmark that examines if 
the organ charged with the regulation is separate from the regulated:
A highly informal self-regulatory system would be one where the regulatory 
function was being undertaken by those same organizations whose activities were 
the focus of public concern. A more formalized system would occur where the 
organizations in question were regulated by a body specially created for this 
purpose by these organizations. An even higher degree of formality would exist in a 
system where the regulatory body had some kind of official status. Direct 
regulation by a government department would be classified as the highest degree of 
formality and this, of course, fails to qualify as self-regulation.
The benchmark of legal status refers to the degree to which being subject to the regime of 
self-regulation is voluntary or is backed by state power and sanctions. As a general rule 
of thumb, it can be stated that “the more formal self regulation... the greater the extent of 
outside participation involved, and the greater the possibility that the self-regulatory 
organization in question will have legal powers and/or statutory status”.
There are also other ways of classifying self-regulation. For example. Priest uses abut ten 
benchmarks in order to classify self-regulation arrangements into five types: voluntary 
codes of conduct, statutory self-regulation, firm-defined regulation, supervised self-
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regulation and regulatory self-management.*^'* The benchmarks include: the degree of 
government involvement; source of power; involvement of the public; accountability to 
government, the regulatees and the public; procedures for rulemaking and adjudication; 
type of sanctions; the nature of offences created (regulatory, civil or criminal); 
membership and availability of judicial review and other mechanisms of external review.
One of the advantages of self-regulation is its effectiveness attributed to the fact that the 
regulatory rules are developed by the regulated enabling “a regulation of the spirit rather 
than the letter of the law”.*^  ^ It should be noted that this cannot be associated with all 
arrangements of self-regulation as in some cases the regulatory rules are, though enforced 
by private organisations, made by governmental organs. In the case of ‘supervised self­
regulation’, for example. Priest writes that the rules are made by both the private 
organisation (with approval) and by the supervising (government) agency. In another 
form of self-regulation which Priest calls ‘regulatory self-management’, the government 
is responsible for formulating rules and policies and is also a residual enforcement and 
sanctioning body.*^^ However, “implementation of the regulatory program through the 
application of rules and monitoring of compliance is carried out by an industry self­
management organization, which is a nonprofit corporation formed to fulfil the self­
management responsibilities”.*^ * Therefore, to the extent that the effectiveness of self- 
regulation is linked to the fact that the rules are made by the self-regulatory agency, it 
should be noted that there are types of self-regulation which do not possess this 
characteristic.
Related to the above advantage and restricted to those forms of self-regulation where the 
self-regulated develop the regulatory rules is the fact that self-regulation is more flexible 
and quicker to respond to new problems and developments by changing the rules and
M Priest, ‘The Privatization o f  Regulation: Five Models o f  Self-Regulation’ (1998) 29 Ottawa Law 
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s t a n d a r d s . This advantage is more pronounced in regulatory systems like United States 
where regulatory agencies are required by law to follow strict and protracted notice-and- 
comment procedures.
Self-regulation is said to be cheaper because the administrative costs of regulation are 
borne by the regulated.**** The administrative costs include the costs of developing, 
monitoring compliance with and enforcement of regulatory rules and standards. Baggot 
writes in this regard that delegating regulatory powers to the industry enables “the 
government to have its cake and eat it”: “To those who demand regulation in the public 
interest, the government is able to point out its general supervisory role...whilst at the 
same time shifting the costs of regulation on to private bodies, to the satisfaction of those 
who want a smaller role for the state”.***
The fourth advantage o f self-regulation is that it supplies expertise to the regulatory 
process wherein government may lack such expertise. This might explain the 
predominant use of self-regulation in the “professions where regulatory matters are 
highly technical and where there exists a strong tradition of self-discipline”.**^  One may, 
however, respond to this by saying that there are other mechanisms for the government to 
benefit from the expertise of the industry such as a procedure of public consultation and 
participation.
Coming to the other side of self-regulation, disadvantages, one may point to the fact that 
self-regulation might be ineffective or less effective because there is an incentive to 
under-regulate and under-invest without external intervention.**^ Unless there is a greater 
benefit that would accrue to the industry as a result of gaining a reputation for optimal 
regulation of members, self-regulation might be used to pre-empt a more optimal and 
effective level and form of state regulation. Second, related to the above and as discussed 
in relation to regulation of competition in Chapter Six, self-regulation might at times be
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used to restrict competition in the industry and form a sustainable cartel among the 
members. This is particularly the case if membership to the self-regulatoiy agency is a 
mandatory legal entry requirement and the association of existing members have a power 
to reject applications for admission.
Third, there are some issues of accountability associated with self-regulation. Regulatory 
power, being essentially a governmental power, is being delegated to association of 
private interests and it is argued that this “undermines accountability in that decisions 
affecting the public interest are being made by bodies having no formal accountability to 
the public”.**'* Related to this it is argued that government, even if delegating the 
regulatory functions, might continue to shape decisions behind the scenes without being 
held accountable.**^
It should be noted here that self-regulation is not appropriate in all cases. There are some 
conditions where it can be effective and others where it will utterly fail. Priest identified a 
number of conditions which will make self-regulation effective. Priest argues that self­
regulation will be more effective when: there are relatively few industry players; the costs 
of exiting from the industry are high; there is a history of effective cooperation; expertise 
and resources for regulation are available in the industry; noncompliant behaviour can be 
punished; consumers value compliant behaviour; fair and adequate dispute settlement 
mechanisms are in place; and some role is available for public participation or 
oversight.**^
The above advantages and disadvantages and the conditions which make self-regulation 
effective or non-effective are considered to argue in the next section for a modified form 
of self-regulation as far as SIPS are concerned. This modified form of self-regulation 
involves formation of a forum of control, cooperation and support.
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1,6,1 2 , A Proposal for a Forum of Control, Cooperation and 
Support
Self-regulation of SIPs involves allowing an association of SIPs regulate both entry into 
the market and the safety of the water provided by the members. The problem with 
association of SIPs as regulators is that they tend to be used to coordinate price 
behaviour.**^ A cartel is a very unstable form of agreement by its nature; there is a strong 
incentive to cheat.*** It is more unstable in situations where there are many parties 
involved.**^ In a small-scale water supply market, the possibility of forming a cartel is 
very remote. However, if an association of SIPs is formed and authorised to regulate the 
conduct of the members, this might be used to coordinate price behaviour and hence 
stabilise such a cartel. Therefore self-regulation, at least that type of which is informal, 
voluntary and without the participation of the public, should not be recommended to 
control safety and entry into the market.
In addition to creating cooperation instead of competition among the members, self- 
regulatory agencies can also be used to fend off potential competitors or to serve as ‘a 
clock for the discriminatory treatment of individual applicants’.*^** In the stakeholders’ 
workshop in Kisumu, many of the well owners were in favour of not allowing any more 
people from digging wells or boreholes on the ground that the water table is falling from 
time to time because of over-abstraction (notes taken by the researcher during the 
workshop). This might be partly true. But coming from someone who would benefit from 
such kind of prohibitions one might as well wonder if the same people who are in charge 
of a self-regulatory agency would hesitate from denying membership to new applicants if 
membership is a prerequisite to be exempted from a general prohibition of sale of water 
or to get a permit of supply from the government regulator.
One of the advantages of self-regulation as discussed in the preceding section is its 
effectiveness as the rules are formulated by the regulated firms and individuals. If this 
advantage is to be maintained here, it should be proposed that an association of SIPs, well
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owners in particular, should be allowed to formulate and develop such rules. What are 
these rules? These rules are the rules regarding water quality standards. It has been 
discussed earlier that the national water quality standards should be modified and be less 
strict and more relevant to the type and size of risks posed by SIPs. Developing the 
regulatory rules therefore involves identifying the particular type and size of health risks 
posed by SIPs. The question will now be whether this is a task that should be left to the 
association of SIPs. It is argued here that any association of SIPs would not be in a 
position to discharge such function. In addition, it has been suggested earlier that 
regulation of small suppliers should rely on process rather than product standards. This 
involves identifying affordable source protection and treatment methods that will help to 
minimise the health risks of wells. Again this is a task that is better performed by an 
expert than an association of well owners. The second advantage (speed and flexibility) is 
also related to the first advantage.
The third advantage of self-regulation is that it would result in regulations which are 
better informed and more scientific as the state regulator lack the expertise which is 
abundant in the private sector. This is not also an advantage which favours the use of 
self-regulation to the case of SIPs. Fourth, it is said that self-regulation is cheaper because 
it shifts the costs of regulation to the regulated. In the context of SIPs, it amounts to 
saying that self-regulation is cheaper because it shifts the costs of regulation to be borne 
by SIPs. It is already discussed in justifying the use of process as opposed to product 
standards, the use of light-handed regulation, that costs of regulation (the compliance 
costs) impose a huge burden on SIPs resulting in their extinction or aggravated problem 
of affordability. If, on top of the compliance costs, the administrative costs are shifted on 
SIPs, the result would be more disastrous.
The foregoing discussion suggests that adopting a conventional form of self-regulation is 
not advisable. Association of SIPs, such as the current association of well-owners in 
Kisumu, could however play a supporting role; they can be used as a forum for 
discussion, support and regulation provided that they also admit without discretion other 
stakeholders from the government and non-governmental organisations.
In an earlier section it was indicated that sticks (sanctions) cannot be solely relied on to 
ensure compliance by SIPs; there must also be some level of voluntary compliance. 
Voluntary compliance comes with participation and fairness of the process and method
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used.*^* The use of association of SIPs as a forum for support, discussion and control 
contributes to voluntary compliance. It can be used to create trust when there is no 
trust.
Moreover, the presence of other stakeholders is an insurance against the tendency to use 
it exclusively for the benefit of SIPs. It should, however, be noted that mere presence 
might instead of ensuring accountability and serving as a safeguard against abuse might 
end up only establishing legitimacy. Active presence is required to ensure that the system 
is made to work for the public interest in addition to being validated.
And most importantly membership of external members brings technical expertise and 
other resources for the support of SIPs. One of the challenges of regulating SIPs as it is 
discussed in previous section has to do with their size and limited capacity which 
undermines their capacity to comply with conventional regulatory requirements. In this 
regard, therefore, self-regulation cannot be justified on the ground that it enables the 
government to shift the administrative cost of regulation and overcome its limited 
availability of technical knowledge. On the contrary, what is desirable, if possible, is to 
shift not only the administrative but also the compliance costs of regulation away from 
the small-scale providers. This will have therefore an important implication in the design 
of the specific form of self-regulation appropriate to the circumstances of SIPs. In this 
connection, requiring and encouraging the participation of stakeholders such as 
governmental and nongovernmental water sector organisations would help to pool 
technical expertise and other resources towards the support and regulation of SIPs. It 
should be emphasised that the forum to be established by reforming the existing 
association of well owners must not have the discretion of selecting members. Any 
applicant must be admitted. The purpose is to establish a structure for organising capacity 
building activities.
See section 7.2.2.
Baggott espouses the contrary argument that self-regulation has emerged, for example as the 
predominant British, way o f  regulation because o f  the high degree o f  trust between the regulator and the 
regulated. See Baggott (n 166) 442
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7.7. Regulation of Official Utilities and Non-Regulatory Tools
The ultimate concern here is not with maintaining SIPs per se but with serving the urban 
poor with affordable and safe water. SIPs have become part of the landscape because 
official utilities have failed. Therefore in the long term the problem can be solved by 
making sure that there are relevant measures binding and putting constant pressure on 
official utilities to improve their service and coverage. Attention should also be directed 
at regulation of the official utilities in Kisumu and Addis Ababa to the extent that the 
water supplied by SIPs comes from the official provider. This is particularly true in the 
case of Addis Ababa where there is no external mechanism of controlling the safety of 
water provided by the AAWSA. The service provision agreement between KIWASCO 
and LVSWSB contains a number of provisions to improve the performance of the 
operator. It contains targets for increasing number of private connections; provides for a 
charge on current connected customers as a contribution for a fund to expand connection 
by subsidising connection charges; provides targets for reduction of unaccounted water 
through increasing bill collection rate, reducing illegal connection and water loss. Most of 
these targets are however dependent on capital investments which is the responsibility of 
LVSWSB. The same is true regarding water quality standards. The service provision 
agreement contains a financial penalty on the operator in case it fails to comply with the 
water quality standards. Again the quality of drinking water requires capital investments 
which are the responsibility of LVSWSB. This highlights the regulatory problems of 
assigning liability for non-compliance when compliance is determined not only by the 
level of effort and investment by the operator but also the developer and owner of the 
infrastructure. Further research should be done on this point to identify the extent of the 
problem and seek solutions as the national legal framework requires the separation of 
ownership and operation.
Water safety problems are also discovered in both Addis Ababa and Kisumu from 
samples from water stored in houses. A water of good quality will turn out low quality 
because of storage. This can be minimised to a large extent by reducing the need to store 
water. Even households with private connection are forced to store water because of 
unreliable service by the utilities in both countries. Therefore, the regulatory framework 
applying to official utilities should impose standards on reliability of services as they are 
related to safety of water.
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In addition to regulatory tools extending to both official utilities and SIPs that may be 
used to ensure that drinking water is safe and affordable, a number of non-regulatory 
instruments should also be used. This is based on the belief that regulation is not a 
panacea. It is indicated in the previous section that the principal function of the forum 
proposed is to pool resources together to provide training and technical support. This 
non-regulatory instrument should be given paramount consideration. By providing 
training and technical support to independent producers of water, a lot can be achieved in 
terms of safe water. In this relation, resources pooled from governmental and non­
governmental sources through this forum could be used to provide free water treatment 
technologies to water producers. In addition, consumers should be educated on the need 
to take certain water safety precautions because of the significant contamination that 
occurs in the household. This could include campaigns on the need to boil water and safe 
ways of storing water.
7.8. Conclusion: Specific Proposals for Administrative and Legal 
Reforms
7.8.1. Ethiopia
In this Chapter, the second-order question relating to regulation of small-scale providers 
has been discussed. The Chapter explored the need to adopt a light-handed approach to 
regulation owing to the size, informality and sheer number of SIPs. In the context of the 
case study areas, the Chapter has investigated the propriety of using prohibition and entry 
requirements as regulatory instruments. In addition, it has discussed the choice between 
process and product standards. The discussion has drawn insights from the way small 
water supplies are treated in England and United States. The choice of regulatory 
instruments is also complemented by a choice of regulatory agencies. The discussion has 
identified government organisations operating in the sector which are best suited to the 
task. In addition, the Chapter has called for the formation of a forum of control, 
cooperation and support. By way of conclusion, specific administrative and legal reform 
proposals in Ethiopia and Kenya are outlined.
Eric Groom, Jonathan Halpem and David Ehrhardt, ‘Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the 
Regulation o f  Water and Sanitation Services’ (2006) 6 Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board 
Discussion Paper Series 17 (stating that “regulation alone cannot solve all water sector issues”).
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Ethiopia needs to have a comprehensive legal framework for regulation of water 
providers. Considering the importance of safety and affordability of water supplies for 
public health and the current constitutional mandate of the federal government in the area 
of public health, the federal government should be responsible for the development of 
this framework. The framework should provide clear and specific answers to a number of 
questions:
• Who can supply water (the legal status of different providers and the 
responsibility of federal, state and local governments)?
• What procedures should be followed for getting a permit for supply of water? 
What are exempted categories of water suppliers?
• Under what conditions may exclusivity privilege be granted to a supplier?
• Who sets standards of drinking water quality? What are the procedures for setting 
such standards? What are the objectives of such standards? Uniform or 
differentiated (according to the size of suppliers or local conditions) standards? 
Who is entrusted with monitoring and enforcement of such standards? What are 
the specific water quality obligations of suppliers?
• Who is the economic regulator? What are objectives of economic obligations? 
What are the procedures that the regulatory agency should follow?
• To what extent may regulatory decisions be reviewed by the courts?
Developing a comprehensive framework for regulation of water providers is a long-term 
agenda. It requires answering some fundamental policy questions such as the desirable 
role of the private sector and to what extent social objectives should be achieved by 
economic and social regulations. In the mean time, however, it is proposed here that 
some specific reforms may be introduced immediately. The short-term reform agenda 
involves liberalising re-sale of water by mandating the use of a flat rate for communal 
taps, water kiosks and reforming the cross-subsidy system to make it more targeted and 
fair. The law establishing AAWSA should be amended in such a way that it allows resale 
of water. This by itself is not, however, enough. It should also be noted that the ban of 
resale of water without agreement of AAWSA has not effectively prevented resale of 
water. It has only made resale of water expensive to the poor. This is because the sellers 
are subject to a progressive tariff. One aspect of official recognition of SIPs is to put a 
system by which water kiosks and neighbour sellers could benefit from a flat rate. The 
law that has established AAWSA provides that the authority may expropriate private 
water supply systems. The law does not contain any arrangement for compensation. This 
should be revisited.
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7.8.2. Kenya
As opposed to Ethiopia, Kenya has a comprehensive national framework for regulation of 
water providers. However, based on the discussion that is made in this Chapter, some 
specific administrative and legal reform proposals are outlined in this section. First, the 
law in Kenya which restricts SIPs to supply not more than twenty households and twenty- 
five thousand litres per day should be amended in such a way that it allows mobile 
vendors without any limitation and well-owners and borehole operators subject to only 
the modified and unified permit system proposed in this chapter. Second, banning the 
activities of SIPs even under conditions where the official utility is capable of universal 
service should be considered as regulatory taking and retroactive application of laws 
which affects an already entrenched property interest of well-owners and borehole 
operators. This applies to the case of Kisumu where well and borehole owners have been 
operating for many years, long before the water sector has been restructured creating 
KIWASCO and LVSWSB. One of the reasons why well-owners are reluctant to register 
with KIWASCO and LVSWSB, as it has become apparent during the stakeholders 
workshop in Kisumu (notes taken by the researcher during the workshop), is that they 
have found it difficult to accept newly created company and board having regulatory 
power over an activity which has been part and parcel of the water landscape (see section 
1.3.3 and the appendix for further details about the workshop). It could be argued that 
banning the use of a property (well) for any reason might be considered as expropriation 
except that the property is not taken. The property is not taken but it cannot also be used. 
Therefore there are two solutions. The first is to continue to recognise SIPs as long as 
they survive in the market. Or the other alternative is to ban their activity by providing 
adequate compensation. Third, the WRMA should take a proactive interest in the 
formation of a forum for the control, cooperation and support of SIPs. It should also work 
with local authorities for more effective enforcement of laws governing siting of latrines 
as it has direct connection with the safety of water supplied by SIPs.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
8.1. Concluding Remarks
The case studies o f Addis Ababa and Kisumu provide two contrasting pictures of the 
issue o f urban water supply. Addis Ababa, a city where low income households are 
evenly distributed (perhaps for historical reasons and lack of central planning in its 
development), water is supplied by a department of the city government. The water 
supply system is owned and operated by this department. The tariff is set by the 
political layer o f the executive branch o f the city government. Uniform water quality 
standards are set by the department o f the federal government generally entrusted with 
setting and monitoring of national standards. But there is no national or regional organ 
entrusted with monitoring and enforcing of the water quality standards. The fact that 
poor households are not restricted to specified neighbourhoods could explain the fact 
that water supply infrastructure is not limited to particular neighbourhoods. This does 
not, however, mean that low income households have private connection to this 
network. Because o f financial (connection charge, disconnection) and legal 
(requirement of legal title) reasons, poor households are not connected. In addition, 
owing to recent rapid expansion of the city, residents of these new neighbourhoods 
find themselves short o f a water supply, even if for a limited period of time. Limited 
capacity to cope with the growing demand for water in the city forces the utility to 
ration water from time to time. Demand by permanently disconnected poor 
households and by the provisionally disconnected households in newly emerging 
neighbourhoods and households in areas where water supply is interrupted due to 
rationing is satisfied by various forms of SIPs. These include neighbour sellers, 
kebelle managed standpipes, communal pipes, water kiosks and to a limited extent 
mobile vendors. Despite the fact that there is shortage of water in the city and as 
opposed to the situation in Kisumu no independent provider has been found in this 
research. The absence o f independent providers could be explained by the difficulty 
of accessing water sources or by the fact that water shortage is a recent phenomenon. 
The legal framework recognises only kebelle managed standpipes and in some cases 
communal pipes. The rest are subject to the progressive tariff structure o f the utility. 
This puts some households at a disadvantage in terms o f affordability. Even if  there is 
no strong case to suggest that contamination occurs because o f the way SIPs operate, 
there is however a safety issue as these permanently and temporarily disconnected 
households need to store water. The price charged by water kiosks and neighbour 
sellers is not controlled in any way.
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The situation in Kisumu is markedly different from that o f Addis Ababa. The official 
utility, KIWASCO, has managed to satisfy about 60 percent o f the water demand in 
the city. Due to large amount o f water lost due to leakage and limited water 
production capacity, 40 percent o f the water in the city comes from independent water 
sources like wells. About 60 percent of the population in the city relies on one or 
another form o f SIPs. These include standpipe operators, well operators, mobile 
vendors, and operators in the delegated management model. Standpipe operators and 
operators in the delegated management model work with the consent o f the utility. 
The remaining SIPS do not have any kind of contractual agreement with the utility. 
The Water Act 2002 recognises the operation o f SIPS to a limited extent, so long as 
they provide only twenty households a day and do not provide more than 25,000 litres 
per day. SIPs which currently operate in the city however exceed this threshold 
suggesting that they should have secured an agreement of the government organ that 
develops and owns the water supply infrastructure in the city. No legal framework 
exists to control the quality of water especially by well operators and other 
independent providers. The price charged by SIPs is not controlled.
The research has examined whether there is a need to regulate the price and safety o f 
water by SIPs in the case study areas. It has analysed this question within the 
normative framework of the public interest theory of regulation. According to this 
theory, regulation is justified only when a market is suffering from certain identified 
problems and such problems cannot be effectively solved by private law remedies. 
The price o f conventional water utilities is usually regulated because these utilities are 
said to be natural monopolies. The characteristics of natural monopolies include huge 
fixed cost which is largely a sunk cost, economies of scale, and the need to use public 
rights of way. Natural monopolies, if unregulated, tend to increase price and limit 
production. The purpose o f regulation is therefore to control these problems. 
However, SIPs do not have these problems. They do not have huge sunk costs and no 
natural entry barriers. That implies that price regulation is not desirable to that extent. 
According to the public interest theory, regulation is justified in some cases to bring 
about equitable distributive outcomes. Affordability o f water services is one such 
concern. Economic regulation in general and price regulation in particular should to 
the extent possible attempt to ensure that water services are affordable. Even if  SIPs 
do not have problems o f natural monopoly, there is however a serious problem of 
affordability as it is found out in the survey of water prices conducted in the case 
study areas. This problem cannot however be solved by regulating SIPs.
362
Conventional water utilities are also subject to quality regulation for a number of 
reasons in the public interest theory. First, since they are natural monopolies, they do 
not have adequate incentive to improve and maintain the quality of drinking water to a 
safe level. This does not however apply to SIPs. Second, there is problem of 
information asymmetry. More particularly, the parameters which determine the safety 
of water (microbiological and chemical qualities) cannot be ascertained before or 
even after consumption. As a result, providers do not have adequate incentive to 
improve and maintain the microbiological and chemical qualities o f drinking water. In 
the absence o f regulation, competition among SIPs might result in lower prices but 
‘bad water’. Third, safety o f water is a public issue owing to the external costs of 
water-related diseases. Therefore, it is desirable that regulatory framework be 
established to control safety of water.
The need for regulating o f safety of water and for adopting regulatory and non- 
regulatory instruments to increase affordability of SIPs is transformed into an 
obligation to regulate because o f the right to water. General Comment No. 15 has 
located the right to water in the right to life, right to health and right to adequate 
standard of living. These are rights which cannot be realised without access to safe 
and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. General Comment 15 also 
directs attention to the fact that the right to adequate standard o f living uses the term 
‘including’ suggesting that the listed elements are merely illustrative and access to 
water should be included there. Another commentator argues that the International 
Bill o f Rights recognises rights which are less fundamental than right to water and it 
could not be the intention of the drafters to exclude water fi*om the scope of 
international human rights law. In addition several instruments of international ‘soft’ 
law recognise the right to water. Recently the General Assembly has adopted a 
resolution recognising access to water as a human right. One o f the obligations states 
have with respect to the right to water is the obligation to protect. Obligation to 
protect with respect to right to water is a requirement that states should develop 
regulatory frameworks to ensure that drinking water is safe and affordable. 
Considering that Ethiopia and Kenya have ratified the two covenants in the 
International Bill o f rights; that international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are parts o f 
Ethiopian laws without the need for having transposing laws; that the new Kenyan 
Constitution recognises the right to water and the obligation of Kenyan government to 
protect this right, it is therefore argued that Kenyan and Ethiopian governments have 
the duty to regulate the activities of SIPs. Since however it is argued that there is no 
need to regulate price o f SIPs, the regulatory framework should concentrate on
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ensuring safety o f water. Other regulatory tools (other than price regulation o f SIPs) 
should also be incorporated into this framework to increase the affordability of water.
The research has further addressed the issue of how to effectively and appropriately 
regulate the safety o f water provided by SIPs. SIPs are the micro enterprises of the 
water sector. Therefore, the propriety of regulating them, when attention is currently 
being directed at minimising regulatory burden on micro and small enterprises 
through regulatory exemptions, might be questioned. The research has examined the 
general case for regulatory exemption and applied this case to the matter of SIPs and 
concluded that exemption might on the contrary result in a distorted market. However, 
the research argued for a differentiated regulation. In addition, the sheer number of 
SIPs and their largely informal nature implies that a different model o f regulation is 
needed, one that relies largely on collaboration and voluntary compliance. One of the 
regulatory instruments which is used in general and in the area o f public health is 
prohibition. The research has thoroughly examined prohibition as a regulatory 
instrument and concluded that it is not appropriate and cost-effective instrument. The 
research proposed a simplified and unified licensing system. It particularly questioned 
the propriety o f the Kenyan requirement that small-scale providers operating beyond 
the specified threshold should secure service provision agreement from WSBs. It 
argued that there is no need and duty to subject SIPS to economic regulation and 
therefore this requirement which is basically a tool o f economic regulation is not 
appropriate. The research has also argued against uniform national water quality 
standards. Water quality standards should be differentiated according to regions and 
types of providers. Small-scale providers should be monitored only for the most 
essential parameters for public health. In addition, regulators should develop process 
standards as opposed to product standards. This research has also called for a 
modified form o f self-regulation to complement the licensing system proposed. Even 
if  the research has argued against price regulation on the ground that SIPs are not 
natural monopolies, it has gone one step further and examined if  setting maximum 
retail price is practical. And it concluded in the negative. The research has also come 
up with specified administrative and legal reform ideas for Ethiopia and Kenya.
8.2. Back to the Literature
The literature as outlined in Chapter Two identified lack o f legal framework 
governing the activities o f SIPs as leading problems. It has been widely reported that 
SIPs are operating in the absence of any regulatory framework governing their 
activities. It has been also pointed out that there are generally no water quality and 
price controls applicable to the activities of SIPs. On the basis of this observation
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some have called for the establishment of regulatory frameworks which among others 
control competition, price and quality of water. Some have gone further to propose 
elements of potential regulatory systems. But the discussion on this point has not been 
comprehensive. This research has formulated and addressed three general questions. 
First, are SIPs not subject to any regulatory framework? Second, should they be 
regulated? Third, in what way should they be regulated? Particularly the last two 
questions have not been adequately addressed. This research has first developed the 
normative framework by defining regulation and outlining the normative theory to be 
applied, public interest theory o f regulation. It has then explored Ethiopia’s and 
Kenya’s legal frameworks for regulation of water providers in general. Within that 
framework, it has identified the legal status of small-scale providers. Nationally, in 
Ethiopia, there is no law which prohibits their operation except that there is a 
requirement o f obtaining a license. In Addis Ababa, however, their legal operation is 
officially dependent on the consent of the utility and practically the utility consents 
only to communal taps and kebelle managed standpipes. This indicates that there is at 
least some kind of regulatory framework. It may not be adequate. This refines the 
general assertion in the literature that SIPs operate unregulated. It is true however that 
the price they charge is unregulated. And there is not any water quality control 
mechanism. Likewise, the national legal framework in Kenya recognises the 
unregulated operation of SIPs so long that they do not exceed a specified threshold. 
When they exceed that, they will be subject to the requirement to get a permit (service 
provision agreement) from the developer and owner of the water supply infrastructure 
in the region. This is also a further qualification to the general assertion in the 
literature. This requirement to get a service provision agreement is not also being 
implemented now and many SIPs exceed the threshold specified in the Water Act.
Apart from refining the general assertion that SIPs are not regulated, this research has 
also explored if  there is any need in the first place to regulate SIPs. Absence of 
regulation does not warrant any proposal for regulation. By explicitly addressing this 
point and identifying the extent of the need for regulation, this research has focused 
and determined the scope and objective of any regulatory framework that may be 
instituted. This discussion is done within the normative framework outlined at the 
beginning. Within that framework, it has identified that there is no prima facie case 
for price regulation. But there is a need to regulate quality of drinking water. The call 
for regulation of competition in the literature is also shown to be unwarranted. The 
research has also contributed to the existing knowledge regarding SIPs by exploring 
how SIPs may effectively be regulated.
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8.3. Ideas for Further Research
One of the general implications of this research is regarding legal reform in 
developing countries. Developing countries are routinely involved in legal transplants. 
The propriety o f this has been extensively discussed. In developing a framework for 
regulation of water providers, therefore, developing countries transplant regulatory 
frameworks from developed countries. This may be praised or criticised on the bases 
of those traditional arguments for and against legal transplants.* This research has 
however brought the idea that regulatory frameworks from developed countries may 
not work to the reality of developing countries because the nature of the economic 
actors to be regulated is different. In developed countries, national regulatory 
frameworks are developed taking into account that the regulated are relatively large 
conventional utilities. Therefore, the nature o f the standards, approach, the regulatory 
obligations and process are all suited to large conventional utilities. And it is true that 
almost all of the population are served by these utilities. The reality in developing 
countries is however markedly different. Small-scale providers, which are different 
from conventional utilities in their size and business models, serve households, which 
are as large as those served by conventional utilities. Therefore, to transplant a 
western regulatory framework, which is suited to conventional utilities, into 
developing countries will not achieve its purpose. Such transplanted regulatory 
framework will be broader in some sense and narrower in another sense. It will be 
broader because it has elements (like economic regulation) which are not necessary 
for small-scale providers. It will be narrower because it is concerned with only 
conventional utilities. It will also be ill-equipped because the regulatory instruments, 
requirements and procedures cannot effectively be used with respect to small-scale 
providers. Therefore in transplanting attention should be directed at the nature and 
diversity of the regulated in the host country.
The nature o f the economic actors is not different in the water sector alone. Providers 
of health, food and electricity services are also different from those found in 
developed countries. This indicates the need to do similar researches in how such 
providers are and should be regulated.
' See, for example, C Kirkpatrick, D Parker and YF Zhang, ‘Price and Profit Regulation in Developing 
and Transition Economies: A Survey o f  the Regulators’ (2005) Public Money and Management 99 
(concluding that price-cap regulation is over-promoted in developing and transition economies by 
consultants and international agencies without regard to the difficulties that are faced when operating 
this method o f  regulation in lower-income economies)
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One of the reforms introduced by the Kenyan Water Act is the requirement of 
separating ownership and operation of water supply infrastructures. The seven WSBs 
established in the country are responsible for the development and ownership o f water 
supply systems. But these water supply systems are required to be operated by 
separately instituted water supply companies, known as water service providers. The 
water service providers are required to enter into water service provision agreement 
with WSBs. They use the water supply infrastructure developed and owned by the 
relevant WSB to provide such services. The water service provision agreement 
contains a number of targets that should be achieved by the water service provider. 
Such targets include water quality standards, coverage targets, and measured targets 
of service reliability. Sanctions for failure to achieve these targets are also 
incorporated in these agreements. However, achieving most o f these targets requires 
investments in the water supply infrastructure, which is the responsibility o f the WSB. 
A research question that could be formulated in this regard is as to the desirability of 
separating ownership from operation of water supply systems.
It is proposed in this research that water quality standards should be variable 
depending on the nature o f suppliers and regions. In both countries, however, the 
national quality standards which are based on the WHO guidelines are uniform and do 
not make allowance for the size of suppliers and local variations. Further research is 
needed here on how to set realistic and variable quality standards.
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Summary
In much o f the developing world, including Africa, domestic water supply is 
dominated, not by the officially sanctioned water companies, but by independent, 
frequently small-scale operators who may hold more than 80 percent o f the water 
supply market. Even though water provision by independent and small-scale water 
providers meets an important need, for a long time their role has been not only 
ignored but also misunderstood. In relation to two case study areas, namely Kisumu, 
Kenya, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, this research report assesses whether guidelines 
for technical, policy and legal frameworks can be created that will help to integrate 
independent water providers in developing countries into the formal system of water 
supply as a means o f improving water supply provision and meeting the needs of 
consumers.
The research found out that there are different forms o f independent and small-scale 
providers playing important roles in Addis Ababa. Most forms o f independent and 
small-scale providers are operating illegally and their activities are not controlled in 
any other manner. There are no regulatory controls on the price and quality of water 
which they supply.
Analysis of data collected on water sources in Kisumu and Addis Ababa indicates that 
households in areas un-served and poorly served get water from an average of two 
sources but up to five different sources may be used. Sources used include kiosks or 
standpipes connected to the official water supply network, wells, and household resale 
of water, yard and private taps. The main criteria used by a household when selecting 
a water source seems to be distance form the source. Water use levels in both cities 
appear low with more than 85% using 20-251pcd in Kisumu and 171pcd in Addis 
Ababa. However, use o f other sources may compensate and the actual water use could 
be slightly higher.
In Addis Ababa the average water price ranges from 3.9 to 30 birr/m^ (US$0.40/m^-to 
US$3.09/m^). In Kisumu handcart vended water costs the highest, ranging from Kshs. 
8-20 per 20 litre jerry can or Kshs. 400- 750/m^ (USS5.97-S11.19/m^); this is between 
2.75- 6.87 times the cost o f water collected at standpipes or 8.5-to 18.5 times the cost 
of water sourced from wells. There is general high expenditure on water, 8-18% of 
income for the cheapest source (well water) in Kisumu, and (7.5 -14.5%) for the 
cheapest source in Addis Ababa. Water vending provides an important source of 
employment in the poorer communities o f Addis Ababa and Kisumu.
The quality of water from some sources including those supplied by independent and 
small-scale water providers is not always safe. Water from wells was the most 
contaminated with a 100% failure rate on microbial quality. Handcart containers were 
second to wells in contamination, with 59% failing on microbial quality. Tap water 
had better microbial quality with 81.5% samples testing negative for microbial 
contamination. Water stored by households showed poor quality, with analysis 
suggesting that deterioration occurs within the household rather than during 
transportation.
Strengthening o f the well owners’ development group in Kisumu is recommended. 
The group can be strengthened by ensuring that there is strong leadership. It may also
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be strengthened by having an officer from Kisumu city council represented on it, as 
well as representatives from the public health department, Lake Victoria South Water 
Services Board, the Water Services Regulatory Board and NGOs working on water 
and sanitation. Recommended price charged at standpipes through the delegated 
model of water supply should be enforced.
The main type o f independent and small-scale water providers in Addis Ababa are 
public water taps managed by different stakeholders. They are characterised by low 
standards o f service delivery in many cases and a lack of appropriate management. 
This study recommends that by adopting a micro-enterprise view or strategy in the 
management o f public water taps, their operation and services provided through them 
can be greatly improved. Public water taps can then be outsourced to private 
individuals for income generating activity, giving preference to the poor and 
unemployed to create employment.
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Background
Introduction
At the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 a target was set to halve the 
proportion of people without access to safe drinking water as part o f the Millennium 
Development Goals. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg this target was extended to also include halving the proportion of 
people without access to basic sanitation (United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development 2002, paragraph 7). With global population likely to exceed 7 billion 
people by 2015 (United Nations Population Division 2002), this commitment will 
pose formidable challenges since it involves not only maintaining existing levels of 
supply, but also providing new or upgraded water services to approximately 1.7 
billion and sanitation access to a further 2 . 1  billion people.
It is projected, for example, that by the year 2030, 80 percent of the world’s urban 
population will live in developing countries (United Nations Population Division 
2007) but already many urban households have none or little access to water supplies 
that are reliable and o f good quality. This is more pronounced in places like sub 
Saharan Africa where 431 million of those with no access to improved water live and 
the populations are growing faster than improvements to water availability. Further, 
recent coverage trends show that while the world is likely to achieve drinking water 
MDG target, sub- Saharan Africa will not (World Health Organisation and United 
Nations Children’s Fund 2005; United Nations Development Programme 2006).
Poor water supply has profound and linked health and socio-economic effects. In 
relation to health, ingestion o f water contaminated by pathogens and toxic chemicals 
or use o f insufficient amounts for personal hygiene may lead to spread o f water 
related diseases. Further, high costs, poor accessibility and reliability may result in 
insufficient quantities o f water for household hygiene, or the use of alternative 
sources of poorer quality (Howard 2001). Other social and economic impacts include 
among others cost o f care for ill health, purchase of water, and time and energy lost 
from both ill health and from time spent in water collection. The later significantly 
impacting on women and also girls who among others lose opportunity for education.
Approaches and challenges to meeting water supply needs in urban areas of 
developing countries
Public water utilities 
Private sector participation
Other approaches: community management
Independent and small-scale water providers
The regulation of independent and small-scale water providers
Project aims
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This project aims to assess whether guidelines for technical, policy and legal 
frameworks can be created that will help to integrate I&SSWPs in developing 
countries into the formal system of water supply as a means of improving water 
supply provision and meeting the needs of consumers. In relation to two case study 
areas, namely Kisumu, Kenya, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, this research project 
addresses the following specific research questions:
• What legal frameworks exist for the abstraction o f water?
• Why is the regulation of official water providers necessary?
• How is water provision currently being met within the case study areas and 
what are the costs?
• What proportion o f water supply provision is currently being met by 
independent and small-scale water providers, the official water supply 
networks, and other sources, and for water purposes are the different water 
sources used?
• What factors influence households’ choice of water sources and / or suppliers 
and usage o f water from different sources?
• What is the water quality o f the different water sources, what quality 
protection measures are in place and how do these measures affect water 
quality?
• What is the potential to increase the proportion of the population being served 
by either the official water authority or by independent and small-scale water 
providers?
• How can the quality of water provided by independent and small-scale water 
providers be improved and how can the costs be reduced?
• Can guidelines be developed that take into account the socio-political and 
economic conditions o f the case study countries which will lead to improved 
provision o f safe drinking water in the case study areas?
• What regulatory standards and procedures are in place to control price and 
quality of water and service by formal water providers?
• What regulatory standards and procedures apply to independent and small- 
scale water providers and to what extent are these standards actually enforced?
• How can property rights over water be used to enable independent and small- 
scale water providers to meet the needs o f consumers?
Research Methods 
Household surveys
It was important in this project to determine which water sources are currently used 
by households including the use of different types of independent and small-scale 
water providers, the criteria for the selection of water sources or suppliers, the factors 
considered when selecting water for different uses, the quantity, costs and reliability 
of the different sources used, as well as the socio-economic characteristics o f the 
respondents. Using a preset questionnaire, a survey of households from a range of 
socio-economic backgrounds was carried out. In total 310 questionnaires were 
administered.
Stratified sampling based on socio-economic status and water availability was used 
for selection of areas of focus for the household survey, with a random sample of 
households chosen from areas of different income levels and with a low connection
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rate to the official water supply network. The response rate the household survey was 
lower in Addis Ababa since many possible respondents (households getting their 
water from neighbours) were unwilling to participate in the survey for fear it would 
lead to problems or disconnection for their neighbours and hence endanger those who 
provide them with water.
Monitoring of microbiological and chemical water quality
An assessment was carried out of the water quality, both microbiological and 
chemical, o f water from different sources from within the case study areas. 
Households were asked from where their water supply was sourced, and samples were 
then picked from these sources for analysis. With the permission of households, water 
samples were also taken from household storage containers for analysis.
For microbiological water quality, thermotolerant coliforms (TTC) were used as the 
indicator o f faecal contamination and water hygiene. Thermotolerant coliforms were 
analysed using the membrane filtration method with membrane lauryl sulphate broth 
used as the selective medium. Turbidity and pH o f the water from the various sources 
used were also monitored. Turbidity was determined using turbidity tubes while a pH 
comparator was used for pH determination. Free and total chlorine were also 
determined in treated water samples using a simple comparator.
Nitrates and fluorides were used for monitoring chemical water quality for 
groundwater sources. The spectrophotometer method was used to determine nitrate 
and fluoride concentrations.
Supply chain analysis
Using categories o f independent and small-scale water providers identified in the 
literature and those available in the case study areas, a representative sample was 
chosen from each category for in-depth analysis of the supply chain. Samples of water 
were analysed for their water quality from each stage o f the supply chain in order to 
determine at which point in the supply chain (if any) contaminants enter. Further 
analysis of the supply chain focused on the security of supply, ownership of the 
infrastructure, the means of supply and delivery, employment relations, and 
ownership o f the water itself. A standardised questionnaire for each category of 
provider was developed to reduced interview bias.
Sanitary inspections
Sanitary inspections, to identify likely hazards and risks to which the water supply is 
exposed in relation to faecal contamination, were carried out. The methodology 
employed a combination o f visual assessment and interviews using questionnaires. 
This entailed the systematic logging of observable faults that may lead to the 
degradation o f water quality in order to complement the actual water quality 
measurements.
Doctrinal and documentary research and socio-Iegal analysis
Legal research can be doctrinal, both interpretive and evaluative, and socio-legal. The 
interpretive aspect attempts to identify what the law is with respect to a particular 
issue while the evaluative aspect attempts to evaluate the law with respect to a given 
issue in order to identify gaps, inconsistencies and ambiguities within the law. Socio-
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legal analysis is designed to identify how laws are, for example, perceived and 
enforced, and how they affect behaviour.
In order to identify and analyse the legal framework for the regulation o f water 
providers legislation relevant to the subject must be identified and analysed. This 
requires the collection o f documentary sources such as laws, regulations, and 
background papers.
Socio-legal research included interviews and questionnaires. These included 
interviews with relevant officials to reveal how written laws correspond with the law 
as it is applied and enforced. Interviews were also used to establish the perception of 
key stakeholders and water users of the role o f I&SSWPs.
Stakeholder workshops
The results o f the initial research findings will be presented in stakeholder workshops 
in order to gain feedback which can then be incorporated back into the research in 
order to improve and refine the contents and outcome of the research.
Project case studies
Why Kisumu, Keuya aud Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?
Kisumu, Keuya 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Keuyau aud Ethiopiau legal frameworks for the regulatiou of iudepeudeut aud 
small-scale water providers 
Keuyau legal framework 
The uatioual framework
The case of Kisumu
Ethiopiau legal framework 
The uatioual framework 
The case of Addis Ababa 
Results from water usage surveys
Water usage questionnaires were administered to respondents with a wide range of 
socio-economic characteristics in selected areas within the two case study cities. In 
total, there were 310 respondents and their characteristics are discussed below. 
Another 172 was administered to sellers of various types.
Demographic aud socio-ecouomic characteristics of the respoudeuts
In terms o f gender, the respondents were overwhelming female, 8 6 .6 % in Kisumu and 
6 8 .6 % in Addis Ababa. The high percentage o f women among the respondents may 
have been due to a perception that water handling and use is primarily a concern for 
women. The age o f respondents varied; however, the majority 74.2% in Kisumu and 
93.1% in Addis Ababa were adults above 18 years o f age while the rest were between
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14 to 18 years old. The later age was considered mature enough to understand and 
respond to issues related to water as was asked in the questionnaire. However, they 
were only interviewed when an adult member of the household was not available and 
an appointment could not be fixed for a later date due to time limitations.
The average household size was five members. The smallest households had one 
member, while the largest had 18 members; however, the majority o f the households 
(97%) had between one and nine members, with observations indicating that the 
majority of members could be children. With regard to education (Figure 1), over 
91% of the respondents had at least some formal education, with 45.1 % and 46% 
having primary and secondary level education respectively. 3.5% had post secondary 
education; however, some 5.3% had no formal education.
5 .31%3.54%
45.13%
46 .02%
Education level of 
the respondent
@ Primary
Q  Secondary
n  Post 
' secondary
U  None
Figure 1. Education level of the respondents
The income level of respondents varied (Figure 2), with 44.2% falling below Kenya 
Shillings (Kshs.) 5000/ 600 Ethiopian Birr (Birr) brackets, 28% had incomes between 
Kshs 5001-10,000/ Birr 601-1000 and the rest (27.4%) had above KShs. 10,000/ 1000 
Birr. These figures indicate that majority of respondents (72.6%) could be considered 
poor (the official recognised poverty line for Kenya is Kshs 10,000, while that for 
Ethiopia is 1,075 Birr (2004/2005 figures).
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Figure 2.Households estimated family income per month (both Cities)
Water sources currently in use
A variety of water sources are used in the case study areas. The analysis here is 
restricted to first and second water sources. Results for the main water source are 
shown in Figure 3. In Addis Ababa, piped water from the official network was the 
main water source. However, it is available to households mainly through public 
water taps or standpipes locally known as ‘bonos’ (51.4%), a connected 
neighbour/household resale (2 0 %), while tap in the yard and direct connection took 
14.3% each. In Kisumu a variety of sources are used as first water source, each 
sampled estate seemingly having its own variety. Overall, wells (both shallow and 
deep) take the lead as the primary source for 67.9% of respondents. Water from 
official supply follows, however, the provision is mainly through standpipes at 23.1%, 
while 3.8% of households relied on handcart delivery and only 1.3% had direct 
connection, the same as those using other sources (rain/spring). 2 .6 % get piped water 
that is sold from a standpipe but from a private producer rather than the official water 
provider, but they mainly came from one estate (Nyamasaria).
The use of wells as a main water source appears a common phenomenon in Kisumu. 
An earlier study estimated that two estates alone -Manyatta and Migosi- have 321 and 
58 dug wells respectively (Drangert et al 2002). Recent estimation put the number of 
wells in the town at a figure o f 800 (Pers. communication/interview with officer in 
charge of public health at the city council, 2008). The high density and number of 
wells may suggest that no form of guideline in terms of permit or licence is required 
for well digging and any one can dig a well on private land to extract water for 
domestic use. However, many owners of such wells have converted their wells into 
commercial water selling points. Three types of wells are common: traditional 
shallow wells, hand/foot and motor pump shallow and deep wells.The best yielding
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well can produce up to 20m^ per day. The total yield from about 379 deep and 
shallow wells in Migosi and Manyatta has been estimated at 664,000mVyr. Using this 
estimation and with current estimates of over 800 both deep and shallow wells and 
different levels o f sophistication in drawing water to meet the demand, the total yield 
sustaining water vending activities from wells could be substantial and therefore 
probably the source of water filling the deficit from the official water supplier. In 
addition there is water from a private small scale producer who abstract water and 
treat on a small scale using a combination of conventional methods involving 
sedimentation, sand filtration and chlorination. Producing about 50,000 litres (50m^) 
daily and principally serving an area without any official utility network, this can be 
considered an important contribution to the water market in Kisumu. Main customers 
for the small scale producer are handcart vendors who buy water and sell to 
households at the door, but individual households also collect water by the bucket. 
The water is also sold to tankers, majority privately owned by companies, businesses 
and hotels within the city that turn here to get water because the official water supply 
network is insufficient to meet their needs. Although several households rely directly 
on water from wells and standpipes, as a main source, it was reported that a large 
portion of water from such sources reach households through handcart vendors rather 
than direct collection by households.
Water source 1
^  Handcart
-n Other 
^  standpipe
I] Housetap
Pipe
neighbour 
I] Pipeyard 
J] Standpipe 
□  well
O 3 0 -
Kisumu Addis A baba
Town/ city
Figure 3: First/main water source as indicated by households
For second water source, analysis of the data shows that, like first water source, in 
Addis Ababa, a majority rely on water from the official authority (AWASA) through 
public water taps/standpipe (34.3%), resale from neighbours (20%) and pipe in the 
yard (8 .6 %). But there are also households using other sources. 25% of respondents 
indicated that they use rain as a second water source, and the rest less than 1 0 % use 
boreholes, rivers and water delivered by tanker, suggesting that these may be the
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alternative sources available. Half o f respondents indicated that the public water 
taps/standpipes are owned by the Kebele (local govemment/sub-city administration), 
ten percent thought that they were owned by Community Associations/groups like 
women groups or Board o f trustees and NGOs. Very few thought they were owned by 
official water authority (AAWSA) or said they did not know.
In Kisumu standpipes act as the main second choice water source (32.1%), followed 
by hand carters (29.8%), wells (25.6%), but there are also others who use unprotected 
springs (5.1%), house taps (5.1%) and rain (2.6%). Information gathered from 
documents and interviews indicate that standpipes/kiosks are playing an important 
role in helping the water companies achieve their bench marks set by the Water 
Services Regulatory Board (WSRB). The WSRB accepts standpipes/kiosks in the 
figures of coverage though as a lower level of service. The standpipe operators 
mainly draw water from the network supplied by official water utility/KIWASCO. 
The estimates o f 159, 000 people served by official piped supply therefore includes 
those supplied through standpipe/kiosk. The number of such standpipes is currently 
estimated to be a total o f 235 in Kisumu as a whole with five which are public and 
another 230 individual/private kiosks. Some NGOs and Community Based 
organizations (CBOs) e.g. SANA International and Undungu society have also helped 
low income areas (particularly in Manyatta and Obunga) access water through 
extension of pipes and construction of standpipes. The ownership o f such standpipes 
is handed over to the community.
For some standpipes in low income areas, KIWASCO has adopted what they refer to 
as a ‘delegated model’ of water supply. Though still in its trial stage, the water 
company contract a resident called a master operator to manage water lines serving a 
given area within a low income estate. The master operator then meters the residents 
who connects on his line and collects the revenue from the residents. The company 
has a master meter which measures what the master operator has distributed to those 
connecting to his line, and bills him for the water.
The placement of standpipes in second and first position as a main and second choice 
water source respectively could also be due to the belief that piped water is safer and 
therefore even households using well water as a main source resort to piped water for 
drinking but which may be available mainly through standpipes. The placement of 
hand carts in second position as a second choice water source is probably because 
although many households reported using wells and standpipes as first choice water 
source, they rely on handcart vendors to deliver it to the households. Those who use 
house tap as a second choice water source were found to be mainly households having 
connection to the official water supply; however, because the supply is not continuous 
they do not consider it a primary source.
Determ inants of household’s choice of w ater source/supplier
The study sought to establish priority factors considered by households in selecting 
their water source and supplier. From Figure 4 distance was cited by 62.8% of 
respondents, followed by quality (15%), costs (11.5%), ‘only source available’ (8 .8 %) 
and reliability ( 1 .8 %).
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Figure 4: Main reason for selecting first water source
From the responses distance to the water source appears to be the leading factor 
considered by households in choosing main water source/supplier. Although quality 
of water/safety come second overall, a split of the data by city (Figures 5a and 5b), 
however, shows that it was a decision criterion only in Kisumu where it was cited by 
21.79 % of respondents and none at all in Addis Ababa. In Kisumu, this could be 
explained by the variety of sources used and because respondents are likely to be 
uncertain of the quality of water from the different sources, hence the consideration of 
safety. On the other hand, in Addis Ababa, piped water from AAWSA is the main 
source both as a first and second choice water source and since the tendency is for 
respondents to believe that water from the official authority is clean, this may explain 
why consideration of safety appears not to be a priority. The data further reveals that 
all the cases where ‘only source available’ (availability) was the criterion for the 
selection of a water source were in Addis Ababa where it was cited by 28.58 % of the 
respondents, this may suggest less variability in choices available for households 
compared to Kisumu.
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Figure 5a: Main reason for first choice water source- Kisumu
Reason for first choice water source-Addis Ababa
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Figure 5b: Main reason for first choice water source-Addis Ababa
Piped water available either through a tap but mainly through standpipes or public 
water taps appears to be the preferred option for drinking and cooking in Kisumu 
(55.9%), followed by wells (39.9%) and other rain 3.6%. But households report that 
frequent cuts, shortages and high cost where piped water is available through handcart 
vendors, may force household to also use other sources for drinking. Results indicate 
that well water is preferred (52.55%) for non consumptive purposes like personal and 
general hygiene, but it is also used for cooking and drinking due to persistent 
shortages and scarcity in piped water supplies. In Addis Ababa all main water sources
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can be traced to piped network from AAWSA, households therefore appear non 
selective on use o f different forms o f provision e.g. tap in yard and public water taps 
for different purposes but it is notable that sources such as streams and unprotected 
springs were only mentioned in relation to uses for general or personal hygiene.
Quantity of w ater collected and costs
The study sought to establish the quantity o f water collected and used by households 
and its costs, including both the unit cost and affordability in terms of the proportion 
of household income spent on water. Majority of respondents, 70% collect or buy 
water using jerry cans with a capacity o f 20 litres, while 17.9% use 25 litres. The rest 
use a variety o f sizes, with a few, 6.3% using containers with a capacity less than 20 
litres, this could probably be due to involvement o f children in water collection in 
some households. However, 7% use containers with capacity greater than 25 litres. 
On average, households in Kisumu collect about four to five 20-25 litre jerry cans of 
water per day which translates to between 80-100 litres of water per day from their 
first choice water source. Given an average household size o f five, this suggests that 
the daily per capita water use is very low, about 20-251cpd, almost the minimum 
amount recommended by WHO. However, given that respondents indicated that they 
use a variety o f sources, these probably compensate for what may appear as low water 
use from the first choice water source. 80% of households responded ‘Yes’ to 
question on whether they collected rain water and 42.5% had guttering or tank for 
collecting rain water. In Addis Ababa the average amount o f water used was 171cpd.
The cost o f water in some cases varies according to source (Table 1). In Addis Ababa 
various methods are used to pay for water including monthly bills for household and 
tap yard connections, payment by cash or voucher/card system for public water taps 
and cash only for those getting from other households. Water from household resale 
costs the highest at 0.60 birr per 20 litre jerry can or 30 birr/m^(US$ 3.09/m^), 
followed by public water taps where the price range fi*om 0 .1 0 -0 . 2 0  for a 2 0  litre jerry 
can or 5-10 birr/m^ (US$ 0.515- 1.031/m^). The figures suggest that households 
getting water fi-om the black market (household resale) pay the highest even in terms 
of price per cubic meter which is 17 times that of residential/ household with direct 
connection- the rate at which the household resellers also get water, almost 2 0  times 
the rate at which public water taps get water (1.45/m^) and about 10 times that of 
commercial connections (3.3birr/m^). Public water taps sell water at 3.45 to 6.90 
times the price at which they get water fi-om the utility. Tap in the yard costs 0.13 for 
a 20 litre jerry can or 6.5 birr/m^ (US$ 0.67/m^) while household connection charged 
at 1.75m/^ (US$ 0.180/m^) or 0.035 birr per 20 litre jerry can costs the lowest. Those 
in the poorly served new or up coming areas (both poor and non-poor) without 
connection seem to generally pay the higher costs of 0 . 2 0  birr for a 2 0 1 itre jerry can 
for public water taps, or 0.60 for household resale compared to those in older parts of 
the city where they pay between 0.10-0.13.
Table 1: A comparison o f average costs o f water from sources used
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W ater source Addis Ababa Kisumu
Cost in birr 
for 2 0 1 tr jerry 
can and (per 
m^)
Cost per m  ^
in US$
Cost in 
Kshs for 
2 0 1 tr jerry 
can (per 
m^)
Cost per m  ^
in US$
Official
supply
network
Household
connection
0.035(1.75) 0.18 0.66 (33 1- 
1 0 )
0.49
Yard tap 0.13 (3.9) 0.67 Not
common
Not common
Household
resale
0.60 (30) 3.09 Not
common
Not common
Standpipe 0.10-0.20 (5- 
2 0 )
0.515-
1.031
3-4 (150- 
2 0 0 )
2.34-2.99
Other
standpipe
Not available Not
available
2.50 (125) 1 . 8 6
Wells Not available Not
available
2 .0 ( 1 0 0 ) 1.49
Handcart Not available Not
available
8-20 (400- 
750)
5. 97-11.19
* Standpipe supplied by water from a small treatment owned by one small scale 
producer
In Kisumu handcart vended water costs the highest ranging from Kshs. 8-10 per 20 
litre jerry can or 400-500/m^ (US$ 5.97-7.46/m^) in wet season or times of no 
shortage to Kshs. 15-20 per 20 litre jerry can or Kshs. 750/m^ ($11.19/m^) during dry 
season or times o f shortage. Given the handcart vendors buy water at the standpipes at 
a bulk/whole sale price o f Kshs. 35 per handcart filled (12*20-25), that is about Kshs 
2.91 per 20-25 litre jerry can, the price of water from handcart vendors and hence the 
profit they make is 2.75 to 3.44 times during wet season and much higher, 5.15 -  6.87 
times during dry season. Households with connection to the piped network using 
official utility fist block tariff pay Kshs. 33/m^ (US$ 0.49) for 1 to lOm^ or Kshs. 0.66 
per 20 litre jerry can, thus those using handcart vended water pay 12.12-15.15 times 
paid by those with household connections during wet/no shortage season and 22.73- 
30.30 times higher during dry season or shortage time.
The standpipe operators on the other hand get water at Kshs 55/m^ (US$ 0.82/m^) or 
Kshs. 1.10 per 201tr and Kshs. 35/m^ for the delegated model and resell the same at 
about Kshs. 3-4 per 201itre jerry can or 150-200/m^ (US$ 2.34-2.99) for households 
collecting directly, thus making a profit o f between Kshs 95-145/m^ or about two to 
three times what they pay for the same water. Although the water company 
recommends a selling price of Kshs. 2 per 201tr the standpipes operators seem not to 
practise this. Water is sold to households collecting directly at a constant price 
Kshs.2.50 or 125/m^ or (US$1.86) but at a discounted rate for handcart vendors from 
a standpipe supplied by a small scale private producer. Well water costs the least with 
household collecting directly paying Kshs. 2 for 20 litre jerry can or Kshs 100/m^ 
(US$1,492) but handcart vendors are given at a discounted rate or a whole sale price 
ranging from Kshs 15 -20 per handcart filled (12*20-25 litre), to Kshs. 1.50 per 20
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litre jerry can or Kshs. 18 per handcart filled. This water is in turn sold to house holds 
at the same price as water drawn from the standpipes/kiosks, thus making a profit of 
8.5-13.5 times during wet season /no-shortage and 13.5 to 18.5 times during dry 
season or shortage time and contrary to a popular belief, that mobile vendors sell 
water according to the source (well or standpipe). For Kisumu with exception of water 
sold at the standpipe supplied by water from a small treatment owned by one small 
scale producer, generally the cost of water changes with season, being cheapest during 
the wet season. The cheap water during wet season could be attributed to availability 
of rain water as 80% of households responded ‘Yes’ to question on whether they 
collected rain water, although 51.3% did not have guttering for harvesting or tanks 
for storing rainwater.
Results on household daily expenditure on water for Kisumu are shown in Table 2. 
The results indicate that households generally spend more on water but even much 
higher during the dry season with a daily expenditure o f about Kshs. 16 or Kshs .480 
(US$ 7.16) per month for well water and water sold at standpipes fixed on official 
water network, Kshs. 19 or Kshs. 570 (US$ 8.51) per month for water Ifrom other 
standpipe, and highest expenditure on handcart vended water, about Kshs. 50-67 (US$ 
0.75-1 at 2007 exchange rate o f 1US$ to Kshs 67) or Kshs. 1, 500- 2,010 per month ( 
US$ 22.39- 30). The expenditures on water are high for poor households, thus taking 
a substantial proportion, about 8 - 18% (above 3% recommended) of household 
income which is in the range o f 3,000 to 4,000 (US$ 44.78-59.70). It is even high 
when compared with what households spend on house rents which cost about Kshs. 
300 in Obunga and between 500-1000 in areas in Manyatta, where such low income 
people live. And although some households are fi-om non-poor income group, like 
those from Migosi and parts of Nyamasaria, the costs still indicate that household 
spend relatively high amounts on water. In Addis Ababa, taking the cheapest o f 0.25 
birr for three jerry cans a day for those paying by voucher in low income areas, and 
the highest costs 0.60 birr per 2 0 1 tr jerry can or 1 . 8  birr per day for those using 
neighbours, household expenditure on water in Addis Ababa range from 7.5 to 54 birr 
per month, a higher portion (7.5 -14.5%) o f those with low incomes.
Income from water selling activities
The estimates of number of jerry cans of water collected per day given by tap 
attendants in Addis Ababa varied very widely with some though few areas recording 
as many as 500 per day while others recorded less that 20. More than half, however, 
served about 1 0 0 . In most cases revenue collected was less than 15 birr a day while in 
some cases it was less than one birr a day partly due to rationing in the water supply 
system but in some cases because of few numbers of customers or controlled time of 
selling by some Kebeles. The average payment received by those employed to 
manage stand pipes in Addis Ababa was estimated at 75.71 Birr with a minimum 
payment of 50 Birr and a maximum of 100 Birr per month. These figures may 
indicate that public water point operators in Addis Ababa earn very low income. 
Although their income is low, those getting the mean of 75.71 Birr per month (908.52 
per year) fall below the poverty line but slightly above extreme poverty line figures, 
while those who earn above the mean fall above the poverty line. But those getting the 
minimum pay o f 50 Birr per month (600 Birr per year) fall below government poverty
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line cut off o f 1075.03 Birr per year (US$ 150) and even lower than extreme poverty 
line set at birr 806.27. However, water selling was their only source o f income.
Table 2: Quantity of water collected in wet and dry season and the approximate 
household daily expenditure -  Kisumu (cost in Kenyan shillings)
Source/supplie
r
Wet season Dry season
Average 
No. o f jerry 
cans
cost total Average 
No. o f jerry 
cans
cost total
Well 3.46 2 6.92 6 . 0 0 2.63 15.78
Handcart 3.00 8 24 3.33 15-20 49.95-
66.60
Standpipe 3.47 3 10.24 5.36 3.06 16.40
Other
standpipe
3.50 2.50 8.75 7.50 2.50 18.75
Earning from water selling activities in Kisumu also varies widely from less than 
Kshs. 1,500 (US$ 22.39) per month profit earned by some standpipe operators with 
fewer customers in low income areas to as much as Kshs. 30,000 (US$ 447.796) 
earned by a large scale standpipe operator. The median earning for standpipe 
operators was Kshs, 6,500. The range o f earning reported for well owners also varied 
and was estimated from as low as Kshs. 200 (US$ 2.98) per day or 6,000 (US$ 89.55) 
per month earned by traditional open/scoop well operators to as high as Kshs 1, 800 
(US$ 26.86) per day or Kshs. 36, 000 (US$ 537.51) per month earned by some motor 
pump fitted deep well operators during dry season when these become the main 
source o f water for some households and handcart vendors. The earning of handcart 
vendors was estimated at between Kshs 410-1850 (US$ 6.12 -27.61) per day or 
12,300 to 55,500 (US$ 183.58 -828.38) per month. Although some water sellers 
income fall below poverty line, the earnings generally compares well with the average 
earning in other informal sector jobs. For example, estimates suggest that majority of 
population in slum areas in Kisumu generally work in the informal sector and earn 
incomes ranging from Kshs 3, 000 to 4,000 or (US$ 44.78-59.70) (Habitat, 2005). But 
they are also not far below those in public service at the lower level cadres. Current 
salary for Job group A ranges from Kshs. 7, 619-8,039 per month. Job group B Kshs 
8,039-8,519; Job group C Kshs. 8 , 259 -8,819; and Job group D Kshs. 8,819-9,721 
(GOK, 2007), although these groups receive other benefits which go along with their 
employment that water sellers do not receive.
W ater quality monitoring results
The quality o f water from various sources used in the case study areas was analysed 
with respect to the presence o f TTC as indicators of faecal contamination and 
hygiene. In addition, pH, turbidity, chlorine residual and total, and in ground water 
nitrates and fluoride were also determined. Sanitary surveys on the risks water sources 
are exposed to was also carried out during water quality monitoring. In both Kisumu 
and Addis Ababa the standards for microbiological quality o f drinking water is that
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given in WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality - a zero presence of coliforms 
in a 100ml sample o f drinking water. For fluoride, the standard value for Kenya is 
1.5mg/1 (GOK, 2005) which is the same as that given by WHO; while Ethiopia gives 
3.0mg/l (FDRE, 2002). The WHO guideline value for nitrate is 50mg/l as NO3 
(11.3mgl N 0 3 -N), which is the standard adopted by Ethiopia, but Kenya gives a 
maximum of lOmg/1.
Microbiological status
The data presented in Table 3, and Figure 6  is a summary of results o f samples 
analysed and risk scores. Generally samples from well sources had a higher failure 
rate (100%) than samples from piped sources 18.5% (21.1% for Kisumu and 16.1% 
for Addis Ababa) in both cities; however, only one well sample was tested in Addis 
Ababa. Samples which failed were those that had greater than 0 TTC/lOOml. All well 
samples show gross contamination, with all having greater than 200TTC/100ml. 
Although the microbial contamination failure rate for wells was high, wells within the 
case study areas especially in Kisumu are not officially recognized as a water source 
for the population and hence there is no statutory requirement for quality monitoring.
Tap water (collected from standpipes and taps in house) had better microbial quality 
with 81.5% samples having no (negative) TTC/lOOml hence meeting the standard of 
no TTC/lOOml. However, some (12.9%), from standpipes mainly in Kisumu had 
between 1 and 100 TTC/lOOml while only 5.6% had more than lOOTTC/lOOml. For 
hand cart vendors about 59% had greater than lOOTTC/lOOml, 32% had none 
(negative) while only 9% had between 1-lOOTTC/lOOml, suggesting that handcart 
containers were second to wells in contamination. This however was mostly for water 
sourced from wells. For boreholes 33.3% had 0, another 33.3% had between 1 and 
lOOTTC/lOOml and the rest (33.3%) had greater than lOOTTC/lOOml. All samples 
from tanker trucks had no TTC while 50% from spring had between 1- 
lOOTTC/lOOml, another 25% had >100TTC/100ml and the rest (25%) had none. On 
the other hand 47.2% of samples from household storage had greater than 
lOOTTC/100ml, 25.8% had between 1 and lOOml/1, but the rest (28%) of samples had 
no (negative) TTC/lOOml.
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Figure 6: Log TTC/100ml for all of the various sources of water sampled.
Analysis along the supply chain indicates that quality of tap water sampled at source 
was significantly different from that in household storage. Poor hygiene practices 
related to water transport and/or storage can lead to good quality source water 
becoming contaminated at the household level. No significant difference was found 
between tap water samples (collected at house or standpipe) and well water collected 
at the source with that in handcart container, suggesting that handcart vendors do not 
make quality worse. This could be due to short time taken to collect and transport 
water to customer, but may also suggest that the containers from where water samples 
were picked were not contaminated. However, this may not be the case always. 
Although both were high in levels of contamination, no significant difference was 
found between the quality of well water sampled at source and that in household 
storage. Comparison of the source water and water stored in the house shows that 
significant deterioration in source water quality can occur once transport and storage 
in the home is undertaken this especially shown in deterioration of quality of tap 
water stored in the house compared to quality at source but suggesting that the 
deterioration is also related to the quality of the source.
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Table 3; Summary microbial analysis results and sanitary risk score
Water source N Average
TTC
cfl/lOOml
Median
TTC
cfl/lOOml
% Positive 
TTC detects
Average 
sanitary risk 
score
Tap 50 53.98 0 18.5 19.42
Household
storage
99 1777.96 50 73 43
Well 34 4598.82 1450 1 0 0 -53
Handcart
container
19 613.32 320 69.2% 50
Borehole 6 1043.17 24.5 -67 8.33
Tanker 3 0 0 0 3.33
Spring 4 6 6 2 0 75 -38
Attempts have been made to address the poor well water quality in Kisumu. The 
public health department o f Kisumu City Council together with the Kenya Red Cross 
have conducted two trainings for well owners in which 60 well owners participated, 
although it is estimated that there are over 800 wells and therefore well owners in 
Kisumu. The training covered: water borne diseases and their management, law that 
governs issues concerning the health o f the general public, health law (Cap 242 of the 
laws o f Kenya), which for example states that in the siting of wells, a shallow well 
should be located at least 1 0 0  metres away from any possible source of 
contamination; water treatment methods including traditional and modem methods 
and demonstration to the participants how chlorine pots are used for disinfecting wells 
to keep the water safe for human consumption; and possible responsibilities of well 
owners. Figure 7 shows how the city has been zoned to enable easy identification of 
wells, estimated total number o f wells, the number visited and those given chlorine.
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Figure 7: Subdivision and attempts at Chlorination of wells within Kisumu as a 
whole by the public health department of Kisumu City Council
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Analysis results of TTC/lOOml count from different sources against sanitary risk 
inspection score are shown in Figure 8 . The results for all sources (figure 7) seem to 
suggest that there is no direct relationship between risk score and TTC count. Wells, 
however, seem to have a higher contamination in general.
Chemical status
A total o f 104 samples from wells, boreholes and spring used as sources o f water were 
analysed for nitrate and fluoride. Fluoride concentration for the water samples 
collected during range from a minimum of less than 0.5 up to 13 mg/1. The highest 
concentrations were found in wells with a concentration raging from less than 0.50 up 
to 13mg/l and a mean o f 4.40 mg/1. Boreholes had a concentration ranging fi-om less 
than 0.50 up to Img/, with a mean of 0.6 mg/1. Springs on the other hand had a 
concentration between 0.50 and 0.80 mg/1. 44% of all samples had more than the 
maximum recommended value o f 1.5mg/l, while approximately 17.30% had between 
1.51 and 4.0mg/l. The rest 26.92% had 4.6 mg/1 and above.
For nitrates the failure rate was smaller than for thermotolerant coliforms. 47.1% of 
the samples from wells had concentrations between 11.1 and 45 mg/1, hence more 
than the maximum allowed of 11 mg/1 of nitrate as nitrite. Another 52.9% had 
concentrations less than 11 mg/1. Those which failed were those that had nitrate 
contamination (greater than 50 mg/1 NO3 (11.3 mg/1 N 0 3 -N). Boreholes had 
concentrations raging from 0.9 mg/1 to 1 mg/1 hence did not exceed the recommended 
maximum compared to wells. All samples from springs analysed had concentration 
levels ranging from less than 0.11 to 0.47 mg/1, less than the set standards.
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Figure 8: Relationship between TTC/100ml and risk score for ail sources
Conclusions
Analysis of the data on water sources indicates that households in areas un-served and 
poorly served get water from an average of two sources but up to five different 
sources may be used. In Addis Ababa public water taps (kiosks/standpipes) connected 
to the AAWSA network were indicated as both the main (51.43%) and second 
(34.3%) water source, followed by household resale (on selling) at 20% and yard and 
private taps each at 14.29%. In Kisumu wells are the first water source (67.9%) 
followed by standpipes but water from these sources also reach households through 
handcart vendors. Sellers of water at the public water taps with connection to 
AAWSA network are the main type of I&SSWPs serving households in Addis Ababa, 
but household reselling is ‘illegally going on’. The majority of public water taps are 
managed by kebeles but some are managed by community associations or board of 
trustees. In Kisumu there are standpipe operators connected to official network, 
well/borehole owners and individuals with small scale treatment, and mobile 
(handcart) vendors. Some standpipes were installed by NGOs and handed over to 
communities.
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Water from independent producers contributes a substantial portion to the total water 
used within Kisumu. With official production estimated at 18,1700m^ serving 
159,000 (31.8%) of the population, individual independent small treatment works 
supplying 50m^ per day, and the best yielding wells producing 20m^ per day and there 
being an estimated over 800 wells (though some produce less), it appears that these 
independent sources supply the water for over 60 percent o f the population, currently 
those un-served or poorly served by the official network.
The main reason for selecting a water source as a main source seems to be distance 
form the source - 60% in Addis Ababa and 64.1% in Kisumu. In Addis Ababa other 
important factors considered appear to be availability and cost, while in Kisumu 
quality and cost seems to be the other main considerations.
There appears to be a differentiation in water use. In Kisumu, piped water is the 
preferred option for drinking and cooking while well water is preferred for non 
consumptive uses like personal and general hygiene. However, irregularity in supply, 
shortages and high cost where piped water is available through handcart vendors, may 
force household to also use other sources for drinking. In Addis Ababa households 
appear non-selective on use o f different forms of provision e.g. tap in yard and public 
water taps for different purposes; sources such as streams and unprotected springs 
were mentioned only in relation to uses for general or personal hygiene.
Water use levels in both cities appear low with more than 85% using 20-251pcd in 
Kisumu and 171pcd in Addis Ababa. However, use of other sources may compensate 
and the actual water use could be slightly higher.
In Addis Ababa various methods are used to pay for water, including monthly bills, 
payment by cash or a voucher/card system. The average water price ranges fi-om 3.9 
to 30 birr/m^ (US$0.4021/m^-3.09/m^). Water from household resale (black market) 
costs the highest at 0.60 birr per 20 litre jerry can or 30 birr/m^ (US $3.09). 
Households getting water from household resale pay 17 times that o f households with 
a direct connection, 20 times the rate at which water is supplied to public water taps 
and 10 times that o f commercial connections. Water from public water taps where the 
price range from 0.10-0.20 birr for a 20 litre jerry can or 5-10 birr/m^ (US$ 0.515- 
1.031/m^) is the second highest in cost, with this water being sold at 3.45 to 6.90 
times the price at which it is obtained from the utility.
In Kisumu handcart vended water costs the highest, ranging from Kshs. 8-20 per 20 
litre jerry can or 400- 750/m^ (USS5.97-$11.19W), with vendors charging 2.75- 6.87 
times the cost o f water collected at standpipes or 8.5-to 18.5 times the cost o f water 
sourced from wells. Handcart vended water sourced from taps or well is sold at the 
same price contrary to a popular belief, that prices vary depending on where it is 
sourced. Households using handcart vended water pay 12-30 times those with 
household connection. The standpipe operators make profits between Kshs 95- 
145/m^ or about 2.7 to 3.6 times what they pay for the same water. The ‘delegated 
model’ o f water supply appears not to benefit households directly in terms of reduced 
costs. Well water costs the least in terms of cost per 20 litre jerry but still higher than 
those with household connection to piped water.
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There is general high expenditure on water, 8-18% of income for the cheapest source 
(well water) in Kisumu, and (7.5 -14.5%) for the cheapest source in Addis Ababa. The 
average income received by those employed to manage stand pipes in Addis Ababa
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44% of all samples had fluoride concentrations above the maximum recommended 
value, while 47.1% had nitrate concentrations above the maximum recommended 
value. Nitrate concentration levels were greater for samples from Kisumu compared 
to Addis Ababa and within Kisumu in Manyatta and Obunga compared to Migosi and 
Nyamasaria, a possible indication of the potential influence of high density 
development on the surface on the quality of ground water.
Recommendations
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